

14 Jun 79 → Padoch → Behling (see note)

POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Case

Overview of Trends, Consequences, Perspectives, and Issues

Note: This committee is kaput, but there are some interesting items here. See p 358 ff for Blackwelder, et al., also p 758 ff for Karen Smith

on Indonesia.

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

Case

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POPULATION

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 18, 19, 20, 1978

[No. 6]

VOLUME I

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Population



POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Overview of Trends, Consequences, Perspectives, and Issues


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Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Population



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1978

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HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: AN OVERVIEW

TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 1978

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POPULATION,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Harrington and Hon. Paul Simon (cochairmen) presiding.

Members in attendance: Messrs. Harrington, Simon, Scheuer, Erlenborn, and Beilenson.

Also present: Dr. Teitelbaum, Dr. Vinovskis, Mr. Robinson, Ms. Williamson, Mr. Baron, Ms. Nyrop, Ms. Boone, Ms. Pincus, and Mr. Lieberman.

Mr. SCHEUER. The hearings of the Select Committee on Population will come to order.

For the next 3 weeks, the Select Committee is going to conduct hearings on Population and Development Assistance. We are going to look into the operation of our own donor program and assistance programs in general. We are going to look into the question of how developing-world countries are meeting their obligations to use the aid intelligently and cost effectively, restructuring their institutions when necessary and appropriate to achieve the goals articulated at the 1974 World Population Conference and on subsequent occasions.

The committee will be looking into ways in which we can make our own aid, and the aid of Western donors in general, more effective. We will examine the elements that seem to contribute to declining fertility rates, the relationship between population and development, and other challenging and complex aspects of the population debate.

In this most perplexing field of human conduct and human decisionmaking, we know that, as a result of the billions and billions of decisions that are made in billions and billions of homes, thatched huts, and cottages around the world, life as we now know it will be vastly altered in the coming decades. We know that unprecedented population growth rates around the world have an impact on food, on nonrenewable natural resources, on the environment, and a vast impact on our energy needs. We also know that exploding population growth rates have implications for international serenity and international security.

The testimony to be offered in the 9 days of hearings promises to be very thoughtful and provocative. We are grateful to the impressive array of witnesses who have been willing to share their insights and advice.

As is our custom in this committee, several members have taken the responsibility for organizing and directing the work of the task forces and have been requested by me to chair the hearings. In the case of these hearings, we have two of our most able, thoughtful, and hard-working members as cochairmen: Congressman Paul Simon from Illinois, who has written a very thoughtful book on food and population; and Congressman Michael Harrington from Massachusetts, within whose jurisdiction as chairman of the International Relations Subcommittee on International Development this hearing lies.

I'm very grateful to Congressmen Harrington and Simon for the hard work, talent, and effort they have contributed to the organization of these hearings. I would now like to turn the chair over to Congressman Harrington.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Scheuer and Mr. Simon.

Rather than imposing on the witnesses any further, let's begin to hear from the witness—unless Representative Simon would like a word before we do that.

Mr. SIMON. No; I wish I could plead guilty to our chairman's tribute to all the hard work I've done. I'm afraid it has been the staff who has been doing the hard work, and I pay tribute to them.

We're dealing with a very, very vital area for the future of humanity, and I look forward to hearing our witnesses.

Mr. SCHEUER. May I just interrupt for one second and apologize for not having thanked the staff. We have a remarkably talented group of people working on these hearings—our staff director, Michael Teitelbaum, Barnett Baron, Leonard Robinson, and Molly Williamson. Whenever anybody says something nice about a Member in terms of the hard work that is required, there should be an invisible footnote that 85 or 87 percent of what a Member has accomplished has been accomplished in his or her name by hard-working, intelligent, diligent staff.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Before I proceed further, Congressman Erlendorn, would you like to make an opening statement this morning?

Mr. ERLENDORN. No, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

Mr. HARRINGTON. We have four of the five witnesses who are scheduled today with us. The first witness is Ambassador Melissa Wells, who is presently the U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council, United Nations, in New York.

The second witness is Dr. Carmen Miro, the Chairperson of the International Review Group on Population and Development, Mexico City.

Third, Dr. Leon Tabah, Director of the United Nations Population Division, New York; and fourth, Ms. Randy Engel, the executive director of the U.S. Coalition for Life based in Pennsylvania.

We can proceed by hearing from the witnesses in this order, and hope that you can make whatever observations you'd like, Ambassador Wells. Then we hope you will be available for questions on behalf of members of the committee and the staff. In this fashion we can proceed with an appreciation that we have others to hear from.

I, for one, would like to try to get our witnesses, who probably have a century of collective experience, to provide as much specificity beyond the definition of the problem concerning what we

might do to launch either individual country initiatives or collective initiatives through multinational organizations.

Ms. Wells, please proceed in any fashion that's comfortable to you.

STATEMENT OF HON. MELISSA WELLS, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE ECOSOC, U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK CITY

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 207.]

Ambassador WELLS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, It's a great honor for me to be here today, and a particular privilege to be your leadoff speaker on this very important subject.

I submitted my statement last week, and I assume you have it. What I would like to do is briefly touch on some of the major points that I made in my statement and, as I go along, give you some free-swinging ideas in terms of my work at the U.N.

I've been there for one year. I think it's fair to characterize my particular position as the one person with the most intensive contact in the North-South dialog.

Tomorrow morning you will be hearing from Ambassador Mills, the Ambassador from Jamaica to the United Nations, who is the spokesman for the Group of 77. He's also the president of the Economic and Social Council.

The topic I have is one of an overview of population, North-South relations, and the U.S. stake in it. The first thought I'd like to leave with you is a description of this North-South relationship or dialog.

I think it first burst onto the scene at the sixth special session in a rather confrontational mood. It has been with us since then. It is focused on the expressed demands of the developing world as to what needs to be done to redress the inequities of the global economy in what has come to be known as a New International Economic Order.

Now, what is our stake in all of this? One problem I face is that many people continue to see it as a purely confrontational issue, and the question I'd like to pose is: Does the developing world have a case?

There are many of us who think that they have a case, and that, in many ways, they are alerting us to problems that we have failed to focus on.

If we take a long hindsight view of our aid programs and of our whole attitude toward the developing world since World War II. I don't think we've ever thought of development in the true sense of its meaning; that is, bringing to full potential something that is inherently there.

We have commonly thought of development as assistance or charity, help for the needy. What I'd like to think is that we are changing. Obviously, the moral implications of helping the needy are still there, but what needs to be realized is the opportunity for our own growth in terms of the development of a global economy. That, to me, is the stake of the United States in North-South relations.

Basic to any development of a global economy that works well and is better than it is now, is the question of numbers—numbers of people in the world.

In my statement I indicate that many countries are wrestling with decisions that will determine whether there will be 8 billion or 11 billion people on this Earth in the early part of the next century. This is absolutely vital in terms of trying to get a hold on developing a world economy in which all of us will prosper.

Population control is one of the terms that has been somewhat sensitive in the North-South dialog. The antecedents for it run as follows: there are some leaders in the developing world who would see population programs as a substitute for other programs. In its extreme form, they would argue, all “they,” the developed countries, want to do is control numbers, and leave us unwashed, unfed, and so forth, and simply in manageable proportions.

Some of this is a recurring theme when the term “basic human needs” comes up. Last summer, I attended a session of the governing council of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) where the concept of basic human needs, as a key feature of our assistance programs, both bilateral and multilateral, was heavily criticized. Again, the fear was that this is—and I quote the argument in its extreme form—a plot on the part of the developed world to keep the developing countries relatively fed, to attend to their basic human needs, without allowing them to increase in productive capacity.

The question of population, of course, as we see it at the U.N., is keenly related to another factor, social justice, and there is a shift in attitude taking place. When I say “we,” I’m very pleased to tell you that I have recently returned from a regional commission conference of the U.N. in Bangkok where one of the preambular paragraphs of a resolution cited that economic growth, per se, is not enough to meet social justice.

This, again, is a relatively new concept in terms of the language contained in resolutions of the United Nations. When we’re talking about population, and talking about social justice, it is impossible to try to deal with the problems of the developing world unless you try to manage the numbers.

And when we talk about social justice, we’re also talking about a new socioeconomic approach to development, one in which I think women will have to play a very key role, certainly in terms of population.

This is beginning to be sensed, I think in many of the projects of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). We also see this emphasis on women’s roles coming up in many of the UNDP programs. Unless a woman has a role other than that of raising children, it’s going to be difficult to bring the population problem under control.

So the three thoughts I’d like to leave with you are, one, that we do have a stake in the North-South dialog, the North-South relationship; two, that population is key to it; and the third one, the need for a new socioeconomic approach.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Any comments, Paul?

Mr. SIMON. Ambassador, toward the end of your formal statement I note that you say, "Overall, notwithstanding the developments described earlier, the North-South dialog does not treat population growth as a major threat to development," and then a little later on you say, "There is a sensitivity on national sovereignty grounds."

Recognizing these two realities, how can the United States effectively assist developing nations who have major problems without appearing to be excessively involved in their internal operations? Do you have any feel for what we can do? Can the United Nations play a role in that?

Ambassador WELLS. Well, the reason it is such a sensitive topic is one I described regarding the role of the church in certain countries, and so forth. That's why you use code words in terms of resolutions.

Again, the key to all of this—and I had some experience with this in Cape Verde where I was Ambassador, before coming to the U.N.—is reconciling the conflict between the political sensitivity and the—

Mr. SIMON. The political sensitivity and the reality that the North-South dialog does not treat population growth as a major threat to development—the realities we all know are there. How do we move on this, and can the United Nations play a more effective role?

Ambassador WELLS. The word reality is as you define it. If you define it in a resolution, that's not necessarily the reality, because it is compromise language that has been carefully put together to excise any political sensitivity in terms of population control.

The reality is there. I mean, they recognize that.

Now, the most effective programs, of course, are those which are not purely directed at "pushing the pill," or at the technical aspect of population control, but those which can be seen to be socioeconomic.

In other words, the key is changing the role of women. In Cape Verde, I visited an island, Mindelo, and saw a little clinic there. There was no U.N. program at the time, and a group of women had started their own program of trying to bring women in and get them on the pill. There was resistance from the priest, and there was resistance from their husbands.

Over a period of a year, they had involved about 60 women and they had a small clinic. I met with the women and I asked them, "What is it you want to do most in life?"

And they said, "We want to learn to read." These are full-grown, child-bearing women.

Now, to set up a literacy class for what is really considered a forgotten "uneconomic" section of society is the type of population program which I think will become successful, because this way you overcome the stridency of a too technical population program.

Mr. SIMON. What you're suggesting is that the indirect approach is, in fact, the most effective.

Ambassador WELLS. Yes; and where—as with UNFPA—they blend, they work their programs in with other projects.

You can't expect UNFPA, for example, to be running all these other projects that UNDAP would be involved with, but they work closely.

But optimally, that would be the most effective way.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Congressman Erlenborn?

Mr. ERLBORN. Ambassador Wells, you mentioned the Bucharest meeting and the attention given to population as a problem of the underdeveloped or less-developed world.

Since that time, most of the international development conferences have seemed either not to mention population as an element relative to development, or to demphasize it greatly.

Do you think that the less-developed countries have an awareness of the interrelationship between their economic well-being, their development, and their population policies? Or are they in need of a better understanding of the interrelationship?

Ambassador WELLS. Let me answer that by saying that I think it's a question of the degree of communication between the developed and the developing countries.

You have just stated the viewpoint of the developed country. Let me come back with the developing country argument.

If I come up at every international conference stressing the importance of population, you may think that I have no other problems. Now, part of the mood that I really believe is beginning to develop and take hold at the U.N. is one of communicating the fact that the developed world is listening to the developing countries. Much of what they have put forward in terms of resolutions and so forth we disagree with, but the key thing is for the developed countries to come forward with counterproposals.

As one of my colleagues said, "Unless you put forward proposals, nonsense will fill the vacuum on our side, because the most radical elements in our group fill that." The burden is on the developed countries to come forward with proposals.

At this point we have been reacting in terms of the total North-South dialog. We're just beginning to come forward with initiatives. But in terms of the total spectrum, for them to keep insisting that population programs are important, they may feel that if the other side is listening to them that they might think that they have no other problems to deal with.

Have I answered your question, Congressman?

Mr. ERLBORN. Yes, I think so. I think you've explained why we don't hear them talk more about it, why you cannot emphasize it more.

I'm interested in your observations about the necessity for the developed countries to come up with positive proposals.

I attended the UNCTAD meeting in Nairobi—I think it was two years ago—and it seemed as though, at that time, the script that was going to be followed was a very familiar one of the Group of 77 meeting some place prior to the UNCTAD meeting, establishing their own agenda, writing resolutions that were introduced at the Nairobi meeting, and then the developed nations would caucus and respond and follow the script as it had been written by the Group of 77.

But at Nairobi there was a different result because initiatives by Dr. Kissinger became the focus, unfairly, but to a great extent.

Now is that the sort of initiative you're talking about?

Ambassador WELLS. Exactly, and I'd like to draw your attention to the meeting coming up on May 3 to 12 at the U.N. It's the first meeting of a nameless committee, and it's called the Overview.

This was a rather controversial subject, setting up a new special committee of the General Assembly which would overview—look over—all developments affecting North-South relationships within the entire U.N. system. It is not to start to negotiate the price of oil, seeds, or anything, but simply to have an overview. We had one organizational meeting, which was amazingly successful in terms of mood building. We have an agenda for the first and the second meeting, which is a matched agenda. We're dealing with one subject—the transfer of resources.

Now, what is meant by the transfer of resources? Whether it's official development assistance, whether it's a question of trade—you can go all the way to reforming the international monetary system—the key thing will be to create digestible discussions.

It should be a high-level meeting, and this is the type of communication between North and South that we hope will lead to better things.

Mr. ERLBORN. I think it's also understandable that the Group of 77, or the South, should be interested in economic matters, because there is, or could be, a more immediate result.

For instance, with regard to the management of their resources or reserves, the banks that they're suggesting that we set up could be having an effect on those countries within a matter of one or two or three years, whereas a population matters are pretty far down the pike; aren't they?

The population issue is a difficulty for those nations, any real impact on lessening population growth probably would not be experienced for a number of years.

Is that one of the reasons that they're more insistent on economic matters today?

Ambassador WELLS. Well, I consider population an economic matter, and this is key, I think. As I state here, eighty percent of all developing countries have central population planning offices. Almost all of them have an agency or a government office concerned with doing just this, with planning their population.

Mr. SCHEUER. I think we will be hearing from one of the other witnesses that they don't have an agency. Some do have population policies and many have expressed an interest in developing population policies, but I think most of them have not gone so far as to set up a government agency or any institution of government expressly concerned with population.

For example, family planning is most often under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health. It may well belong there, but it is also subject to competition with many other programs in preventive health care, health care for the elderly, food programs, and public sanitation programs, among others. I think this is probably one of the problems.

Ambassador WELLS. I see. What you're saying is that they hang a shingle out and have no other business than population planning. I did not mean that; no.

Mr. SCHEUER. I see.

Ambassador WELLS. I mean that they are interested, that they are conscious of their development—

Mr. SCHEUER. About 80 or 85 percent of the LDC, do have population programs?

Ambassador WELLS. Yes.

Mr. SCHEUER. Yet they haven't set up a single institution of government to provide leadership, direction and high priority for those programs.

Mr. ERLNBORN. Mr. Chairman, just one last question, and this may be a difficult one. I'm not certain, but there is a policy or theory of "triage." I'm sure you've heard of it. I've only heard of it in medicine, until recently at one of the hearings they applied it to foreign aid as well. In medicine, in the emergency room, triage is taking the pulse, the blood pressure, and so forth, and if the vital signs aren't very strong, then you devote your resources to the one with stronger vital signs and let the one who is in extremis pass on. Some have suggested that we apply this policy to our foreign aid program. Those countries that have uncontrolled population growth and are doing nothing about it, and are showing very weak vital signs, we ought not bother with expending our resources on them in foreign aid. Rather we should provide assistance to others with stronger vital signs.

Have you heard discussions of this in the U.N.? And if so, what's your opinion?

Ambassador WELLS. No; I haven't heard discussions on it. My own personal opinion is that it would be foolish. I think it's simply compounding the problem by turning your back on it. It'll be back there to haunt you more ferociously twenty years from now.

Mr. ERLNBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Congressman Scheuer?

Mr. SCHEUER. On page 4 of your testimony, you state that today's pattern of investment in the developing world will determine which of those economies will be able to distribute the Gross National Product for the benefit of the many and not for the few. Then you discuss actions in support of key social measures which will go a long way to assuring an improved status for women. You also talk about the Overview Committee on the transfer of resources at the United Nations.

I don't get the feeling—and maybe I have misinterpreted your testimony—that these things are being done intranationally, whereby governments in the developing world are trying to make investments or trying to channel investments within their own countries, so as to distribute the gross national product for the benefit of the many. Nor do I get the feeling that they are supporting key social programs and legislation that will improve the status of women and create educational opportunities.

You have not told us anything specific about the transfer of resources intranationally via tax programs and via programs in health, education, welfare, and housing that, in effect, are redistributive programs.

You've talked about the obligations of the developing world and you've talked very intelligently and very articulately about the obligations of the international community. You say on page 5, "We

have a large stake in seeing that our resources have maximum impact on the real development problems of the Third World."

Don't you think that for success to be achieved in improving the status of women, achieving the social justice that you have talked about, and achieving socioeconomic approach to development in a meaningful way—very significant changes must take place in the way these countries govern themselves, in the way they channel their own resources, and in the way they organize resources and programs to distribute wealth far more equally within their own societies?

Do you see any responsibility resting on the shoulders of these developing nations themselves?

Ambassador WELLS. I think that what we're living through today is the success of the lessons that we preached 20 to 25 years ago. It's fair to assume that we credited economic growth, per se, measured by growth in GNP, as a solution to many of the problems of development.

Get up the economy, grow, and it will trickle down.

Now we're beginning to realize, when we look around at some of the economies of the world, and certainly Latin America has many of those that have grown in terms of GNP very dramatically, but when you look at income distribution, in many cases they're worse off than when we started the whole thing. Something's wrong.

So let's think about bubble up. This is what people have called basic human needs.

But there is a recognition on the part of the developing countries that this is the case, as well.

I quote again from this resolution that we put together in Bangkok. This is from an area of the world which covers over half the population—India, Southeast Asia. It's a preambular paragraph that says—

Recognizing that the process of economic and social development in many developing countries has not brought about adequate improvement in the living standards of the poorest, and that real per capita income in some of the least developed and geographically handicapped countries of the region has declined, and also that the achievement of economic growth does not of itself insure the elimination of poverty and the improvement of quality of life—

It goes on to talk about measures on social justice.

May I leave with you one specific example of what I learned in Bangkok.

The Indian Minister of Commerce delivered his statement and in it he announced that in India's sixth plan no more composite textile mills would be.

So I cornered him afterward and I said, "What is a composite mill?"

A composite mill is a mill which spins and weaves on a mechanized basis. No more of these mills will be put up under the sixth plan. For weaving, only hand looms.

What this means in terms of labor is that for every laborer in a composite mill, nine would be employed on the hand looms. The cost of the textiles obviously will go up, but the employment created will exceed the economic disadvantages.

To me that is a very dramatic illustration of what we're talking about.

Mr. SCHEURER. You are talking about appropriate intermediate technology that is labor intensive and far more suitable to the needs of the developing world than high technology, which is capital intensive. Many developing country nationals react quite strongly to the suggestion that high technology is inappropriate for them, and they can point out a few places in the developing world where it has worked fairly well, though it hasn't provided employment opportunities.

Isn't there some sense of obligation on the part of the developing world to aid in the distributive process? It's a question of initial distribution so that the poor get some benefits, so that our resources, as you state on page 5, have maximum impact, so that key social measures will be taken—legislative and programmatic measures—to improve the status of women, so that their intranational pattern of investment will produce more equity and a better distribution of goods and services.

I see nothing in your paper—and very little in any U.N. document—that places the burden on the back of the developing world to do its share.

They have, instead, called upon the developed world to make significant sacrifices, to make major adjustments and restructure their standard of living. In many cases I sympathize with the developing world, but within the U.N. family, and in your testimony, I see very little evidence that there is an awareness of a concomitant obligation on the part of the developing countries to share in this process of introspection.

Physician, heal thyself. They prescribe to the developed world quite articulately. Don't you think that it is up to us and to the various U.N. agencies involved in development—UNIDO, UNESCO, FAO, WHO—to help the developing world restructure some of their own institutions to provide more equity and a better distribution of goods and services, to provide the key social measures you are talking about, to make institutional changes in their society that are indispensable to any real progress? Improving the status of women is not just technology and not just development. It means structural change.

Where is this impetus coming from; where is the leadership coming from on a global basis? I see very little on this topic in your remarks.

What kind of changes do you think ought to take place in the developing world so that U.S. assistance has maximum impact? Where are the initiatives coming from within the U.N. family of nations and organizations?

Ambassador WELLS. I think the only honest answer is that there is certainly not enough of it going on, and this is the beginning of a process. One component of that process is a recognition on the part of the countries themselves that this is necessary.

Now, aid to certain measures to be taken in that country—certainly multilateral aid—will be resisted on a question of national sovereignty. It's a question of how you package it.

But the pressures are there, and they should be increased.

Mr. SCHEUER. Is there anybody in the developing world who believes that, other than Dr. Miro? Have there been any spokespersons

from the developing world who have said openly, "We have an obligation too. We have to make certain changes in our governmental structures and institutions. We have an obligation to make some changes?" There are mutual obligations between the developed world and the developing world. Where are the voices from the developing world that freely accept their concomitant responsibility?

Ambassador WELLS. You have the beginnings or you have some language in a resolution.

Mr. SCHEUER. I'm talking about what goes on in the field. I'm not talking about what goes on in the salons of Geneva and Paris and New York. I'm talking about what is happening out there in the field where the people are.

What kind of governmental restructuring and reorganization of institutions are taking place to make life better for people out there, to improve the status of women, to change the perception of those societies that women are not childbearing creatures or lackeys in the field, that they are equal human beings, that they ought to have an education and job responsibilities, be able to marry freely, and be able to decide the numbers and spacing of their children?

Ambassador WELLS. Well, leadership in terms of a global drive this way?

Mr. SCHEUER. No; within these countries. Within any of the countries. Is UNFPA bringing some kind of gentle leadership or persuasion to bear?

Ambassador WELLS. Yes; there are UNFPA or the UNDP programs, certainly, with our pressure in terms of multilateral assistance being directed towards basic human needs.

As I said, more of this needs to be done, and more in terms of receptivity on the part of the receiving countries. That's one of the key blocks, because many of them are still so sensitive that you're impugning national sovereignty if you're going to be prescribing social actions that they should take.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, aren't they impugning national sovereignty when they tell us we should reduce our consumption of energy?

Ambassador WELLS. I've quoted that back to them.

Mr. SCHEUER. And reduce our consumption of meat products?

Ambassador WELLS. That's right.

Mr. SCHEUER. And I accept that. They have a certain degree of justice on their side. We are the ones who, on a per capita basis, at least, are environmental degraders on a fifty-to-one scale, if you compare a new child born in New York City from a middle income family with a newborn child in the slums of New Delhi. They are telling us to make the most intimate and sensitive restructuring of our own society, and I accept some obligations on our behalf, but certainly that constitutes palpable intervention in terms of telling us how we ought to organize our way of life.

I think it's justifiable, but if we should accept that, isn't there some concomitant responsibility on their part to accept some suggestions, too, from us?

I think there is reason on our part to be a little impatient with this one-way sermonizing. I think there is a lot that the developing world has to do to set its own house in order and I don't see the

leadership coming either from our Government or from the U.N. I'm wondering where is it coming from, if it's coming at all.

Mr. SIMON. If my colleague would yield—

Mr. SCHEUER. Of course. I'll be happy to.

Mr. SIMON. It seems to me that there are a great many leaders in the developing nations—and you tick off programs that have resulted in restructuring—who say we have a responsibility, and they're doing something about it.

I think of Indonesia as one quick example. It doesn't make headlines unfortunately. We're not going to pick up and read in the Congressional Record or the New York Times about it.

Mr. SCHEUER. I've been to Indonesia, and I've looked into their family planning programs, and they are indeed exemplary and very encouraging. But I know of no action that has been taken by the Indonesian Government to radically improve the status of women, to radically improve educational opportunities for women, to radically redistribute the proceeds from their oil discoveries, to establish what we would call a progressive income tax structure.

I think they have made a lot of progress in the area of family planning, but they have not done the other things that we have been talking about to make their society more fair and more equitable, and to improve substantially the status of women.

Mr. SIMON. If I may just respond very briefly. When you say "radically change." I think we have to realize—

Mr. SCHEUER. Significant change, all right. I'll withdraw the word "radical."

Mr. SIMON. You can take a look at how long it takes us in the United States to pass ERA. I think what we have to do—and on this I would be interested in, what you would say—is to continue to exert leadership, but without a heavy hand. We could, for example, in our foreign assistance, not require as an absolute necessity programs for the status of women or family planning, and so forth—but provide incentives on an incremental basis.

We could say you're going to get this on the basis of need, but we're going to give you an extra five percent if you don't spend too much on armaments, if you have a family planning program, if you have something on status of women.

I would be interested in knowing your feeling on whether that would be too heavy a hand on the part of the United States.

Ambassador WELLS. At the moment, I think that might be too heavy a hand, because the way to tackle the problem, I think, is to get it out into the open, to talk about it in international forum. Until a few years ago, you didn't look in people's backyards in terms of human rights. This is a new age.

You need an idea, a broader definition of human rights, not just the traditional political aspects, but the right to eat, the right to learn to read, the right to have a roof over your head.

Now, when the United States comes forward and is clearly understood in these areas, by itself the consciousness raising prospect will build up pressures within the countries to increase their receptivity in terms of political roadblocks.

At that time it would be appropriate to do the carrot-and-stick approach, I think.

Mr. SCHEUER. At which time?

Ambassador WELLS. I think we can still do some of it now, but in order to become more specific in terms of action orientation, what you're saying is to tie our aid to certain steps to be taken within a country to do this or to do the other. Are you're talking about bilateral aid at this time, or multilateral?

Mr. SIMON. I'm talking about bilateral aid, and I'm talking about an incremental approach, so that you're not saying, "You're not going to get any aid if you don't do such and such."

But we might recognize that a country that does not spend too high a percentage of its budget on armaments, forgetting the immediate area—that that country maybe ought to get a little more assistance from the United States.

Ambassador WELLS. Excuse me. On the incremental basis, I think that makes eminently good sense to me; yes.

Mr. SCHEUER. You haven't answered my question. You did answer my colleague's question.

Ambassador WELLS. In terms of where the leadership is coming from?

Mr. SCHEUER. Where is it coming from, either in the U.N. or in the developing world?

Ambassador WELLS. It's not in the form of leadership right now, nor certainly to the degree that it's required. There's recognition on the part of the countries themselves that it needs to be done. There is pressure here, there is pressure there.

What I think you really need to do is develop the background that I have stated, and again, if I may say something on the point of the North-South dialog, which is where we find ourselves now, I am frequently rather disappointed that we're hobbled by the modalities of the dialog up until this point, which means that we're trapped between not raising expectations by putting forward an initiative, and hobbled on the other side by, "Oh, that's confrontational." That needs to be broken down, and we're trying to do it.

Mr. SCHEUER. You mentioned that we haven't made offers to the developing world. You think that we ought to respond to their calls.

We have had a conference, the greatest established, permanent conference in the history of human civilization, on the law of the sea. I think there, to the best of our ability, we have made offers. We have had Ambassador Elliott Richardson heading up that effort in recent months, one of our more highly skilled diplomats.

Yet we see very little evidence that what is possible and practical for us is even marginally acceptable to the Third World. What their minimum demands are, we consider wildly unrealistic.

So I really don't think it's a question of not having tried. We have tried over a period of many years in this and other areas, but there seems to be no medium ground.

I think this offers a perfect example of the problems involved in the North-South dialog. Demands are being made by the developing world that the developed world feels are unrelated to reality.

Do you have any comment on our posture at the Law of the Sea Conference, which provides a fair example of how we are trying to

cope with the important problems that your overview committee is dealing with—namely the transfer of resources? We are trying to engage in some kind of acceptable, orderly plan for resource transfer, but we have these two poles.

Ambassador WELLS. Law of the Sea is not my strong suit. I beg off on that.

Mr. SCHEUER. I don't mean to get you bogged down in technicalities or rubrics, and so on.

Ambassador WELLS. No; but I do know about some of our other negotiations, certainly on specific issues, and again, the difficulty there is that I think we simply accept the original demand as what they really want.

The demand as laid out, say in the Manila Declaration, or in the program of action. When you get to know the Group of 77 in its various components, what we need to do in many cases is to put forward proposals of our own, which is what we have just started doing under the Common Fund, and we did it at the Debt Ministerial not long ago.

It's this type of approach, whether it's the code of conduct on transnationals or other subjects, not to let them do the drafting: we do the drafting. It's a different style. We're doing the leading—saying that this is what we have to offer, which there hasn't been enough of thus far.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, I've enjoyed your testimony very much. I would like to ask if I could submit a number of additional questions to you in writing and perhaps you could answer them in the next 10 or 12 days. I would ask unanimous consent that we could keep the record open for that 10- or 12-day period.

Thank you very much for your splendid testimony.

Ambassador WELLS. Thank you very much.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Ambassador Wells, I had a couple of questions I'd like to ask your opinion on before we move on to the next witness.

I'd like to use as the text for it an excerpt that appeared in this morning's Post, a speech given yesterday in Canada by Secretary of Labor Marshall, where the theme appears to be that the world's largest democratic powers are unwilling to take the necessary risks to return their own countries to high unemployment.

In another point, and perhaps more central to what I want to try to do, Secretary Marshall said that the overall problem in the world today is economic stagnation, which in some ways is similar in the generic sense to the problems that industrialized market economies faced in the 1930's.

There are reoccurring themes that come to mind, mentioned by Senator Javits in the course of the last session, suggesting an apocalyptic view of the world, which I concur in, when it comes to our failure to deal with growing signs of the weaknesses of the industrialized states in solving the problems of the less developed world.

In the context of your attempt to address economic development this morning, in dealing with the broader issue and with the generation of experience that your resume indicates you can bring to bear, I'd like your assessment of that theme, our efforts in a narrow na-

tion-state sense as it would reflect the industrialized nations of the world, and what, if you were writing the prescription, you would like to see done, assuming that this plays a role in the agenda that's been agreed to by parties to this dialog.

[The material referred to follows:]

1. *My personal prescription on desirable international and U.S. actions in the context of the North-South Dialogue (Mr. Harrington's question, pages 39-40 of the typewritten transcript).*

First I should like to reiterate the recommendations I made at the time of my appearance before the committee:

(a) revise our attitude regarding the dialog so as to support policies which would reflect the reality that our economic relations with the developing world are very much a two-way street in the sense that our own economic growth depends in important part upon maintenance of a constructive partnership with healthy and expanding third world economies; (b) help restore a stable investment climate in developing countries by accelerating efforts to reach a consensus in the current UN negotiations on the main issues relating to a code of conduct for Transnational Corporations which would include responsibilities for all concerned parties, including host governments; and (c) encourage direct U.S. medium-scale investment in developing countries in addition to the more traditional large-scale investment.

Additional key actions I would like to see accomplished include:

Within the U.S. Government explore ways of assisting small and medium-sized business not only to enter the export field but actually to lay down investment overseas;

Improving the openness of the international trading system is in the interests of all nations. The Multilateral Trade Negotiations represent an important opportunity to establish a more open and better functioning system in support of expanding trade for years to come;

Increasing U.S. and other Official Development Assistance to levels more in keeping with the spirit of international cooperation and the requirements for raising productivity and improving living conditions particularly among the neediest of the world's poor.

Ambassador WELLS. Well, as I tried to indicate when I first opened my remarks, I think that our attitude toward the developing world has really been cast in the mold of helping the needy, rather in development for our own purposes, and here there's a very healthy natural blend of charity and mercantilism involved.

Not only do we need to cooperate to solve our problems, but I think that the solution to our problems is in solving theirs. When we can experience that quantum leap in thinking that we had, say, after World War II—although I don't like to use the Marshall plan as an example, because it's not a similar situation, and not comparable. But in terms of rebuilding a destroyed economy, the fact that we were able to see what would happen, and who was the greatest beneficiary of the Marshall plan, of course, it was the United States.

There was a good friend of mine the other day who said, "Well, when will that crowd up there at the U.N. understand that we need to export?"

I indicated the record of very good growth in terms of exports to the developing world. I said, "When they get increased purchasing power, your exports will go up even higher."

So they are definitely related.

Now, what would I like to see done? I'm writing my own prescription now, right?

Mr. HARRINGTON. That's what I want. If you've got a sense of it from your own perspective, I would appreciate hearing it.

Ambassador WELLS. I'd like to see a restoration, to more areas of the world, of a sense of business confidence in terms of employment, for investment. There has been a loss in a number of countries in this respect.

I think a number of actions taken within the United Nations could help in this area. We are negotiating a code of conduct, a key element of which would be responsibilities of host governments. That's one aspect.

I would like to see the U.S. Government encourage investment overseas, possibly not of the traditional large investor, but of the medium type of investor. There would have to be the realization on the part of labor that you're not exporting jobs, but that you are creating jobs by investing overseas.

I think I'll draw the line there. I'd rather think about it some more and write it down for you.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Thank you.

Mr. SCHEUER. What impediments are there to women throughout the world exercising the rights they were granted under the World Population Plan of Action, which states that all couples and individuals shall have the basic right to freely and responsibly decide the number and spacing of their children, and to have the information and education and means to do so? If you would prefer, you could give us a country-by-country rundown, or at your leisure, in the next week or two—of the major developing countries, indicating what the elements of government resistance are, as well as some of the areas of private institutional resistance, to making the means and the education available to women.

I would like to add that Congressman Pete McCloskey from California, Congressman Daniel Akaka, from Hawaii, and I just returned from a conference of parliamentarians in Tokyo. They are planning a worldwide conference next year in August in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on the global population program. We issued a call to action, and the executive committee, on which I was designated to serve as vice chairman, was assigned the mission of identifying over the coming year some of the impediments to women in the exercising of their right to freely space and plan their children. I was wondering whether you might wish to give us a memo that would list some of the impediments.

[The material referred to follows:]

2. Impediments to women exercising the rights that they're granted under the World Population Plan Action, which states that all couples and individuals shall have the basic right freely and responsibly to decide the number and spacing of their children, and have the information and education and means to do so. (Mr. Scheuer's question, pages 42-43 of the typewritten transcript.)

Before discussing the impediments, it might be useful briefly to describe the broad patterns that exist in the developing world regarding governmental attitudes toward family planning and the efficacy to date of public and private operational programs designed to reach couples and individuals interested in spacing or limiting births.

Four out of five people in developing countries live under governments expressly committed to reducing birth rates. In Asia, 25 out of 30 governments give direct support to providing to couples and individuals access to modern methods of birth control, 21 out of 27 in Latin America, and 22 out of 48 in Africa. There is evidence that the percentage of women of reproductive age

who already accept a method of family planning has increased markedly in the 1970's; and, that population growth rates have begun to decline in many parts of the world.

While each country of course has its own unique set of circumstances, broad patterns of experience do emerge in the third world in regard to population-related programs as they do in agriculture, health and many other socio-economic sectors. Thus, with regard to public sector "family planning activities" (to use a term of art to cover all population-related programs), we can detect a range of typical impediments to more effective results than obtain at present:

Governmental outreach services to widely-dispersed rural populations are typically very weak;

Family planning services are usually top-heavy with men, approach women solely as mothers and beneficiaries and are overly-invested in staff and infrastructure instead of drawing more on local women to provide services to each other; and,

Governments often are restrained in implementing programs in support of their stated population policies as a result of the traditional values and education which motivate much of their civil service and also due to domestic pressures from dissenting groups, such as religious bodies and political parties. Alternatively, governmental administrators of these programs at times have carried out their missions with too much zeal, insensitivity and inadequate attention to the voluntary nature of the program.

As regards local private organizations operationally involved in this sector in developing countries, they are generally under-rated and underutilized as a national resource and receive little or no financial assistance. They often are urban-oriented and middle-class with limited ability, resources or even interest in reaching out to the rural poor. They can and do play a useful role in catalyzing public, especially elite, opinion toward adopting an activist approach to family planning; and they facilitate the entry into the country of external assistance agencies looking for local vehicles with which to initiate projects and programs.

Turning now more precisely to the impediments to women in developing countries exercising their right freely to space and plan their children (page 43), I see the following as key factors:

Women there almost universally share many political, social and economic disadvantages limiting their ability to exercise their rights in this matter. First and foremost, male domination in their private and public lives too often is the main barrier to women's advancement and participation in decisions affecting their own living conditions. This domination is rooted deeply in traditional values and expresses itself in all matters, including even whether the concerned couple will practice birth control;

Women as a group have no weapon, no bargaining power, no power base . . . and are not even seen to have one by themselves or by the society as a whole;

The contribution of women to society is always understated. Census data are biased against women (e.g., by distorted definitions of work, the percentage of men in a population is typically stated as twice as high as that of women with regard to those who are considered "economically active," although women, aside from their household and other chores, contribute over 40% of the worldwide food supply). As a result, public policies are not developed which recognize present and prospective female contributions to the economy . . . instead, women are not encouraged or permitted to break out of their traditional mold, with its heavy emphasis on family-related responsibilities.

Modernization ironically often has an adverse rather than beneficial impact on women's lives (e.g., urbanization, industrialization, and introduction of modern farm implements generally reduce the scope of female employment).

Perhaps a good way to end this analysis would be to indicate some key actions I see as necessary to ease or remove these impediments. Before doing so, I'd like to note that these desirable actions are pertinent not only to meeting the requirements of the World Population Plan of Action but equally to the achievement of the goals of a just international economic order and the meeting of human needs. The actions are as follows:

Governments and the private sector should assure that introduction of modern methods does not remove opportunities for productive female labor;

Women must organize themselves more systematically and with greater geographic and social reach than at present, particularly with a view to assuring their appropriate sharing in the benefits of development;

More women should be used as implementors and as administrators and planners of public and private programs directly affecting them;

Family planning-type programs should be given better and more identifiable financial and technical support, extended more effectively and sensitively into rural areas, and better integrated than at present with the full range of socio-economic activities in which women are involved (relating not simply to health concerns but also to the vocational and educational dimensions of women's lives); and

There should be better legal protection of women's rights, particularly since the laws of modernizing elites tend to derogate those rights.

Sincerely yours,

MELISSA WELLS.

Ambassador WELLS. Yes; and I welcome the project. Now, do you want the whole world?

Mr. SCHEUER. There aren't that many countries, and you could give us a paragraph or two on each of the major ones—I'll talk to you after the hearing or by telephone. I don't think it will be a major project.

Do you think population issues and the efforts and priorities which developing countries assign to population questions, to reduce or accommodate population growth rates, should occupy a more central place in the U.S. negotiating position?

In other words, without being hardhanded and crude about it, we could say, "If you don't do this, we won't do that." Should concerns about population be factored into our negotiations over all other development assistance? Of course, this would not be done in a crude, harsh, offensive, or insensitive way, which is what Congressman Simon is properly concerned with.

Ambassador WELLS. Yes; if tailored on a case-by-case basis. I mean, if you consider the role of the church, or the lack thereof, or whatever the particular circumstances in the country concerned, and if you adjust your pressure, taking into account the local problems that they have to deal with, I think that we should—if you don't do the meat-ax approach.

Mr. SCHEUER. Right. Thank you very, much, Ambassador.

Ambassador WELLS. Thank you. [Witness excused.]

Mr. SIMON. Is Mr. Nooter here?

Mr. NOOTER. Yes.

Mr. SIMON. We're pleased to have you here, and you may proceed however you wish. You can enter your statement into the record and make informal remarks, or you can read your statement if you prefer.

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT NOOTER, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID), DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 227.]

Mr. NOOTER. Thank you, Mr. Simon. With your permission, I will enter my statement into the record and summarize it for the committee.

Mr. SIMON. OK. I'd also like to say for the record that Mr. Nooter is the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development.

Mr. NOOTER. I'm delighted to be here to participate in this overview session on the population program. I'll try to keep my opening remarks brief to save most of the time for questions. But I do think it is worth reviewing first the geometric progression of population over the history of the world, and what we now know about what those figures will become in the years ahead, almost regardless of what course of action is taken in the world. I won't belabor that point because it is in my statement.

The awareness of the geometric growth trend, I think, is what has brought home to a large part of the world the fact that this is a most serious problem, where we see as a minimum a world population level of 10 or 11 billion people in the 2000's.

This has widespread implications for what the natural resources of the world can cope with, can respond to. Again, I won't go into that in great detail. It is covered in the statement, but I do think it is an important part of the record for this overview hearing.

I'd like to provide a little more detail, though, on AID's role in addressing this problem. To put this in perspective, we should remember that until 1964 we were simply not permitted to work in this area. I remember the frustration of Bill Rogers, Assistant Administrator for Latin America, at the time—who saw this problem ahead of most of the rest of us—in not being able to begin using AID funds to work on the problem. But by 1964, we had persuaded the Congress to amend the law so that we could take our first tenuous steps, just 14 years ago.

By 1967, the Congress had become very aware of the problem, and in fact passed the title X legislation and earmarked funds within AID's budget specifically for the population program. That added tremendous impetus.

During this decade—that is, since title X was enacted—AID has provided \$1 billion for population program assistance, which is about 60 percent of all such international assistance provided to date. With the strong support of the Congress, AID's population program has given impetus to many other activities during the last decade, such as support for the U.N. Fund for Population Activities; for the development of a more adequate demographic data base which is a way of measuring what is going on in this area; for assistance to countries for population policy development; for the training of administrators, physicians, nurses, paramedicals, and village health workers; for research on determinants and consequences of fertility; for research and development on new and improved means of fertility control; for the purchase and transportation of contraceptives and surgical equipment; and for assistance to country programs and international private voluntary organizations in the provision of family planning assistance. We might want to come back to that area later, because that's been a very important part of getting this program started, providing information and education to leaders of developing countries and to the public regarding population growth and its impact.

Of the 4 billion people in the world, AID's programs have been directed toward countries with about half—or two billion—people with high fertility who live in more than 100 less-developed countries in the world.

I'd like next to talk a little about the achievements in that period. There is a feeling, I think, that frequently our AID programs are not as effective as we would like. I would say this is a case where we can point with some pride to a great deal of achievement in a 10-year period with a program that consciously started out moving down a certain track, and now where we now are beginning to see measurable results.

The majority of nations—especially in Asia and Latin America—now recognize population growth as a key development variable. That in itself—considering the complex social and cultural aspects involved in this question—is quite a remarkable accomplishment in such a short period of time.

There have been indications of sharp declines in the birthrate over the last decade in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Costa Rica, Mauritius, and other countries—Indonesia, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Barbados, and so on.

In all of the countries where birthrates have fallen sharply family planning information, services, and supplies have been made generally available and developmental progress has been substantial.

Indeed, over the past 15 years, there has been a spectacular rise in the number of family planning programs throughout the less-developed world.

From only two government-supported family planning programs in 1960, there are now 63 countries in the developing world which have either launched official programs, or officially sanctioned the activities of private family planning organizations.

In terms of the current trends within the Agency, I would like to point out that we have been shifting the emphasis that we've been giving to the program in recent years.

When it started, the heaviest emphasis was on the delivery of contraceptive supplies, even though we were working in these other areas which I mentioned. In the last few years—and particularly during the past 12 months under this administration we have been broadening the dimensions of the program. This is because of our awareness that, while contraceptives themselves respond to a certain degree of demand, further progress after those initial successes requires other factors. It requires a more direct link with development. It requires a broader motivation on the part of families in the developing world, and so on.

With that in mind, I'll mention three things that we're doing in connection with this shift in emphasis.

First, we suggested and the Congress passed into law section 104(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act which requires us—or we're requiring ourselves if you will—to take into account the population aspects of all of our development projects.

This is an effort to change the design of some of those projects to make them more effective for population purposes, but it's also an effort to make our field and Washington staffs more aware of the link between population and development.

Second, we have made a number of organizational moves with this thought in mind. For many years, the Office of Population was in a different bureau within AID from the Offices of Health, Agriculture, Education, and so on. We have now put it under a Deputy Assistant Administrator in charge of both the health and population programs to bring about what we think is a much-needed closer integration of these fields.

The third thing we're doing is developing country strategies in regard to population in a number of the developing countries, and ultimately we hope to do this in all of the countries in which we work. This is an attempt to put the population program in the perspective of the full country development activity and provide us with some guidelines for our staff in mapping out their strategy in regard to population.

In summary, I think it is a remarkable phenomenon that the world has come from a state of almost total unawareness of this problem 10 or 15 years ago to a condition where most countries of the world now recognize it. Some are still sensitive about it. Some political leaders are cautious about taking action in it. But there are very, very few who don't recognize this as a major problem for the world.

There are still some countries—particularly some of the smaller and least developed countries—which don't yet recognize it as a problem. But even that is changing at a rate I think can encourage us that there may be some hope in coping with what might have looked like an almost insoluble problem.

I'll stop there, Mr. Simon.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Nooter.

You touched on the reorganization within AID. There are some who have fears, as you're probably aware, about that reorganization. I gather from your remarks you do not consider this in any way a downgrading of population emphasis. Is that correct?

Mr. NOOTER. That's right, and I must say I appreciate those apprehensions. On one hand, there are those who say that the integration of population with other programs will dilute the population effort. On the other hand, if we are going to achieve some integration, we think that the value of bringing these programs closer together outweighs the other possible disadvantage.

Mr. SIMON. Let's just take a country for an example, and you take some other country if you wish. Let's say Bangladesh.

When you determine what the aid level is going to be, is the population factor considered? To what extent do we have real integration of population into this picture?

Mr. NOOTER. Well, first there is one other organizational shift which we made that I think is very important. We did have our population specialists in Washington all working in one office. We now have assigned some of those people—perhaps 25 percent of them—to work in what we call our regional bureaus where they are more closely involved in the development and review of overall country strategies, and programs. This is another way in which I think we're integrating our various programs more closely with the population program.

When we develop a country strategy for Bangladesh, for example, it will include what is going on in population, what the country is doing, and what we're planning to do.

The degree of effort by the country will also be taken into account as one of the factors in determining the aid level for the country, both the overall level and the level in the population field.

Mr. SIMON. Are we explicit to that country that this is a factor?

Mr. NOOTER. I'd be hard pressed to generalize that on a worldwide basis. I would say that each of our missions and each of our regions have to cope with that in the way that seems most sensible in each country. But I know that I have been involved in conversations with heads of state, and with AID administrators where population was one of the key subjects of those conversations.

Mr. SIMON. So that they are generally aware of that being a key factor.

Mr. NOOTER. Yes.

Mr. SIMON. One of the realities is the topic that our Chairman touched on earlier, and that is the status of women. Our staff has noted that AID's population officers are overwhelmingly male. Is that changing at all? Is there a sensitivity to that developing in the office?

Mr. NOOTER. I just checked on this recently. Twenty percent of our professional staff in the population office are women. The present Administrator is very aware of the desire to bring more women professionals into the Agency as a whole, and this certainly would apply to the Office of Population as well.

Mr. SIMON. One final question and then I'll turn it over to the chairman. It was of interest to me that AID's population assistance in fiscal year 1977—and I frankly don't know how typical that fiscal year may be—36 percent of your funds were channeled to private, nonprofit organizations; 21 percent to the U.N.; 21 percent is direct assistance to the recipient government; 13 percent to U.S. universities.

The figure that strikes me as being low here is this 21 percent direct assistance to the other governments. Is that a fairly typical spread of our expenditures? Maybe you're not equipped to answer that right now, but I would be interested in having—for the record and for my own personal information—a breakdown for other fiscal years to see if we have a trend here. Then just to compound the question for you, does this strike you as a fairly good balance, or does it not?

Mr. NOOTER. I don't have the exact figures here, but I think that the 21-percent figure sounds low in the sense that some portions of those other amounts would go to countries particularly through the international organizations which work in this field.

In other words, although our money goes to IPPF or the UNEPA, that money, in turn, goes for assistance to countries where population programs are going on, so that the actual amount of funds being delivered would be, I think, considerably higher than 21 percent. But I'd like to develop something for the record and submit it, if I may.

Mr. SIMON. Fine, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. SCHEUER. Yes; I enjoyed your testimony very much Mr. Nooter.

The General Accounting Office has just released a report—I'm sure you're familiar with it—in which they said, "Despite the widespread recognition of the need to interrelate and integrate development and population assistance to developing countries, AID appears to have segregated these forms of assistance. AID has made little effort or progress in the use of development programs to influence fertility."

I visited six countries in Africa a year and a half ago—Kenya, Tanzania, Zaire, Nigeria, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal. Apart from the Ivory Coast, which is a situation unto itself, and leaving aside Nigeria, which wants population assistance in addition to every other kind of assistance but is gradually being eased out of the developing-nation category, all of those nations wanted population assistance.

Many of them have a sense of urgency and are almost desperate. Yet, when I asked each of the six ambassadors when they had last discussed population concerns with the chiefs of state, not one of them ever had.

And these ambassadors were very able fellows. Our Ambassador to Nigeria, Ambassador Easum, is probably one of the half dozen most brilliant, gifted and talented ambassadors we have, but with-out exception I was told they had never discussed population concerns with the Chiefs of State to whom they were assigned.

And they gave me excellent and very compelling reasons for why they hadn't. They had too many brush fires to put out on a daily basis, population was on the back burner, and it was terribly sensitive. My routine was to come into the airport and some junior Foreign Service officer would meet me and take me to the Embassy. He'd tell me in the car how sensitive population was and how one had to tread around it so lightly. Then the Ambassador would spend a few minutes with me in sort of a ceremonial visit and he'd tell me, "I wish you wouldn't talk about population. You can't imagine how sensitive it is."

Yet, 15 minutes after that I would be sitting with a Health Minister and he would describe their 5-year plan and he'd say, "We need 2,000 packages." A package would entail a gas-fired sterilizer, a gas-fired refrigerator for drugs, and a sphygmomanometer.

And his eyes would light up, hoping that this Congressman, the first Congressman ever to come to Africa to look into population concerns, would help get him some money for his family planning programs and his education programs.

He would pour out his heart to me, how desperately he needed help to do his job. Then they'd generally arrange for me to meet a few parliamentarians, a few other ministers. Again, they would almost grab me physically and pour out their hearts about how much they needed help.

And all this in a country where I was told first by a junior FSO and then by the Ambassador that this subject was too sensitive.

This was also reflected in the AID mission. I found that the AID population officers felt isolated, not only from the Embassy mission, but from all of the other AID officers as well, with the exception of the AID health officer, because they were working in maternal-child

health/family planning and were almost forced into contact with one another.

I found a palpable sense of isolation, a palpable sense of non-priority or low priority on the part of the AID population officers, that again poured forth when you had a quiet dinner with them in the evening.

What do you think can be done, apart from structural reorganization, to impress on the Ambassadors representing the United States in the developing world that population must be factored into their discussions with Chiefs of State? In the same manner in which we have little interagency competitions in our country, perhaps the health minister in a developing country who wants to do population and family planning needs a little buttressing, given all the competing demand made on the pitifully thin cash flow in the developing world. What could we do to raise the level of consciousness, of both the Ambassador and the mission chiefs in the Embassy, in their discussions and negotiations with the host government that population concerns should be integrated into the work that they're doing?

Mr. NOOTER. Well, you've raised a number of quite important issues. Let me try to see if I can cover them all.

First, I think the GAO report is quite good. It's very comprehensive and makes a lot of very good points.

I do think, however, it was written at a time before we had made some of the changes that I talked about, and to that extent, we are now addressing organizationally some of the problems that you talked about. Our population office did operate with a great deal of autonomy that gave it certain advantages and certain disadvantages. At the field level this did tend, I think, to produce some sense of isolation where you had an individual from the population office assigned to a mission.

I think the changes that we're talking about will help that problem, bringing the population program more into integration with the rest of the program will be the way we'll be coping with that.

In regard to your comments on the role of ambassadors, as you know, the State Department doesn't work for us. It's more the other way around. The State Department does have Marshall Green, who's a very forceful and dedicated person in regard to the population program, assigned to this as a full-time job.

Mr. SCHEUER. He will be testifying here the week after next, and he did testify during our oversight hearings earlier this year.

I know of no one who is thinking more clearly or articulating more eloquently world population concerns.

Mr. NOOTER. I think he really will be the best person to answer this, but let me say from the AID viewpoint, certainly we would always welcome ambassadorial support in this area. It could be very helpful and very important, particularly at certain times in the life of the development of programs. I'm not certain, though, that in some cases that is the best way for a program to start in a very sensitive area.

For example, we started working in the Philippines when there was no government policy about population. It was considered a very sensitive area. A few years later it became a government policy.

Mr. SCHEUER. They had a government policy, which was not to have an official government policy but, instead, to quietly permit the private, nonprofit sector to do its thing and keep a safe distance between the government and the private groups.

Mr. NOOTER. Exactly, and I think it was illegal to import contraceptives at the outset of the program, but the government proceeded to ignore its own law and permit it to happen.

Mr. SCHEUER. That's been the pattern all over the developing world, as I understand it.

Mr. NOOTER. In many cases; yes. Egypt for example, had a population program years ago, but it had not been active in recent years. When we renewed our assistance programs in 1974 they were really not interested in this area.

I am aware that you will be having a session on Egypt, and I believe you will find that Egypt has now been coaxed along to the point of having an expanding program in the population area.

I think at some stage, Government leaders, being politicians, will become conscious of the developmental implications. They won't want to get too far ahead of their own people, however, until the political climate has been tested.

Mr. SCHEUER. Too far ahead of their populations? They're way behind their populations.

Mr. NOOTER. In many cases; that's right.

Mr. SCHEUER. Way behind. In each of the countries I visited, they took me out to both maternal child health and family planning clinics in the urban areas and in the bush, 25 or 50 miles outside of the cities. In both cases, wherever they had maternal child health and family planning facilities, the women were lined up around the building and down the block to get in.

I don't know what percent of the women of child-bearing age in the developing world are ready right now, who don't need motivation, who don't need information and education programs, who just know that they want to space their children and control their fertility.

But I suspect that this percentage is significantly higher than most people think it is. In that one respect I think Rei Ravenholt has a germ of truth. People are way ahead of their governments, just as people in some religious denominations are way ahead of their top church officials in what they're actually doing on a day-to-day basis.

Mr. NOOTER. I would say to the extent ambassadors can be induced to be more supportive of the program, we would be entirely in favor of such support. It could well be important to help shape the leadership views which are one of the things needed to make a really effective program.

Mr. SCHEUER. Perhaps, if nothing more than to encourage them, just to open a few doors to let the nonprofit organizations operate for the first few years, and perhaps make a little indirect funding available, would be useful.

In some countries, chiefs of state have made government funding indirectly available to some of the nonprofit organizations to engage in this testing period without getting the government more directly involved. I think this would be a very constructive kind of counseling for the ambassador to engage in.

Mr. NOOTER. We would agree.

Mr. SIMON. We appreciate your testimony, Mr. Nooter, and appreciate what's being done at AID. Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. Dr. Carmen Miro. For the record, Dr. Miro is the Chairperson of the International Review Group on Population and Development, El Colegio de Mexico, in Mexico City. Dr. Miro is a well-known population specialist. She's been Director of the United Nations Latin American Demographic Center, President of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, and is currently directing an international review group examining the relationship between population and development, based in Mexico City.

Dr. Miro, we're very pleased and honored to have you here. However you wish to proceed, if you wish to read your statement, or if you wish to enter it in the record and make comments, we'd be pleased to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF DR. CARMEN MIRO, CHAIRPERSON, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW GROUP ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT, EL COLEGIO DE MEXICO, MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 275.]

Dr. MIRO. Thank you very much. I have handed in my statement in written form, and I would just like to ask that it be submitted for the record.

Mr. SIMON. It will be entered in the record.

Dr. MIRO. I would, nevertheless, with your permission, make some remarks. I should begin by thanking Mr. Scheuer for having invited me to come on this occasion. I think it is a privilege to address policymakers of a country that weighs so highly in world affairs.

I have had the opportunity before of talking to policymakers in other parts of the world, but this is really the first time that, in such a direct manner, I have the opportunity to address policymakers of the United States.

Mr. SCHEUER. May I say that we are very privileged and honored to have you here today. I benefited enormously from the article you wrote in the Population and Development Review in December 1977. It is a brilliant piece of work, and I hope we will have the opportunity to meet in the coming months with policymakers in your country to discuss mutual population concerns.

Dr. MIRO. Thank you very much.

Very briefly, I would like to underscore that my testimony refers very briefly to the origin of IRG, the International Review Group, and I don't want to burden you with details, but there are a few ideas that we classify as premises justifying the creation of the group. I think these premises are relevant to the type of work that this select committee is trying to accomplish.

These premises can be briefly summarized as follows: the size and structure of a population, the pace of its growth, and the pattern of its geographic distribution, are influenced by the stage and the style of development adopted by a country.

Therefore, coherent development strategies and plans should take into consideration if and how population factors should be modified in order to attain the development goals.

To be able to do so, an understanding of the process through which population and development interact is indispensable, but our knowledge regarding these processes is incomplete and inconclusive.

IRG is attempting to establish how incomplete and how inconclusive this knowledge is, which are the important aspects that policy-makers would really like to clarify, and eventually how they would use new knowledge for policy purposes.

The testimony goes on to examine the five regions or subregions with which IRG has concerned itself; namely, Africa south of the Sahara, the Arab countries, middle-south Asia, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.

The examination covers in broad lines the demographic situation relating to some gross economic indicators. It also takes a brief overview of evolving government positions vis-a-vis population policies and some demographic issues perceived as important by these governments.

The presentation of the regions follows an order related to the general position they occupy along what is customarily referred to as demographic transition, from Africa, which can properly be identified as pretransitional, to Southeast Asia where I doubted whether to place it ahead of Latin America or not, because the similarities are very great.

The demographic picture is so well known that I need not go into its details. Perhaps what is worth underscoring, though, is the persistence of some common characteristics—namely, the presence of great disparities in demographic behavior between countries of the same region—that to a great extent can be associated with the presence of higher socioeconomic indicators.

While the statement does not go into that, it should be pointed out that similar disparities can be found between social groups within countries, a fact that is associated with their differential access to the benefits of progress.

In all regions there are countries showing firm fertility declining trends. Countries of all regions share the problem of excessive urban concentration, but also face continued growth of their rural population.

To varying degrees, all regions still have a long way to go in the process of increasing the life expectancy of their populations, in spite of the mortality declines experienced everywhere.

With very few exceptions, countries of all regions have doubled or more than doubled their 1950 populations by 1978; in spite of recent declines in fertility, most of the countries of all regions continue to have high or moderately high rates of growth.

Although not of the same nature or with the same characteristics, South Saharan Africa, the Arab countries, and Latin America present problems associated with international migration.

All regions present a very young age structure. In some countries, there are really high proportions of those under 15 years of age, these proportions continue to increase.

In countries where the fertility decline has been underway, young adults are the proportionately higher age group. This increases even faster the potential labor force members and potential parents.

Now, as for the way economic and social development has kept pace with demographic growth, only Latin America seems to have, in general, moved clearly ahead—as a region, of course. The Arab countries have, in general, economic potentialities, but they do not seem to have had an important impact on overall development.

The policies adopted by governments—more properly, the degree of commitment vis-a-vis these policies—vary widely. It can generally be asserted that a perceived population problem does not always lead to the adoption of policy measures. Nevertheless, concern with population issues has been continuously growing in all regions, and the number of countries adopting an explicit population policy has been growing in all regions.

This is a very broad summary of the demographic situation, and also to some of the elements pressing this situation that have a bearing and some relation to the socioeconomic situation.

I was asked to testify on something and I wasn't very sure what it meant. It's the word "perspective", the population and development perspective. If I understand correctly, to some extent this would have implied some sort of forecast of how the whole thing would be moving along in the Third World regions.

Of course, I intentionally didn't attempt to do that, and the reason for that is clearly stated at the end of my testimony.

It is my personal belief that this perspective hinges on many imponderable factors for which we do not have the answer right now, such as what the future economic international order will be, how the internal political affairs of the countries of the Third World will have evolved in the future, what new breakthroughs will there be in the new physiology of reproduction technology? How will we be able to face the environmental and resource constraints that are frequently mentioned?

The answer to these questions will depend on how population and development in the countries of the third region evolve. So I say let the question hang there, with no attempt to start forecasting the future.

Of course, I should underscore that because of the built-in potential for growth that the populations of the Third World already have, we can make a reasonably good estimate of what the population and its structure will be in the immediate future. That is included in all of the U.N. publications and some of the figures have already been mentioned by Mr. Nooter, so I don't think that it is important for me to go into these details.

This is, in summary, what I would like to put before you. If you have any questions that you would like me to clarify—I have heard some of the questions that have been put to the previous witnesses and I feel they are difficult—I shall try to do my best.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you, Dr. Miro, and I'm sure you will handle them very well.

In your formal statement, one of the things that intrigued me was when you said, "In view of the urgency of population problems, and then considering the International Review Group's main concern is in social science research applicable to policy design, the group will aim to produce recommendations potentially useful for this purpose within the next 10 years."

When you describe urgency, and then you say, "We're going to produce recommendations in 10 years," it is confusing. Is it possible that the International Review Group can have some recommendations before 10 years?

Ten years in the population field means a tremendous increment in population in that period.

Mr. MIRO. No, I guess the statement is easily misunderstood if that is how you read it; the recommendations will be produced before the end of this year. What this sentence is intended to refer to is that we hope that these recommendations will have an impact within the next 10 years. Not starting maybe the year after 1978, in 1979, but that we're not going to wait to suggest research that would be useful let's say 25 years from now, but on the contrary, something that will have an immediate impact so initial that it should have an impact later.

Mr. SIMON. Within 10 years. OK, I understand. I feel better about your sentence, then.

This is a very sweeping kind of a question, but if President Carter were to come to you right now and say, "What one thing should the United States do to improve its population program?" and if Secretary General Kurt Waldheim came to you and said, "What one thing should the United Nations do to improve its program?" how would you answer those two questions?

Dr. MIRO. Well, probably my answer would be that there is not only one thing that anybody has to do in order to face the population question. One intention of my statement was to put across the fact—and this has been repeatedly said, especially since the Bucharest Conference in 1974—that population problems are not hanging in a vacuum, isolated from the rest of the economic and social system.

So, in order to actually tackle problems associated with population, a constellation of measures should be adopted.

I listened with great interest to some of the new approaches to population policy assistance that Mr. Nooter indicated in his statement. I should think that at least Mr. Waldheim should be advised that I have to say only one thing, and that is please pay attention to the requests other countries are making about what they think are their own problems. In other words, to me—and this is reflected in the statement you received earlier—the keystone to international assistance is precisely that, to try to help where the person, country or institution to be helped thinks that it needs help.

I know that this is difficult, because outsiders sometimes have the impression that they know better than you do what is good for you, but I don't think this is always the case. Most of the countries do have a clear idea of where the problems lie.

Now, I would think that problems are different from one country to another. For example, the case of Mexico. Right now they are implementing—and I think very seriously and very strongly—a family planning program, and if they request support for that, this is exactly what they have identified at this point as their main concern.

President Lopez Portillo is also studying a new urban development plan which tries to redistribute population. It's a very difficult thing and, of course, a lot of reinvestment will have to be made.

But again, maybe they will make mistakes.

Nobody can live the mistakes beforehand, so maybe they will make mistakes, but this is, in my opinion, the way to go about it.

Now in the case of the United States, as such—and I have heard some of the questions while I was sitting back there—we are not working in a political vacuum. If we were, things would be easier. Some of the decisions of the United States have to take into consideration other things that are not directly related to population growth.

So, for me to provide one single manner in which to approach the whole issue, I don't think it is even salutary to think in those terms.

Mr. SIMON. I understand. I was oversimplifying here.

On the basis of your response to the question, though, has there been a weakness in U.S. and U.N. population efforts to take into consideration the problems of the recipient nations?

Dr. MIRO. Well, I think that the whole history—and in this I would like to remind you that my answers are related to the fact that my experience is mainly with Latin America—the whole history of how assistance in the population field on the part of the United States began is not a very happy one.

It started by giving the impression to other countries that they had some sort of different interpretation of what was the crucial thing.

I should make myself clear. The crucial thing was to decrease demographic growth and this was, at the beginning, the slogan, and the slogan of course was the basis for the action. Decrease population growth and you increase your development potential.

Well, as time has gone by, one has seen that this is not exactly true, although I agree that high demographic growth complicates the efforts of development.

I think that the image the United States transmitted has been changing little by little and, as I say, a statement like that of Mr. Nooter is a clear indication that the United States is looking on population assistance in a broader manner.

In the case of the United Nations—I have my former colleague, Mr. Leon Tabah, in the back, so I have to be very careful. I, myself, worked for the United Nations many years—there is a tendency to think that the United Nations is the Secretariat with the people that are working there complying with some of the resolutions that the bodies of the United Nations have adopted.

If the United Nations to some extent has not complied—and I believe that it has not complied entirely with the mandates—for example, those emanating from the World Population Plan of Action—it is to some extent due to some of the directives that the Secretariat has received.

I do not think that the United Nations has a world population program. There is no such thing. And the words sound too simple. It looks as if I am thinking that there could be a program that is of general application to the world. This is not true.

When I think—for simplification—of a world population program, I am thinking of a very concerted package of actions that will involve not only the United Nations as such, implying the Secretariat and the different divisions, but also the rest of the organizations within the U.N. family—WHO, UNESCO, ILO, and so on.

I think the paper you have read clearly points out that even with this world conference that's going on—during the conference in which Government representatives were the ones who were adopting resolutions—even in these conferences, there does not seem to be a concerted effort to look at population as a matter that should be of concern in every field. In that way I think the United Nations, both at the level of the organs of the United Nations in which countries directly participate, as well as the level of the Secretariat, still has a lot of ground to cover.

If I may, I would like to rest on the Latin American experience, and I think this touches the matter that Mr. Scheuer raised earlier in one of his questions. I think that in the majority of Latin American countries there are now population councils of one sort or another, national population councils entrusted with aspects of population.

But we still do not know how to really integrate population into the development strategies and plans. Unless the United Nations, through some of its technical bodies, would really take the time to work on this problem, how can they offer technical assistance to the numerous national councils that exist that can really do a lot in the direction of promoting the introduction or integration of population variables in the development effort.

So there are several fields in which I think the United Nations could be of great use. Training is one.

The training in the United Nations—and I have long been associated in the past with these efforts—was kind of compartmentalized. We need a program that would bring together, in a more global manner, the treatment of population. A slogan that we are constantly repeating, is that population is not isolated from the rest, but we continue to teach population isolated from the rest.

New training programs should be devised that incorporate the consideration of all economic and social factors, and this can be done through several of the training programs that the United Nations runs. These are examples of some of the things that I think can be done in order to improve the contribution of the United Nations to the effort in the population field.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHEUER. That was a very interesting statement, Dr. Miro. I'm going to ask you a few questions which are related to the article you wrote in *The Population and Development Review* of December 1977.

On page 438 of your article, you state that the population activities of certain intergovernmental bodies within the U.N. system, and of some departments of the United Nations proper, appear to be marginal in the efforts to implement the World Population Plan of Action. You mention that special attempts should be made to develop a coherent and integrated population program for the entire United Nations system.

Could you elaborate on that and tell us which of the intergovernmental bodies within the U.N. system and the departments of the United Nations proper you think are not playing their full and potential role?

And when you finish telling us which ones, I'm going to ask you

how you think we could motivate them. How do you think we can stimulate them to get their act together?

Dr. MIRO. The first thing one has to be clear about is that all these organizations—ILO, WHO, UNESCO—have their own legislative bodies which are the bodies that give the directives.

And as you are well aware, because you also embarked on this type of exercise, the guidelines concerning the types of programs that these institutions should follow—their Secretariats—are laid down several years ahead.

Mr. SCHEUER. You're saying there's a time lag.

Dr. MIRO. It takes some time for any institution, assuming that the Secretariat is the most dynamic, creative, and innovative body of the world—which is not true—because there are deep secret conditions, vested interests, and all the characteristics that plague any bureaucratic organization. I mean, this is not characteristic of the United Nations only.

Mr. SIMON. Even the U.S. Congress.

Dr. MIRO. And Latin American and African governments and corporations—even those that are very pointed in making profit, also have problems of that sort.

And we are assuming that the Secretariats would be very, very active, and that they are or were working at the time of the adoption of the World Population Plan of Action, in a different direction.

In fact, the World Population Conference was a sort of surprise to the developed world which, in the end, is the one that makes for the adoption of most of the programs in these organizations, in view of the fact that they are the largest contributors to the program.

So the World Population Conference came to show other directives, and I think that it has taken them some time to realize that they have to take on a different direction.

I would say that I was surprised that in the World Employment Conference, the Director would actually say, "I won't touch the matter of population policies, because that's family planning, and we're not going to go into that controversial issue."

Mr. SCHEUER. The still controversial issue of family planning.

Dr. MIRO. It's a controversial issue, but the World Population Conference had already taken place, and he should have taken into consideration what the resolutions of the countries were.

I think that little by little some of the programs of the institutions have begun to be permeated with the directions that attempt to take care of some of the recommendations of the World Population Plan of Action. But still I think that each one is doing its part, and that in spite of the fact that there are coordinating mechanisms within the United Nations—probably Leon Tabah could talk more properly on this, and probably he knows of more recent information that is not available to me now—that through this coordinating mechanism more clearly integrated programs are coming out.

I don't know how a world population program, as such, could really be developed and implemented. It seems to me that the Population Division within the United Nations, of which Leon Tabah is the Director, should be the focus and be made responsible for that, but then there are internal jealousies and political combinations that

probably do not depend on Mr. Leon Tabah to make a decision. And we have a very strong body called the UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Activities which was originally set up as a disbursing mechanism of money for population programs.

But I think that somehow they are attempting to enter into the substantive field also, competing with the Population Division, so it's difficult to envisage, at this point, how an integrated population program could be defined, but I think that this should be with the United Nations proper.

Mr. SCHEUER. And the question is, "How can we get the United Nations proper, either the Population Division or UNFPA, together or separately, to provide a little stimulus to the UNDP, the FAO, the WHO, UNESCO, UNIDO, and ECOSOC to get their act together?"

Dr. MIRO. Actually, as I intimated before, I do think that attempts are being made to arrive at this coordination. There is a coordinating mechanism within the United Nations. The Administrative Committee for Coordination, which has a Subcommittee on Population in which all these organizations are represented. And I think ECOSOC is the authority above all these coordinating attempts.

Mr. SCHEUER. As I mentioned to you before, we are now in the process of organizing an international group of parliamentarians, representing countries, who are, both developed and developing, concerned with population. We're planning a conference to be held in Sri Lanka in August of next year. One of the things we aim to do is to stimulate the various elements within the U.N. family of agencies, to move more effectively into an effort to integrate population into whatever their mission is.

For example, UNESCO has a wonderful opportunity to integrate population and family planning concerns into the educational materials they produce, all the way from elementary and secondary schools through college and postdoctoral studies, teacher training manuals, and the like. I visited with UNESCO last year and, to the best of my knowledge, they've done virtually nothing in this area.

It may be possible for this coordinating group to get UNESCO to do that. I would hope that through the efforts of this coordinating group, UNIDO and UNDP could gradually or even promptly begin factoring population concerns into the deliberations when they design development programs of all kinds.

I was asked by Bradford Morse, when he was Under Secretary General of the U.N., to try and solve a problem between UNIDO—which was located in Vienna and headed up by Abdul Raman, an Egyptian astronomer and a very brilliant man—and UNEP—the United Nations environment program that was then headquartered in Geneva and has since moved to Kenya, which was headed up by Maurice Strong at that time, a very brilliant Canadian.

Maurice Strong was frustrated because UNIDO, which sponsors development programs such as pulp and paper mills and petrochemical installations, was ignoring the environmental impact of their development programs. Brad Morse asked me to see if we couldn't get these two agencies to cooperate with one another. After

some trips back and forth, a little shuttle diplomacy, we managed to do just that.

Now, why couldn't it be possible to effect the same thing with the whole array of U.N. agencies and get them to factor not only environmental concerns, but also population concerns, into their work?

Dr. Miro. Well, I think it can be done, and as I say, I think that the very promising beginnings are on the way.

I insist that the responsibility for changes does not lie exclusively with the Secretariat, and a good example of that is that I have the impression, after having met Dr. Mahler, the Director of WHO, that he has very clear ideas as to the type of health programs or activities that should be offered to the Third World—not the sophisticated, highly developed medical technology. But in fact, WHO is not putting that into effect, and I suspect the reason is that the directive he received from the legislative bodies of his organization, in which I would say traditional Western highly developed medical practices are the ones that are most respected, and that's the one that should be sold to the rest of the world.

So you see, it's not only a matter of the Secretariats being able to get together, it's also a broader comprehension on the part of the government representative in these organizations as to the way the whole thing should move.

There has been a long discussion about formal and informal education. With the millions and millions of people that we have to educate, probably to get 32 people in a room with one teacher is no solution to the problem; so new, innovative methods really should be applied. They have already been developed.

But there is certain resistance on the part of certain representatives as to the launching of programs of this nature.

It's a combination not only of good will, but also a determination on the part of government representatives—among them, of the United States—and the Secretariat with innovative and creative abilities.

Mr. SCHEUER. In 1939, 39 years ago, I was an exchange student and I worked in Mexico for a summer. I lived in a little place outside of Torreon, San Jose del Dinero, and worked in the Banco Nacional de Credito Ejidal. At that time, there was a program in Mexico called Programa Contra Analfabetismo, "against illiteracy," where each Mexican adult was to teach another Mexican adult how to read.

That was very innovative, and it was 39 years ago. It seems to me this kind of program, offering some kind of incentive or reward system, to adults that were willing to teach other adults how to read and write and count, might be part of an overall mix.

This was done almost four decades ago, and that kind of informal education, with some rewards, should be structured into the system now.

Dr. Miro, getting back to your paper, on page 438 you suggest—

An in-depth study should be undertaken to determine how U.N. population activities might be revised to reflect more clearly the concerns that were expressed in Bucharest. Integration of population activities into overall planning is an evident need of a wider commitment from the U.N. system, and a related need is the development of institutional organizations to deal with those policies.

It might be advantageous to organize an active technical assistance program at the international level to advise developing countries attempting to

set up or reorganize high-level government units responsible for population policy.

How can we, as Members of Congress and as parliamentarians, working together—and Congressman Beilenson was at the organizing conference of this international group of parliamentarians a few months ago in Bonn—how can we work to stimulate this kind of activity in the U.N.? Who should do the in-depth study, and who should design the active technical assistance program to advise developing countries?

Dr. MIRO. Again, I believe that the main responsibility for studies of this nature should lie with the Population Division of the United Nations, which to me is the focal point for population activities, from the substantive point of view, within the United Nations system.

Now, I understand that the beginnings, the thoughts for putting in motion an organized program of technical assistance of the manner described are at least being discussed. I personally have seen the description of a project that AID was attempting to organize in that direction, and I know of some of the concerns that have been expressed by Rafael Salas, from UHFPA in some of the conferences that I have attended in which he has intimated that UNFPA is interested in an approach of this nature.

So I wouldn't be surprised that with a little stimulus from a few of the developed donor countries the program could be set in motion.

It is my understanding that there is demand for that type of technical assistance.

Mr. SCHEUER. So you think that, perhaps, representatives of our country and the distinguished parliamentarian from your own country who was elected chairman of this group of parliamentarians, Dr. Miro, could jointly request the U.N. to get on with this?

Further down that same page you suggest:

Institutions of the U.N. system granting financial support to development programs should seriously investigate the possibility of including population studies as a component in programs they assist, and should also attempt to evaluate the impact on population variables of selected projects that they fund.

Again, this gets right to the heart of the matter.

Dr. MIRO. This is mainly directed to UNDP. UNDP was created primarily either to finance directly some investment projects, or to make feasibility studies for projects of this sort for other institutions to finance. It has done that for years and years with no reference whatsoever to the implications for population policy—I mean what the population perspective would be—whether they would create an increased tendency for fertility to rise, and therefore take into consideration other aspects in order to establish a balance there, or whether they would widen the gap in the mortality of certain social groups, and so on.

And no attention has been paid in the past to evaluating these potential effects, and certainly it should. It might be that the possibility of financing two projects exists—both demanded by the country. That's the first condition, and you would select to finance the one which from the point of view of population seems to be better directing the attempts of complying with certain of the demographic goals of the country.

But these have not been done at all in the past, and I don't think it's being done yet.

Mr. SCHEUER. You also state, on page 426, that—

The Economic and Social Council, after considering the guidelines which were requested to the Secretary-General, ECO-SOC returned these guidelines to the population commission with a request that a manual on population and development planning be prepared, a task on which the U.N. Population Division expects to work during 1978 and 1979.

Do you happen to know if there's been any progress on the development of this manual?

Dr. MIRO. The man is here who can answer that question. I don't really know what has happened since then.

Mr. SCHEUER. You must have gotten some sense of the frustration that we share with you, with both our AID population program and the U.N. population program.

The questions that I've asked you are largely related to the U.N. program, but the questions that many of us have asked of Ambassador Wells and Mr. Nooter reflected our frustration with the effectiveness of our own donor program.

How do other governments, in both the developed and the developing world, perceive our AID population program relative to the U.N. program? Are we the only ones who feel that these programs fall short of their potential? Do the other nations think they're working very well?

I am referring to United Nations programs and our own AID program.

Dr. MIRO. Well, actually, while I cannot claim to represent the views of other countries and can only offer a reflection of my own feeling, first I would like to make very clear that there is no reason for a sensation of frustration regarding how population is moving in the world. On the contrary; I think that for the first time, and starting very recently, unless the trends are completely reversed, we seem to be entering into a completely new phase regarding the behavior, at least, of reproductive patterns in the developing world.

Of course, this is a broad generalization. As any broad generalization, it can be criticized, but as my testimony clearly points out, with the exception probably of Africa, and in lesser degree, of South Asia, Middle-South Asia, there are clear indications that changes are occurring in the other two important regions. I leave the Arab countries aside, for obvious reasons, but even in these countries where I am—

Mr. SCHEUER. Why are you leaving the Arab countries aside?

Dr. MIRO. Well, because they are included in the developing world and they rightly belong to that developing world in terms of their demographic behavior, but their development potential is such, because of oil, that I think that to put them together with some of the South Asia countries that do not have access to this same potential, is not correct.

But even in Africa and in South Asia there are clear evidences that some countries have begun to experience some fertility decline, so this is one thing that I would like to underscore. The picture does not look as dark as it looked, let's say, 10 years ago.

That doesn't mean that everything is fine and we don't have to be pessimistic. The developing world is still growing at more than 2 percent per year, and if it continues to do so, it will double its population in less than 30 years, so we know with some certainty what we are likely to have in the year 2000. But what really could be a cause of frustration is the manner in which some of the approaches to the population problem have been inappropriate. That seem to be changing—to me there is no doubt—not because I have read Mr. Nooter's statement, but because I have seen some of the developments in the field. The AID approach is beginning to change, and I do appreciate some of Dr. Ravenholt's contributions. I think he has made some important contributions.

But that's not the only contribution, and the way it's done sometimes is probably not the best way, so I put bilateral assistance, whether from the United States, Sweden, or any of the big donors, in a different category than the approach that has been taken by the United Nations.

In the case of the United Nations, I think that the contribution has to be doubled, because they should not only be able to pour in money—as probably is done through UNFPA programs—but they should be able to pour in knowledge, technical expertise, support of other kind that probably is not the most welcome through bilateral channels—the direct contract of experts and technicians from the developed world, with developing technicians. So I think that there is a slight difference between the types of assistance that can be channeled through bilateral programs and through multilateral programs.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, as you can see from the time that we've kept you here, we have benefited greatly from your testimony. You are certainly one of the great individuals on the global population scene, and we admire you for the brilliance with which you've articulated your views and for the intelligence and the obvious concern that you bring to this whole field. We look forward to working with you in the future to solve some of the problems you have pointed out in your article. We will continue to look forward to your guidance, your counsel, and your support, and we are very grateful to you for coming all this way to help us.

Dr. MIRO. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you.

Our next witness is Mr. Leon Tabah, the Director of the Population Division of the United Nations.

We're very happy to have you here, Dr. Tabah. You've probably heard some of our concerns and some of our interests concerning the work of the U.N. We have read your testimony and we would appreciate it if you would just chat with us for 10 or 12 minutes. Then I, as well as the staff, will have some questions for you.

Dr. TABAH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Should we follow up the discussion that Ms. Carmen Miro has raised?

Mr. SCHEUER. Fine.

Dr. TABAH. I would be very happy to, Mr. Chairman, because there are some very important discussions which are taking place today and tomorrow in ECOSOC about not only population, but also the situation in the U.N.

STATEMENT OF DR. LEON TABAH, DIRECTOR, U.N. POPULATION DIVISION, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK CITY

[Prepared Statement in Appendix in p. 306.]

Dr. TABAH. I would be very pleased, Mr. Chairman, if I could follow up the discussion of the matter raised by Carmen Miro, because it's extremely important in these days since through the restructuring of the U.N., the matter of population might be totally different in the future.

First, Carmen Miro said that there is no population program in U.N. As a matter of fact, we do have now a population program in U.N. It is the world population plan of action, which is in reality a doctrine on population, and it is the first time in the history of the U.N. that we have such a document.

Mr. SCHEUER. Yes, but a document is not a program, and the gist of what Dr. Miro has said is that they enunciated a brilliant document, but many of the opportunities that they had to put meat on that skeleton and to make it a reality were simply lost.

Dr. TABAH. This doctrine now is put into a program at different Secretariat levels: In the U.N., the U.N. Population Division, the Department of Technical Cooperation, the UNFPA, the specialized agencies, the regional commissions.

It seems to me that it's extremely difficult to have full integration, among all those programs. All these bodies are directed and guided by their own legislative bodies, which do not always make consistent decisions, but these decisions are nevertheless binding on us.

Carmen Miro also mentioned that we are not integrating population within development planning, and you asked why this is so. I would like to tell you and to tell Carmen Miro that this is a very complex subject.

We do not really have adequate techniques in this area. There has been insufficient progress in this direction made by the universities, but we at the U.N. have made some headway in designing methodological tools for integrating population within development planning. And we have begun a study program on the consumption relation to population in planning.

Mr. SCHEUER. Are you saying that we don't know how to integrate population into development planning?

Dr. TABAH. A main handicap to studies in this area is the lack of adequate methodology that makes it possible to come to clearcut conclusions.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, you know, Dr. Tabah, this may be a case where the perfect is the enemy of the good. There are certain things that we know from commonsense; such as, when you have a system of elementary education out in the rural areas, when women become literate, and particularly if jobs are made available, people change their fertility behavior. When the United States gives a grant to Brazil, for example, \$10 million for education, and the Brazilians choose to build another school for postdoctoral studies for their elite and neglect to build an even minimum fabric of elementary educational facilities in the rural areas, we know that from the point of view of population concerns, that's a poor decision.

We know that if we give Brazil \$10 million for health care and they build another tertiary hospital in Rio de Janeiro or in Sao Paulo, and they neglect to open up maternal-child health care centers with family planning services in the rural areas, and there is no vestige of even elementary health services in the rural areas, this is a poor decision.

We know that that such decisions are missed opportunities for making development decisions that are relevant to population concerns.

Now, it may well be that we need not fine-tune our knowledge to the last gnat's eyelash in order to know that, in making development decisions pertaining to education, health, and food, there are certain perfectly obvious and simple population-related components that should go into those programs. The fact that we may not have ultimate knowledge, down to the last one-tenth of one percent, doesn't mean that we can't do very simple, obvious things that a child would know to be useful and constructive from the point of view of population concerns.

Does that mean that we do nothing until we have total knowledge?

Dr. TABAH. Well, we have difficulty in quantifying the problem of integration of population within development, taking into account the different fields—education, consumption. There is no methodological work which has been developed on the subject up to now.

But we're working on that. We're progressing.

Now, Carmen Miro said the World Population Plan of Action came as a surprise at the Bucharest Conference in 1974. I would like to remind her that just before the World Population Conference in Bucharest, there was a special session of the General Assembly on the New International Economic Order, and at that time the Secretariat could not have changed the draft prepared for the conference because this document had already been approved at the regional level by government's representatives including those from the Latin American region. It was totally impossible to change the document, already approved by Governments, before the Bucharest Conference in August so that it would include the recommendations of the special session of the General Assembly held in May.

That is the reason why it did not in fact take us by surprise. We knew it was impossible to have included the new political element introduced by the New International Economic Order.

Let me say to Carmen Miro that in general terms the draft prepared by the Secretariat was not changed in substance in Bucharest. The changes were only in the political nuances introduced at Bucharest.

Mr. SCHEUER. In effect, what Dr. Miro is saying is that here we are, in 1978, 5 years after the 1973 plan of action, and still that grandiose document remains a glittering generality and an innocuous platitude that has still not been made a reality in the ongoing work of the U.N. and its constituent agencies.

Now, Dr. Miro, if I have misstated the general thrust of your remarks, please correct me. Is that a reasonable summary of what you're saying?

Dr. MIRO. At the time I wrote the statement that you are reading; yes.

Mr. SCHEUER. Yes. That was last year.

Dr. MIRO. But there are some events that have taken place since then.

Mr. SCHEUER. That's correct. This statement was in an article published last year.

Dr. TABAH. But I have not the time to go into great detail about what we are doing at the U.N. to implement the plan of action. It would be too long, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to tell you that the population programs of the whole U.N. system are aimed at carrying out the recommendations of the plan of action.

Mr. SCHEUER. I understand that, but we're very much interested in getting that information for the benefit of the Members of Congress. Perhaps you might be willing to write us a brief memorandum in the next week or two enumerating the steps that have been taken. We would be glad to include that memorandum as part of the record.

Additional materials are available in committee files.

Population Newsletter, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, No. 23, March 1977.

Population Newsletter, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, No. 24, October 1977.

Population Newsletter, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, No. 25, March 1978.

Dr. TABAH. I'd be very pleased to do that.

Mr. SCHEUER. We'll hold the record open for the next 2 weeks. We're very grateful to you for doing that.

Dr. TABAH. It's a real honor, Mr. Chairman, to address this committee. The topic is the recent trends of population policies, and I have placed the emphasis in this short paper on the Third World.

This paper is a very brief summary of a more important U.N. document on the monitoring of population trends and policies which is now in press.

Let me remind you, Mr. Chairman, that according to the General Assembly and to the Bucharest Conference itself, the Secretariat has the mandate to provide, every two years, an overall view of world population in terms of the demographic situation on the one hand, and on the other hand in terms of the population policies, governments' perceptions, formulations, and actions taken.

It is an important document since next year there will also be at the U.N. a review and appraisal of action taken to implement the goals and recommendations of the plan of action adopted in Bucharest, in light of trends and policies—once again, policy in terms of perception and formulation—and action taken by certain governments since Bucharest.

Mr. SCHEUER. When will that review be finished?

Dr. TABAH. There will be a special discussion on ECOSOC, and I am expecting this will take place in the summer of 1979.

Mr. SCHEUER. I say that because we have scheduled an inter-parliamentary conference of parliamentarians from all over the world on population, to take place in August 1979 in Sri Lanka.

And it would be extremely helpful for our deliberations if your report could be available by then.

Dr. TABAH. The paper should be available before ECOSOC will take up the question of population next summer.

Mr. SCHEUER. That would be very helpful.

Is this the 5-year review?

Dr. TABAH. Yes, the 5-year review. The plan of action adopted in Bucharest should be reviewed every five years.

In the meantime, we provide legislative bodies with a biennial overall review of world population trends and policies, and I hope that in this document you will find what the governments and the community are doing in terms of action.

Mr. SCHEUER. This would be extremely helpful to all members of the interparliamentary group. They expect to have about 40 or 50 countries represented, most of them from the developing world, with about 100 or 125 delegates.

Dr. TABAH. The paper that I provided to the committee, Mr. Chairman, is based on a survey sent to 156 countries with a covering letter from Mr. Waldheim. I also used information from the data bank we have in the population division on all the different components of population trends as well as on policies.

In general terms, we consider there is no longer any doubt that the Third World desires to reduce its rate of growth, and it is my opinion that this is about to be achieved. There is no doubt that a decline of fertility started some years ago in many countries of the Third World.

Mr. SCHEUER. I agree with you totally, but I do not agree that it's the ultrasensitive or ultracontroversial subject that it's been painted to be.

I think frequently governments describe population as being an ultrasensitive and controversial subject, because they don't know how to cope with it. I think that calling it sensitive and controversial can frequently be a copout.

The question is: Is it a sensitive subject, and if it is, how does one cope with it, how does one design donor programs, how does one help developing countries make the institutional changes in their own societies and in their own legislation that they're going to have to make in order for this aid to be effective? How does one do all that in a way that is tactful, acceptable, and consistent with certain mores, traditions and religious, cultural and tribal heritage?

As you have already said, it's perfectly clear that in Asia, Africa and Latin America there are numerous examples of countries that urgently want to get on and actually are getting on with the task of demographic transition. There's perhaps no portion of the world where there are not at least some examples of countries that are making a diligent effort and who, by this decision, have indicated that there are indeed no religious, tribal, cultural, and political sensitivities that cannot be overcome if there's a will to do it. We need to help design programs that are acceptable and meet all of the legitimate sensitivities that vary in different parts of the developing world.

Dr. TABAH. According to our survey, 81 percent of the Third World's population believe that a lower rate of population growth is desirable. In terms of governments, it's more difficult to assess because the smaller governments, in general terms, have different views on population growth than those of the bigger countries.

Mr. SCHEUER. And wouldn't that 81 percent include population samples in all parts of the developing world? Is there any part of

the developing world where there has been refusal of the countries there to engage in population-sensitive programs? In other words, would that 81 percent all be located in some areas with the total exclusion of other areas?

Dr. TABAH. No; I would not say that. I gave in the appendix of my paper, Mr. Chairman, country by country the perceptions of population growth; we have split the countries in terms of the level of development, in terms of their perception of their rate of growth and in terms of the desire for intervention. As you can see in this paper, Mr. Chairman, which is based on replies, answers given by the governments themselves, that my opinion—as Carmen Miro was saying herself some minutes ago—there is a great change in the perception of population policy in the world, mainly in the Third World.

There is less sensitivity.

Mr. SCHEUER. How recent is this change, in your view?

Dr. TABAH. The 1974 Bucharest Conference certainly was influenced by the decisions of the Special Session of the General Assembly on the New International Economic Order.

I would take Mexico as a very important example. The Mexico Conference, as Carmen Miro reminded us, was just before the Bucharest Conference. When we prepared the plan of action, we were totally opposed to any targets of growth. We were recently in Mexico with Carmen last August at a conference in which the President of Mexico made a very interesting statement. I was informed by a member of the Mexican Government that a target has now been accepted of a 2.5 percent growth rate. This is a total change from the Government's attitude at the time of the Bucharest Conference.

That means that if we had, today, a new conference on population I would expect that the tone would be totally different from that in Bucharest. That is the reason why the next debate in ECOSOC is so important next year.

Mr. SCHEUER. Isn't it also true that at the time of the Bucharest Conference, the Socialist countries were loudly and stridently opposed to population programs because they said that in Socialist countries there are no population problems since goods and services are equally distributed? But the Chinese have made it clear to the world that they have very strong and very effective population programs, at least in their urban areas; doesn't that sort of neutralize the past opposition of the Socialist countries?

Dr. TABAH. You know that at the moment of the conference, China already had a very strong population policy.

Mr. SCHEUER. But their rhetoric certainly didn't reflect that.

Dr. TABAH. No, no, no. Because it seems to me that there is no longer any relationship between ideology and population.

Mr. SCHEUER. That's a very important statement; that's precisely what I was getting at.

Dr. TABAH. I have been in China, I have been in U.S.S.R., and I was in Cuba last week. My observation is that these are countries where the growth rate is declining more rapidly.

The demographic conditions now in Cuba are very close to stationary and Cuba is not any longer influenced by the potential inherent in age structure.

All Socialist countries in the Third World have a very low population growth rate. What is different with respect to other countries is that they rightly put emphasis on indirect methods.

All governments say "We should put population within a development program," but that is already a matter of fact according to our studies in the developing world. Direct methods are clearly preferred because of the urgency of the situation.

For example, in India and in many Latin American countries, direct methods are not at all ruled out and are not considered at variance with the philosophy of Bucharest.

A last point that I would like to make, Mr. Chairman is the need for the developing countries to have diversification of their population policies.

They have the feeling that it is not only growth which matters, but also distribution of population, as well as mortality.

We have the feeling that the decline of mortality is not going down as rapidly as we were expecting 10 years ago, and this is a very important thing. If you would like to succeed in a population policy you have to take into account the different facets of the problem.

Mr. SCHEUER. Leonard, do you have any questions?

Mr. ROBINSON. Dr. Tabah, you have expressed a tremendous amount of optimism with respect to the changing attitudes of developing countries. You've stated that they are beginning to develop population policies and programs.

How would you suggest that U.S. population assistance be used in a more effective and efficient manner to accelerate this process, to assist these developing countries in providing population assistance to their people, based on your own experiences?

Dr. TABAH. I would say certainly not in advocating exclusively family planning, but putting family planning in a more concrete perspective within developmental issues.

This is most important in African, and Latin American countries. If you do not link—as Mr. Chairman said very rightly, if you do not link, for example, family planning with maternal health and infant mortality, you will not succeed.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, I would say it a little differently.

My perception is that when a developing country first gets a family planning population program started, it is essential that family planning should be linked to maternal and child health programs, since maternal and child health programs are anti-mortality programs. Lower maternal and child mortality rates will, in turn, encourage the acceptance of family planning.

In the first 2 or 3 years, I think it's absolutely essential that family planning programs be linked to maternal-child health programs. To come into a developing country and say, "Look, we're not concerned with preventive health care and we're not concerned with sanitation and nutrition. All we want you to do is reduce population growth rates," is an absolute invitation to an explosion of resentment. That's the worst possible format in which to place family planning.

But I have noticed that, after a country has had some experience with maternal and child health, has experienced significant declines

in mortality rates, and has become accustomed to family planning, then one can establish freestanding family planning clinics that offer only family planning services. I saw such clinics in operation in Lagos, Nairobi, and in Kinshasa, and it was explained to me that once family planning was accepted by the people and the politicians as an integral element of a total package of maternal-child health programs, then it was possible to establish single-service family planning clinics in various places.

Dr. TABAH. I would like to give you some figures which seem to me interesting in this discussion, Mr. Chairman.

Some studies made by the U.N. and by Dr. Parker Mauldin who also testified here, if I am correct, came to the conclusion that for the last 10 years the decline of fertility in the Third World has been due one-third to the family planning programs and two-thirds to the change in the social setting.

That does not mean that family planning is not important. It could be very different in the future, mostly if it is put rightly into a development program.

Mr. SCHEUER. What kind of changes in the social setting was he talking about?

Dr. TABAH. Well, we are studying precisely that. We are trying to see what the indirect factors are which affect fertility.

Mr. SCHEUER. These are actually factors which affect motivation.

Dr. TABAH. Well, there are a lot of factors, but certainly, as has been mentioned in this discussion, the status of the woman is certainly one of the most important.

Mr. SCHEUER. What is the U.N. doing in this one area of concern, to help developing world countries improve their legislative treatment of women and the way they actually perceive of women in general?

Dr. TABAH. I don't know, that is not my field, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHEUER. Who would be the top official in the U.N. on the matter of the status of women?

Dr. TABAH. Ms. Helvi Sipilä, who is Assistant Secretary General. She's certainly the person who can give you the best information.

Mr. SCHEUER. I appreciate the suggestion.

Dr. Tabah, on page 8 of your testimony you note that impediments to programs are not so much matters of political will, but rather the need for knowledge and resources with which to convert principles into practice. I agree with that statement. "The limits are now less those of politics than of the need for knowledge and resources." I quite agree with that statement.

Just to fill in the gaps, what kinds of assistance would be required from the international community. Is the international community prepared and able to meet the need for this kind of assistance, both in their ability to design appropriate programs and their willingness to fund them at a certain order of magnitude?

Dr. TABAH. There are very interesting papers which will be presented to the next UNDP Governing Council by UNFPA, which is as you know, the U.N. agency providing funds for population activities, and there is an important paper providing guidelines for action by UNFPA in the different countries.

Mr. SCHEUER. When will those guidelines be available?

Dr. TABAH. It seems that Mr. Salas will present the paper in June to the UNDP Governing Council.

[The paper will be in the committee files and available upon request.]

Dr. TEITELBAUM. Dr. Tabah, I was interested in a sentence on page 9 of your testimony, to which you've referred earlier. You said, "For the moment we are incapable of quantifying the effects of indirect action, of improvements in educational levels, changes in the status of women, et cetera."

Now, often the rhetoric of advocates of particular approaches and the conventional wisdom of policymakers differs from what is known on the basis of scientific research. I wonder if you could comment specifically on what you believe to be well established in scientific literature as to the relations between fertility and three major areas that have become part of the rhetoric of indirect relations between fertility and development. Those three areas are mortality—particularly infant and child mortality, the status of women—one of the two you referred to here, and the distribution of income within the country.

I'd be interested, very interested, to hear your comments as to what you believe to be known about those indirect relations.

Dr. TABAH. Those are the three major factors which influence fertility. About mortality, I'm very surprised by some comments made by scholars about the effect of infant mortality on fertility. For years and years we were saying that the decline in infant mortality is a prerequisite for the decline of fertility. Now, scientifically, this is being challenged. We are not any longer sure that it's true. There is a very difficult controversy on this subject. Professor Brass, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine—whom you know very well, has said that there's no proof of this relationship. It seems to me that the link is correct. What we don't know is the mechanism by which infant mortality could induce, could be a kind of first sign for the decline of fertility. My impression is purely intuitive. I still believe that infant mortality is a very important factor for the decline of fertility, but there are some scientific controversies in this respect.

About the status of women, it's certainly one of the factors we know least about, because it is so much linked with the culture of the different countries. In Arab countries, in Latin American countries, and even within the Latin American countries, as Carmen Miro said, there are so many differences.

We don't know much, and it's extremely difficult because it's not a quantitative variable, while infant mortality is.

Now, on income distribution, we are working on that, and I would like to refer to what you said in the first hour this morning, Mr. Chairman. The effect of change in income distribution is extreme regarding fertility. My own experience is when there is a change in income distribution in a country, you automatically have a change in fertility.

In any country when there is a change in income distribution you have a change in fertility.

Mr. SCHEUER. What is the link?

Dr. TABAH. I would say that when it is not too large, too extended, you have a lower fertility.

Mr. SCHEUER. I take it you're talking about both motivation and the ability to buy contraceptives and absorb the price.

Dr. TABAH. Oh, it's more than a question of contraceptives. I would say it is the background and the social setting that matters.

Mr SCHEUER. What exactly are the factors in the social setting that affect fertility? Is it the fact of enjoying a slightly better standard of living that one would want to protect by not having so many children?

Dr. TABAH. Exactly, when you have a higher level of income, certainly, you have a lower fertility. There is no doubt about that in the Third World. But it's not so simple. I have just returned from Cuba. There is certainly not a large income distribution in Cuba, and yet there is a very strong decline of fertility, which is not due to the income distribution, but to the political aspect of the country, the political environment, as is the case of China.

So it's not a very simple question. We cannot take the different countries' income distribution and fertility, and come to conclusions. It is much more subtle than that. Certainly income distribution has an affect on fertility.

Now, between countries, this is also extremely important: if the income distribution between countries is changed, that will certainly have an impact on the world demographic situation.

Dr. TEITELBAUM. You seem to be saying in your written statement that it's impossible to quantify these relationships.

Dr. TABAH. Yes; very difficult.

Dr. TEITELBAUM. And if I understand you correctly now, you're saying that your hunch is——

Dr. TABAH. My what?

Dr. TEITELBAUM. Your hunch, your belief is that some of these relationships are important, but that it's very difficult to quantify them.

Dr. TABAH. Exactly.

Dr. TEITELBAUM. Where does that leave a Congressperson who has to allocate scarce resources between various components of the development program, and has a concern with fertility rates? How can he decide what an optimal allocation of funds would be to direct efforts, as compared with indirect efforts, affecting variables such as mortality, and others that we've discussed?

Dr. TABAH. It's a difficult question, but it depends on what your objectives are. If your objective is a decline of the world demographic trend, you might have to act on the larger countries. The rate of growth of the world will depend on the action taken in the countries with more than 35 million people.

That is one objective, but you might have another objective, which is a humanitarian one, and you will take in this case a different set of priorities. It depends on your objectives.

Dr. TEITELBAUM. But if you had a certain sum of money, the marginal \$100, say, and your goal was in a particular country to bring population growth rates down in a gradual way, how would you invest that money, based upon the lack of quantitative knowledge that you so eloquently described?

Some people would say you should put it into direct family planning efforts. Others would say you should put it into education

of women or maternal and child health programs to lower infant mortality, because that's the main factor.

Dr. TABAH. There is no one answer to this question, Dr. Teitelbaum. Certainly direct action is still very important; according to our survey it is really the desire of the government to get some resources to act directly. Certainly the indirect aspects are very important, too, and it is absolutely impossible, in my mind, to adopt any one single formula. It depends on the context. You have—I do not believe in general policy, but in specific policies.

Mr. SCHEUER. Dr. Tabah, we've kept you far beyond our usual time period, and we thank you very much for your thoughtful testimony.

We look forward to receiving from you, within the next few weeks, the information that we discussed. We would like to express our gratitude to you for your patience and for your very thoughtful and helpful testimony.

Dr. TABAH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The following backup paper was sent to the committee and is available in the committee files:]

Economic and Social Council: Population Commission, Report on the 19th Session, January 1977.

Mr. SCHEUER. We will now hear from Mrs. Randy Engel, executive director of the U.S. Coalition for Life, who will discuss world population growth and the role of family planning.

You are more than welcome to give us an excerpt from your testimony and to summarize it, or discuss any aspect of any of the testimony that you've heard this morning.

Your testimony, of course, will be printed in its entirety at this point in the record.

Mr. SCHEUER. We're happy to have you here.

Mrs. ENGEL. Thank you. If there's any difficulty in hearing me, I'm sure I can speak up a little louder.

STATEMENT OF MRS. RANDY ENGEL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, U.S. COALITION FOR LIFE

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 334].

Mrs. ENGEL. We're here to light candles. There's only one problem, one doesn't want necessarily to burn down the house when one lights a candle, so that the cure is worse than the disease.

So let's look at a few lightings of candles here.

As Ms. Robinson has suggested, now, the formal text of my testimony has already been distributed to the staff; correct?

Additional copies of my testimony, plus auxiliary materials—including prolife reports and so forth—are available on the table to my right for anyone who would like additional material.

It's kind of interesting to get here early this morning and to hear the population testimony. It reminds me of the story of the primitive pygmy tribe who saved a Scandinavian youth who was swept on shore after a shipwreck, and when the pygmies viewed the Scandinavian boy, and particularly as they lived with him, they thought

there was something pathogenic about his growth, so the pygmy tribe tried everything they could to stunt the growth.

Now, you see, the pygmies were very sincere, because this giant was quite outside their particular point of reference. So one can say that they were sincere in their efforts to keep the youth's growth down, although they were probably wrong in trying to do so. The point being that where we come in, the population issue is very much related to where we stand in reference to our moral and ethical perceptions of the value of people.

Have any of you been watching the program "Holocaust"? It's very interesting, because I think one of the mistakes one can make when viewing it is that somehow it can't happen again, or that the Nazis were insane barbarians. As we know, of course, they were perfectly sane scientific technicians in the worst sense of the word. The coalition's position on population control is basically that Neo-Malthusian theories represent the new holocaust.

By this I mean that what we're going to be seeing in the future is a biocracy. It's going to be a world of technicians. And just because it's going to be a biocracy of the test tube doesn't necessarily mean it's going to be any less harsh than the dictatorship of the hobnailed boots.

My role today is to discuss the ethical and moral implications of population control and draw these issues into the public arena. Also, to make some practical legislative suggestions in terms of determination of Title X of the Foreign Assistance Act funding. So I'm going to start talking about some of the issues at stake, and why I can relate population control to the new "Holocaust."

We're talking about population control; we're talking about basic elements in relation to human existence. I don't believe that it's possible to discuss the population issue rationally without coming to grips with some fundamental assumptions posed by the population control establishment.

You know, we saw that the pygmies thought that natural growth in the young Scandinavian man was abnormal. Now in the eyes of many Malthusians, population growth is seen as a deterrent to human progress. It's a very subjective analysis, of course, and certainly many valid arguments could be put forth by the non-Malthusian.

Let's begin by talking a little bit about basic human rights.

Here I'd have to define population control as so-called government family planning programs, programs of population limitation as public policy.

The first thing, when we look at the issue of population control, is that it's actually an inversion of what I would suggest the norm—at least in the democratic society—would be. In population control the individual and the family are seen as being subservient to the state, and the right of human existence from this perspective is based on his economic contribution, or some other materialistic goal, rather than the proper position, which is a man's right to exist is simply for the fact that he is.

In terms of USAID policies, we must say that they have got the largest human experimentation going since Nazi Germany. What

we've got is, in the eyes of USAID, is a disease of so-called overpopulation for which they see collective prophylactic therapy as being the answer.

Now, in the eyes of the population control establishment, USAID, what we've got is a new scapegoat. Of course, the scapegoat is the poor, the fertile poor. They're responsible for ecological disasters, for unemployment, and so forth. I hope I'm mistaken. I've heard several references here about women with many children in developing nations needing improved educational opportunities. I hope the assumption wasn't that if one has a large family, one is therefore uneducated.

You weren't trying to make that implication, were you, Congressman?

Mr. SCHEUER. We're here to listen to you, Mrs. Engel.

Mrs. ENGEL. Fine. I simply wanted a clarification.

The next criterion for the technocrat is his almost slavish devotion to technology.

Now since Title X of the Foreign Assistance Act came into being, July 22, 1965, we've had over \$1 billion of tax dollars poured into USAID programs, and it's interesting that when Congress deals with the population issue in terms of AID appropriation authorizations the preoccupation is always on the "how" of population control; never on the "why."

In USAID programs we have the largest scale experimentation going on in the area of testing fertility control drugs. The guinea pigs, of course, are usually women—poor, ignorant—and that makes a mockery of informed consent.

And I don't care what technology you're talking about—whether you're talking about the pill, whether you're talking about Depo-Provera, whether you're talking about exsanguination, whether you're talking about mass sterilization—it's a massive experiment, and instead of the professors using their wives and daughters, they prefer to go out and use the women in the Third World.

We have in the person of R. T. Ravenholt—who directs the Office of Population—who I would say is the architect of USAID population programs—a real symbol of what I would call the ultimate technocrat. It's interesting to note that for Ravenholt the desired—the ultimate in fertility control—is a substance which will insure the nonpregnant state at the end of each monthly cycle. Secondly, he is very interested in the inoculation, the injection, which would probably be a contraceptive, sterilizing, and abortifacient agent. This particular technology has tremendous appeal for the population controller, and the greatest potential for violation of human rights in developing nations. There would be less freedom of consent for the women who would be receiving the injection as we know from Depo-Provera trials in Thailand.

With regard to the new holocaust we also see a tremendous rise in euthanasia and in eugenics.

There is a specific point that I want to make with regard to what I call the manipulation of public conscience. There's been a tremendous focus by USAID on "motivation" and "propaganda" in population programs using tax moneys. My money, tax dollars—in stirring up what I would call demographic panic, and the essence of

population control propaganda is that they want people to react to adopt certain values, so they have to manipulate the public conscience, the collective conscience, if you will. And they do this sort of in-depth psychology to get people to do what they may not desire to do. Of course, as you have already suggested, there are probably few obstacles that can't be overcome—religious, moral, and so forth.

We have this drive to form the public conscience.

The only gimmick in this desire is that the propaganda has to be such that the person being propagandized, the "propogandee," must feel that it was himself who wanted it all the time. The "sine quo" of what we call population propaganda.

Another relationship between the new holocaust and the old is the preoccupation with euphemisms. I have with me a statement by Marshall Green, whose name came up in earlier testimony. The State Department recently sent me a copy of one of his older speeches, and he says—talking about controlling population growth, "Let me now turn to what is being done to control population growth."

Well let's have a little honesty. What are we talking about? Controlled population growth. Aren't we really talking about some people controlling others? And usually it's the elitists. Usually it's the person in power who is the controller and the controllee is usually the poor, who has very little knowledge of what would be called his basic rights. He's not a constitutional lawyer. Therefore, he has a very difficult time defending himself against the psychological persuasion of public authorities who hold perhaps different views with regards to the population issue, than he.

Population policies must be implemented, so when we talk about Title X population policies, we're also talking about auxiliary services.

Let me backtrack a minute. Let's take a look at the wording of Title X programs relating to population growth. It's attached to the next to the last page or the last page of the printed text of my testimony, and I particularly wanted to hit upon the issue of volunteerism with regard to population control programs.

The position of the coalition is that government population control programs have a built-in coercion, if we would extend the word "coercion" to include the broadest spectrum of definitions within legal circles.

By this we mean when the state undertakes a program of population limitation, it has the wherewithal, the propaganda machine, and so forth, to manipulate the public conscience, to force its will on those who are the population controllees. Therefore, when Congress in Title X states that programs—the first section—are "voluntary family planning programs—" and it goes on to suggest that no individual be coerced to practice methods of family planning inconsistent with his or her moral, philosophical, or religious beliefs—the whole phrasology is meaningless.

We've heard statements today about how one overcomes this obstacle or that to effective population control measures. But how does one "overcome" without being coercive?

For example, Title X states "The President of the United States shall establish reasonable procedures to insure volunteerism."

Title X came into being in 1965. I've yet to see any practical guidelines which insure volunteerism with regard to congressional authorized and appropriated funding for population control programs in foreign countries. As a matter of fact, it appears that the U.S. Congress cannot even guarantee volunteerism in its domestic programs. For this reason we certainly oppose any USAID activities in the whole area of sterilization, as well as abortion and contraception.

So far, we've sort of been talking ideology, or at least I have been talking ideology. I think it would be a mistake to simply end on the note of ideology without making reference to the issue of money, because money is certainly a motivating factor for the population controllers.

There's a tremendous amount of money to be made in poverty. For example, the USAID budget from 1965 to 1975 was a little over \$732 million. What is so interesting is that more than half of that was spent right in the United States.

In terms of who profits, I think we could go through a whole litany of people who profit or agencies which profit from the population control, because insofar as birth control involves devices and drugs, that means that money is made for someone.

So in the whole spectrum of the population control establishments, you have a wide diversity of people who make money off population control. The most obvious, of course, would be the drug companies. Second would be university bases such as the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

You have agencies such as Planned Parenthood. I gritted my teeth back there every time that one mentions "private agencies," because I think we have to be honest enough to at least—regardless of what one's position is on population control—to admit that most of the agencies we call private, such as Planned Parenthood, could not survive without subsidy from the tax dollar.

So, when we're talking about so-called "private agencies," actually, it's a psychological maneuver. HEW does it; AID does it perhaps more. It's a method of getting into countries by saying it's a "private" agency, but all the while it's really Ravenholt, USAID, channeling money—under the table, so to speak. Such tactics rob the people in the developing countries of the right to autonomy, to develop their own programs and positive alternatives to what I would call population control.

Now, from both economic and ideological points of view we haven't got a really total picture yet of what the population control establishment is, because we're seeing it in the process of becoming. We'll have to wait to see whether the biocracy triumphs.

However, I wanted to mention in closing that the population control policies of USAID are neither in our national interest, nor in the interest of the developing world. It's difficult to see what advantage is accrued from the sexualization of youth in developing countries.

MR. SCHEUER. Excuse me, could you please explain what that means?

MRS. ENGEL. Yes; the term "sexualization" means the promotion of birth control, as opposed to the promotion of sexual control, and

when I talk about sexualization, I'm talking about, for example, USAID programs of condom inundation. I'm talking about the proposals of putting birth control pills in gunball machines in gas stations and in local transportation terminals. I'm talking about sexualization as the separation of sex from procreation and policies which tend to undermine the family.

In discussing these matters we have a basic problem. Mr. Chairman, and that is we simply view the whole picture from totally different perspectives.

The difficulty I have is that my perspective is not supported with tax dollars, whereas the population control perspective is very much a matter of tax subsidy.

With regard to Title X, we have always opposed Title X. We would rather see the money put into alternatives, and later on I'd be happy to talk about those alternatives with you.

So we have actually consistently called for—and this was before Congressman Zablocki's committee and other committees—for the termination of Title X, because first of all it does great harm in developing countries where energies—physical, mental, and spiritual energies—should be directed toward nation-building, and not toward—as what I described—sexualization.

This concludes my oral presentation. I would welcome any questions.

Mr. SCHEUER. Do you believe that more women should plan and administer family planning programs in developing countries? In other words, design the programs as well as administer the services?

Do you believe this would help enhance the moral integrity of these programs if they were services designed and delivered to women for women?

Mrs. ENGEL. No. I'm not so sure that they would be any more humane than those population control programs put forth by men. I will say, though, we've talked a lot about women and the role of development, and so forth. What I'd like to see is not so many more women in family planning, but more women in the broader health field, for example, more women who promote breast feeding, let's say, as a positive alternative to artificial methods of birth control.

I'd like to see expanded health facilities with regard to communicable diseases.

Going back to your original question, Mr. Chairman. I can't say that we'd like to see an expansion of the role of women in these population programs, because we don't defend the existence of the programs period—no matter who's operating them!

Mr. SCHEUER. Even if they were designed and delivered by women.

Mrs. ENGEL. That's right.

Mr. SCHEUER. For the benefit of other women.

Mrs. ENGEL. That's right.

Mr. SCHEUER. You did make the point in your testimony that there were programs whose design and delivery was dominated by males, yet aimed at women. I was wondering that if this was changed, would these programs appear any more acceptable to you?

Mrs. ENGEL. No. In developing countries we would certainly fight for various freedoms for women, and I think one of them would be

freedom from sexual exploitation, especially by USAID. I think the best way to describe this position is to give you a specific example.

Ravenholt, from AID, recently had a published paper on the USAID experience, and the paper included some complications, or how do women react to the difficulties with the pill, and the quip was that women can be told that there are certain advantages in swollen breasts—which of course is one of the complications or side-effects of the pill—by being suggested that they would be more alluring to their husbands and wear a larger bra size.

Now that kind of remark to me is so repugnant, but it's the kind of thing that AID and Ravenholt's office continues to suggest. It's certainly demeaning to women.

I think in the area of family planning, what I'd like to see for women is more informed consent, certainly more education with regard to the biological nature of their bodies, but all this would be achieved not through Government birth-control programs or population-control programs, but really on a woman-to-woman basis at the family unit, and agencies which act as a private entity and not subsidized by Government.

Mr. SCHEUER. Is it the Government subsidy that makes these particular education programs immoral and unacceptable? We have lots of Government programs in education and in preventive health care that are sponsored by the Government and paid for by the Government. What makes family planning different from all the other programs, or do you find that they're all immoral if they're funded by Government?

Mrs. ENGEL. No; I wouldn't make that blanket statement. What I'm suggesting here is something that one of the staff workers on the committee pointed out, and which perhaps would clarify the position of coalition in this whole area, and that is the fact that where family planning exists and is not promoted by any Government entity it is—the programs possess quite a different characteristic than that which is promoted by Government.

You see, when Government promotes birth control, it's essentially putting the Sangerite philosophy as public policy, and we oppose this. A person has a right to believe in the Sangerite philosophy. However, that person should not suggest that it's appropriate for me to subsidize that philosophy or the programs through tax dollars.

Does that answer your question, or should I maybe go through it again?

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, that doesn't exactly answer my question, but it's a fair statement of your position, and I respect you for it.

Do you believe all Government programs are "coercive" if they seek to change people's behavior and their attitudes through education, exhortation, and the provision of the necessary means with which to effect a new way of life?

Is it possible for the Government to try and change people's perceptions and attitudes without being intrinsically coercive?

Mrs. ENGEL. It certainly would in specific areas, such as population control.

Mr. SCHEUER. It certainly would be what? Would not be coercive, or would be coercive?

Mrs. ENGEL. Not all Government programs are a threat to individual freedom and common welfare, but in this particular area, where we're dealing with the individual in relationship with the state and in birth control, such programs are in fact inherently coercive.

Mr. SCHEUER. And what makes it inherently coercive?

Mrs. ENGEL. It's inherently coercive because of the relationship between the persons involved. In other words—we're getting to the whole concept of volunteerism and free consent.

The person who is on welfare or on government subsidy is not in the same position as a middle or upperclass person who has the right to accept and reject that which is proposed by Government.

Mr. SCHEUER. Are you suggesting that low-income people accept supinely and acquiescently every Government wish and directive? Because if you do and you review the history of the sixties, I suggest you'd find something quite to the contrary. That is, that poor people, if they don't like a Government directive or a Government program, they let the Government know very unmistakably where they stand. And this is true around the world.

Mrs. ENGEL. Oh, I don't agree with that at all. I think the main target population in developing countries are the poor, the ignorant, the less powerful. In terms of ignorance, I'm not talking about moral ignorance, I'm talking about formal education.

And what you're dealing with here—for example, we've just heard mentioned several times the compulsory program in India for forced sterilization.

Now, it was the Government in certain provinces of India which was carrying out the compulsory sterilization. What recourse does the person who was dragged by public authorities to meet sterilization quotas have? What's the practical route—where does he go? Does he take a trip across the ocean and come to the U.S. Congress and sit here and say, "Now I was sterilized, and this is the circumstances, and my constitutional rights were violated." I mean that's absolutely ridiculous.

Mr. SCHEUER. I don't think there's anybody in this room or in the Congress or in this country who would condone the abuses of the India program that Sahjay Ghandi fostered. These abuses were, no doubt, one of the major factors in the toppling of Mrs. Ghandi's government. It was an outrageous and unconscionable abuse; I quite agree with you.

Mrs. ENGEL. Yes; It's interesting, though that USAID was not outraged by India's attempts at compulsory sterilization. I had a chance to read the memos that went back from the State Department to New Delhi, our embassy in New Delhi, while this mass sterilization was going on. And the memos are absolutely fascinating to read because they nowhere indicate any sense of outrage at all!

The gist of the memos basically is, "Are they going to be able to get away with it?" Agencies such as, for example, the Population Council, did an analysis on sterilization and the question was not whether it was good or bad—forced sterilization was good or bad—but whether or not the Ghandi regime could get away with it.

But getting back to your original question, we're talking about the relationship of the poor to the state in this area in which the Supreme Court has said is intimate and sacred.

The person who is dependent upon the goodwill of the state for their livelihood—for example, for their food, for their medical care, and so forth—this dependence on the state puts that person in a position of not having the freedom to choose or the freedom to reject population control policies that someone in a middle class or upper class position would have.

So when I say government birth control programs are basically coercive, I'm using coercion in the broad sense of the word to also mean in terms of relationships, and I think if you look through many Supreme Court decisions, they deal not only with forced coercion, you know, the dragging of persons, the physical coercion, but also the coercions related to relationships.

Mr. SCHEUER. Do you believe there's a global population problem which, if left unchecked, could severely affect the quality of life for us here on Earth in terms of its impact on food supplies, its deleterious impact on the environment, the extraordinary needs for energy, and the difficulty of producing sufficient energy without seriously degrading the environment?

Mrs. ENGEL. Well, first of all, let me say that environment and the relationship between environment and population is not my area of expertise, but if you would be interested in seeing a paper that one of our national advisers has recently put together on relationship between environment and population, I'd be happy to submit that to the staff.

Mr. SCHEUER. How long is that paper?

Mrs. ENGEL. I'd say maybe 20, 30 pages.

Mr. SCHEUER. Perhaps you could give us a small excerpt from that paper—5 or 10 pages that could be added to your testimony. We would make it part of the record.

Mrs. ENGEL. Yes. OK. Fine.

Now you asked the question, though, about what we feel with regard to population growth, and so forth.

Mr. SCHEUER. Do you believe the population of the Earth can go from the present 4 billion to the 10 or 11 billion that's been predicted for the next few decades without severely affecting the quality of life of the individual citizen?

Mrs. ENGEL. Well, first of all, I think that if you look over the world demographic situation you come across with a very uneven picture.

First of all, overpopulation is a relative concept, because it usually means an imbalance. Now whether we're talking about an imbalance of food, people, imbalance of energy to use, and so forth, so we're talking about a relative term, and—

Mr. SCHEUER. It's pretty absolute when tens of thousands of hundreds of thousands of people die of starvation.

Mrs. ENGEL. You see, Mr. Chairman, there is really no relationship—

Mr. SCHEUER. We've already seen that happen in the Sahel. We've seen that happen in India. And it's predicted that millions of people will die of starvation around the globe unless we do something about

the growing numbers of people that require nutritionally adequate diets.

Mrs. ENGEL. First of all, when we're talking about birth control, let me say I'm all for the sterilization and birth control for non-humans. It's too bad when we begin population control programs we don't start with rodents and birds which consume a great deal of food.

Mr. SCHEUER. We already have sterilization programs for non-humans. Many of our antirodent, our insecticide programs, and our pest control programs are based on the concept of sterilization.

Mrs. ENGEL. Right. I'd like to see all AID sterilization money go to nonhumans.

Mr. SCHEUER. As a matter of fact, AID does carry on these types of programs abroad, as part of its agricultural development programs.

Mrs. ENGEL. Right. But frequently, with persons such as Ravenholt, they somehow sometimes can't distinguish between nonhuman and human policies.

But we were talking about——

Mr. SCHEUER. The big difference is that we don't ask the rat or the insect. But we do ask the people, and they do choose to use these contraceptive devices in the privacy of their own homes. There's no Big Daddy watching them; it is not 1984 a la George Orwell.

Mrs. ENGEL. Are you saying that people in the developing countries come after these programs of their own free will?

Mr. SCHEUER. I've been to a great many developing countries and I've visited numerous family planning clinics, and that's exactly what I would say.

Women in Africa and Asia walk hours and hours under the hot burning sun, over deserts and whatnot to come to these clinics. And when they arrive they stand and wait in the hot sun for hours and hours. If they've run out of drugs or if it's a rural clinic and the village midwife didn't get there because of a breakdown of transportation, they'll walk hours and hours through the hot burning sun back home only to return a week later to get the devices and knowledge that will help them control their own fertility and their own body.

They go through the most extraordinary inconvenience and hardship in order to acquire the ability to control their own fertility.

Mrs. ENGEL. You know, now your statement is really absolutely amazing! Because one would think if one was coming of her own free will, why do we need, for example, outreach workers which go from home to home? Why do we need such massive propaganda, such antinatalist policies if this is something that women do of their own free will?

I don't buy what you're saying at all, and my experience with relationship to principally Southeast Asia—I was a director for 10 years of a relief agency in Southeast Asia—my experience is just the opposite, that if and when family planning agency exists and is not promoted by, officially promoted by government, that it does a very miserable business and that's where they have to go out and they have outreach workers and they grind the propaganda machines, and so forth.

Mr. SCHEUER. There are many parts of the world where the private programs, unassisted by government, are much more popular than the government programs.

For example, in Kenya, the Government programs aren't well funded. Frequently the family planning clinics run by the Government run out of drugs, pills, and diaphragms so that a woman may have made a trip in vain.

Yet, the family planning clinics run by the Catholic and Protestant churches are often far better funded. They have a far more adequate supply of drugs and medications of all kinds, and they are even more oversubscribed and have even longer waiting lines than the Government funded programs.

Mrs. ENGEL. I have no problem with private agencies promoting family planning. We oppose government efforts in this area where tax money is used and where such tax funds can hardly be called volunteer contributions as in the case of private groups.

Mr. SCHEUER. I'm talking about church-run programs. These are church-run programs that enjoy no governmental funding at all, they are run by the Catholic and the Protestant churches, and I suppose they are supported by contributions from their parishioners all over the world. They are not government funded.

Mrs. ENGEL. Fine, no problem, because you see the church—people who go to church, who subscribe to various creeds, and so forth, this is their right and I have no problem with private behavior and private contributions.

My whole testimony really is in terms of public policy, and I would say that every church has a right to contribute to the moral formation of its people, but when you're dealing with an area of the state—for example, government—there are many different religions and different philosophies with regard to this whole moral question of birth control.

Now, it seems to me, then, in a democratic society, nontotalitarian, that the government position would be one of neutrality—that is not promoting the Sangerite philosophy, but not inhibiting those who wish to promote it.

And what I'm saying is that we'd like to see a return in USAID programs to a position of neutrality with regard to the certain basic issues, and in the case of Title X neutrality can only be achieved by ending Title X funding. There is no way that the state can promote the Sangerite philosophy and go unopposed by us, unless they would be willing to promote a philosophy of—for example—our agency, which opposes such programs. Of course USAID would not support funding of our philosophy.

See, the position of our agency is that the government and the state are not the final arbitrator as to what is moral and not. The churches do have a right to direct the moral tones of their membership.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well now, let me ask you this question. Let's take the Salk vaccine. Would you say it would be immoral of government to engage in a program of distributing the Salk antipolio vaccine, whereas it would be moral if this were done by private groups? Is there something immoral about the fact that a government sponsors a health program that would become moral if it were done by a private group?

Should the government not be engaged in a program of giving antipolio injections to kids at school?

Mrs. ENGEL. In population control programs we talk about eliminating people. In polio programs we talk about eliminating germs. I would not equate the morality of the two. I don't think there's anyone who promotes getting polio. I don't think the issue of polio is a question of morality—in other words, there are not those who say one should have polio and there are not those who are saying one shouldn't get polio. It's assumed that polio is a disease which can be conquered. I would not put people in that same category even though many population controllers would.

With regard to the promotion of the Salk vaccine, as you know, that whole episode of the Salk vaccine has a very long controversy regarding it. I think in this case that the position of government is to offer—in the case of the Salk vaccine—to offer the vaccine along with the other, which would of course at the time have been the Sabin, and to give people the right of informed consent and volunteerism with regard to inoculations.

But I don't think you can put the polio question in the same bracket as the issue of birth control, which has vast moral implications which are not evident in the issue of a communicable disease.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, let me give you another example. The Sisters of Maryknoll, a Catholic order in Yonkers, N.Y. run a family planning clinic in Dar es Salaam, in Tanzania, and the Tanzanian Government also runs family planning clinics in Dar es Salaam. Much of those government programs are run with Title X support.

Now, let's assume, as is the case, that both programs offer the full range of family planning methods—the pill, IUD, foam, condom, etc.

Now, is one program more moral than the other because one funded with Government money and the other, a church program, is funded privately? They offer the same options; they are both voluntary; coercion is in no way involved in either program. People go there because they want to go there. Is one moral and the other immoral; are they both immoral; or are they both moral?

And if there's any difference, what is the distinguishing factor?

Mrs. ENGEL. I think the distinguishing factor would be that the Maryknoll Center provides only natural methods of birth regulation is supported by private funding, whereas the Government programs involve conscripted tax money—ours—to promote birth control values and programs which citizens like myself oppose.

The state, by promoting birth control, puts itself in the position of suggesting that it is a positive good. It becomes an arbitrator of a specific set of morals and of course implies the use of tax money. It puts those who would not subscribe to the proposition that birth control is a universal mandate in a position of having their money used for perhaps the promotion of the pill, and so forth, which they believe to be immoral.

Now, the Sisters of Maryknoll, on the other hand—no church that I know of pretends to be morally neutral. The state is required to be morally neutral in this area of birth control. The church is not. The church is an agency for moral and conscience formation. Therefore, it would have its right to exist and promote its programs with volunteer contributions.

The Government programs cannot be neutral, and therefore we would oppose Government programs which use tax money collected from its citizens who hold pluralistic views on population control, birth control, etc.

And by the way, you know, when you say "full range," it's like going to a supermarket or sitting down for dinner. If we were to say a person has a freedom of choice, it doesn't only mean that their freedom of choice is limited to let's say the pill, natural methods, and so forth. One—in order to have the broad range of freedom of choice—would have to be—have the option of saying no, I don't wish any of the methods.

Mr. SCHEUER. But that's what the woman was doing before she made the first visit to the family planning clinic. She was saying no, and she had 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 kids, and that was her life before she found out about the existence of some alternatives.

It's not that she never had the option of saying no. That's her first option.

Mrs. ENGEL. There's always been plenty of alternatives to artificial contraception. Probably the most universally acknowledged is first of all sexual abstinence. The second is breast feeding, which is a natural child spacer. And in fact, one of the problems with the pill—

Mr. SCHEUER. Breast feeding, incidentally, is widely used as a tradition in Africa, as a contraceptive, as you know.

Mrs. ENGEL. I'm sorry, what was that? I didn't understand.

Mr. SCHEUER. It's a traditional tribal practice of contraception—breast feeding. The practice among many tribes in Africa is that after a woman bears a child she can't have sexual relations with her husband until the child is weaned and walks or runs, and either one of those generally entails a 2 or 2½-year waiting period.

Mr. ENGEL. That's true, I know, among American Indian tribes. One of the complications, however, to natural child spacing is, for example certain fertility-control drugs which make it impossible or deleterious to have the woman breast feed, and this is of course one of the problems we've run into with the pill.

Mr. SCHEUER. Yes. That practice—the breast feeding means of contraception—is particularly well established where there is a pattern of polygamy.

Mrs. ENGEL. Let me clarify the term "contraception" within the Sangerite terminology. I would say that abstinence and breast feeding are forms of spacing and let's say child limitation, whereas contraception in its traditional Sangerite sense means the carrying on of sexual activity using a drug or device which would frustrate the natural consequences of fertility. Therefore sexual abstinence and breast feeding cannot be called "contraceptive."

Mr. SCHEUER. The world population plan of action states that:

All couples and individuals have the basic right to freely and responsibly decide the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education, and means to do so.

Do you agree that the means with which to effectively practice family planning is a basic right?

In other words, do you accept or do you reject the principles of

the world population plan of action that was passed by the U.N. assemblage in Bucharest in 1974?

Mrs. ENGEL. For a full statement on that, you may want to check—

Mr. SCHEUER. Well I'm asking you.

Mrs. ENGEL. I'm going to give you my comment. I just want to say if you want a total picture—since our time is limited—you might want to check the front page of the U.S. Coalition for Life Bucharest Report. When our 12-member team was at Bucharest they had a policy statement and you can get a detailed answer to that.

Mr. SCHEUER. If it's a brief statement, we'd be happy to include it with your other two statements.

Mrs. ENGEL. OK. I'm trying to keep track here of what you need.

Mr. SCHEUER. Yes. Now, can you answer the question?

Mrs. ENGEL. Yes; I will. We support true freedom of choice, responsible and generous parenthood, and full consent. We would support the education or we would support truth with regard to these matters regarding fertility control.

One of the problems with the world population statement is that how can a family realize its choice, its free, informed consent choice, in the face of aggressive population control programs which are managed and promoted by Government? This is one of the contradictions in Title X, which we also saw in the Bucharest Population Conference statement, and that is on the one hand a talk about the rights of the family and the couple; on the other hand, they talk about the need for population control; and what I'm saying you can't have both.

Now, either family planning, as we understand it, is planning for a family by the family, by the married couple, or it is population control in which the Government has the primary say with regard to the size of families and brings all the power of the state to converge on basic government policies.

So you see it would be very much appreciated—for our agency at least—if the staff or yourself could include into the record exactly how this sort of conflict of interest—that is conflicts of the state versus conflicts of the individual family—how does one resolve them within the context of title —? I would be very interested, you know, in seeing something on that.

Mr. SCHEUER. Any questions here?

Mr. ROBINSON. Mrs. Engel, I think we're all very intrigued by your testimony this afternoon. I'd like to ask you a couple of questions.

To what extent do you think your organization's views and values are representative of government and private officials in developing countries?

And second, why do you think many developing countries do accept U.S. population assistance?

Mrs. ENGEL. To answer the first part of your question, the U.S. Coalition for Life operates, of course, in the United States, plus we have international representatives on every continent of the world. In fact, when we sent the Bucharest team over, there were six Americans and six foreign nations represented on the pro-life team.

And I would say that our position and our values are very much in keeping with the traditional family values that one finds in many developing countries.

I would say that our position has tremendous support among our international advisers, which are really grassroots people who are involved in grassroots activities, and therefore would be reflective of popular sentiment, so I think our feelings are very much reflected in the concerns and needs of developing countries.

Mr. ROBINSON. Are any of these people involved in the governments of these countries we're talking about, developing countries? Do they have policymaking positions?

Mrs. ENGEL. Our advisers would be the persons involved in non-governmental activities. Specifically, physicians, clergymen, maternal and public health service workers, and so forth. I would say with the exception of the public health service worker who is perhaps indirectly related to an agricultural program, most would be active in the capacity of private citizens, and they would of course share our values.

OK, now you had a second question. Would you repeat that, Mr. Robinson, please?

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes; I asked you secondly why do you think many developing countries accept U.S. population assistance, and in many cases they are asking for more.

Mrs. ENGEL. First of all, I think—if developing nations had a choice in taking population control programs as opposed to what we would consider positive alternatives—for example, funds for indigenous farming activities to stimulate food development and food preservation. I think if they were given a free choice, most of the developing countries and the persons that I would associate with them would choose the latter. In other words, they would choose alternatives.

If you look at the wide perspective—and here I make a specific reference to Latin America—the Latin American governmental birth control policies came into existence on July 22, 1965, that is when USAID declared its task under Title X to promote government family planning and population growth programs.

Generally speaking, the population control initially is directed from outside rather than in developing nations themselves. For example, let me take the situation in Bogota, Colombia.

The architect of the Colombian program was Bernard Berelson of the Population Council, which is, of course, an offshoot of the Rockefeller family.

That program was actually designed in New York. Because of the activities that had gone on prior to the official act of sending down the population control directions, certain things had already been established in Colombia.

For example—and this is probably true of most Latin American countries—family planning was integrated into maternal and child health programs. There were a number of programs designed for so-called economic incentives and disincentives, the linking of ability to get powdered milk for one's child, linked with the acceptance of the pill or IUD.

Then the powerful foundations—for example, the Rockefeller Foundation and agencies such as Pro-Familia—took from Colombia and brought to the United States a whole group of agreeable technocrats who are very efficient at contraception, sterilization, and abortion.

Then these USAID trained technocrats go back to their homelands. AID sends them back to Colombia with all this spanking new equipment and they open a clinic.

Then the propaganda machine in Colombia goes into action. None of this was what I would call indigenous. The people are really not aware of the source of the propaganda, the thrust, as being outside, because the issue of population control is often under the guise of improving maternal and child health care. There's very little honesty in dealing with Latin American population control programs.

The Government has already been heavily infiltrated by persons who are Malthusian in creed, who have been placed in strategic positions within the demographic policy structure of government, and so you have all these considerations.

You have mass propaganda, literally the mental and psychological rape of the masses. A demographic crisis is created. You have all these things, and for the most part the source is not from within. The source—the impetus for the programs came from without, mainly USAID and various agencies such as the UNFPA and IPPF.

Then, after the initial attack from the outside they have now infiltrated many Latin American countries so that the government structures, the key people within the government structures, are the very same people who were originally on the outside looking in.

So I would say that these are not particularly welcome programs, and I don't think they do anything to promote the U.S. image abroad, and that if given their choice that many developing countries would pick other alternatives.

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you.

Mr. SCHEUER. Dr. Teitelbaum?

Dr. TEITELBAUM. Mrs. Engel, I have a few questions for you.

On the Latin American issue you raised just now, you indicated that policies on population started currently with AID funds, and that these programs were not indigenous and were directed from the outside.

Do you apply these characterizations to the two largest countries in Latin America—Brazil and Mexico—or are these to be applied only to Colombia and other smaller countries?

Mrs. ENGEL. I would say that would probably be the rule, rather than the exception.

Dr. TEITELBAUM. So you think that Mexico and Brazil are undertaking national family planning programs directed from outside.

Mrs. ENGEL. Well you see, as I tried to clarify, the initial thrust was definitely one from the outside, but now the persons in policy-making positions are in key positions within government, so now it looks like it's spontaneous government reaction.

Dr. TEITELBAUM. OK, the other question I have is, do you—I sense a disagreement in your testimony with previous testimony today by Dr. Tabah of the United Nations. I wish he were here so you could engage in colloquy, because he reported to us—and you will have heard this—on an official governmental survey undertaken by the United Nations, which showed that governments representing 81 percent—if I have the number correct—81 percent of the population of the Third World, wished to see lower population growth

rates in their own country and are prepared to provide their own policies and resources in order to expedite the declines in fertility.

Now, do you have different evidence based upon your sources which is inconsistent with the international survey of the United Nations?

Mrs. ENGEL. I would say that there—I think throughout the testimony I distinguished between what I would call the micro level of activity—in other words, the family unit and the individual choices, and so forth, as opposed to what might be called the macro level, the national level and governmental level. So having made that distinction, let me say that there are many governments who instead of instituting the necessary reforms would like to make the so called population explosion the scapegoat for the ills that plague their societies. So it very well may be true that there are governments who would like to see increased population control programs, as a substitute for various reforms that might be stimulated by demographic pressures.

But what I was basically talking about was the grassroots people in the developing countries are not banging down the doors at the family planning clinics. They would rather bang down the doors of agencies providing milk, and so forth, for the young.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, you've been extremely patient with us. You certainly presented your viewpoint in a very articulate, compassionate and impressive way. I think you were both intelligent and impassioned.

And you've given us a great deal to think about, and we thank you very much for your patience.

Mrs. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.]

HEARINGS TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON POPULATION, RESOURCES, AND NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19, 1978

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POPULATION,
Washington, D.C.

The task force met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Paul Simon presiding.

Members in attendance: Mr. Simon, Mr. Scheuer, Mr. Erlenborn, Ms. Collins.

Also present: Dr. Teitelbaum, Mr. Robinson, Ms. Williamson, Mr. Baron, Ms. Nyrop, Ms. Boone, Ms. Pincus.

Mr. SCHEUER. The hearing will come to order. This is the second day of hearings of the Select Committee on Population on the subject of population and development assistance.

Today we have a very interesting set of witnesses. We will have two panels: The first will speak on "Population, Food, Energy, and the Environment," and the second on "International Cooperation and World Population Growth."

Our leadoff witness is Ambassador Donald Mills, the Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations. Ambassador Mills is President of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and Chairman of the Group of 77 countries of the developing world which are pushing for structural changes in the economic and political relationship between the North and the South, what is commonly known as the New International Economic Order.

Those who have read Ambassador Mills' statement would agree that it's a brilliant, incisive, remarkably clear and eloquent statement of the problem. He has just flown in from Geneva and will fly back shortly. We're flattered that you made this great effort to be with us and we look forward, with great anticipation, to what you have to say, Ambassador Mills.

Your complete statement will be printed in the record. What you might wish to do is just chat with us for 10 or 15 minutes, and then I'm sure we'll have some questions for you.

We're delighted and honored that you made such a great effort to be with us, and we're looking forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DONALD MILLS, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JAMAICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS, PRESIDENT OF ECOSOC, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE GROUP OF 77

[Prepared Statement in Appendix p. 385.]

Ambassador MILLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege for me to have been asked to come and join in this discussion. It is an unaccustomed privilege; it's the first time I have had the opportunity to testify before a committee of the U.S. Congress.

As I said, Mr. Chairman, it's a privilege to be here, and any special effort which I may have made to get here is merely an indication of what I believe to be the considerable importance of the committee's work, and, I would say, the importance of people like myself accepting the opportunities which have been offered to join in discussions of this nature.

I think we are faced with major global problems which influence both developed and developing countries, and there is a great need for more discussion, more interaction both inside and outside—I would say particularly outside—of the United Nations. So, again, I welcome this opportunity and thank you.

As I understand it, the committee is concerned with the question of population and development assistance. In examining this issue, I believe that you will be looking at a number of connected matters, one of them being the relations between industrialized and developing countries, between north and south. It is in respect to that particular issue that I have been asked to participate, especially to give the positions and viewpoints of developing countries.

Mr. Chairman in the North-South dialogue, little emphasis has been placed on the population factor, but it is clearly a major element in the relationship between developed and developing countries, and this, I believe, will become more evident in future years.

We all face the prospect of a world which has a large number of poor countries with very large populations increasing at a high rate, relatively speaking, alongside a small group of countries with relatively small and slowly increasing populations, with a considerable imbalance in the distribution of income, opportunity, and use of the available resources of the world between the two groups.

The political and economic consequences of this, which are already being felt, will become, I believe, more marked over the years ahead as these imbalances in numbers, income and wealth increase.

It would seem, then, to be imperative that efforts be made, and made now, to move the global society onto a path which will more and more correct the imbalances. Some of these imbalances, in the view of developing countries, derive in large part from historical circumstances which include the past relationship between what were then colonies and a number of countries in the North Atlantic community.

The colonial system and the political and economic developments of the past have produced an international economic system and a set of relationships in which those countries which, in the main, were parts of the colonial holdings, have occupied a subsidiary position. They have been unable, by reason of such a position, to par-

ticipate fully in global economic activity and in decisionmaking in that sphere or to obtain, in our view, an equitable share of the benefits of such activity.

This issue has been the subject of discussion, particularly in the U.N. system, for many years. But the political circumstances have changed dramatically over the past two decades, as scores of countries, which were former colonies, have become independent and begun to participate in international affairs.

In the past 4 years, the call came for a fundamental change in the relationships between developed and developing countries, for the New International Economic Order. This issue has become more and more the primary concern of all countries.

At first, many industrialized countries reacted negatively to the idea of structural change in the global system and to many of the specific proposals made by the developing countries. However, from the outset, a number of industrialized countries supported the call for structural change.

Now, after many conferences and negotiations inside and outside of the U.N. system, in our view, very little by way of concrete progress has been achieved. We are now reaching a critical stage in terms of the relationships between developed and developing countries and the general state of the world economy.

This present situation is a matter of great concern because of the lack of consensus on the proposals which have been put forward. As I say, the present state of the global economy is another major cause for concern. The developing countries argued 3 or 4 years ago that the present economic system had ceased to serve the interests of even the industrialized countries around whose interest it evolved. A new system was needed to serve the interest of both the industrialized countries and the rest of the global community on an equitable basis.

To date, there are many persons in industrialized countries who have come to realize that the international economic system is suffering not merely from some temporary indisposition, but from a serious and fundamental illness. We hear these statements repeatedly, and they come from industrialized countries, and we in the developing countries see this as a further strong argument in favor of a restructured system which can satisfy the requirements of all countries.

It is being said more and more, certainly in North America and in European countries, and by officials in many cases, that the continued prosperity of the industrialized countries will depend on the building of the economies of the developing countries and the establishing of a more equitable partnership between the two groups of countries.

In the face of the very serious difficulties industrialized countries are experiencing today, there have been many indications and statements in those countries of a lack of confidence in the old remedies which were applied to deal with economic problems, and a sense of uncertainty as to what should be done in the face of the serious difficulties.

Tensions have arisen between industrialized countries in discussions about what one or another country should do in the face of the economic difficulties. Of course, developing countries with more

fragile economies suffered more in such circumstances, but I underline, Mr. Chairman, that there is a serious dilemma in the world, in relation to the problems of internal development in developed and developing countries, and the problems of global economic activity and development. Statements and comments in the press in Europe and North America clearly seem to indicate a sense of our having lost our way. It is a problem which equally faces all countries.

In considering the question relating to development assistance and population, may I suggest, then, Mr. Chairman, that full account be taken of these changes in perception concerning the global economy and global economic relationships which have taken place over the years.

It is now realized, I believe, that development assistance, while having a significant role to play in the future, has ceased to be the centerpiece of the relationship between developed and developing countries. During the 1960's and 1970's, we have seen disappointments and failures of our expectations that aid could, by itself, significantly change the conditions in developing countries and alter the relationships between developed and developing countries.

We have seen the disappointments of the development decades and the international development strategy. Many developing countries have found, including my own country of Jamaica, that after years of strenuous and dedicated efforts, the process of development at both the national and the global levels is a most complex one. We have always tended to oversimplify the problems and the prescriptions.

It now seems clear, Mr. Chairman, that it is a most difficult task to remove the manifestations of poverty and suffering in a country; it is a task one which calls for fundamental political, social, and economic changes. I'd like to underline, Mr. Chairman, that this position applies not only to developing countries but to developed countries also. The eradication of poverty, even in rich countries, has caused serious difficulties with respect to both concept and approach. I believe this has demonstrated itself as a complex matter which calls for more fundamental examination and change than we might have believed necessary in the past.

So it has become clear that diminishing the gap in income and opportunity between countries calls for fundamental changes in the relationships between these countries, as well as changes in attitudes. Developing countries have therefore put forward proposals relating to international trade and the restructuring of world trade, as well as to investment and new approaches, new partnerships, and new attitudes with regard to investment. They have also put forward proposals regarding the distribution of industrial activity.

For example, at present, only about 7 percent of total industrial production takes place in developing countries. One of the aims of developing countries, which they are trying to have accepted by the international community, is that, by the year 2000, 25 percent of world industrial activity should take place in developing countries. We are aware of the complex social, political, and economic problems which would be encountered in attempting to achieve this, but we think it is worthy of achievement.

We have put forward proposals concerning the transfer of technology from developed to developing countries, the transfer of resources, and other things.

These proposals are all subjects of discussion and negotiation in the U.N. system under the broad heading of the new international economic order. The lack of significant results from these negotiations is a matter of deep concern to developing countries and to all of us, but we persist in our efforts, as the alternative—in particular, the perpetuation of the wide gap between the two sectors of the world and the perpetuation of gross poverty in so many parts of the world—are unacceptable.

There has been a growing realization on the part of developing countries that most of the initiative, most of the resources required for their development must continue to come from within these countries. It is also true that the requirements of internal economic and social justice must be seen as complementary to the issue of global economic and social justice.

But we believe that it is a mistake to insist on a strict system of conditionality which requires specific performance on the part of developing countries as a qualification for movement in the direction of greater global economic justice and the necessary restructuring of the international economic system.

In the field of population, developing countries must also see the relationship between poverty and population growth and derive policies and programs which can bring a better balance between population and development. But it is not a simple task, as the experience of the developed countries themselves has shown.

In this respect, a balance must necessarily be achieved between national concerns and the interests of individuals who are most directly affected by population issues. A central concern must be the effect of large families on those who have the first responsibility for looking after them, and most particularly on the mothers.

In an effort to assist countries and individuals to escape the trap of poverty, it must be recognized, I think, that the surest way to the establishment of a better balance between population growth and personal and national well-being is the improvement of the economic and social conditions of the people and the countries involved.

The aim and purpose of the move toward a new international economic order is not merely the eradication of poverty, though this is a major element in the process. It is the establishment of a global economic system and a set of relationships between countries which allow full opportunity for the achievement of adequate and satisfactory ways of life for all people and for their full participation as equals in global affairs.

Development assistance is required in greater volume to advance this process, and the lag in such resources flowing to developing countries has been most unfortunate. It is hoped that steps will be taken to bring about a significant increase in these transfers, which are greatly needed and greatly appreciated.

But the establishment of means whereby developing countries can earn a greater and more equitable share in the fruits of global economic activity, along with increased efforts by those countries with

respect to their internal development processes, are the main requirements for the achievement of the aim of a more just and equitable global society.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you very much for a very forthright and impressive statement.

We have four task forces within this committee. It is our policy that when one or two members do the work in organizing a task force, we ask them to chair the hearings. It is my pleasure to turn the chair of this hearing over to Congressman Paul Simon, of Illinois, who is one of our very distinguished, hard-working and eloquent spokesmen. He himself has written a book about the global food situation and is an expert in this area, as well as being a highly effective and hard-working Member of the Congress.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you very much, Mr. Scheuer.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your excellent statement. Because we have a number of witnesses today, I am going to take the Chair's prerogative of limiting myself and members to 5 minutes on questions, if there is no objection to that.

Congressman Scheuer is suggesting that we make an exception to that for our initial witness, and we will do that.

QUESTIONS AND REMARKS

Mr. SIMON. Let me ask the first question, Mr. Ambassador. In reading about the new international economic order, I sometimes have a hard time grasping the specifics.

If you could fashion this New International Economic order in any way possible, how would you structure it?

Ambassador MILLS. Mr. Chairman, this is one of the dilemmas of the global dialog. If one looks back at the development of the discussion over the 1950's and 1960's as developing countries came in, they switched the focus of the U.N. system—the international dialog—more and more to development matters, aid being one of the main concerns of the time.

Slowly, development perceptions widened. My own country became independent in 1962, having been struggling with its own internal development for some years and learning slowly a little bit about development. In the U.N., not only developing countries, but countries like the United States and others—getting away from the cold war situation—became concerned more and more with world poverty and matters of world development, slowly developed ideas, slowly realized that aid was not enough. Out of this, the development decade came.

The United States played a great role in this and in the concept of the international development strategy. These ideas contained many of the ingredients of what is now called the new international economic order. So the process was rather gradual.

For instance, UNCTAD was set up in 1964 because of a dissatisfaction with the functioning of the U.N. system in relation to trade and development. The developing countries pressed for this, and many of the things which have been advocated by developing countries in UNCTAD over the years appear in the new international economic order; for example, the restructuring of world trade and the

change in the situation so that developing countries would no longer be committed, by and large, to being producers of raw materials and importers of manufactured goods, which is what the classic colonial situation provided for them.

The whole structure of the world marketing, shipping, and communications systems lent itself to this situation—this particular division of labor which had, of course, political implications.

The United Nations Industrial Development Organization was set up out of a concern for more industrial development in the Third World. In 1974, at the seventh special session, many of these perceptions were pulled together, with some additional ones, into what is called the New International Economic Order.

There, for instance, pride of place is taken by trade, particularly the commodities: What can be done with regard to access by developing countries to the markets of the industrialized countries; greater processing of their raw materials and the exporting of more processed products; stabilization of export earnings—because developing countries' incomes were fluctuating widely as prices and market conditions fluctuated.

So we have a complex, then, of proposals concerning trade and commodity trade in particular.

On investment, particularly through the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States which Mexico promoted, there is a great deal said about the rights of countries to their mineral resources—whether it's the United States of America or Jamaica or any other country—and the conditions under which private investment would operate. This is very controversial, but that again became a major element in the New International Economic Order. In regard to industrial development developing countries which now account for only 7 percent of world output have a set target of 25 percent of production by these countries by the year 2000.

The transfer of technology is a major area in the New International Economic Order, which is concerned with the terms on which developing countries acquire technology from developed countries. These are now, in many respects, prohibitive. The technology belongs to the people who produced it, but we believe that on a more equitable exchange basis, developing countries can acquire that technology without the cost being as high and the circumstances being as difficult as they are now.

So the New International Economic Order is concerned with specific sectoral matters. But I would like to stress, sir that if one looks at the declaration which goes with the new international economic order and which came from the General Assembly in 1974, the main concern is the creation of a world which is an equitable one in the relationships between countries and peoples.

We have been forced to prescribe in more and more detail, because we are the advocates for change. What we would like to see is others who accept the notion of the need for change and the need for such a world, to join us in the process of creating this sort of world and in putting forward ideas. We would then not be the only ones who are making these proposals, but we would have joined our efforts with those of industrialized countries who see the need and see the benefits which they will derive from such an improved global society.

Mr. SIMON. Our specific task is to look at this population question. Obviously, one of the ways of encouraging a more stable population is to improve economic conditions. Beyond that, how should the United States carry out its policy of discouraging population growth within our country and abroad without looking as though we have a heavy hand? You understand our dilemma.

Ambassador MILLS. Mr. Chairman, before I found myself in the position of being a diplomat—in the doubtful position of being a diplomat—I at one time was closely associated with population matters. I worked in the field of statistics and population. I was research manager on a research project in Jamaica in the 1950's, sponsored and financed by a few American foundations. The project attempted to find out what people's attitudes in Jamaica were—particularly working class women—toward family life, childbearing, the bringing up of families, the size of families, and birth control.

In recent years I have not been as closely associated with the development of these issues. I was Director of Economic Planning when Jamaica put out its 5-year plan in 1963. The plan indicated that the government would encourage family planning—and I know some of the struggle that went into the making of that decision. It is, as you know better than I do, a most delicate matter.

There has been, in many developing countries, some suspicion, as you imply, about the interest which comes from outside in relation to these matters.

I believe, after many years of association with this field and concerns about global population and national population problems, that the essence of the problem is the individual. I think that, recognizing the delicacy of the position of a country like the United States in dealing with developing countries, really what is required is for the developing country to promote its own interest in this matter so that you become a partner and not someone who's pushing in the direction of the necessary programs and policies.

It's very difficult to work. I would imagine, in a country which itself has not seen the need for some sort of population policy. For an outside interest to go in—whether it's the United Nations or the United States—there is the great danger that it will be viewed with some suspicion. After all, the governments in countries like mine had a very difficult time getting over the well-known political and social obstacles in this matter.

So I would say that the answer to your question would be to spend your first efforts in trying subtly to get the government to see what its own best interest might be. There are countries which do not agree that numbers are necessarily a bad thing, and it is a sensitive area if one attempts to tell a country what the size of its population might be ideally.

I believe that nobody can seriously argue against the right of each woman to the knowledge that she can control her destiny in terms of the number of children she may have. Whatever arguments you might run into about national population growth or levels, it is the right, I believe, of every woman to have that knowledge. In my country, it has taken a long time for women to discover this. It is revolutionary when they do. After that, I think the rest of the policy will evolve.

So I would say that your approach might go on these two bases.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Scheuer?

Mr. SCHEUER. I pass to Mr. Erlenborn.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Erlenborn?

Mr. ERLBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, let me thank you for your very interesting testimony. I, like my colleague Mr. Simon, have had some difficulty in really identifying what is meant by the New International Economic Order, a phrase that I've heard used many times in the international forum. As a matter of fact, it seems to kind of preoccupy many of the countries—the Group of 77 in particular—in just about every international forum, whether it be International Women's Year meeting in Mexico or UNCTAD in Nairobi.

But some feel that it is rather like a welfare program, in that it calls for a redistribution of wealth without any necessary concomitant change in the productive capacities of the various nations involved. Is that an incorrect perception? Do you feel that productivity—contribution to the world economy—should be a part of and a precondition to a redistribution of the world's economic resources?

Ambassador MILLS. I would accept your term "should be a part of it," but not a precondition, because we are witnessing a dynamic process in this respect. Developing countries must increase their production and their productivity. In such matters as food, there is a need for greater production; in respect to industrial goods, there is also a great need. But we immediately run into the question of the marketing of these goods—and that's an issue facing both industrialized and developing countries in their relationships—and the question of the imports by industrialized countries of more manufactured goods from developing countries. But we do have to increase our output and our productivity.

But then, if we look at the immediate situation, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources—which has been accepted by all countries including the United States—simply states that those resources, and in particular mineral resources, that are within your borders are the property of the people of your country.

It is also significant in terms of the internal implications because it means that people inside a country can see it as implying that the resources are for the people and for future generations also.

So where we move from a situation where the mineral resources in a country were in the ownership of someone outside, to the correction of that, in my view, we imply, in a sense an immediate redistribution of wealth—but more accurately, a restoration of the rights of ownership. One, of course, could not apply that to all other forms of property.

One does not take away, for instance, the property of a company that is in a country. The question of nationalization is a very burning question; that's a different issue.

So to the extent that any redistribution of wealth may be involved, as I said, it would be in those cases related to the principle of sovereignty over national resources. The redistribution of income is a different matter, now. You have this, in relation to current situations, in trade. We believe, in the developing countries, that in many instances, especially where our raw materials are concerned, if you look at what the consumer pays and what the producer re-

ceives, there is a wide margin, and it is how that margin is distributed that is at issue. Without increasing the price to the consumer, wherever he may be, there is a more equitable basis on which the margin can be distributed.

As in all cases—whether in a small bargain between two people or in trade between countries—how the margin is shared is not entirely a matter of objective consideration. It is based on the abilities—the bargaining abilities and other capabilities of those concerned.

In terms of equity, we believe—and we've already seen examples of a more equitable sharing of that margin—that a redistribution of income can take place on the basis of equity without either side losing anything that it could regard as a legitimate claim.

We have to concentrate, as I said, on those changes which can take place now in the pursuit of equity, and those which will come as we move into the future. Developing countries have a great deal of work to do to demonstrate their own capability in the matter of a greater opportunity for participation in global economic activity.

MR. ERLBORN. I couldn't help but think, when you were explaining in a very eloquent manner, how we could increase the share of the producer of the raw materials without making the ultimate consumer pay a vastly inflated price, that you would have done an excellent job representing the farmers a week or two ago on the floor of the House. We were discussing a very similar problem: seeing that the farmers get a larger share of what is ultimately paid by the consumer without increasing the price to the consumer.

AMBASSADOR MILLS. If I may say so, sir, there are many parallels between the issues being discussed at the international level and those at the national level. We tend to make heavy weather about certain matters, and I've found personally that there are many, many cases in which there are internal difficulties—for instance, in the relations between small communities and large communities within a country like the United States, in the establishment, for example, of a major enterprise in a community which was previously based on small enterprise.

We have many similar problems. We have the problems of a mining corporation which comes into a community, bringing capital, management, technology, and in a sense creating difficulties for that smaller community in hosting such a major enterprise. There are many parallels, and we would wish that the issues which are unique to the relationships between developed and developing countries would be seen as such. If those which have parallels within countries could be identified, I think we'd have a better understanding, since they would be seen as universal.

MR. ERLBORN. The context in which we're discussing world population today is development assistance. Let me say that I was impressed with your discussion on pages 17 and 18, where you were talking about basic human needs and a complex and wider process of development and social and economic change, "designed to remove the indignities of poverty and lack of opportunity, and to build a viable community which more and more satisfies the wide range of requirements of its members."

I know, from what you said earlier, that you're also quite conscious of the need not to impose from outside on a country the values

of other countries, but to protect the independence and autonomy of each country.

Let me ask you this: if we have one or more or a large group of lesser developed countries that may not be establishing the mechanism within their own country of land redistribution, redistribution of the economic gains that may come through greater trade and the new economic order, if you want to call it that, should the developed community establish some standards that would direct development assistance into those countries that are improving the lot of the citizens within their borders?

Should we, as a precondition to development assistance, require that someone other than the power structure at the head of the government be the beneficiary of the new resources flowing into the underdeveloped country?

Ambassador MILLS. I think that we've come to the heart of the dilemma here. I believe that those countries—developing countries in particular—we do not move on the path of greater social justice will find that the internal political pressures on them will increase greatly. It has always been so, but it will increase much more rapidly now because of communications and because there's a global dialog.

How you deal with the question of a country whose people are deprived because of the character of its government—and it's not only the government and the people who happen to be in power; it's a whole complex of perceptions and attitudes within the society which are also involved—how you deal with that is difficult to say. But there is always the danger of doubly depriving a people by withholding from them even that little which might have reached them. It's very difficult to judge.

I would agree that it is the right of a country which is making concessional assistance available to be really concerned about these matters. I would not question the right of a country which is making concessional assistance in this area.

But I do fear that there is a danger of oversimplification, and it applies across the international board. We have oversimplified the development process. If you look at income distribution, if you look at the history of the countries which are now wealthy, they went through periods of great poverty and suffering, and one must not assume that the more privileged people in those times—in the 19th century and early 20th century—were totally unfeeling. But the process of development was most costly and most harsh in terms of the suffering of the people, whether they were at work or they were deprived of work. There was no attempt to provide the services in education or health or otherwise, on a national scale.

So let's not expect too much of a community today which may have to go through agonies before those perceptions and the political or other processes develop. We know that they must, but I for one could not say what one could do from outside.

Even within developing countries, the principle of noninterference in the affairs of states is very, very strongly felt. I believe again, as in the case of family planning, that one would have to use a more subtle means—for instance, in terms of selection of projects. I do not believe that one can lay down conditions in the sense that is sometimes

advocated or implied. I am unable to give a clear answer to your question. I would say on the one hand that your concern is a legitimate one.

Mr. ERLNBORN. Thank you.

Ambassador MILLS. But on the other hand, I would say that in dealing with developing countries, it is not practical simply to try to apply your perceptions about income redistribution. Redistribution, after all, has still not reached adequate levels in many rich countries. One must bear in mind the fact that all the efforts, if I may say so, of a country like this to eradicate poverty are still without total success, which shows that it's not that the people of, say, this country are unfeeling, but that it's not a simple matter, even after years and years of affluence.

So as I said, I cannot give you a fully satisfactory answer. I express my own concern about this matter and say to you that I think that we should all continue to search for the best way of insuring that resources will continue to flow, but that somehow countries will be influenced more and more along the path of greater social justice.

Mr. ERLNBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Scheuer?

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, let me carry on the conversation that Congressman Erlenborn, of Illinois, began.

It is, of course, quite true that we haven't achieved Nirvana in the United States or in Western Europe, but virtually all of the countries in Western Europe and the United States do have redistribution mechanisms: We have a reasonably progressive income tax structure, and we have a relatively small percentage of our population that is desperately poor and disadvantaged.

We have a barrel-like income structure with very few at the bottom and very few at the top and most of the people in the middle, whereas the developing world has an income pyramid that sprawls out, with a very few at the top and almost everybody down below.

What we're suggesting is that it's difficult to convince the American people to make massive structural changes when the elite in the developing world have not taken the first steps in the adoption of redistribution mechanisms, such as a progressive income tax structure and reforms in land holding patterns.

Now, the United States wouldn't tell the developing world how to structure their tax systems and what kinds of deductions they ought to have for health expenses and charitable expenses. But, I think some of us feel that the developing world ought to adopt some kind of redistributive institutions. They won't work perfectly any more than ours work perfectly, but at least they'll be a first step.

As long as there are no redistributive systems within developing countries, and not even within the Group of 77—where you have OPEC countries that are oil-rich as well as very poor countries represented—the plight of much of the developing world will be painfully and tragically accelerated. The poverty of people in the developing world has been accelerated by the quadrupling or quintupling of energy costs which, in turn, has affected fertilizer and irrigation costs.

And yet, I haven't heard a call for a redistributive process within the group of 77. I haven't heard a call by the non-OPEC members

of the Group of 77 to the OPEC members to help undo at least some of the damage that the OPEC nations have done, and I think we here in the West feel there should be a mutual process. The process of structural change leading to greater equity should take place both within countries in the developing world and within the Group of 77 at the same time that we're being called upon to make some changes—and very rightly and fairly so. We should make many of the changes and the concessions you're talking about, but many of us feel that it ought to be a mutual process.

Ambassador MILLS. Let me first say that there certainly are very many developing countries which have redistributive mechanisms.

My country is now going through a painful process of redistribution of wealth and income. Having had 30 years of a system which we considered democratic, and having tried very hard, mainly out of our own resources, to accelerate development—and I worked as Director of Planning for some years—we have found that, in spite of some years of rapid economic growth, the problems of the deprivation of large parts of the population remained. It is, if I may say so, the story of Puerto Rico; it's the story of many developing countries—we are now recognizing that it takes much more fundamental change in economic and political and social terms to bring about that level of redistribution, which is the only thing that will satisfy the population of the country and afford political and social stability.

So Jamaica is one example of a country which has an income tax system, which has all sorts of other systems—including land redistribution. I would say many other developing countries, in different ways, have tried redistribution.

But redistribution is a process which, if you take it seriously, takes you very far along the road, because you're talking about redistributing opportunity. My country has free education up to and including the university level. It is a crippling cost, but if you do not provide that, you're not changing the basis of opportunity.

So let me say this to you: it takes time for a country to reach that stage—in many ways—in terms of the levels of public administration and political development and a lot of other factors. I would like to suggest to you that one of the problems of the world today is that countries like mine have to do in 10 or 20 years what took 100 years before.

It is really a dilemma. Certain things cannot happen until you have had certain developments—parallel developments, for instance, in the network of public administration institutions.

There are some countries that don't have an income tax structure. I think you will recall what happened when this country tried to introduce income tax. There are certain circumstances in which it cannot work. In my own country, while we have had a system of income tax for a very long time, we have depended heavily—and perhaps still do—on indirect taxes because of the levels of income and distribution of income. So one would have to look at individual countries to see what stage they are in and what type of tax would be the most appropriate to insure the beginnings of redistribution through those means.

Again I say: While it is a fact that countries must move along that path, don't ask us to do too much of the impossible. We have

to do the impossible, but really, when you look at the history of the development of the presently industrialized countries. It took a long time and a lot of suffering for them to reach that stage, including the state of public understanding and sensitivity that forced these things to happen—and “forced” is the word that one has to use.

So we must move along that path and much more rapidly. What will happen is that, apart from the expressions of opinion and criticism from the outside, people in developing countries will press for faster movement in these areas.

On the question of redistribution between developing countries, the OPEC countries are under pressure with respect to doing more to relieve the circumstances of developing countries, but they claim—with some justification—that they did not begin the process which has put the developing countries in the positions of disadvantage.

The fact is that, while the price of oil weighs heavily upon countries like mine—most of our energy is imported—there have been major increases in the prices of other essential commodities which certainly don't come from OPEC countries.

So without arguing your point that one must put the pressure on all around, the fact is that the OPEC countries can show the percentage figures of the significant transfers which they make in relation to their gross national products. This is an answer to the political pressures which have been made.

What I think is the essence of your point is that all of us must make our efforts internally. As you say, you have political constituents to face, who must be convinced that, in moving along the sort of path on which we have asked that you move, you can see that everybody is making an effort within their own circumstances.

What we would ask you to do is to insure that we improve between us the information about what is happening—and we have our own responsibilities in that direction—and also that you look at our circumstances patiently. As I say, we have to do the impossible in my country because if we do not do the impossible, disaster will overtake us. It is not easy to do the right thing in those circumstances.

As to the dilemma facing developed countries concerning their own economic development, there is this sense of their being lost. They thought they knew all the answers. We in developing countries are looking for the answers in our countries: sometimes we find them; sometimes we make mistakes which are costly.

What we need, I believe, is a greater understanding and a frank exchange, which, certainly in these circumstances, if I may say, I appreciate very much.

Thank you.

Mr. SCHEUER. One last question, Mr. Ambassador. Going from the general to the specific, we are currently in the process of trying to negotiate a law of the sea. We've had conference after conference, and the American who is representing U.S. interests—Ambassador Elliott Richardson—is one of our most able public servants. He is an enlightened and imaginative person, who, I think, is seeking some kind of equity and fairness on a basis that's realistic and desirable.

Yet, at the end of several years of effort on all our parts, there is still what seems to be an almost unbridgeable gap between the interests of the developing world and those of the developed world.

How would you characterize those negotiations and how would you characterize the posture of the Western governments; without trying to assign blame or guilt, what would you describe as the areas where there should be more give and perhaps less take on both sides?

Ambassador MILLS. I have not been directly involved in the law of the sea talks, but I have tried to understand the broad aspects of the discussion. I have always had the feeling that the global community has been noble in some things and the very opposite of noble in others—in the way which we have dealt with each other and the way in which the world has developed, by conquest and in some rather harsh ways, and yet, as I say, returning to nobility now and then. The effort to suddenly turn around and decide to share the resources of the sea, which are vast, in this way is really a most fantastic exercise.

It is asking almost too much, and yet it is most worthwhile because if the world community could agree in this matter, it would be the most tremendous boost, I think, to the concept of a world in which people really share their perceptions and share the picture of the future.

But to do it, in fact, against a background of interests and experiences, is really very, very difficult. I think, quite frankly, that there are differing interests on both sides which are very difficult to bridge.

Industrialized countries have technology—they have all sorts of things that would put them in the direction of wanting to be able to put their own technology into the field, even if there were some limitations there. Developing countries, because they don't have the technology by and large, would like to see this great new enterprise under global management.

This is, I think, a philosophical difference and also a practical and political difference. One hopes that, while the ideal—from our point of view—might not be achieved, we will still maintain the essence of the idea of this great enterprise, which is being pursued, in the main, in the interests of the global society.

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you very much.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Ambassador, we thank you very much for being here and for your testimony, and we appreciate your candor and commend you for your leadership. We wish you the best.

Ambassador MILLS. I thank you very much once more for affording me this opportunity.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you.

[Witness excused.]

Mr. SIMON. We have a panel now. I will ask all members of the panel if they will seat themselves at the table: Dr. John Mellor, Mr. Robert Lewis, Mr. Erik Eckholm, Mr. John Olsen, Dr. Lee Talbot, and a former colleague, the Honorable Patsy Mink.

I think what we will do, rather than hear from one person and then have questions, is we will hear from all the members of the panel and then toss questions at you. You have statements—if you wish to read them, you may; if you wish to enter them into the record for the sake of brevity and summarize and add whatever comments you wish, that would be perfectly acceptable.

Mr. SIMON. Dr. John Mellor, the director of the International Food Policy Research Institute. Dr. Mellor?

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN W. MELLOR, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 403.]

Dr. MELLOR. Thank you very much. I will just make a few comments and not read my statement. I'm grateful for the opportunity to meet with you on this very important issue.

Because I want to speak very briefly, I will come rather directly to what I think are the points of my presentation.

I'm going to make a small number of points. The first one I think we all understand and agree to—I simply want to make it clear that I have the same view: the world's population growth does represent an extremely serious longrun problem. I do want to emphasize longrun. I also believe that it's very much in the longrun interests of both the rich industrial countries and the poor rural countries to see the world's population stabilized. I believe that this can only happen, given present-day circumstances, if there are broadly participatory, accelerated processes of economic growth in the Third World, and that those processes will inevitably change substantially the way the world is governed and the power relationships. I think it's very important to understand that, and I will make a further comment on it in a moment.

As an aside on that, I would like to remind people of something we very often forget—if we had it in mind initially—if we go back to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution—let us say go back to about 1600—the people that comprised the population of Europe represented about 20 percent of the world's population. The Industrial Revolution brought about processes of economic growth, rising incomes, and inevitably, a rapid growth in the populations of those countries—those groups of people who were participating in the Industrial Revolution.

As a result of that, those people grew to represent not 20 percent of the world's population, but something in excess of one-third of the world's population. There was a tremendous change in the population composition of various classes of people in the world.

I would say that it is inevitable that, starting from the mid-1900's, where we are now, or the last half of the 1900's, we will return to a proportioning of the world's population somewhat like that at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution as that Industrial Revolution progresses through the rest of the world and goes beyond the bounds of Western Europe. We will return to a situation in which the peoples who grew out of Western Europe will once again comprise about 20 percent of the world's population, and the other people something like 80 percent.

My final major point is that what is done about the food situation is crucial to these processes of population growth. I was asked to speak specifically on this topic, and I want to emphasize that I think this is a crucial part of the relationship.

In my prepared testimony, I tried to make three major points with respect to this. The first one is that there is a very powerful relationship between population growth, food and food supplies, and the choice of development strategy. I tried to emphasize that there are many ways in which countries may develop. Some of those

ways involve a major emphasis on the rural sector and food production and improving the lot of the mass of the people, and some of the ways do not.

One of our concerns, I think, is the extent to which the rich industrial nations want to take steps which will encourage the presently poorer, more rural nations to follow those processes of growth and development which will bring population growth rates down somewhat more rapidly.

In making that point, I have tried to emphasize that there is not—and we can hold out, I think, no hope of—some royal road to reduction in population growth rates in the world. There is not a simple answer to that question.

I would like to just comment very briefly—and perhaps therefore somewhat incompletely—on some examples of countries which are often held out as having brought about rapid decline in their birth rates, in their population growth rates in an apparently painless way—at least apparently to some of the people who use these examples.

Let me comment specifically on the People's Republic of China, in which we have seen considerable evidence of substantial decline in birth rates, and therefore in population growth rates, over the last decade or so. I want to emphasize that the People's Republic of China has been very successful in bringing about very broad participation in the growth processes and in the benefits of the development process in a very rapid way.

There are many people in some of the Western industrialized countries who are not happy, however, about a number of aspects of that process, and I would like to emphasize that some of the aspects of that process, involving rapid, radical political change, have been essential to the redistribution of income which has brought about the acceleration of decline in birth rates in the People's Republic of China.

There are many people in Western democratic nations who would like to search for some other means of bringing about rapid decline in birth rates. My point is that I don't think it would be very easy to separate the fertility aspects of the Chinese record from a number of other aspects of that record.

I would emphasize that a crucial part of the Chinese record in this area lay with insuring food supplies to what has been the lower income people in that country, and that that was done despite a very poor growth record in the agricultural sector. They were able to insure food supplies to low-income people in the People's Republic of China in the face of a poor growth record in that area by very major and radical redistribution of income—a radicalness of distribution of income which is probably not possible in the context of Western-style democracies.

We occasionally see some evidence of small declines—10, 20 percent declines—in birth rates amongst very poor people in very poor countries that have moderately or even substantially inequitable distributions of income. I've been working with a very careful piece of research in this area, and I think the evidence is becoming clear that we are not observing success of fertility control programs, but the effect of an extreme increase in the misery of the people.

When you drive income sufficiently low, you finally reach a point at which fertility does decline. When we see those kinds of declines, we can be sure that, as the developing process finally begins to reach those people, we will see some recovery in birth rates, and then we will have to start the process of bringing those birth rates down through the processes which we think of as being more acceptable and reasonable within the Western World.

Sri Lanka is another country which has seen rather substantial declines in birth rates through processes of broad distribution of income. I would emphasize here, however, that in Sri Lanka, we have had a long record of broad participation in education; we had a situation following independence in which economic growth was going to be extremely difficult. Maintaining the political stability would certainly require, under those circumstances, broad participation in the development processes. They moved in that direction, although I would remind you that there were two separate occasions when, at least U.S. foreign assistance was cut off to Sri Lanka because of political developments in that country which were probably a necessary accompaniment of some of the redistribution efforts that went on.

The point which I'm trying to make there is that if we think the population problem is important, we may have to consider accepting and living with some other changes which may go along with it which we don't like. In other words, we have a difficult problem deciding what our priorities are. Is the population problem important? Is it more important than certain other questions which we are facing or not? That is very difficult.

As long as we're looking at population in the abstract and not looking at it in relation to other conflicting interests which we may have, then we have a very easy problem.

Now, the second point which I tried to make in my prepared testimony is that, in the processes of economic development which are broadly participatory and will bring down birth rates and population growth rates eventually, the pressures on the world's food supplies are going to be immense.

At the International Food Policy Research Institute, we have made some estimates for 1990 as to the kinds of food deficits which the Third World will be facing if present trends of the growth in per capita income, population, et cetera, continue. I might say that the effect of population up until 1990 is pretty much settled at this point. The further growth which we will get between now and 1990 will obviously be comprised mostly of very small children who will not be eating large quantities of food.

The people who are going to eat most of the food in 1990 are either with us or are very shortly to be with us, so we aren't going to affect that through population policy.

We envisage, with the continuation of present trends, a food deficit in developing countries of between 120 and 145 million tons. There is no way that that kind of a gap is going to be met through either food aid or trade processes. That gap is going to have to be met by a major change in the processes of development in the developing countries themselves.

It will happen either by economic development becoming more narrowly based—so that the lower income people do not participate

in increasing wealth and therefore do not have the purchasing power to increase their real demand for food and, I might say, with the concomitant effects on population growth that go along with that—or there will have to be radical increases in the rate of growth of agricultural production, so that the development process can continue in a broad-based way which involves participation of the masses of lower-income people who are the primary sources of increased effective demand for food.

It isn't, of course, the rich who increase their consumption of food as incomes go up; it is the poor. And whether the incomes of the poor increase or not is the critical factor in determining the effective demand for food, and, of course, as I implied before, the critical factor in determining what future rates of population growth will be.

Now, my own analysis would suggest that the potentials for the Third World countries to meet the bulk of that increased demand for food is there. I was just looking at a statement yesterday, made by Raj Krishna, a very distinguished economist who is a senior member of the Planning Commission in India. He was talking about tripling food production in India. What he didn't mention was how long it was going to take to do that, and, of course, that is the critical question.

But the agricultural potentials are there. He talked further about some possibilities of achieving that tripling during a period in which the Indian population might double, and that would probably be something on the order of 20 to 30 years. So what he's talking about is doubling of the population, tripling of the food supplies, and therefore, something like a 50-percent increase in per capita food availability.

Those are very real potentials, but if those potentials are going to be realized in countries like India—which, of course, is one of the major sources of future population growth in the world—it's going to take a massive quantity of resources and a tremendous increase in institutional capacity to organize and use those resources.

Whether countries are going to want to follow those processes or alternative processes, which are less dependent on agriculture and so on, is, I think, the critical question which faces us if we are genuinely concerned with the question of population growth.

What I'm essentially saying here is that the world has plenty of capacity to feed much larger populations than we have now. That gives us time to undertake the kinds of development processes over the next one, two or three decades, that will then give us a kind of leveling out of the world's population growth. And there's no way we're going to get that leveling out without going through those processes.

Another way to put it is to say that we may delay 10 or 20 years getting these processes going and then have the demographic transition, with tremendous increase in world population, from a much higher base, and therefore a much larger total figure, or we may initiate those processes in the next few years and go through them from a smaller base, and therefore a much lesser total population size.

Now, I'd like to make a final comment because I was asked specifically to comment on something which is really not my professional concern at the present time. I was asked specifically to

comment on the question of what the United States might be doing in these areas—how it might be of assistance. Let me make three points.

First of all, if one is concerned about getting through these processes of demographic transition quickly over the next one or two or three decades, the whole question of food supplies is crucial. There's only one way to assure the Third World low-income countries of adequate food supplies over the next decade or so, and that is by coming through with substantial, certain food aid programs.

The programs to increase domestic production in these countries are going to take quite a lot of time to take effect. One can wait for those to take effect and begin one's attack on the population problem from a higher total population base than we have at present; one may choose to do that for various reasons.

But if one attaches urgency to the problem, one would be looking at the question: how can we get started on it now? Food aid can play a very important role in that process. Obviously, for a country to make the kinds of political decisions that involve bringing the lower-income people into the development process more fully, assuring their food supplies so that they can begin the kinds of processes we're talking about—if countries are going to do that, they need some assurance that those food supplies will continue through drought, economic hazards, et cetera. That certainty of food supplies becomes very important in this respect.

I would have to say that the record of the rich industrial countries in managing their food aid has been in no way consistent with that kind of objective in the past. One might hope that it would be at some time in the future.

Secondly, it becomes very important for countries such as the United States—and I use the United States as a particular example here—that have extraordinary expertise with respect to organizing the institutions and training the people for agricultural growth, to play the role effectively.

There has been a substantial decline statistically in the extent to which, within a rapidly declining foreign assistance program, the United States has emphasized these processes of technical change in agriculture and has helped countries build the institutional and trained personnel capacity for increasing their agricultural production.

If we're serious about this interrelated set of problems—of broad-base development, growth in food production, reduction in population growth rates—we would return to a substantial concern with those processes of agricultural growth.

I might say that, over the next few decades, there would still be considerable scope for commercial trade in that process.

Thirdly, I would emphasize that the United States should put substantial resources into research to improve the technology of birth control. You will recall that the United States had legislation in the 1950's which barred it from putting its tremendous scientific resources to work on these problems. As a result of those official positions of the United States, the world's population will be greatly larger than it would otherwise have been.

It's important for Americans to realize what a high proportion of the research resources in this critical area are controlled in the

United States and the important role which mobilizing those resources could have. I know your committee has had some testimony earlier dealing with the U.S. aspects of population growth, which has emphasized the deficiencies of present technology for birth control.

Finally—and I would put much less emphasis on this than on any of the other things I commented on—the United States could continue to play a useful role in providing resources for direct action processes with respect to family planning and reduction of fertility.

I think we should not be fooled by the 10- or 20-percent reductions in birth rates that may come about through family planning programs in a generally inhospitable environment. The tenor of my comments has been to emphasize providing a hospital environment for reduced family size, that would reach the 80, not the 20 percent of the people.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you, Dr. Mellor. I might mention for the other members of the panel and for my colleagues, that we are running a little behind time here now, so to the extent that brevity is possible, it is desirable.

Mr. Robert Lewis, the national secretary of the National Farmers Union. We're very pleased to have you here with us, Mr. Lewis.

[The material referred to follows:]

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ASKED OF DR. JOHN MELLOR BY THE CHAIRMAN

Question 1. It has been stated that U.S. Food for Peace (Public Law 480) shipments "depress" rather than stimulate the incentive of developing (recipient) nations to produce immediately consumable (essential) foods.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Answer: 1. Food aid can play a very substantial role in an agriculturally oriented growth strategy because of the several year lag before modernization increases agricultural production. Such a strategy has two major components—

(1) introduction of high yielding modern methods of agriculture to increase production and

(2) creation of employment opportunities in labor intensive, often rural based industries and infrastructure projects.

If the cash resources the aid releases are used to generate employment and raise incomes among poorer classes, the effective demand for food increases and the availability of the food aid does not depress prices. At the same time food aid can play a positive role in curbing inflation while domestic agricultural production is gearing up to meet the increased demand. Over time, agricultural development stimulated by linking food aid to other forms of assistance should enable the recipient country to phase out food aid.

Question 2. The Congress has considered legislation designed to assure the timely provision of Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) commodities in instances of emergency need.

Do you believe this legislation will also have the effect of making the shipment of Public Law 480 commodities more sensitive to changing needs in recipient (developing) nations, rather than an automatic process unrelated to the existence of food shortages and surpluses in particular recipient nations?

Have the mechanisms to rapidly respond to unpredictable and ever-changing food supplies been developed? What are these specific mechanisms?

Answer: 2. The need to make the shipment of Public Law 480 commodities more responsive to the existence of food shortages and surpluses in particular recipient nations is, in my view, broader in scope than that of meeting emergency needs. The timely provision of food commodities when disaster strikes and normal sources of food supply are suddenly cut off from a population group is extremely important. Legislation giving priority to the shipment of

food commodities in instances of emergency need would be helpful. However, the broader problem of developing mechanisms to respond rapidly to unpredictable and ever-changing food supplies in individual countries requires a legislative commitment to make production shortfall assistance available to recipient countries in accordance with specified criteria, and creation of an emergency wheat reserve to back up that commitment in years of particularly short supply. The Administration's proposal to create a six million ton emergency reserve to back up food aid commitments is a step in this direction, although the proposal in its current form still lacks clarity as to the specific circumstances under which wheat would be released. Another mechanism which the IFPRI has begun to study is the creation of a compensatory financing facility within the International Monetary Fund which would finance the cost of food imports for developing countries when it exceeded a specified percentage above trend. This would enable these countries to enter the market to cover their crop shortfalls without causing an undue foreign exchange burden and a curtailment of other imports needed to stimulate development.

Question 3. The U.S. has been accused of using Public Law 480 shipments as a means by which U.S. foreign policy and development assistance objectives can be enforced. This is, in essence, the "food leverage" argument.

Do you believe this is a valid point?

Do you believe "food leverage" can actually be exercised?

Do you believe "food leverage" and other types of leverage should be used to encourage developing nations to consider, say, the initiation of family planning programs?

Answer: 3. The "food leverage" argument is valid in the short-term in that the United States can and has used food aid to obtain specific foreign policy concessions from some recipient countries. It is more difficult to use food aid to influence long-term domestic policy choices in recipient countries, since the United States has no lever once the food has been delivered. The United States could probably influence countries to adopt development strategies oriented toward job creation and agricultural development in rural areas if sizeable, stable multi-year food aid and development assistance commitments were made to back up such strategies. However, such influence should be of a general nature, and should not constitute leverage in the sense that the United States would ride herd on specific policy choices, such as the initiation of family planning programmes.

Question 4. Per capita food production in developing countries is currently no higher than it was in 1970 and not much higher than it was in the late 1960's (e.g., in 1977, food production worldwide increased by one percent, while the population growth rate in Africa was 2.6 percent, in Asia 2.0 percent, and in Latin America 2.7 percent per year).

Is it possible to address our food problem without also addressing our population growth problem?

Answer: 4. The population growth problem must be addressed directly as part of the long-term solution to the world food problem. However, the expected gains from such an approach will take some time to achieve. Demographers consider it unlikely that, even in countries which have already launched bold population control programs, much impact on population growth will be felt before the last decade of this century. (Asian Agricultural Survey 1976, Provisional Printing, Asian Development Bank, Manila, April, 1977). The present task facing development planners and policymakers is finding short and medium-term remedies that would help close the probable gap between food needs and food production of these countries in the near future. Toward this end, we will have to address ourselves to the food problem without necessarily addressing the population growth problem directly.

In reflecting on the relationship between population and food production growth rates, I would also like to point out that it is misleading to compare the worldwide 1 percent increase in food production with population growth rates in geographical developing country regions. The 15-year trends in food production and population in four developing market economy regions reflect important differences. In both North Africa/Middle East and Sub-Sahara Africa, regions where population growth has outstripped the growth of food output, the annual growth rates of per capita food production are negative. Food production in Asia has kept pace with increases in population, as shown by the 0.3 percent annual increase in per capita food output. The satisfactory

performance of staple food crop production in Latin America is evidenced by food output outpacing population growth by an average of nearly 1 percent a year. (IFPRI, Research Report No. 3, December, 1977).

Data indicate that increasing population growth rates are still expected in both North Africa/Middle East and Sub-Sahara Africa while a declining population growth rate is projected for Latin America. The overall rate of increase in population of Asian countries is expected to level off. Assuming that past food production trends continue, these projected population growth rates would suggest about the same level of per capita food output in Asia, a worsening food situation in North Africa/Middle East and Sub-Sahara Africa, and a slight gain in per capita food production in Latin America. As one might expect, the country variations are considerably more pronounced, necessitating flexibility in policy formulation.

Question 5. Yesterday we heard Robert Nooter, Deputy Administrator of AID, say that “* * * in the developing countries, population growth is a major factor explaining the increasing demand for food. Efforts at achieving domestic food self-sufficiency in LDC’s have been severely hampered by the ever-increasing demand for food from the growing population * * *”

You have argued in your statement, on the other hand, that broad based economic development, particularly development that leads to improved income distribution, is “a particularly powerful determinant of the effective demand for food.”

You go on to say later in your statement that “The rich, industrial countries often appear to attach an immediacy to arresting population growth that is more consistent with an objective of preserving existing power relationships than with the global concerns.” (p. 9) And that “The real test of priority to population is not shown by the appropriation of tens of millions of dollars to family planning, but by the appropriation of billions of dollars to the appropriate forms of development.” (p. 13)

Would it be fair to say that you believe AID is wrong in its analysis of the relationships between food and population growth and that its development assistance priorities are also wrong? How would you restructure AID’s program to improve its performance in reducing fertility in developing countries? Do you think the new Development Support Bureau within AID and the Agency’s increased attention to the impact of development policies and programs on population trends are steps in the right direction?

Answer: 5. Population growth is a major factor explaining the need to increase food production in developing countries, although it should be pointed out that increases in per capita income are projected to account for 25 to 30 percent of the total increase in their projected food needs by 1990. My point was somewhat different—over time the feeding of growing populations cannot be accomplished unless their needs are translated into effective economic demand for food. Large numbers of jobs must be created to employ the increased numbers of rural poor, so that they will have the means to purchase their food requirements if they are not themselves agricultural producers. Rural-based economic development will in turn give the necessary incentive to the agricultural sector to improve its own production performance. Within the context of such a development strategy there is a place for family planning programs, but without such a strategy, developing countries experiencing serious population pressure on available food supplies will not be able to feed their people adequately, no matter how successful they might be in curbing population growth rates directly. For this reason, I find it encouraging that AID is moving to integrate population programs with overall development assistance strategies through creation of a new Development Support Bureau and increased attention to the impact of development policies and programs on population trends.

Well over half of U.S. bilateral development assistance is already allocated to agricultural development, and over 85 percent goes to rural development, broadly defined. I believe this indicates a correct assessment of priorities, and that properly administered agricultural development assistance programs will make a proportionate contribution to the population growth problem. Where requests for direct family planning assistance are generated as part of a country’s general development strategy, there should of course be means available to meet them.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. LEWIS, NATIONAL SECRETARY,
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

[Prepared Statement in Appendix p. 414.]

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will abbreviate my remarks and submit the complete statement for the record.

Mr. SIMON. All the complete statements will be entered in the record.

Mr. LEWIS. The farmers are right in the middle of this complex of problems—population, food, energy, and environment. Our fate is directly involved, not only as citizens of the world, but also as producers and custodians of the resources that are of central importance in the whole complex of problems.

I think it is very unfortunate that this complex of problems is misdiagnosed or mislabeled as being "inflation," and then mistakenly treated as if it were inflation. This is somewhat of an oversimplification, but the primary focus of governments all over the world now is "fighting inflation," and that misinterpretation of the real problem of this world springs from a misunderstanding of the proper solutions.

The classic description of the term "inflation" is "high prices caused by too much money chasing scarce goods." There is abundant evidence that this isn't our real trouble, nor even the cause of most of the high prices we are experiencing. Wage rates go up even while unemployment rises. Auto manufacturers close plants and lay off workers and raise prices all in the same week.

It should not be surprising that the remedy indicated by faulty diagnosis—which is to reduce the supply of money and keep unemployment rates high so as to reduce demand for goods and services—fails to cure the high prices that are commonly supposed to be the problem. The faulty remedy is even less effective in dealing with the real problem that we face in this world.

The real problem arises from the pressures, first, of our large and growing human population, and second and separately, of the even more swiftly growing economic demand of the affluent minority of our population upon the scarce resources that are available in the world. The problem is: How can we adjust our expectations and consumption patterns to, first, the small volume of resources that are available, and secondly, in a way that will create the conditions under which population can be brought under control at a level that is supportable by the resources that are available.

It is my belief that the primary factor in the slowing and stopping of population growth is the will of the population to stop growing. And it is my view that birth control devices facilitate, but are not indispensable to, the successful motivation of couples to limit their childbearing.

The most important condition, it seems to me from my observations, is to increase employment in modern jobs—that is, jobs that pay a decent standard of living—so as to create the conditions under which couples will limit their births.

Now, if we do this, physical limitations on resources are sure to impose drastic changes in the mix of goods and services that will

be available for consumption. The main general change that is likely to result is an increase in the proportion of services—of human services—to resources. We'll have more personal services available—shoe shines, barbering, mental health counseling, and so forth—and smaller quantities per capita of steel, petroleum, paper, meat, and other goods.

Possibly one way we can solve this is to get higher quality goods by devoting more labor to the manufacture of better quality goods. We might get smaller but better automobiles, for example.

The catch in all of this is that the mix of goods and services that can be made available to us if we fully employ our population, may not conform to what we have a present appetite for. Right there is one of the great problems of human adjustment that I think faces us: how can we increase the market demand for the superabundant supply of human services that are available, so that we can generate jobs at rates of earnings sufficient to support the motivation to consume, upon which the will to limit population depends? The second great problem of human adjustment is how the share scarce resources with increased numbers of consumers.

Most of the increase in total population will come in the huge class of about three-and-a-half billion people who now are consuming at a rate of \$200 to \$300 per capita per year.

But the numbers of the minority of about one-seventh of the human population—about 600 million now, who consume at an average rate of about \$2,000 or \$3,000 per year—their consumption and the growth of this class is adding more to consumption of resources than the growth in population which is concentrated in the six-sevenths who are poor.

The potential pressure upon food supplies is probably, as Dr. Mellor says, the most acute single element in the problem that we face of adjusting our expectations and our actual consumption to the necessity to share our scarce resources more widely.

I think that there are two serious obstacles to making the adjustments which could assure that our food supplies will be adequate. One is the cheap food policy, particularly of the United States. Farmers cannot expand production in this world significantly—and certainly not enough to feed the numbers of people who must be fed—at prices at the levels that are established by the United States and enforced upon much of the rest of the world because of our preponderant influence in the world food economy.

Farmers cannot expand their production sufficiently to cope with the increasing need for food unless they have more adequate means. Here we run right smack into the present preoccupation of political leaders with the so-called fight on inflation. Higher food prices must be a part of the solution to the potential food scarcity that we face.

Higher food prices are not the problem, but they are part of the solution.

The second great obstacle is the high unemployment and underemployment that persist throughout the developing countries, in particular, and also throughout the developed countries. It is aggravated by policies which are slowing down and impeding the economic growth that could greatly increase the rate of employment.

The creation of jobs is the primary necessity in order to produce the buying power that is required. People who are hungry then can

pay the farmers what it costs to produce food and can provide the incentive prices which farmers must have in order to be able to increase food production to the extent that it is needed.

These two obstacles, which arise from our policies of overconcentration on and misinterpretation of our problem as being "inflation" or "high prices," are causing our world to drift into two separate worlds.

To one world, we say, "Go feed yourselves." We goad them toward national self-sufficiency in food production while we shut out the products of their abundant labor from our markets and deny to their underemployed workers the opportunity for jobs and economic growth that could create the kinds of conditions under which families would have the will to restrict their population growth.

In the other world of the rich, we build costly machines to do the work that is denied to human hands. We keep the world economy paralyzed in stagnation and decline, lest economic growth generate competition from those who are now jobless, that might raise the price of food and other scarce resources for the minority of affluent consumers.

We deny ourselves the benefits that we could realize from the poor's boundless capacity to supply human services, and our economies also decline.

This drift toward two worlds is dangerous. It cannot work to avoid such solutions to population growth as famine, disease, and genocidal conflict. It cannot achieve the brotherhood of man, which is the professed goal of all of our religions and most of our philosophers and political movements.

The resources of this Earth must be developed with the utmost efficiency in order to stretch to meet the needs of our human population. This can be achieved only by a unified world economy and a unified international trading system, using mankind's abundant resources of labor and nature's scarce resources of natural materials in accordance with the principle of comparative efficiency.

That, Mr. Chairman, is the goal that I think we must seek to set for the United States, so that we will provide leadership in moving the world economy in that direction.

Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you very much, Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Erik Eckholm, of the Worldwatch Institute, who called our attention about a year ago to the shortage of firewood on the face of the Earth.

Mr. Eckholm.

**STATEMENT OF ERIK ECKHOLM, SENIOR RESEARCHER,
WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C.**

[Prepared Statement in Appendix p. 426.]

Mr. ECKHOLM. Thank you. Through a misunderstanding, I'm listed as talking about world energy prospects. My prepared statement—which is quite lengthy and which I would like to submit for the record—is a much broader investigation of the importance of environmental quality in the struggle to meet basic human needs.

In that respect, I would like to draw your attention to what I think is a very significant philosophical shift that is now occurring in the area of environment and economic development.

In the past, I think that most of those concerned with environmental quality and development have very often been at loggerheads with one another. They've seen themselves as sponsoring opposing concerns. But I think that, within the last few years, a new sophistication has emerged on the part of both sides.

Development economists and those advocating development have learned the hard way that if economic development isn't ecologically sustainable, then it is not really a true development at all; and indeed, mistaken forms of development that don't take into account certain environmental ramifications have very often led to a worsened human plight in Third World countries. This is particularly true in the area of food production, where we find in many countries that, because of a lack of proper attention to maintaining the quality of forests and soils, the actual productive capacity of whole regions can be undermined and can be reduced over time.

I think that Dr. Talbot is going to discuss this in more detail in his statement, and I go into it in great detail in my prepared testimony.

On the other side of the coin, those concerned about environmental quality are beginning to realize that if there is to be any hope whatsoever of preserving a decent natural environment in Third World countries, there is, at the same time, going to have to be very rapid, intensive, and socially equitable development taking place that will provide the masses of the population in these countries with a decent livelihood.

When people don't have food and they don't have access to land, then they quite naturally are going to move into the national park areas and onto mountain slopes that ought to be kept in forest.

Similarly, if people don't have fuel to cook their dinner with, then they are going to cut down the nearest tree and burn that wood, no matter how important that tree is to the future environmental stability of the country.

So I see hopeful signs both from the conservation community and the economic development community of a new awareness of the mutuality of their interests, and I think—considering the history of both concerns—it's a historic shift and a good one.

Now, the energy problem of the world's poor is a very good illustration of the interaction of development—or perhaps I should say underdevelopment—and environmental degradation. Not many people in rich countries realize that close to half of humanity depends almost entirely on firewood or charcoal for their cooking fuel and, in colder areas, for keeping warm at night.

Historically, this was actually a good energy system, because trees—unlike the oil that we use—are a renewable resource, and when the human population and the tree population were in a good balance, it was a perfectly workable system. But over the last quarter century, in country after country, the human population has greatly outpaced the tree population. In fact, there has been very little replanting of trees in most Third World countries.

The results are, first of all, a tremendous and growing economic burden—particularly on the poorest half—within developing coun-

tries, and secondly, a huge ecological cost. Looking at the economic burden in countries as disparate as Niger in Africa and Guatemala in Central America, the average family is now spending one-fourth of its cash income on firewood—and the prices are constantly rising.

In some countries, firewood prices have risen faster than oil prices because of the growing scarcity of wood.

A certain portion of the population can't afford to pay these prices, so their time is occupied scrounging for wood. In some remote Himalayan villages in Nepal, people have to walk all day just to get one backload of wood—20 years ago it only took an hour or two.

The firewood problem is often a special burden for women, because many times they're the ones who are given the task of searching for fuel.

Looking at the ecological costs, it has been estimated that about one-half of all the wood cut in the world each year for all purposes is cut for use as firewood, so this is a major cause of the deforestation—the landscape degradation—that's occurring rapidly throughout much of the Third World.

Deforestation of mountain slopes is leading to tremendous increases in erosion in many areas, and to rises in the frequency and severity of flooding; in arid lands, it's a major cause of what the U.N. has termed "desertification," the creation of desertlike conditions in an arid or semiarid environment.

An additional ecological cost occurs when wood becomes so scarce that people switch to using dried cowdung for fuel. In the past, the manure was applied to the fields where it is needed for soil fertility. Instead—in the Himalayas, for example—dung is increasingly used for fuel, so the productivity of farmlands declines as a result.

Solving the firewood crisis really has many parallels with solving the energy crisis of the rich. It requires action both on the demand side and the supply side. The poor, like the rich, need to conserve energy, and that can be done, first of all, through the adoption of more efficient stoves. A simple, inexpensive wood stove can be designed that cuts wood needs in half for cooking, and we need to disseminate these throughout the Third World.

There's been a tremendous lack of attention paid to possible small-scale cooking technologies, and few governments or international assistance agencies have spent much money trying to develop and disseminate such stoves.

Over the long term, demand can be cut only by slowing population growth. There are some countries that already have almost no forests left. You see the population projections, and you wonder how these people are going to cook food—assuming they have enough food to eat—because the trees won't be there.

On the supply side, clearly one major answer is reforestation—the planting of fast-growing tree species in village wood lots and so on. This has been tried in many countries, but has often failed because the local populations have not been involved from the beginning in the planning and implementation of these projects.

Very recently there has been a major success story in South Korea. The country proved that when you decentralize programs and involve the community in planning and make sure that com-

munity members share in the benefits of tree planting, it can be done. Millions of hectares of village woodlots have been planted over the last five years in South Korea.

Earlier, China also showed that through that sort of community-involvement approach, the wood problem can be solved.

Finally, there needs to be attention to alternative energy sources that are socially and ecologically appropriate. One of the most promising ones is the biogas plant otherwise known as the methane digester which is a tank filled with cowdung or other organic matter. It produces gas which can be used for cooking, for running irrigation pumps, and so on. At the same time, it produces a very rich fertilizer for the fields.

The Chinese have led the way with this: they've installed more than five million of these over the last decade.

Finally, there is also new attention to the potential for using solar cookers. These would have to be extremely inexpensive—\$10 or \$15—something that a poor family could use to cook with. There are cultural obstacles to this technology: people like to cook in the evening usually, and a solar cooker has to be used in the daytime, but nevertheless this is another answer worth pursuing.

Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you very much, Mr. Eckholm.

Mr. John Olsen, the senior vice president of Sun Co.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN L. OLSEN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
SUN CO., INC., RADNOR, PA.**

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 460.]

Mr. OLSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The problems that must be overcome by the developing countries are tremendously difficult and complex. The outlook is bleak and, in my more pessimistic moments, I feel some of the problems have no solutions.

I come here with no magic, free-enterprise solutions because there are none. In fact, there is little that private business can do alone. The effort must be a cooperative one with all governments involved.

I'd like to cover rapidly a few of the points that I have made in my paper. First, we expect the period through 1990 to be one of low world economic growth. There are a number of reasons for this; they're all readily apparent: the high cost of energy, natural resource availability and cost, the cost of protecting the environment, changing social values—I could go on. The net results: there are fewer markets for goods produced in the LDC's.

Low growth leads to the second point, and that is the trend toward protectionism. When economic growth is low, unemployment becomes a problem. Countries push exports, and soon trade barriers are established. We've seen it in the United States with steel, shoes and textiles. Even I have to plead guilty as I concern myself about the future of the domestic refining industry.

Another major problem is future world energy supply, particularly oil. In this discussion, when I talk about LDC's, of course I'm talking about the nonoil LDC. In addition to the wood we have just heard about, there is a major dependency on imported oil for LDC energy needs.

We agree with the administration forecast of a real world oil crunch coming in 1985 to 1990. Unless the United States faces up to the problem and develops a sound overall energy policy, the economic impact on the United States will be very severe.

But the impact on the LDC's will be devastating as the price skyrockets. Even with all these problems, the LDC's must still industrialize, but they must do it wisely. They will be capital short; they have large unskilled labor forces and, as I've pointed out, limited markets for products, especially of manufactured goods.

Where does this lead us? Well, the first priority, we feel, is in the area of agriculture. It is relatively low in its capital requirements; it is labor intensive; and of course, there are ready markets for the products.

My last point is the future role of the foreign private company. I will be speaking here from the perspective of a U.S. based oil company. All things considered, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the era of private, direct investment in the LDC is drawing to a close.

There are two reasons for this. First, the host countries are generally hostile to private investment. Profits needed to be earned by private companies are viewed as exploitation in the developing country, particularly in the natural resource area.

Second, by recently enacted and contemplated future tax legislation, Congress has made it abundantly clear that they do not want companies such as Sun to make future investments overseas. Sun has repoded in this way: In 1974, our capital and intangible development costs overseas amounted to \$144 million; in 1975, \$116 million.

In 1976, it was \$58 million; in 1977, \$34 million. If I sound a bit frustrated, I am. The major strength of the United States lies in the capacity of its private enterprise system to contribute to the economic development of poorer nations, but the thrust of this system has been blunted by Government policies both here and abroad.

I would hope that in the future new ways can be found to use the resources of private companies in strengthening the economies of the lesser developed countries.

Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Olsen.

Our next speaker is Dr. Lee Talbot, the Director of the Office of International and Scientific Affairs, and also, I understand, the Chief Scientist on the President's Council on Environmental Quality.

Dr. Talbot.

STATEMENT OF DR. LEE M. TALBOT, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 471.]

Dr. TALBOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a great pleasure to be here, and I shall bear in mind the time of the morning and simply summarize the major points in my paper.

Global population, environment, and resources have been a strong concern of the Council on Environmental Quality since it was established in 1970, and they are central to a study which this Council and the State Department are currently conducting for the President.

In his environmental message last spring, President Carter requested that we conduct a year-long study of probable changes in the world's population, resources, and environment, through the year 2000. The results of this will be presented within the next month or so, and I'm sure that they will be of great interest to your committee.

Now, I also bring to this testimony a personal interest and background, in that as an ecologist, I have worked specifically on environmental issues in over 90 nations. I've also been professionally involved with population. My last trip through Asia, for example, was to view population programs in a number of Southeast Asian countries.

Your committee had requested that I speak on two themes. The first is the impact of population growth on the global environment, and the second is the implication of this impact for international development.

To summarize my points on the impact of population growth on the global environment, I wish to focus on the population growth in rural areas, and deal with forests, range land, agricultural land, and climate.

Deforestation, which Mr. Eckholm mentioned, is a global environmental problem of increasing severity. It is caused largely by population growth driving several factors. Among these are the need for firewood, which Mr. Eckholm mentioned, shifting cultivation, the opening of new lands for cultivation, and the demand for construction materials.

Shifting cultivation is the major basic form of agriculture throughout most of the tropic and sub-tropic/semi-tropic parts of the world. With a low population, it works beautifully, but as population pressure increases, the system breaks down. The net result initially is loss of forests and more significantly, perhaps, loss of productivity of the land, first in the flatlands and then in the mountains.

Population pressure also results in attempts to open new lands for cultivation. This pressure is worldwide wherever forest areas remain.

Mr. Eckholm mentioned the demand for firewood. I would simply add to that that in recent years I've traveled over large areas of Africa and Asia which are now totally denuded by the search for firewood, but which were areas of extensive forest and woodland at the time of my first visit to them in the 1950's.

Commercial logging is another factor exacerbated by population growth. Developing countries need foreign income to provide food and other services for an expanding population. Where their timber resources offer a source of such income, there is a strong pressure to exploit them quickly. The result is generally timber mining, not renewable forestry—hence, loss of the forests.

In many of the areas I have visited—for example, in Southeast Asia—where this commercial lumbering has proceeded, what is left is essentially a wet desert, with, again, the productivity for human welfare essentially lost.

Now, these factors in combination are so rapidly reducing what is left of the tropical forests and the other woodlands of the world, that if the present trends continue, relatively few tropical forests may be left standing by the end of this century, and a large percentage worldwide of what is now forest will be gone by that time.

A second major area of impact from population growth is the range of grazing lands of the world. These cover much of the Earth's surface. They are ecologically fragile and vulnerable, with very restricted carrying capacities in terms of livestock, and that, in turn, is translated into carrying capacity in terms of people. As the population, and consequently the livestock, exceed these capacities, the land is overgrazed, the vegetation lost, the soil lost or degraded, and thus, the potential for human use is reduced or even lost. Of course, the Sahelian zone has been a dramatic example of this process.

A third major area of direct impact of population growth is on agricultural lands. Obviously, as has been pointed out by previous speakers, increasing population inevitably puts greater pressure on agricultural land. Worldwide, this increasing pressure is leading to increased losses of agricultural land due to erosion and the various problems associated with irrigation, such as salinization, alkalization, and waterlogging.

At the United Nations Conference on Desertification last year, it was estimated that one-third of the world's present cropland may be lost by the year 2000.

Now, superimposed on this physical loss is the additional loss of productivity of the agricultural lands wherever the forests—and consequently the watersheds—from above have been lost. This results in floods, siltation of the agricultural irrigation systems, and loss of the water needed much of the year.

Climate may be another area of major environmental impact from population growth, particularly through vegetation clearance, burning of various fuels, and the release of certain chemicals.

In my discussion and in my prepared paper, I've focused largely on the effects of an increasing rural population, mainly in the developing world. This is because three-quarters of the population in the developing world still is rural. These impacts derive basically from the need for food, fuel, and building materials. The direct result is the increasing removal of the vegetation cover—grasslands, shrubs, forests—with resultant erosion by wind and water, soil degradation, and the biological impoverishment or degradation of the remaining land.

In effect, ecological degradation is reducing the ability of the Earth to provide food and fiber, and the increasing human population is decreasing the numbers of people the earth ultimately can support.

There is, of course, an additional set of environmental impacts associated with energy production, industrialization, and urbanization. These involve a series of reasonably well-known issues which I will not go into here, particularly because, while the rate of expansion of these factors is driven to a degree by increases in population, I prefer to focus on the areas where the most direct impact of an increasing human population occurs.

This direct impact is of critical importance, yet it is one which has received remarkably little attention to date.

To focus very briefly on the implications of these problems international development: frequently it has been noted that, while an immense amount of technical assistance in the developing nations has resulted in really impressive increases in food productivity over the past two decades, with the concurrent population increase, the result has been that the food supply on a per capita basis has remained roughly the same, and "the same" is not adequate for far too much of the Earth's population.

Looking ahead, it is clear that even more heroic efforts are going to be required simply to stay even—that is, to provide enough food to assure the same amount of food on a per capita basis to a rapidly growing population.

The environmental factors I've noted, however, raise very serious questions about the long-term food-producing capability of the Earth. If indeed we do lose a third of our agricultural cropland by the end of the century, and if many more areas have reduced productivity because of the loss of watersheds and so forth, it is unlikely that total productivity can be very greatly increased, even with further massive development efforts and the best of climatic and other conditions—and climate is a critical though highly uncertain factor.

Another part of this consideration is GNP. Again, through massive efforts in the past few decades, there has been a significantly increase GNP throughout the world. But again, when the increasing population is taken into account, the increases in per capita GNP have been substantially canceled out.

I'd also like to note that GNP, I think, is a rather inadequate indicator of the welfare of the human population as a whole.

I see two major consequences of these factors. The first is that no matter how great a commitment is made to international development assistance, it cannot succeed in producing balanced development unless population growth is checked.

The second is that no matter how great the effort made on population and other development assistance, it ultimately cannot succeed unless a major and effective effort is made to check and reverse the ecological degradation of our life-support system.

I've emphasized restoring the biological basis for human life—the life-support system. The environmental impacts of population growth, which I've covered very briefly, all have the effect of reducing the viability of this planet from a human point of view. The loss of forests and other vegetation cover, the loss and degradation of the soils, biotic impoverishment, alteration of the water cycles, and possible impact on the climate all constitute ecological degradation and reduce the capacity of the world to support people.

In the past it's been possible to mask or compensate for losses in one area by technological increases in another. However, the losses are at present so great, and those that are projected are so awesome, that we clearly cannot continue to provide further technological quick-fixes.

One other dimension of this: in the past, much of our technical assistance has had the effect of exacerbating these problems. The

examples are legend. Ecological perspective has really not characterized much international development, and this, of course, is one of the reasons why environmental assessment should be a routine part of any international development activity from now on.

But for the future, it will not be enough simply to avoid degradation caused by individual development projects. Meeting basic human needs will require reversing the ongoing biological degradation which otherwise will inevitably cancel out the other development gains.

In conclusion, if international development assistance is to be truly effective, it will require a significant shift in emphasis. Any such development assistance program must include an effective and urgent population program and an effective environmental component to reverse the ongoing biological degradation which reduces the carrying-capacity of the world for people.

Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you very much, Dr. Talbot.

My apologies to our former colleague—I was reading recently where former Secretary of the Treasury Bill Simon said that the worst thing about being Secretary of the Treasury is having to wait to testify before congressional committees—and you have had to undergo this.

Ms. Mink is now Assistant Secretary of the Department of State in charge of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. She served with great distinction in the House; unfortunately, she heard the siren call of the Senate and was tempted, and as a result of that, she now serves the Nation in the executive rather than the legislative branch.

It's an honor to have you here with us, and we welcome your testimony.

**STATEMENT OF HON. PATSY T. MINK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF OCEANS, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT, AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS**

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 514.]

Ms. MINK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the Select Committee. It's a real pleasure to be a part of this panel. You needn't apologize, Mr. Chairman, because I have benefited a great deal from this opportunity to listen to the expertise of the various witnesses whom you have called to participate in this hearing today.

Much of what I have in my statement would be redundant; however, I think that the utility of repeating some of the items which have been mentioned is to underscore the fact that the State Department, in the wide variety of responsibilities that it must assume, nevertheless has a very important aspect of its work in the field of environmental concerns as they relate to resource management and population.

I would like to summarize just briefly the points which I have made in my paper, even though they repeat much of what Dr. Talbot and Mr. Eckholm have already indicated as important environmental considerations in the population field.

I think it is obvious from everything that has been said that the more people we have in the world, the greater the strain on our entire ecological system. What is really frightening is that, as a direct result of the desperate efforts of rapidly growing, impoverished populations to increase food production, collect firewood for fuel, and otherwise survive, the availability of these and other basic requirements of life are increasingly cut off through the degradation of the environment which supplies them.

This past year there were two major United Nations conferences held—one on water and one on desertification. The United States participated in both and I think the outcome—and I have reports here for the benefit of the committee—stresses that population growth has enormous implications for both of these issues.

With respect to the problem of deforestation in terms of energy requirements, I think the significant aspect of this issue is that, if we neglect it, it will ultimately have a devastating effect on the water resources and the land availability potentials of the countries that are affected. As we cut down our forests and watch people having to forage for firewood, the result is the ultimate degradation of the soil and the entire destruction of the biological system.

As we look at this issue, at least from my perspective in having dealt with developed, industrialized world problems in terms of energy deficits and so forth, we talk about the necessity of finding alternate energy systems. Our consciousness dictates that we think in terms of alternate energy sources for our oil requirements, our coal requirements, and other oil-related consumption requirements of a highly industrialized society.

In this context, I think it is terribly important to appreciate the fact that 2½ billion people living in the developing world do not relate to this kind of a dialog with reference to oil and petroleum products, gas and coal. These 2½ billion people rely solely on wood, dung, straw, and human and animal power for their energy requirements. This is tied dramatically to the whole issue of survival, of human development, of degradation of the environment, and of the demands that will be increasingly placed upon our resources if the population issue is not brought quickly under control.

When we talk about the necessity of economic development and what we must do to anticipate the needs of the additional population which will need to be fed, clothed and taken care of, I believe we neglect the fact that we have close to 1 billion people today, irrespective of population growth in the future, who are suffering from hunger and malnutrition, and roughly 450 million people who are on the brink of starvation. Couple that with the fact that 10 to 40 percent of the infants and children in the developing world never reach their fiftieth birthday, and the fact that some 10 million deaths each year are attributed to the absence of safe drinking water and basic sanitation. It is estimated that over 1 billion people in rural areas do not have adequate supplies of safe water. Another fact is that twice as many hectares of land now under cultivation will be lost because of soil degradation and urban sprawl during the fourth quarter of this century as will be added.

This is the current reality. When you place that scene on top of the estimates of growth in population and the demands that will be

made for simple survival for these individuals in the developing world, then I think the true and frightening picture of what is ahead of us, in terms of our responsibilities as human beings, comes to a much clearer focus.

In terms of geographic extent, the most widespread environmental degradations have occurred in the countryside. But as we consider the estimated population growth in the rural parts of the developing world in the decades ahead, we cannot overlook the problems of urban societies and the crushing difficulties that they will have to meet. If we fail to arrive at a policy which will meet the requirements of rural communities to enable them to survive in these areas, such as the provision of food, energy, and housing then we only compound the problems in our urban communities.

In this context, since the committee has requested that we respond in terms of what the U.S. Government could be doing to address some of these issues specifically, it seems to me that the conference which was convened recently on human settlements is an opportunity for constructive participation in the whole question of the requirements of urban society—the needs for habitation, housing, meeting minimum requirements of water and clothing and other basic necessities.

The policies that have been put into effect with respect to our international concerns—particularly as they relate to the foreign assistance program—have been addressed in some regards by the Congress, through its insistence that environmental assessments accompany development assistance programs. I think that this was a gigantic step forward—to recognize that as we deal with development assistance, we also have to take into account the environmental consequences of the projects which we are financing and supporting. I would hope that this kind of effort can receive wide and wholehearted support on the part of the Congress, and that this program can be given the kind of budgetary assistance which I think is essential for the success of this effort.

In terms of the U.S. international environmental policy regarding resource degradation and what the State Department, in general, is doing in regard to it in foreign affairs, I can report that our efforts are largely in supporting initiatives and resolutions in the wide variety of international organizations in which we participate.

You're all acquainted with the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Environment and the resultant establishment of the U.N. environment program—one of the truly significant outcomes of that Stockholm meeting. It's given us a place to take our environmental concerns.

Our prime responsibility as a leading developed industrialized nation is to set the example of how others might very well approach their own problems the way we manage our own problems—energy being one of them. There's no way that we as a nation can impose our ethics or personal solutions upon other nations, but certainly through our achievements and by the tough decisions we make domestically, we can set an example and create the climate for other countries in this area.

The World Population Plan of Action, which I'm sure this committee has had an opportunity to examine, is the basis of our U.S.

policy in world population matters. We have established a mechanism for Government-wide analysis and evaluation of this policy on an on-going basis, the National Security Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Population, which reviews the population policies. Recently a report was released, and I would be happy to leave a copy for the benefit of this committee.

Mr. SCHEUER. Excuse me. Is that report classified?

Ms. MINK. No; it is an unclassified document.

Mr. SCHEUER. I would ask unanimous consent to make that report a part of the Record, immediately following your testimony.

Ms. MINK. Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. It will be entered in the record.

Ms. MINK. The principal thesis under which our policy is managed is that, in order to be successful, it must recognize and respect the rights and responsibilities of each government to determine its own population policies and programs consistent with human rights.

The objective of this policy is to help developing countries and their people recognize the need for bringing population growth in line with their development goals. In my Bureau, we have two offices: the Office of Population Affairs and the Coordinator of Population Affairs. The function of both is to take that aspect of our U.S. policy and try to convey the urgency of this particular program to our embassies overseas. One of the principal ways in which our population policy can be implemented is by convincing the leadership of the various countries of the importance of this issue. If they do not accept this thesis, then, of course, no matter what we do in the population area, it will not receive the kind of success that we would hope.

I would hope that in the total review of this subject, this committee will take into consideration the very serious problems of deforestation and desertification which have been mentioned here. The State Department, in collaboration with AID, will be sponsoring a special all-day seminar on June 12 to discuss this issue and to try to increase and heighten the perception and understanding of the significance of this problem to various posts of the executive branch.

It would be my hope that this committee would find it possible, in its various recommendations to Congress to underscore this as perhaps the most significant environment/resource/population-related problem for which the United States can provide enormous assistance, with technical as well as financial back-up.

It's been a great pleasure for me to appear before this committee, to have the benefit of the various experts who have testified, and to become aware of this committee's enormous understanding of this important population/environmental issue and commitment to helping this country take the lead in solving one of the most perplexing problems that the world is going to have to face in the year 2000.

Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary, and all the members of the panel for a really solid contribution.

I would suggest that each of us confine himself to 5 minutes, and we'll just keep rotating as long as we have the time.

QUESTIONS AND REMARKS

Mr. SIMON. Very quickly—just a comment or two for Dr. Talbot. You mentioned your dissatisfaction with the GNP. The Overseas Development Council has developed what they call the “Quality of Life Index.” I don’t know if you’re familiar with it, but you may want to take a look at it. I think it’s a very fine contribution.

On the matter of land that we are consuming, I had breakfast this morning with the Secretary of Agriculture, and he said that in his lifetime, we have paved cropland equivalent to the total tillable land of the State of Ohio, which is really kind of a devastating fact.

Mr. Lewis, I was interested in, first of all, your very significant comment that the increase up in income is, in fact, going to consume more food than is the growth in population. It means that the population problem aggravates the whole thing even more. I was interested in your statistic of the 13 times as much consumption in that one region when income went up.

Your comments about prices, though, concern me a little. In the long run, I think what you’re saying is correct, but in the short run, isn’t it possible—since you represent the Farmers Union—that, following plans advocated by Charles Brannan and Jim Patton and some of the people that you and I both hold in high regard, we can guarantee the producer in the United States an adequate income without having an excessively inflationary food price?

Mr. LEWIS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to look first at what our situation is. The prices received by farmers of the United States are just about the lowest in the world. Right now, even with *our prices* far below the prices received by farmers in all the other modern advanced countries—*except* those few that are dependent upon the world trading price for most of their farm income, the *United States*, Canada, Australia, Argentina—American consumers are getting practically the cheapest farm products on Earth.

Mr. SIMON. No question about it.

Mr. LEWIS. Almost without exception. You can quibble about Argentina, but who wants to be vying with Argentina for having the cheapest farm products on earth?

We are almost the most affluent country in the world. We now have a food stamp program that could provide adequately for all of our poor people in the United States. We did not have that in the time of the so-called “Brannan Plan” proposal.

We are now meeting the food needs of approximately 15 to 20 million people through the food stamp program; we have special school lunch supplemental programs; we can provide special food aid for elderly people who wouldn’t be reached by food stamps, and so on.

It doesn’t seem logical to me for the U.S. Government to subsidize the food bills of the most affluent consumers of the world, who are already receiving the cheapest food that the world provides. It just doesn’t seem like a good judgment of what our priorities should be. I think that there are many more urgent things that our tax resources should be used for in this country.

Mr. SIMON. So you basically are backing off from the old Brannan plan concept at this point?

Mr. LEWIS. I don't think that it makes sense now inasmuch as we have already solved the major food need problem—that is, the needy people. We now have a food stamp program that takes more money than the farmers get, and that has drastically changed the situation that prevailed at the time the Brannan plan was proposed in 1950.

Furthermore, our affluent people are even more affluent than they were at that time. So I think that the consumer's need for a deficiency payments program for agriculture is now much, much different than it was 30 years ago.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Erlenborn?

Mr. ERLENBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, Patsy, let me say it's good to see you again. We don't see you back here on the Hill often enough, but I hope they keep you busy in the State Department.

Ms. MINK. They do.

Mr. ERLENBORN. Mr. Olsen, I'd like to address a question or two to you, because I think your testimony was a little different from that of the other witnesses who seemed to agree on many things—and I think they agreed with good cause.

You talked about the disincentives for private industry to help in development of the lesser-developed countries. I've noticed a dichotomy in the statements and the attitudes of some of the people from the lesser-developed countries that I think reflects this.

At some of the international meetings I've attended, at one moment you'll hear the leaders of these lesser-developed countries railing against the multinational corporations and saying how they either have recently or would like to have gotten them out of their country—the multinationals are bad; and then they turn around a moment later and say that the developed world is not giving them the technology and the resources to develop.

It seems to me that this is speaking with blinders on: at one moment saying that they want to get rid of or discourage the kind of technical expertise and the capital that a multinational corporation could bring to their country, and then in the next moment complaining that they're not getting the very thing that they're trying to discourage.

Is this what you see existing out there?

Mr. OLSEN. Absolutely. We people who work in the oil industry, of course, have to develop quite a thick skin both here and abroad, but it is quite true that there is hostility, and we do have to try to develop some approach to overcome the problems.

There is justification; there's no question about it. But it seems to me that until we come to a mutual understanding, companies such as mine will withdraw because we do not feel we're welcome. We think we can make a contribution but we really don't know how. As I indicated, it causes a sense of frustration.

Mr. ERLENBORN. There's also, I think, a different attitude toward private industry in some of these countries. I recall one conversation I had in India, where a member of the Indian Government was saying, "Why won't your country give us facilities or help us develop facilities to produce fertilizer that we so desperately need?"

Not knowing anything about the subject, I just made a stab at it and suggested that if they would allow private industry to make a

profit producing fertilizer in India, that my impression was that our American businessmen and other free-country businessmen would be happy to make a profit producing fertilizer in India.

But I fear that the Indian officials had an attitude that "profit" was a dirty word, and for a foreign country to make a profit would be wrong, and therefore, they themselves were discouraging that investment.

Do you see that sort of an attitude?

Mr. OLSEN. Again, I would have to agree with you that there is that problem. I really must admit I have nothing to suggest to overcome it. It is a discouraging prospect, and the contributions that we can make are limited because of that.

Mr. ERLNBORN. Thank you very much.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Scheuer?

Mr. SCHEUER. I will move further into areas that Mr. Erlenborn has penetrated. To continue on this whole question of technology, I think that the developing world has not yet come to realize that most technology is not likely to be delivered by governments but that it will, instead, be delivered by the private enterprise sector from Western Europe, Japan, America, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, where the know-how and the infrastructure already exist.

In this connection I'd like to ask Patsy Mink a question. Patsy, let me say how delighted we are to have you here, and how admiring we are of the way you've taken hold of your job and the leadership you have offered.

Mr. SCHEUER. Let's take a look at the Law of the Sea Conference. This is, as I see it, sort of a symbolic experience that we're going through. In this instance there's really only one country in the world that has the capability of exploiting the deep seabed. I've used the word "exploitation" in terms of development, not in terms of abuse.

And, as I have already mentioned, Elliott Richardson is an enlightened, thoughtful, creative, and innovative thinker. And yet, with all his leadership and with all the years of prior negotiations, we seem to have an unbridgeable gap between the minimum demands of the Third World and the basic preconditions of flexibility and of minimum financial rewards that the private sector requires.

Why do we seem to be faced with this seemingly unsolvable problem? Why is the gap so great?

Ms. MINK. Well, I don't know that I can provide any more light on this subject. I think the issue is exactly as you stated it—that there is such a wide gap between the industrialized sector of the world and the developing world. That is a dilemma which has provided the difficulties of the Law of the Sea Conference.

Given the fact that there are four or five countries that have joined in a wide variety of consortia, constituting about four companies that are able at this very minute to begin the exploitation—and, indeed, in yesterday's paper we saw that one had successfully brought up a thousand tons of manganese nodules—the rest of the world perceives this as a danger to their concept of the oceans being the common heritage of mankind. We have accepted that as the premise on which the Law of the Sea Conference was convened.

If the developing countries permit the mining companies—to proceed to develop the oceans, they view this as a threat to their own ability in the future to profit and benefit from the exploitation themselves.

As I analyze it, it is in their self-interest to delay, to whatever extent possible, the exploitation of the oceans. So the troublesome issue in this committee—and this is really the only basic difficulty in coming together, as I see it—is the question of immediate access.

The United States and the other four countries are interested in adequate access to these rich seabeds. Without that access, the argument goes, the investments which the companies are putting or want to put into developing the technology for deep sea mining would be severely jeopardized. Why should they put in hundreds of millions of dollars to this enterprise if they are not assured that this investment can, in the end, produce profits in a commercial sense?

This is the key difficulty. If we can overcome it, I think there will be a successful conclusion of the Conference.

Mr. SCHEUER. Have they successfully solved the problem of not only who is going to control the corporation that will end up with the cash flow, but also who will control the operating entity?

Ms. MINK. Well, I think there is a general agreement on the establishment of the authority, the idea of revenue sharing has been generally accepted—the whole idea which supports the thesis of common heritage is in place in terms of the negotiated text.

It's the unwillingness of the Group of 77 to permit OPEC free access from this stage to the industrialized world that presents our difficulty. We do not think that it's fair at some point in the future—whether it's 15 or 25 years—to simply say that we'll cut off all private commercial activity and permit the authority to start anew to redetermine the nature of the exportation. That is the aspect which gives our industrial community in particular the most difficulty.

We might accept it if we were not on the verge of being able to do something. If we were not in a situation where hundreds of millions of dollars had already been spent, we could probably accept this. But having encouraged our deep sea mining companies to make the investment, and it being perceived as in our national interest that we encourage this kind of investment and not delay it in any untoward way, there is a basic difficulty in arriving at an agreed access principle in this committee.

Mr. OLSEN. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment on that?

Mr. SIMON. Yes, Mr. Olsen.

Mr. OLSEN. My company is one of the companies engaged in this activity. We do have a one-third interest in ocean mining ventures. To date we have spent \$10 million in research and technology in this area, and we are still spending considerable sums. Because of technological and market uncertainties, it will be years before SUN can hope to profit from this investment. We are most concerned about this particular problem.

We will continue to spend money in the next year, but the problem must be resolved before too long or else we will have to reconsider the level of our commitment. I think that most companies are in the same situation. We're not a charitable institution; we must show a profit; we must return income to our stockholders, and this uncertainty—both in the Congress and in the negotiations—is causing considerable difficulty.

I would say that if there is no guarantee of equitable tax treatment or a reasonable resolution of the regulatory problems within a very short period of time, companies such as mine would have to reevaluate their investment in the development of this technology.

Mr. ERLNBORN. I just have a brief comment. I was much encouraged to hear your comment about your responsibility to your shareholders and the necessity of returning a profit, since I'm one of your shareholders. [Laughter.]

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Olsen, while we have you here, let me toss one other question at you. You said the year of investment in the LDC's is over, and you show this tremendous, dramatic drop in investment—\$144 million to \$34 million in 3 years. Is this primarily because of domestic taxes in the United States? Is it because of the environment you find in the LDC's or is it because of the return you're getting on your investment?

Mr. OLSEN. It's a combination. I guess it's primarily the tax situation in the United States. We're relatively new in the foreign area—we're primarily a Canadian-U.S. company—primarily these are our markets. We are a new entry.

You will recall that before Congress enacted the recent legislation, foreign tax credits were permitted on a per country basis. That was eliminated by the legislation. It did not hurt the multinationals too much, but it did hurt newcomers who had to calculate their taxes on a per country basis. The foreign loss recapture provision also caused problems.

These two were the primary reasons for our withdrawal, but associated with them were the difficulties in getting adequate returns in the LDC's.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Eckholm, you mentioned solar cookers as one way of saving wood and other forms of energy. I have never heard of solar cookers.

One of the things that strikes me as I travel is the very spotty use of solar equipment. In Cyprus, you visit refugee housing financed 55 percent by American funds—every one of these refugee houses has a solar heating unit on it. And yet, you come back to DuPage County, Ill., or New York or southern Illinois and you find hardly any solar units.

How do we go about doing not just the additional research, but marketing, distributing, getting the word out that there is such a thing as a solar cooker unit to heat hot water?

Mr. ECKHOLM. Well, I'd say with solar cookers, I think the technology isn't quite ready for massive distribution in the Third World. There's a problem of cost, first of all.

Incidentally, I think that in this, as in many areas, the answer is not going to come through involvement of multinational corporations. I doubt whether they have the inclinations or capacity to make the kind of products that will be needed to solve some of these very small-scale, basic problems. But I do think that through the United Nations and AID and governmental agencies within those countries, research needs to be pursued into the right kinds of technologies.

The cost factor is hard to imagine. People can't buy something that costs \$100. They need something that costs \$10, and I don't think an American company is going to build a biogas plant for

\$10 or \$20, though the Chinese have done it. It would be a very different sort of process of social organization that initiates these technologies, rather than the classic kind of corporate introduction of a high level technology into a society.

On your basic question, it seems to me that, if the awareness is there among people at decisionmaking levels, much could be done with solar equipment. For example, in our own society, there's no reason why every new house that's built shouldn't have some sort of passive solar—a design that makes it able to take advantage of solar energy. Probably a good case exists even for subsidies to encourage putting in solar hot water heaters.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Erlenborn?

Mr. ERLBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to make a stab at answering your question. In DuPage County we don't have solar cookers because it's a lot more convenient and it's within the financial capability of the people in this country to have electric or gas stoves.

Maybe one of the reasons is we have price controls on natural gas and we encourage its use by keeping the price down.

Mr. SIMON. If my colleague would yield, maybe we would have solar cookers out in the backyard rather than barbecue sets that consume charcoal and pollute the air. At least there are possibilities that we ought to be looking into.

Mr. ERLBORN. I think the final answer is to encourage people one way or the other—either because it's aesthetically better or economically better—but somehow people are going to have to be motivated through self-interest rather than by some bureaucratic governmental decision saying, "Thou shalt use solar cookers rather than charcoal."

If you had a completely autocratic government, without any individual liberties, you could do that, but I think in a democracy, the only way you achieve anything is through motivation, and motivation involves proving to someone that it's in their self-interest to do it.

Dr. Talbot and several of the witnesses have talked about the problems of the destruction of arable land. I have a couple of questions about that.

First of all, though we've talked about the mineral resources of the seas, we haven't directed much attention to the food-producing capabilities of the seas as an alternative or additional source of food. How do we stand there?

Dr. TALBOT. I did not mention the food-producing potential of the seas in terms of futures, largely because it would appear that the food-producing potential in the future is not likely to be very much greater, if at all, than at present. The past several decades have seen a tremendous increase in the amount of effort applied by virtually all nations to fishing—fishing for fin fish, crustaceans, mammals, and whatever—and an incredible increase in the amount of technology applied to this. For a time, there was a concurrent dramatic increase in the global yield, but that has essentially leveled off—indeed, it dropped for several years.

It would appear that the factors involved are: one, overfishing or reaching the maximum of many of the stocks that are being fished;

another factor which may become more and more important—though it's hard to quantify—is habitat damage through pollution and through various kinds of alteration of the near-shore, estuary, and other areas, which are critical, really, for a large percentage of the marine fishes at some time in their life history.

The point here is that, in spite of periodic assumptions in the past that the seas offered unlimited opportunities through traditional fishing, it would appear that they indeed do not; and that while it may be possible to maintain something like the present productivity—and possibly some modest increases with better utilization of what is caught and better management—the potential for providing enough to begin to meet the needs of the growing population does not appear to be there.

MR. ERLBORN. What about vegetable matter rather than the fish—animal matter?

DR. TALBOT. Well, there may be some potential there. Part of the problem there is that one gets into the question of where on the food chain you are going to harvest what humans want to eat. It's a little bit the same as looking at the current interest in krill—the shrimp-like creature in Antarctica.

The vegetable matter—the phytoplankton or other things—are in turn eaten by the animal life of the seas, and at present we do most of our harvesting of the animal life. It would appear that there may be some potential, but again not very great, for increase there. If there is much increase in the existing resources, then there is going to be a reduction in the availability of the creatures which feed on that.

There have been assorted proposals for farming in the sea, which are quite imaginative, but all of these are still pretty much in the proposal stage, and there's quite a bit of question as to how much can really be produced in terms of meeting the real needs of the increasing population over the next 20 or 30 years.

MR. SIMON. If my colleague would yield on that point, I understand that Dr. C. Graham Hurlbutt at Harvard has done research on mussels, and found that in Spain, France and some other areas—a little bit in Nova Scotia now—they are getting up to 260,000 pounds of mussels a year from 1 acre of ocean. That would strike me as having tremendous potential.

Is that not realistic—an expansion of that kind of food, even though it's not part of our diet here in the United States today?

DR. TALBOT. There are potentials for some kinds of mariculture or aquatic farming or management of the resources, but that one, for example, has two or three problems. The sites that are suitable are relatively limited, and most of them tend to be in areas where there is already a good deal of pollution which shellfish tend to pick up—they're a beautiful filter for catching pollutants in the marine ecosystem.

Consequently, given our present levels of pollution and given what's in the seas already, potential for this is somewhat limited. Clearly, there are opportunities like that, and hopefully, more will be developed over the coming years, but there's nothing as yet proven that would appear to offer a major breakthrough.

On the other hand, it may be possible on land to use fish farming in ponds. In certain areas this has shown remarkable yields, but again, for a variety of environmental reasons, it has not shown—even with a great deal of development effort—the potential that was forecast for it by the U.N. 15 or 20 years ago.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you.

Mr. ERLÉNBOEN. Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. We thank the members of the panel. Dr. Mellor, we did not have any questions for you, but I have your statement well marked. Our chairman says that he would like to ask you some questions by mail if you would respond to them.

Dr. MELLOR. Certainly.

Mr. SIMON. We can enter them into the record.

We thank all the members of the panel. It was a very solid contribution.

I'm pleased to turn over the gavel for this particular portion, for this distinguished witness, to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, who is my former Congressman and my neighbor in southern Illinois.

I'm very pleased to turn the gavel over to Mel Price.

Mr. SCHEUER. May I say a word? We are very pleased and honored to have both the witnesses today and our visiting Chairman. It has been the modus operandi of this committee to work very closely with the standing committees of the Congress, because we realize that, to the extent that we can be effective in changing the policies and programs of the executive branch and the Congress, it is only through the process of working with the standing committees that this can be done. We perceive ourselves as a support service for the standing committees.

We have cooperated with them in a number of ways, and this is another example of the way in which we have adjusted our work to the work and interests of the standing committees which legislate policies and programs.

I want to thank the chairman for the cooperation that his staff has extended in connection with these hearings, and him for doing us the honor of chairing this hearing. It is my pleasure to turn the chair over to Congressman Mel Price, chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Mr. Scheuer, and I thank my friend Paul Simon for the nice introduction.

I need no introduction to this witness, however, since I have known him for many, many years and have had the good fortune to be associated with him in the legislative field. The witness is one of our country's most distinguished soldiers and statesmen.

He has done effective work in both fields, and I am honored to be sitting here today in a meeting in which General Taylor is again a participant. I think you have done a great deal of good in your career. I am glad that you are still active, and I hope you stay active for many, many years.

General TAYLOR. Thank you.

Mr. PRICE. We have your prepared statement; proceed in any manner you desire.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, U.S. ARMY (RET.),
WASHINGTON, D.C.

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 529.]

General TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your kind words to me.

Members of the committee, I'm very honored to be asked to appear before you to discuss certain aspects of the population problem. I think the House is indeed to be commended for having set up a select committee for this purpose, because the more one examines the many facets of the population problem, the more one sees that our Government is not properly organized to deal with this kind of thing.

Almost every aspect of American policy, whether foreign or domestic, is affected in one way or another by population growth, which is truly a seminal cause in the sense that it's basic and fundamental to almost everything that afflicts mankind and thus burdens governments with the problem of solving it.

The action by Congress of creating the select committee is a recognition of the interlocking interests of government and of the people involved with the population issue.

I became involved in this issue purely as a layman, with the military background that you've mentioned, approaching it from the point of view not of the demographer, the sociologist, the economist, or the nutritionalist—all of whom have enormous interest and stakes in the question—but rather as an interested citizen who has spent his life concerned largely with national security in its various aspects. I was struck from the onset by the fact that, indeed, national security and national well-being are deeply affected by the population issue in many, many ways.

There's a certain stark simplicity about the way population affects human life—the increase of people increases human demand for and consumption of everything of survival value on the globe, and thereby affects relationships both within countries and between countries.

The conditions created by excessive population growth, of course, vary from country to country, but nonetheless, there is a considerable similarity of consequences, although they are quite different in many respects in an industrial nation such as ours compared with underdeveloped countries—large ones like China and Indonesia or small ones like Chad and Haiti.

Simply by increasing the consumption of those things which are essential to life, health and progress, population growth inevitably creates rivalries which take the form of social frictions and instability within nations, and then international conflicts between them.

Under these circumstances, governments are faced with virtually impossible tasks—especially in those countries which have the greatest problems, with population sometimes doubling within 20 or 30 years, and where indigenous leadership resources are usually very limited indeed.

In such countries government becomes the scapegoat and is held to account for all the unhappiness arising from the consequences of population growth. This discontent leads to disorder, violence, and

frequent changes of government, detrimental to both national and international stability.

Troubles arise among nations resulting from competition for markets and for all sorts of assets like fishing rights and fresh water sources. Problems also result from cases of population overflow, from overcrowded regions to less densely settled areas—a phenomenon we are experiencing along our Southern border.

Overcrowded nations faced with these internal conditions in the past often have sought relief by forceful territorial expansion at the expense of their neighbors. The latter, when threatened, then turn to stronger countries for assistance, often seeking allies among the great powers and inviting their intervention.

Insofar as population growth may affect our relations with the Soviet Union, we're reminded that excessive population growth often creates these centers of turbulence which offer Soviet troublemakers the opportunity to practice their subversive skills, in much the same way as we are observing in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Angola.

I find that our own country has a tendency toward complacency with regard to its own population problem. I gave Mr. Scheuer a copy of the morning paper with a headline which illustrates this point. There is the feeling that, since we have our own rate of growth pretty well in hand—and we get reports in headlines that indicate the rate is declining—the population problem itself is diminishing.

I'm sure this committee is aware of the fact that there's no diminution about it, insofar as the midterm future is concerned. Throughout this decade and leading into the next century, we and the rest of the world are going to be faced with extremely difficult problems which will be uncontrolled and uncontrollable in many of the countries which are most affected.

Yet as you see from the article I mentioned, it points out that last year the birth rate was something like 28 per 1,000 worldwide and it's now dropped to—I believe that article says—14 per 1,000, which sounds like a dramatic improvement. We Americans are likely to feel that since we're on the low end of that scale, we have no problem.

But we should look at our own demographic figures and remind ourselves that by the end of this century, our nation will increase through births, under this low rate that we have, by about 40 million people. Furthermore, in recent years we have accepted some 400,000 legal immigrants annually, and we're aware of the fact that there's another very large number—sometimes estimated at over 1 million—coming in illegally each year.

Now, if these conditions continue until the end of the century, we may anticipate a population of something like 300 million people. Just to mention that term is to remind us that we indeed have a major domestic problem of our own.

One of the reasons our increase is so important is the fact that we consume so much. We are the most voracious nation in the world in terms of consumption of raw materials and manufactured goods, thereby placing exorbitant demands upon global resources for the maintenance of our high standard of living. So when we add 1 million to our population, it's the equivalent of, say, 10 million or even 20 million in Indonesia or Bangladesh or some of the other countries living at a marginal level of subsistence.

This certainly is a reminder to us that our responsibilities extend beyond our own domestic boundaries into the international field.

At home, our increase in population is adding to our growing dependence on foreign imports. Only a few years ago, we were importing only about 4 percent of our essentials. Now we know the situation with respect to oil that's before us every day—we import about half of what we consume. We often forget the fact that well over 50 percent of the seven or eight most important industrial minerals also are being imported.

This dependence on imports, in my judgment, is one of the great determinants of change in our status as a great power. Population growth is not the only cause of this dependence, but it is a primary contributor.

What does it mean to our national policy that we're so dependent on imports at the present time? For one thing, it means that hence forth we must be able to keep our sealanes open to overseas markets; we must be able to maintain close relationships with our principal producer countries abroad.

Where do we find these producers? In several regions: in the Middle East for oil, this hemisphere for almost everything we need—we're very fortunate indeed in residing in a hemisphere so rich in raw materials, but it's also a sobering reminder of the increased importance of our relations to Latin America. I was one of those citizens who heaved a sigh of relief when we passed the Panama Canal Treaties, not just because of the canal aspects per se, but because of the impact of our action on the Latin American world, the source of so many of our raw materials, and a part of the globe with which we must maintain the very closest political and economic ties.

We Americans are going to find it harder and harder to satisfy our needs as they become greater with time, simply because our industrial colleagues in Europe and Japan are going to be competing with us for virtually the same things in the same markets in the same ways. Hence, these Third World producers are going to try to apply what they've learned from OPEC—the cartel system—and we can expect some very tough bargaining in order to assure ourselves of sources of supply.

I mention this to point out how population growth, by contributing heavily to our dependence on imports, is forcing changes in our foreign policy. We can no longer focus largely on our relations with the industrial nations; we must think more and more about the Third World which contains these resources which we must have.

We must realize that our dependence is thoroughly known to the Soviet Union, and you can see in Africa today evidences of a Soviet desire not only to project its influence throughout that continent, but also, in so doing, to offset the American influence and to impede our access to important African markets.

I cannot emphasize too much our growing economic vulnerability, which stems in large part from population growth coupled with excessive consumption. It's a very good question whether we can continue to maintain our economic growth and our present standard of living in the years ahead, if we don't control population and consumption rates.

I would say I could well describe the coming period as being an era of scarcities characterized by chaotic conditions in the countries which suffer most from population growth. The chaos to be expected will contribute to our difficulties in conducting trade on a stable basis with such countries. In Africa, for example, the racial problem in the south will affect our ability to continue to obtain raw materials from that region. In the Middle East, our access to oil is vulnerable to the relations between Israel and the Arab states. In Latin America there is a deeply ingrained anti-Americanism against the Yankee Colossus of the North, which will handicap our ability to trade there on satisfactory terms.

Thus, we see again how the population factor injects itself into foreign and domestic policy in many important ways.

In closing, let me sum up with at least three salient points about which I hope we are agreed. In the first place, we must recognize that the dangers that flow from population growth and the scarcities to which it contributes are so imminent that they should arouse in all of us a sense of urgent necessity comparable to that feeling which we've had in the past when we were threatened with foreign military attack. The social, political, and economic threats, to which I have referred in a very cursory way, are more subtle and less easily identified than those represented by hostile armies and air fleets armed with atomic weapons—dangers which we can understand and against which we can make provision. Yet the consequences of population growth bear so importantly on world peace and tranquillity that we must act promptly to forestall them with all available means.

A second point is the universal nature of this problem. It's not ours alone—no one has the problem alone; everyone shares it. Furthermore, no single nation, such as the United States, however farsighted in controlling its own population problem, can escape the consequences of the irresponsibility of others who ignore their problems or delay in dealing with them. World leaders who believe that nuclear war is the greatest threat to the future of the human race should in logic unite in efforts to control the population bomb and try to mitigate an equally mortal threat to world peace.

The final point is the inadequacy of the organization of our Government to cope with a problem such as population growth with all its complex consequences. Over the years, with the benefit of the National Security Act of 1947, which set up the National Security Council, we have been reasonably well organized to mobilize military forces in defense of those aspects of national security to which military means are applicable. This is far from the case with regard to our nonmilitary resources, particularly those represented by our vast productive economy.

Among the latter are to be found most of the tools we shall need in dealing with population and food problems, but they're widely scattered through many departments and agencies of Government, with no one in charge short of the President.

My own recommendation for solving this organizational defect would be to expand and replace the National Security Council by a National Policy Council to serve as an interdepartmental agency to advise the President on all important policy matters, foreign and

domestic; to formulate the necessary plans and programs for Presidential approval; and to supervise subsequent implementation.

In the coming era, we shall have many problems too complex for the improvisations of the past: problems like population growth, foreign trade, food, energy, and immigration, which, exceeding the capacity of czars suddenly appointed in time of crisis and staffs assembled overnight, will require the undivided attention of career professionals constantly on the job.

I hope that our present justified concern over population growth will lead to a broad survey of our organizational readiness to mass our total resources in dealing with the critical problems arising from its consequences.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. PRICE. Thank you very much General Taylor for a fine statement that I think might bring some interesting questions from the panel up here.

The Chair recognizes Ms. Collins.

QUESTIONS AND REMARKS

MS. COLLINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Taylor, you have a number of very excellent and insightful points made in your testimony which I read and listened to here, and I was wondering what your thoughts are on U.S. development assistance being tied to a developing country's priorities and actions on population, human rights, income distribution, et cetera.

General TAYLOR. The question is the priorities to—

MS. COLLINS. Yes, U.S. domestic assistance being tied to the developing country's priorities in human rights, income distribution, et cetera.

General TAYLOR. Well, certainly the question of the importance of our relations with the Third World countries—the developing countries—grows from the population problem to some extent, not exclusively. So I would feel that in our foreign policy, we must give far more attention to our relationships with the developing world, and, frankly, looking first at those where we have our principal market interests in order to be able to anticipate and cope with the consequences of the population problem.

MS. COLLINS. Do you think that our policy should consider to a larger degree the priorities that the other countries have set for themselves?

General TAYLOR. That we should give more priority to the—

MS. COLLINS. No; that our policy should be more in line with their priorities—what they perceive to be needed in their own countries.

General TAYLOR. I don't think you can generalize on that. I think you have to study every case, and every case is indeed different. We can certainly be much more sympathetic than we have been in the past, recognizing that so many times—in Latin America in particular—a country may have only one essential export upon which its whole economy reposes. The fact that we have rarely been willing to assist such countries in a very positive way in stabilizing export prices accounts to some degree for our reputation of being insensitive to the needs of these countries.

Although far from being an expert on the 75 countries that we're talking about, I would feel reasonably sure that each one is a problem in itself and has to be regarded in that sense.

Ms. COLLINS. Until the Arab oil embargo of 1973 the United States and other industrialized countries enjoyed a continuous and reliable flow of cheap raw materials from the developing world, as you pointed out. The Arab embargo precipitated a surge of Third World nationalism, resulting in increased bargaining for essential resources and commodities.

You imply that this state of affairs poses serious consequences to the security and well-being of the United States. To alleviate these growing international pressures as you see them, would you support the need for conservation and alternatives in the lifestyles on the part of the industrialized world, as well as a more equitable distribution of resources and technology between the developing and developed worlds?

General TAYLOR. Very much so. I think it's a conservative estimate that we waste 25 percent of our food and energy, and certainly consume raw materials and natural resources at rates which can't be justified.

I always have problems at home with my wife agreeing on a priority list of unnecessary luxuries which we should give away first in an economy drive. I say her electric toothbrush is the first thing to go, but she reacts by demanding my electric razor, so this creates problems.

But in all seriousness, we have a long way to go in conservation, reduction of waste, and cutting down on the luxuries of life, an extravagance which contributes to our enormous consumption. This is well known abroad and is a cause, understandably, of great resentment in the less developed countries.

Ms. COLLINS. Thank you very much.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Simon?

Mr. SIMON. First of all, General Taylor I commend you for your leadership. I think the fact that you have lent your name and your leadership to this emphasis on population is a very substantial contribution, and I appreciate what you're doing.

If I may follow though on Ms. Collins' question, there are those who have suggested that in our foreign assistance, we might, in addition to everything else, have some incremental incentives. For example, if a developing nation had a family planning program, they might receive 5 percent more than if they did not. In Illinois, in our school aid policies, we tell the school, "If you have help for the handicapped, we're going to give you more school aid."

So we would say to a developing nation, "If you have"—and population would be just one area—"If you have a population program" or another one would be "If you have a good distribution of the assistance, you would get some additional assistance."

Does that sort of thing make sense or is it too heavyhanded?

General Taylor. In effect, incentives for family planning.

Mr. SIMON. That's correct. That's the idea.

General TAYLOR. We would like to do it, obviously, but as your question implies, it's a very delicate thing to do, and the likelihood

of being heavy-handed to the point of offending and thereby taking actions which are counterproductive, I think, is very great.

Again, I would think you would have to look at every country, and I would think that you could probably accomplish the purpose not by adding amendments to a law, but by private conversation on the ground saying, "Look, we're going to buy more of your sugar, for example, under an agreement that covers seven years to give your market stability. Thus we'll guarantee taking a certain part of your export capability to the United States at a reasonable price, but in the meantime, we expect certain things to be done on your part among which would be your joining us in a common program for family planning of the kind that we're supporting worldwide for population purposes."

I think it could be done, but it would have to be done very carefully, rather than just a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. I think that with the economic benefits that should be derived to this country—the record shows pretty clearly that as income increases and education increases, the birth rate tends to go down—we would be working indirectly to encourage birth control even though we never said a word about it.

Mr. SIMON. I concur completely. You mentioned our own population problems in your opening remarks. One of the criticisms that is sometimes made is that we are eager for other nations to adopt population policies when, in fact, we have no explicit population policy in the United States.

Do you feel this is a desirable thing—that we ought to have a population policy, if for no other reason than that we're not preaching one thing and doing another?

General TAYLOR. I'm not impressed by the need for it, because really our performance is the payoff. Frequently we make the mistake of talking a good game and not playing it. Here is a case one time when we're playing a good game in controlling our own population and not talking about it, and I think that's the most convincing way to display our sincerity.

If I could see an advantage for writing something down on paper which coincides with what we're doing anyway, there would be no objection, but I would doubt that the value would be very high.

Mr. SIMON. I thank you very much, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Scheuer?

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Taylor we're delighted and honored to have you here today. You just put me in a quandry. You said we don't need a population policy and that we should just keep on doing what we're doing. Yet, on the last page of your testimony, you say, in effect, that the administration hasn't put its act together, that there are population concerns and programs dispersed all throughout the executive branch that have not been coordinated. You imply that we don't have a coherent policy on immigration and on the assured availability of the indispensable natural resources that we desperately need, such as energy conservation.

You say that, in the case of our nonmilitary resources represented by your vast productive economy, we can find most of the tools "we

shall need in dealing with population and food problems, but they are widely scattered through many departments and agencies of government with no one in charge short of the President."

That's a pretty strong statement, and I happen to agree with it 100 percent. But I would ask you, from the depths of your wisdom and extraordinary experience in Government, to elaborate on that and give us a few examples, and then elaborate on your suggestion to replace the National Security Council with a National Policy Council. Perhaps you could describe what its interdepartmental role would be. In other words, please describe both the problem and your solution in a little more detail.

General TAYLOR. Yes; I'd be very happy to. If I may put in a commercial announcement, I've written on this subject in a book entitled "Precarious Security."

Mr. SCHEUER. When was this published?

General TAYLOR. Two years ago.

Mr. SCHEUER. Very good.

General TAYLOR. The concept is simple enough, although I recognize that the simplicity can be deceptive because of the underlying complexity of the issue we're dealing with.

We have a National Security Council that's reasonably well organized to deal in three areas—foreign policy, military policy, and intelligence policy. But when you get into an interdepartmental matter involving economic, fiscal, or social policy—

Mr. SCHEUER. Or immigration policy.

General TAYLOR. There is no focal point of responsibility and resources. My solution of replacing the NSC with a National Policy Council offends those of my old military friends who say "Look, you're ruining an essential advisory body for foreign military policy by making it too big," and my civilian friends who say, "Look, you're trying to militarize the civil sector of the executive branch." So I think it must be a good middle-of-the-road idea, since those on the edges don't like it.

Mr. SCHEUER. You're getting it both ways.

General TAYLOR. Under my proposal, you'd have four panels under the National Policy Council, the first responsible for foreign military intelligence policy—essentially the task of the NSC at the present time. Then you would have an economic panel which is hard to organize because there's no one official today responsible to the President for all economic affairs. So I propose that the President nominate an economic representative—ECREP for short—who would have to be approved by the Senate. He'd be a major official who might also be concurrently a Cabinet head, but with a job like that, I think he should be above and independent of all the many departments and agencies involved in this field.

Then there would be a fiscal-monetary panel chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. At the onset, I should have said in the first panel that the Secretary of State would be chairman. ECREP in the second, the Secretary of the Treasury in the fiscal-monetary panel and then in the fourth panel, domestic welfare, the Secretary of HEW would be chairman.

Now, I know that one shudders to think of adding to the jobs of the Secretary of HEW, but in his present capacity he is responsible for most matters falling under the heading of domestic welfare.

Under these four panels there would be a number of standing committees—permanent committees staffed by specialists in dealing with long term problems such as population/food; energy, immigration, arms sales, conservation.

The National Policy Council would be a single executive forum for all major policy issues with the President at the top and fixed responsibility clearly established all the way down the line to the planning committees and the implementing agencies.

Now, having said that, I can hear voices saying, "That general thinks he can do anything with organization." I don't believe that for a second, but I do say that it's immoral if not criminal to fail to give good men the advantage of having the best organization possible because good organization makes it easier for good men to do their job better—it does not replace the need for good men.

I think we're faced with such a complex problem of government in a great country like ours that something that would simplify and fix responsibility would have considerable merit.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, that's a remarkable statement you just made. In your testimony, you refer several times to the potential for international conflict resulting from population growth pressures. Could you give us a few examples?

General TAYLOR. In a sense, you could say that every war stems from population. If you hadn't had people around, there wouldn't have been a war.

You could say that Rome fell because of population—not because the Empire was too crowded, but because the German tribes were being pushed by Mongols who were land hungry, who came off the Steppes and drove other barbarians into the Roman Empire.

So if you want to take the broadest point of view, you can find an affiliation of the population factor in virtually every conflict. In quite recent times, 1971, the conflict involving Bangladesh, India and Pakistan is really classic, because among the many factors at play nearly all have some relation to population.

Mr. SCHEUER. I agree.

General TAYLOR. It's been said that floods contributed. Well, floods contributed because much land had been deforested to raise more rice to feed the teeming, growing population.

The animosities of the countries involved were the results of the frictions of overpopulated countries crowding each other for living room. It's very easy to find such examples, although you can never say that population growth was the unique factor; it never is. It's sometimes a major and sometimes an indirect, relatively minor factor.

Mr. SCHEUER. You mentioned four different kinds of conflict: the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute over the Ogaden Desert; the Southern Africa conflict and the potential threat of Soviet involvement; the roiled-up situation in the Middle East, which I think is clearly population-related; and the anti-American feeling in Latin America.

Now, each of these could be explained in purely political terms. Can you give us your perception of how population concerns underlie each of these conflicts? Could you clarify that for us?

General TAYLOR. Well, it's always very hard, as I said, to isolate the population factor. But if you just look at the population densities in most of the countries involved, you'll see that they're very, very high. At a minimum, that makes for fragile governments with difficulty in controlling their own people.

In Angola, there's still a civil war going on between Communist and non-Communist factions. There are clearly political factors in this situation, as we would normally define political, but nonetheless in a country like Angola which will double its population in 30 years, there would be turbulence and instability with or without the Communist factor.

Mr. SCHEUER. As a matter of fact, just two years ago, I was at a meeting with a number of members of the Armed Services Committee in Indonesia. We met with General Suharto, the Chief of State of that country, and we were discussing all kinds of military and security matters when one of the members asked him what was the greatest threat facing Indonesia was at that time. He said, "Our exploding population growth rate."

It took everybody by surprise. We thought he'd talk about some kind of military situation. But he said,

It's our exploding population growth rate, because we have a tremendous flood of young people coming into the job market who need to be educated, housed, given health care and, above all, jobs, and if we can't provide the indispensable minimum of amenities—especially employment—for them, we are ripe for infiltration, subversion, and overthrow and all the chaos that will be caused in this whole Indian Ocean area.

I think that's much in line with what you're saying.

General TAYLOR. May I make a comment relevant to that? It has occurred to me—and I've tried to tell this to some of my military friends—that I'd like to see here in Washington—under the aegis of this committee, perhaps—a global map that would show graphically national population densities as elevations and depressions proportional to population. Whenever you'd see a mountain of population towering over a valley it would flag a danger area where trouble can arise from the pressure of population in the high density nation causing an overflow into the neighboring area of lesser density.

It would provide a useful way to predict future trouble spots in time to take precautions.

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you very, very much, General.

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much, General. You have been an excellent witness, and I am sure that the panel appreciates your appearance here today.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ASKED OF GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
BY THE CHAIRMAN

Question 1. General Taylor, you comment in very specific terms about the threat to our national security that is posed by rapid world population growth and its concomitants. On page 6 of your testimony you also concede that "our diplomats will face many obstacles in overcoming Third World prejudices—many *justified* by our past indifference to the needs of emerging nations."

Having made this concession, what is your opinion of Third World demands for a New International Economic Order?

Do you believe this demand is justified? If yes, how should the U.S. and other developed countries respond with concrete, positive action?

Answer. The Third World demands are vague as to ways and means but clear as to their purpose of effecting a broad redistribution of wealth from wealthy to poor nations. From the point of view of the have-nots, this is a justified purpose not unlike that of U.S. tax laws which transfer wealth between economic classes of our society. However, in this case, the vastness of the problem requires a cooperative international effort if tangible progress is to be made—an effort in which the U.S. should and does participate but at a level often criticized as inadequate. On a bilateral basis, we can and should help Third World trade partners to stabilize their economies through long term agreements to exchange products on mutually advantageous terms.

Question 2. A considerable amount of your testimony is devoted to U.S. requirements for raw materials—finite resources which are largely located in the developing world. As you clearly indicate in your testimony, our own population growth—fanned by legal and illegal immigration—contributes to the demand for increasingly scarce commodities.

In view of this growing scarcity, don't you believe that Americans must alter their patterns of consumption? Isn't it essential that Americans begin to *conserve* in every way possible, particularly with respect to energy?

Answer. We should certainly alter our patterns of consumption, beginning with an elimination of waste and a moderation of our indulgence in luxuries. In addition, we need a national conservation policy to reduce consumption of all scarce raw materials; especially energy, food and several scarce minerals of particular industrial importance.

General TAYLOR. Thank you very much.

Dr. Organski, you may proceed in any manner you desire.

STATEMENT OF DR. A. F. K. ORGANSKI, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, ANN ARBOR, MICH.

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 539]

Mr. PRICE. The next witness will be Dr. A. F. K. Organski, professor of political science at the University of Michigan and program director for the Center for Political Studies, Institute of Social Research.

DR. ORGANSKI. Mr. Chairman, the letter I received from the chairman of the committee inviting me here suggested that the committee had an interest in my testimony on two subjects: (a) the connection between international politics and demographic behavior, and (b) the question of what the United States can do, with the means available, to help with the population problem of other countries. These are broad questions, of course, and I intend to testify only in regard to small portions.

Let me begin with the first of the two questions. I heard some snatches of the testimony this morning and I paid a great deal of attention to General Taylor's testimony just now, and I would like to begin by noting that there is indeed a connection between international politics and demographic behavior. But I would like to warn, however, that the connection between international politics and demographic behavior is far different and more complex than could be inferred from previous testimony.

For example, the chairman posed a question just a moment ago whether one could detect a causal link between population growth and international conflict. The answer to his question was that population growth was a major cause of war. While it is true that population increases may have played some peripheral role in international military conflicts, the belief that population growth is a cause of international military conflict is untrue.

Aggressors in the recent past did not have a problem with population growth, and aggressors that may have had a population problem were not pushed into aggression by population pressures. For example, National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy did not suffer from population growth. Indeed, both countries tried as hard as they could to raise levels of fertility in their populations. The Japanese were growing, but one feels fairly certain that population growth was not a major reason for their attacking almost every nation in South and East Asia for a period of 50 years. In all three cases the "population argument" was used to justify attacks on neighbors. The argument "We are overcrowded, give us space," was an effective propaganda argument on the part of the aggressors. But when one looks at the facts, one finds arresting evidence that the argument was a convenient excuse. For example, it is significant that after Japan and Italy conquered empires their people didn't go there. There were more Italians in New York and Japanese in Hawaii than in the entire Italian or Japanese empires. Again, it seems rather obvious that the truly "overpopulated" countries do not attack anybody.

For the most part population changes pose threats only in the sense that levels of health, education, and equal opportunity can pose problems for the national security of the nation. The fundamental issue is to what extent the skills and capacities of the population are made available to the country by the socioeconomic and political system of the country.

I would like to read into the record something I wrote a long time ago, but which seems to me still a good description of the problem.

Population is, indeed, a nation's greatest resource, though like other resources it may be squandered or misused. What greater asset can a nation have than a multitude of able-bodied citizens, ready to stoke its furnaces, work its mines, run its machinery, harvest its crops, build its cities, raise its children, produce its art, and provide the vast array of goods and services that make a nation prosperous and content? On the other hand, what greater liability can a nation have than a mass of surplus people, living in hunger and poverty, scratching at tiny plots of land whose produce will not feed them all, swarming into cities where there are no more jobs, living in huts or dying in the street, sitting in apathy or smouldering with discontent, and ever betting more children to share their misery? The relationship between numbers and wealth and power is not simple, but surely it is significant.

Let me reiterate then that the reason population is important in international politics—that is, in the structure of power in the world—can be summarized as follows: It is people who work and it is people who fight, and working and fighting are the twin pillars on which all national power rests. It is the distribution of these people who work and fight across the nations of the world that makes the difference. So you really have to ask three questions when you're dealing with the connection between population and international politics: How many people within each nation can make a contribution to the nation itself? How skilled and productive are the people involved? And third, how capable is the political system of pooling and allocating the resources—human and material—that the nation has at its disposal?

I would like to focus my testimony on that last question: The relationship between the capability of the political system and demographic behavior.

First of all the political system is a major determinant of how much of the total population of a nation can be effectively used. Let me give

you an example of what I mean. We guess that the People's Republic of China has roughly 800 million people. Only very gross estimates are possible because there has been no census in China for 25 years; the estimate of 800 million may represent an underenumeration or overenumeration of 100 million. But, assuming a population of 800 million in China today, one is faced with the fact that only a small fraction of that population can make a contribution to the national goals of that country. There is no way of saying precisely how large that fraction is, but assume that the Communist system in that country makes it possible for roughly 10 percent (from 70 to 80 million people) to make a contribution. In the political system headed by Chiang Kai-shek the political network could capture the contribution of only one or two percent of the population, so that five to ten million Chinese could make a contribution national goals. The quantum jump in the power of China from the period of Chiang Kai-shek to the period of Mao Tse-tung is due to the expanded capacity of the political system to use the human resources of the population.

Here, then, you have one part of the relationship between politics and population expressed in the number of people that the political system enables to make a contribution for national purposes. When the socioeconomic systems of a nation are underdeveloped most of the burden for stimulating and collecting contributions falls on the political system. One of the reasons the United States is the most powerful nation of the world today is that its political and socioeconomic systems make it possible to use more people more effectively than any other country in the world.

Let me give you an example. During the last national political campaign President Carter and former President Ford debated the economic situation of our Nation. President Carter kept pointing to the the rate of unemployment in the United States as unacceptably high, while former President Ford pointed to the fact that more people were working than at any time in the history of this country. I don't remember the exact figures but it was in excess of 90 million people. If that figure is accepted and used as an indicator of the capacity of the system to use human resources, it seems quite clear that the difference in power between us and China is in some sense due to the fact that our system makes it possible for one out of two Americans to make a contribution while the Chinese system makes it possible for only one out of ten or more Chinese to make a contribution. To sum up, the capacity of the economy defines to a large extent how many people can make a contribution and the level of that contribution, and the political system also defines how many people are part of the system (i.e., can make a contribution to the nation) and the level that that contribution may reach. This is one way, then, that the political system affects the demographic posture of the nation.

There is another and very important way, I believe, politics and demographic behavior are connected. The matter is complex, and we know very little about it, but in summary I would argue this. First, certain types of political change affect the important demographic variables in significant ways. Certain types of political transformations (the creation of internal security, the creation of universal rules of interaction, et cetera) clearly affect the level of

mortality in the country. A major reason that mortality has fallen to very low levels all over the world is because all over the world we have seen the emergence of state structures capable of sustaining minimal services for their population. Although most of the political systems of the new nations are very inefficient and ineffective compared to those of developed countries still they are capable of supplying minimal services sufficient to improve materially chances for life. In a sense, in underdeveloped countries, the major reason that mortality has dropped so low so fast is the health improvements in major areas of the world. It is usually argued that the improvement of food supplies and sanitary conditions, primarily responsible for the fall in mortality levels, is due to the developing nations borrowing the required technology and practices from the developed countries. This is true. What people forget to mention, however—and this is critical—is that the technology could be imported and applied because a political system with at least a minimal capacity to deliver services had been installed. The sanitary facilities, the road system, the minimal health system would not have been possible had governmental structures not been there. These structures are often admittedly barely able to function, but it is important to realize that the bare capability had sufficient effect to make possible the presence of facilities that, in turn, made possible the conditions for mortality to drop.

The second influence I would like to indicate between the political and demographic behavior is the influence of the political capacity on fertility. That is a very critical area and little is known about it.

Let me explain why this new knowledge may be important. For a long time it has been believed that a nation's fertility drops as the nation develops economically and socially. There is a great deal of evidence sustaining this proposition, and this view is very largely accepted. There is unquestionably an inverse relationship between education, per capita income, urbanization, et cetera on the one hand and fertility on the other. What is usually not said, however, is that the changes in question explain only from 50 to 60 percent of the variance. And that the remaining portion of the variance remains unexplained. For a long time I have suspected that the remaining variance could be explained, in large part, by taking into account political factors. In other words, the changes in the political system from low to high capacity may depress fertility in much the same fashion as occurs when economic development takes place.

A number of assertions that this indeed happens have been around for some time. They are usually made in reference to the communist portion of the underdeveloped world, but evidence that the propositions underpinning such beliefs are right is hard to come by. Still, the hypothesis of the connection between the capacity of the political system and fertility is fascinating and should be explored. Such propositions could not be tested until recently because we did not have systematic or rigorous measures of the capacity of political systems. We do have such measures now, even though very primitive, and I think the area should be explored. The findings of such research ought to prove very important in any attempt to help others help themselves in their attempts to correct unfavorable population patterns.

Let me turn to this last point very briefly. This obviously is a very vast subject and I can only sketch out what I consider the principal area here. Helping other nations correct unwanted fertility patterns is probably a more complex and difficult thing to do than any other kind of aid. There is no time here to deal with why this is so. In some ways, however, the problem of giving aid in the population field is not in principle different from transferring resources and technologies, attitudes, beliefs, et cetera, from one country to another. The success of transferring such resources depends obviously on the level of investment which can be made, on the efficiency with which the lender can transfer the resources in question, and most important of all on the capacity of the recipient to use the resources given it. This question, can the recipient use the resources to be transferred, is the question that needs to be answered before one begins to use aid effectively in helping in the population field. In deciding and executing policy one would be in a far better position if one could answer in systematic manner certain questions. Can the recipient's governmental system use the resources in question? Does the governmental structure have the capacity to deliver resources to target? Should the resources in question be allocated for their best use to the private or the public sector? Most important, the ability to answer such questions should permit a far more sophisticated and satisfactory evaluation of the effectiveness of programs to reduce fertility. These are the main questions that would permit the allocation of resources by the United States or any other lender in the population program.

Mr. Chairman, I am quite sure you are not surprised that having invited a scholar to testify, his testimony should consist of a plea that in order to do the job we wish to do better we must understand better the problem. In the field of population policy, however, this is literally true.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Scheuer, you may lead off with the first question.

QUESTIONS AND REMARKS

Mr. SCHEUER. Dr. Organski, you spoke very forcefully about the importance of political systems in implementing and encouraging the acceptance of programs such as health care in various developing countries.

From your knowledge of the situation, what do you think basically went wrong in India? They've been at it for a generation. Their top decisionmakers must know the need; they must know the devastating impact of population on their development programs; they must know the techniques that have worked and the ones that haven't worked. Why are they falling so far short of the mark?

Dr. ORGANSKI. Mr. Chairman, the honest answer to your question, I think, goes to the core. I was about to say it goes to the "gut" of the problem, but I will not use that word. It goes to the core of the problem. The honest answer would be that I don't know, and I don't think anybody knows.

We can suspect and we can bring up some hypotheses. I want to say—there are tentative things—I do wish the Government sponsored more of this kind of research; maybe some future testimony might give you the answer to your question.

One of the reasons why it has not worked in India is, first of all, that the problem is immense. A lot of things have been done, but the problem is so large that we just expect results infinitely faster than they can possibly occur.

Mr. SCHEUER. We've been informed that the population of India is likely to stabilize around the year 2020 at 1,600 million people. The population of China—which is now around 900 million—is expected to stabilize around the year 2005 at about 1,525 million.

In other words, at the points where they level off, India is likely to have approximately 100 million more people than China, although China is almost twice the size of India. So if you think the problem is large now—or if Indian decisionmakers think it's large now—what are they going to do in the year 2000 or the year 2020? How are they going to cope with that problem?

Dr. ORGANSKI. Mr. Chairman, I really cannot answer that. I can only tell you that my impression is—and this is only an impression—that responsible people do what they can, rather than what needs to be done, because they cannot do what needs to be done.

The projections for decades hence, no matter how strong the authority, should be taken with a grain of salt, simply because it is very difficult to project, and as you know, demographic projections have been wrong in the past.

I am in no way minimizing the gravity of the situation insofar as India is concerned or insofar as China is concerned. To go back to your earlier question, I would daresay that if our measures of the capacity of the political system of India indicates to us that she does slightly below average of countries in her socioeconomic bracket, and our measures of the capacity of the political system of China indicate that China, like North Vietnam, like Israel, for example—countries which have done immensely “better”—in quotation marks—they've performed “better” than countries in their own socioeconomic bracket—part of the answer, and only part of the answer, will be there.

I am very concerned—well, I think I shall leave it at that. You may have another question.

Mr. SCHEUER. Recognizing all the variables and so forth, is rapid population growth in the developing world a cause of instability, a cause of potential conflict, a threat to international peace?

Dr. ORGANSKI. The socioeconomic and political arrangements that accompany the process of growth may be, indeed, a problem. But they are the socioeconomic and political arrangements—the incapacity of government, the lack of productivity of a society: that's where the fault lies.

Now, it would be much simpler if they didn't have this growth. But Bangladesh is not attacking anybody, and if I understand what population pressure is, population pressure is there. So that is a weakness.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, we must face the fact that it is the people who have solved population problems who have gone to war and have destroyed each other. The ones who have not solved them or have not been even in a partial solution—they have been incapable of doing it.

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Simon?

Mr. SIMON. I have no question. I appreciate your testimony. I particularly liked your reference to the fact that the percentage of people or the numbers of people that you effectively put to work in a country depends on the political process. You would have been a good witness for the Humphrey-Hawkins bill here a little while back.

Dr. ORGANSKI. I'm pleased, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PRICE. Ms. Collins?

Mrs. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions.

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much, Dr. Organski. We have completed the afternoon's session.

Dr. ORGANSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Witness excused.]

Mr. PRICE. The committee will recess.

[Whereupon, at 1:56 p.m., the hearing was concluded.]

HEARINGS TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON POPULATION AND IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF HUMAN LIFE

THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 1978

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POPULATION,
Washington, D.C.

The task force met, pursuant to notice, at 8 a.m., in room 340, Cannon House Office Building, the Honorable Paul Simon, chairman, presiding.

Members in attendance: Mr. Simon, Mr. Scheuer, Mr. Kildee, Mr. Beilenson, Mr. Erlenborn.

Also present: Dr. Teitelbaum, Mr. Robinson, Ms. Williamson, Mr. Baron, Ms. Nyrop, Ms. Boone, Mr. Lieberman.

Mr. SIMON. The hearing will come to order. Our first witness is Mr. George Zeidenstein, the president of the Population Council of New York City. We are pleased to have you with us.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Thank you very much.

Mr. SIMON. Before I call on our first witness I should acknowledge that although I am chairing this series of hearings, the real chairman of the committee, Mr. James Scheuer of New York, is sitting to my right.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE ZEIDENSTEIN, PRESIDENT OF THE POPULATION COUNCIL, NEW YORK CITY

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 554]

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Congressmen, as I mentioned informally, my testimony should take about ten minutes to read and I would like to read it, especially because the other members of the panel haven't heard it. They don't know what I am going to say and I don't have copies for them.

Mr. SIMON. However you wish to proceed.

Mr. SCHEUER. It seems to me that it might be better just to have you talk to us for 10 or 15 minutes and then we will ask you some questions.

Mr. SIMON. I hate to differ with my good colleague from New York, but I feel that if Mr. Zeidenstein would really prefer to read the statement and other members of the panel have not previously read it, then he should proceed as wishes.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, my name is George Zeidenstein and I work as president of the Population Council, which is an independent, nonprofit, research, training, and technical assistance organization that is international in the composition of its Board

of Trustees and its staff, as well as in the nature and deployment of its activities.

The council was established in 1952 at the initiative of John D. Rockefeller III, and seeks to contribute to knowledge and the capacity for improving human welfare through its research and services in the broad field of population.

Since 1965, I myself have devoted my working life to development efforts in poorer countries; during about eight of those dozen or so years, I was resident in Asia—first as Director of the Peace Corps in Nepal and later as representative of the Ford Foundation in Bangladesh.

In those positions, my concerns covered the wide spectrum of development activities, including population activities.

The intensity and complexity of my experiences in those situations of paradoxically mixed poverty and beauty taught me that tendencies to oversimplify frequently characterize even the most dedicated efforts to be helpful to others.

We want to see and describe problems clearly and succinctly, and to attack them unequivocally and effectively. But some problems are too complex for that approach.

We need to be particularly aware of and cautious about tendencies to oversimplify when we focus on population issues because here we touch upon the most intimate and private aspects of people's behavior toward one another and upon their most vital strategies for family and community survival.

For example, global population numbers and projections of what they are likely to be at future times express an important element of reality. Yet there is a danger that in focusing on global numbers and defining a global population problem we may divert attention from the importance of improving the quality of life of people already here.

In fact, these are the very people whose decisions about family size and child spacing are the major determinants of future population growth. And those decisions are affected by the quality of their lives.

Similarly, even those of us who are firmly convinced that population growth rates in many countries are too high for sustained balancing of resources and people need to perceive those situations from local vantages.

At the same time, and even more importantly, we need to assist in strengthening the local human and institutional capacities to identify and deal with population problems.

In this way we can help to provide strengthened bases for collaboration and cooperation rather than be seen as dictating to others what we think is best for them or, worse yet, what we want them to do because it is best for us.

We should associate ourselves only with programs that center attention on the well-being of the people affected. That is, we should not be prepared to trade the well-being of today's people for presumed benefits to be enjoyed by generations in a future world about which our predictions are bound to be imperfect.

For example, heavily target-oriented projects for providing contraceptives can become projects for imposing contraceptives. When

this happens, violations of fundamental human rights can be made to appear legitimate and can even become institutionalized.

Again, pegging development assistance levels to degrees of success in reducing population growth rates can mean withholding assistance from the very people who need it the most. Application of such triage concepts against the citizens of countries with population growth rates thought to be excessive would be shameful.

Although there is more than one definition for the phrase "quality of human life," adherents of most definitions would agree, I think, that an acceptable quality of human life means more than mere survival.

In addition to food and shelter, people require the wherewithal to lead lives of dignity and purpose within the contexts of their own societies and cultures; this seems always and in all places to include decent opportunities for health, physical security, education, and socially valued productivity.

There are important connections between population processes and improving the quality of human life. In fact, population issues and quality of life issues are interdependent. They interact with each other and they affect each other both casually and consequentially.

Regarding fertility, as the quality of life enjoyed by people rises, their desire to limit family size frequently rises, too. On the other hand, rapid population growth can aggravate and intensify many of the kinds of social and economic problems that make it difficult for poor people to experience improvements in their general welfare.

But, if one is to avoid oversimplification, it must be recognized that rapid population growth is not the sole or even the main cause of the widespread poverty in many places. In fact, for the rural poor in large parts of the world, high fertility makes good economic and social sense for several reasons.

For example, in many poor countries, where the household is the center of economic activity and unpaid family labor may be critical, a surviving child can be expected to produce more than he or she consumes; motherhood remains the main source of status for women whose other contributions to the family and the community tend to be undervalued; and grown sons are the principal providers of social security for parents in old age.

Thus, as we think about population and improving the quality of human life, we see that the two are definitely related in important causal and consequential ways, but we cannot simply and comfortably conclude that high fertility is the cause of low quality of human life or that fertility reduction insures its improvement.

Indeed, if a country lacks demonstrated commitment to improvement of the living conditions of its poor, we should be uncomfortable when it issues family planning posters and slogans attempting to convince people that they will be better off with a two-child family than with a larger one.

If those of us whose principal development focus is population are to concern ourselves with improvement of the quality of human life—and I believe that that should be the central objective of all development work—then we have to see high fertility as one of several threads in the complex tapestry of people's lives.

Seen this way, high fertility is a problem mainly in terms of how it relates to other important threads of the life fabric—including

ing, for example, patterns of disposition and consumption of resources; inequities in the distribution of capital, income, and social and economic opportunities; and inadequate realization of the full potentials of women and men.

Therefore, at the same time that we concern ourselves with reduction of excessively high or rapid population growth, we must also concern ourselves with the other developmental and structural problems that block substantial improvement in the quality of human life for the great mass of the world's poor.

What does this perspective mean for U.S. policies? Does it mean that investments by the National Institutes of Health in biomedical research on human reproductive systems and in new contraceptive technology should be reduced, or that the family planning programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development should be curtailed or given lower priority? Not at all. Definitely not.

The funds allocated for these activities are vital, and there is a pressing need to increase them in order that people everywhere, the poor as well as the rich, the rural as well as the urban, become able to implement their desires about child spacing and limitation of family size with safe, effective, and convenient contraceptive means.

To achieve this goal, a variety of new contraceptives are needed; widely available, nonclinic-based delivery systems must be emphasized; information about contraceptives that is accurate and understandable needs to be provided to prospective users.

Major challenges with regard to contraceptive development cannot be met with the limited fundamental knowledge available thus far.

For example, the chances for development of safe, effective, convenient contraceptives for men will remain slender until a great deal more is known about the physiology of the male reproductive system. Advancement of this important frontier of knowledge requires that even larger amounts of funding than before be made available for basic biomedical research.

With regard to service delivery, it is only in recent years that community-based delivery systems in a few countries have begun to extend contraceptive services to the countryside and to the urban poor. Most rural and urban poor people in the world are not yet adequately served by existing family planning programs.

More resources are needed, both to extend the use of already available practical knowledge and to develop still more through applied research, before we can satisfy people's needs for readily available contraceptives and related information.

Very little has been done thus far and much more needs to be done to assist countries in strengthening their own capacities to evaluate the safety and health effects of fertility regulation programs and, where necessary, to modify contraceptives in order to suit local needs.

In particular, physicians and social scientists in the poor countries need to be assisted in developing statistical, epidemiological, and pharmacological skills.

But in addition to continued and increased investments in resolving these concerns, all of which are essentially on the supply side of the fertility regulation equation, we in the population sector of development work need to increase our attention and to draw

the attention of our colleagues in the other development sectors to the demand side—that is, to those development undertakings that help to improve the quality of human life for poor people and, at the same time, to increase their demands for smaller families and the contraceptive services with which to achieve those ends.

We know that activities which tend to make nations richer but to increase gaps between their rich and poor do not serve well either the purpose of improving the lot of the poor or of increasing their desires for smaller or better spaced families.

We have still to learn how to more effectively do the kinds of development work that do tend to improve the quality of human life for poor people. In particular, we need to pay greater attention to the implementation of development projects at grassroots levels and to the evaluation of the demographic impacts of those projects.

In this way, relatively small investments in basic and applied research charged against population budgets can have potentially immense influence on the ways in which vastly larger development budgets—for example, those reserved for agriculture or rural development—are actually spent.

The point is that development programs in sectors other than population have a tremendous impact on population processes; if those programs are adequately informed and designed with population considerations in mind, population objectives as well as the primary sectoral ones can be included.

Steps in this direction were mandated for the first time in section 104(d) of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977, which, in my opinion, is an immensely forwardlooking, positive, and potentially important piece of legislation.

I am not suggesting that we, who are in the field of population activities, should undertake general development assistance. Rather, I am suggesting that all development programs in addition to their primary or intended impacts have substantial secondary impacts on population processes.

I am suggesting that attention should be given to designing those programs in ways that increase their beneficial, and decrease their detrimental, impacts on population processes. I am suggesting that we, whose work is population, should encourage, support, and conduct the necessary basic and applied research to inform those in a broad range of other development programs how best to include population concerns in the design and evaluation of their work.

We do not have all the answers to these questions yet. The state of scientific knowledge about population and development relationships is imprecise. But more is known about the directions of these relationships than is yet being fully utilized in the design of development projects.

Development inputs that are helpful both toward improved quality of human life and toward smaller family size desires include those that provide opportunities for education, particularly for girls and women; improvements in health, especially of rural poor people; increased employment; and better income distribution.

There is a growing body of experience with appropriately-scaled development projects that are succeeding in changing the life con-

texts of the individuals they seek to serve—in ways that tend to make the small family more socially and economically desirable.

We need to identify and analyze such programs and to disseminate their experience more broadly throughout the development community.

Additionally, there are a growing number of practical economic-demographic models that permit prediction and measurement of population effects on various kinds of development inputs. Further work with such models is needed and, again, the implications need to be made known throughout the development community.

To advance applied research, we, in the population field, need to encourage, support, and even undertake small-scale projects in other development sectors where these projects seem to offer promising insights into population and development relationships.

Here again, our objective should be to inform the other sectors of the development community and to promote their broader application of the findings.

One of the most important areas for selectively increased development assistance—and one in which experience bears out the contention that this is an area with which we in population should rightly concern ourselves—is the improvement of the social and economic status of women and recognition and strengthening their productive roles in their societies.

This element of needed development activities is of major importance both for improving the quality of human life and for reducing excessive fertility.

It is now clear that in the more than 20 years of major development undertakings in various fields, women have been badly neglected. Although women have always been active participants in the economically and socially productive activities of their families and communities, recent efforts toward modernization have tended to exclude them.

When there was something important to be provided by governments and their foreign development financiers, it was provided only to men. New knowledge, better inputs, and more credit are only some of the elements of modernization that men received and women were denied.

Everywhere, among the poor, women are the poorest of the poor. Their exclusion from modernizing efforts in the last 20 years in the poorer countries has aggravated their relative poverty. In many places, the principal—if not the only—source of status, which in those places equates with economic security, available to women is motherhood.

So long as a woman is producing sons, her status is reasonably high and her life secure. When she stops, the uncertainties of her life increase. Because women are half of the productive population and because they are all of the reproductive population, future development efforts need to be consciously designed to tap their productive potentials and serve their needs.

Here again, the question arises—well, how shall we do it? And again, the response is that although the available knowledge is not as complete as we would prefer, there is already much more known

than is being used in the design and implementation of policies, programs, and projects.

Let me give one example from my personal experience. The Integrated Rural Development Programme of Bangladesh (IRDP) has established a network of women's cooperatives based on agriculture. A central element of the project has been the recognition—evolved over many years by those closest to the original women's program of the Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development at Comilla—that women are motivated by rational self-interest.

Incidentally, we can note that it has been quite a while since their husbands were acknowledged to be motivated by rational self-interest—without any requirement of sophisticated research to prove it.

Because they are women in a society in which men have the overt power, Bangladeshi women have had to devise their own special ways to look for themselves. Thus, changing their behavior requires attention to their special needs as well as to those needs that they share with their husbands.

Accordingly, in the IRDP project, it is recognized that, just as their husbands do, the women need economic resources—including credit—and opportunities to enjoy improved profits before they are likely to be motivated to change behavior that has worked for them in the past.

But, in addition and equally important, it is also recognized that the status that Bangladeshi women achieve from seclusion is itself a valuable asset and occupies a valid position in the overall equation of their self-interests.

Therefore, the IRDP women's cooperative provide credit and opportunities for profit along with useful training and improved health and family planning services—but they do so in ways that allow women to participate without violating the rules of purdah.

As the project continues, the rules of purdah may themselves change as part of a dynamic process whereby women begin to transform social and self-concepts in response to tangible new possibilities.

It is this transformation—the expansion and broadening of women's roles and status, the provision of alternatives to high fertility—that leads to situations in which small families are socially and economically desirable and in which demand for contraception will grow.

In fact, the demand for contraception among the women participating in the IRDP project is substantially higher than the demand in surrounding areas.

Only as the quality of life of the individual is altered will the demand for children be altered. A primary role for those of us in the field of population assistance is to encourage activities that will insure that people everywhere will be able to implement their desires about child spacing and family size with safe, effective, and convenient means for family planning.

But at the same time, I believe we should be deeply concerned and intensively engaged in identifying and promoting those development projects and programs that both improve quality of life and at the same time increase the demand for family size limitation.

Increasingly, our development work needs to be done collaboratively with governments and local institutions in the poorer coun-

tries. U.S. efforts that are perceived as dictation to other countries or groups within those countries cannot be fully effective.

Accordingly, a tremendous need remains for U.S. development assistance to be focused on enabling poorer countries to strengthen their own capacities in both the social and the biomedical fields for population-related research, training, and delivery of services.

In particular, there is need to support and encourage local constituencies that favor attention to population issues and that favor population programs and population-relevant development programs.

These constituencies can be achieved only by local people who have become committed to understanding and resolving population matters. They can be an important product of capacity-building activities.

Mr. Chairman, I have had occasion to review some of the issues mentioned here this morning in greater detail in two publications that I would like to offer for the record. The first is entitled "Strategic Issues in Population" and was published in the Population Development Review. The second is entitled "Including Women in Development Efforts" and is forthcoming in World Development.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my views.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you very much, Mr. Zeidenstein. Those two articles will be entered in the record.

QUESTIONS AND REMARKS

Mr. SIMON. Relative to your testimony about the status of women:

When a representative of AID testified for us earlier, I asked what percentage of people in the population area were women. He was not sure, but said overall about 20 percent in AID are women.

I was advised later that overseas, in the population field, the involvement of women might be as low as one percent. How significant do you think it is to actually have women in important roles in the population area?

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. I think it is very significant. In my opinion, neither USAID nor the Population Council has an adequate proportion of women working in this field. I think that improving this situation would make a significant difference.

I believe that there is no question that, when discussing issues such as which lead to follow first on contraceptive development, or assessment of the nature and quality of services delivered or of the type of information that is made available to prospective users of contraceptives, women are likely to contribute points of view that men may not consider; just as it is likely that citizens of poorer countries are likely to have different points of view from citizens of richer countries. I think it is terribly important.

I think it is unfortunate that—due to how we have operated educationally and otherwise in the past—the available supply of qualified women is disproportionately low compared with the available supply of qualified men.

Certainly, when we talk about capacity building as one of the areas that requires major concern and attention in the future, we need to pay special attention to encouraging women to enter the field.

Mr. SIMON. When you refer to the available supply, are you talking about U.S. women or are you talking about Third World women?

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. I think it is true in both cases. My own experience in the organization for which I work involves recruiting people with academic backgrounds fairly frequently. In terms of the particular academic backgrounds for which we recruit, the available pool of women is disproportionately low as compared with men.

But in addition to that, it is one of our elements of affirmative action within the Council to recruit internationally because we think of ourselves as an international organization, and in fact 25 percent of our staff is international.

Looking abroad, again, one finds the same situation—a disproportionately smaller availability of women.

Mr. SIMON. You mentioned that your recruiting is international. Is there generally a significant added barrier when a U.S. woman works in third world countries among local populations?

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Well, yes and no. If I may be excused for citing personal experience—when we lived in Bangladesh my wife was very heavily involved in substantive project activity there, and there is no question that in some quarters she certainly was given what she thought was short shrift, what any reasonable person would have thought was inadequate attention.

On the other hand, there were very important spheres within which she had tremendous impact and was able to make a very substantial contribution. I don't believe that the cultural factors that exist in many traditional societies are any reason not to post a capable person who happens to be a woman. I think that a capable person overcomes those things everyday.

Mr. SIMON. A couple of other points. One is your reference to the quality of human life and your definition of it. I might say I'm not doing this simply because Jim Grant is here right now—I also suggested it to one of the witnesses yesterday. I don't know if you are familiar with the Quality of Life Index the Overseas Development Council (ODC) has developed.

I really think that perhaps that index ought to be modified and refined, but that kind of index gives us a much better picture of what is going on than the traditional GNP and per capita income measurements.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Could I add something here, Mr. Chairman? I agree with your point, but on the other hand, I think that Mr. Grant would agree that one needs to be as careful with that index as with any index.

Indices are very handy but are too often used as surrogates for reality. Neither the GNP index nor the Overseas Development Council Quality of Human Life Index is any real surrogate for reality, and although they are very handy and useful, in the last analysis one does have to go beyond that.

Mr. SIMON. My guess is that Mr. Grant would not disagree with you.

Mr. SCHEUER. May I ask a question on that point?

Mr. SIMON. Yes.

Mr. SCHEUER. The reality of indexing is a very complicated business. I understand the function of these indices as a means of

summarizing and providing a thumbnail overall measurement of reality. Many decisionmakers don't have the time or staff to explore each developing country and analyze political, social, and economic realities.

Isn't an index just a tool for decisionmakers who wish to gain some kind of synthesis of reality? It is a reflection and an analysis of what that reality is. It is not a substitute for reality, nor is it antithetical to reality. It is a way of making the reality meaningful and intelligible to people who have to make decisions about program design and delivery of services.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. I agree with that entirely, Congressman. I guess my reservation is that even busy people periodically need brief, succinct reminders of what a particular index actually measures.

Where we tend to go wrong with GNP, for example, is that because of its convenience, you know, it is the easiest thing in the world to forget that it often includes duplications or measures expenditures whether or not we might think they are socially useful.

The index gets to be so convenient that over a period of wide use we occasionally tend to forget what it is that it is being measured, and we need to be reminded about that. I think that it will be the same with the ODC index.

Mr. SIMON. Let me make one more observation. First of all, I like the thrust of your comments that population is not a simple gimmicky kind of problem.

You mentioned the need for small-scale projects. I'm interested in how the Population Council determines what projects it supports. I am interested in knowing whether you think AID is making a reasonable assessment of the projects it supports. Right now about 21 percent of AID population assistance goes directly to the nations involved, 21 percent is distributed through the U.N., and 13 percent gets channeled through universities. The balance is allocated through various foundations. Is that a sensible mix for establishing the kinds of projects you think they ought to be working on?

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. In reference to appropriately scaled projects and the Council's own standards—the Council is basically a research and training and technical assistance organization rather than a foundation, and we really have very little in the way of available resources to use for actual support of programs, as opposed to USAID or an endowed foundation.

Actually, the Council solicits money from those sources of funds, and then undertakes projects that those sources of funds have designated as worthy.

Our primary standard with reference to the projects of the kind that I am talking about now is to the extent that there is something to be learned from them that is population oriented; the extent to which there is likely to be a lesson that can be identified, learned about, articulated, and the information disseminated so that other organizations that are larger can make use of that information. For example, with reference to an appropriately scaled project, I would, if I may, just mention a couple of examples. One is a rural electrification project in Misami Oriental Province in the Philippines which is fully described in an article called "Rural Electrification, a Study of Social and Economic Effects in Misami Oriental in the Philippines," published by Xavier University of the Philippines.

Another example is a recent project in Upper Volta exploring ways to reduce the nonproductive workload of women. It is described fully in the U.N. publication called "A Report on the Republic of Upper Volta." I can give these full citations for the record.

Mr. SIMON. All right. As you compare those kinds of projects with the projects funded by AID, is AID doing the same type of quality job? Are there ways to improve what take place there?

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. I think that there are ways to make improvements. I should say at the start that one problem that I believe USAID faces is legislation. It operates under legislation which requires that it undertake only those things that are for the "direct" benefit of poor people. The interpretation of the term "direct" may sometimes militate against undertaking truly developmental activity rather than welfare activity. There are frequently choices for which, under the current legislation, AID really has no other option than to move in a welfare rather than development direction.

Beyond that problem in the legislation itself, I guess that my impression is that the support of projects is uneven. Different regional bureaus see things differently, and different elements of the Office of Population see things differently.

I guess I would say that there are some projects that USAID finances that I think are excellent and some that I think are not very interesting at all. I'd have to go into a great deal more detail to be able to answer your question more completely.

Mr. SIMON. But as far as fundamental policy goes?

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. I think the fundamental policy may not be as inquiring as it could be. I think there is perhaps an inadequate distinction made between those portions of Title X funds being spent on inquiry and those Title X funds being spent on the supply of services or on the development of new contraceptives.

I think that—particularly on the questions that are so important to me—a relatively small amount of Title X money is being used to support the kind of research likely to influence the people who control the other development budgets.

I think there is a great deal of uncertainty and disagreement within the field as a whole. I don't purport to represent a point of view with which all of my colleagues would agree. As far as I am concerned, it is a weakness that there is no clear consensus that it is appropriate to spend Title X funds on these sorts of applied research activities where the primary objective is to learn about the population impact of other development activities. Such research would enable us to say to the agricultural specialists, "Look, spend your money in a way that has a better rather than a worse demographic impact."

He or she then asks, "What shall we do?" If our answer is, "Do research," their response is going to be, "It's not for us to do. That is for you to do. Our business is to raise more food. If we do it in ways that are less appropriate demographically rather than more, you had better tell us about that in advance and we'll try to mend our ways."

They look to us in the population field for those answers. We have to use Title X money to help get some of those answers. We already have a good number of them, but we need to keep at it.

Mr. SIMON. Then, the final portion of my question: Is the dispensation of funds that I have indicated—21 percent direct assistance, 21 percent U.N., 13 percent universities, and the balance to foundations—a wise use of the funds?

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. I have to say, Mr. Chairman, that I haven't given enough thought to that question to be able to give you a useful answer except to say that, insofar as the proportion made available to independent organizations is concerned—to universities and foundations—there is a quite serious problem, I believe, for those organizations and their future. That problem is related to the USAID's present tendency to be quite exclusively oriented toward the project funding and quite heavily oriented toward contract funding.

Research is an important element of the USAID program. It is very difficult and I guess I would argue quite inefficient to buy research on an RFP basis. Research really has to be worked out in large measure on a collegial basis between the grantee or contracting agency and USAID. The RFP procedure is great for buying nails or salami, but I think it doesn't work very well for buying research.

A problem of which I am most aware is not so much the proportion of USAID funds available to the independent sector, but the way in which that money is made available. I think that there is a big chunk of the independent sector that could easily go out of business in the next five years because it is simply not finding funds needed to support its infrastructure.

It's got peaks and valleys, and the valleys are going to knock some of them right out of business because other traditional sources of that kind of core funding—basically the U.S. foundations—have suffered financial setbacks and simply don't have the wherewithal to assist as they once did.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you. Mr. Scheuer.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, I very much enjoyed your paper, Mr. Zeidenstein and I would like to ask you a few questions about it. On page 8 of your testimony you say that more is known about the directions of the relationship between population and development which in turn is being fully utilized in the design of development projects. Then you mention a few things such as development inputs that are helpful toward both the improved quality of smaller family sizes. That would include education, especially for women, improvements in health for the rural poor, increased employment, and better income distribution.

Is there anything else that we know about where development of projects have an encouraging effect on motivation for a smaller family that you haven't mentioned here? Increased employment, I presume, especially for women; better income distribution—is there anything else?

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Yes, actually there are several, Congressman. The references in the testimony are at a fairly broad level. They are sectoral rather than programmatic. I think that there are quite a number of things that we know. For example, if one were designing an agricultural project for a particular watershed area in the world, there is a lot that we already know about the impact on the welfare of the people affected with reference to differences in the design of that agriculture project regarding labor intensity, capital intensity,

regarding tendencies that it might or might not create to induce migration, and if those tendencies were created whether the tendencies induce migration of males or females.

Especially, there is a growing body of knowledge right now in reference to the migration of females who are not attached one way or another to a male migrating. Those kinds of things are well enough known now that a person designing the agriculture project could actually make use of it.

One of our problems—one of the problems for those of us in the population field is that we have not yet been able to get our own story adequately across to people in the other fields.

Mr. SCHEUER. Maybe you would like to speak with some of your colleagues and give us a statement—a laundry list of things that ought to be considered or the factors that ought to be integrated into each kind of development project to make them population and motivation sensitive. I would like as many specifics as possible.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. There are a number of those things. I could supplement my testimony with a letter giving you these things.

Mr. SCHEUER. Yes, we would very much appreciate your doing that. In fact, let me say here and now that for any of the witnesses, if you get any sober, second thoughts in the next ten days or two weeks, we will hold the record open for your comments. We may, in any event, ask you some additional questions if we don't have a chance to finish all of our questions for you today. We should, but if we don't we may write you to ask some further questions. So, if you have any further thoughts, please let us know.

In this connection, Mr. Zeidenstein, as you know, under the law recently passed by Congress we require that AID have a population impact statement for each of its development projects.

Do you think it would be a good idea for U.N. agencies and multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF also to ask countries requesting development assistance to provide a population impact statement on how that development project for either employment or education or housing or industrialization or urbanization impacts on population, on motivation, on the status of women; and on the distribution of income? Just having to fill out a form or having to write an impact statement might encourage decisionmakers in the developing world to make certain their development programs are more population and motivation related.

In other words, if we require it of AID, why wouldn't it make sense for us to suggest to the World Bank, the IMF, the FAO, the UNDP, the UNFPA, UNIDO, and UNESCO, that whenever they support a given program they consider the population implications. Whenever FAO provides some kind of farming assistance or when UNIDO subsidizes an industrialization project, why shouldn't we suggest to these U.N. agencies and multinational agencies that they ask the developing world to go through the thought process that AID has already acquired.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Fair enough. I don't think my answer is going to sound very palatable to one whose profession is making laws. I think, for example, that if it were Robert McNamara's attitude that in regard to every project of the World Bank that came to his attention, he would ask the people responsible for that project—"Have

you thought about the population impact of this project?"—and wouldn't let them sit still until they had adequately answered that question, that would be of immense value.

But impact statements I think are different things. Impact statements are just those sorts of things which can discourage such thoughtful consideration. It takes the pressure off everybody. You fill out the form with something or another and that is the end of it. That is the great danger of section 104(d) right now. If it is interpreted by AID simply as a reporting requirement and somebody devises a form and some junior person in the mission fills it out, checks off the boxes, nobody will pay any attention to it.

Mr. SCHEUER. Nobody thinks at either end, in other words.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Well, the problem with that, I think, is that it really does allow a copout to happen. The reason I am reluctant to say that is that I don't have a legislative solution to propose. I really think that there is a proselytizing period that is needed. I mean, people who believe as I do have to try to speak as convincingly as they can—people like yourself, people like McNamara, people like the head of USAID, the head of the UNFPA, and the head of UNDP and others in similar positions. We must try to get them to really believe that, No. 1, it is important, and, No. 2, that they can do something about it. If we simply imposed a checklist form on them at this stage, I think we would let them all off the hook.

Mr. SCHEUER. In other words, you are saying it is a good idea if it can be done in such a form that it is real and not merely pro forma.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Right. Yes sir.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Grant?

Mr. GRANT. I thought George Zeidenstein gave a very informed answer. I would add to it only that you might consider putting in a requirement which suggests that each U.N. agency consider this question, and ask the executive branch to give you advice within a year as to what each agency has thought might be done with this.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. That is a very good idea. That would give folks like me a chance to walk in the door. See, I could go in there and say, "Well, you've got this thing now. Have you thought about analyzing it?"

Mr. SCHEUER. Very good. On page 9, Mr. Zeidenstein, you talk about improving the social and economic status of women and recognizing their productive roles in society. This seems to be an emerging consensus, and I know that members of this committee feel very strongly about that. Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Akaka and I were in Tokyo the week before last where we participated in a conference of parliamentarians who were planning a major conference in August of next year in Sri Lanka on population and development.

At Pete McCloskey's instigation, we put a status of women paragraph in the conference statement. What I have been thinking about as a result of the suggestions of many people is for us to play a sort of catalytic role and help identify where we are around the world in terms of the status of women question. Pete and I together developed some language that not only mentioned the status of women, but also recommended that this group conduct a continuing inquiry into progress in the status of women, especially in terms of what

impediments seem to be in the way on the part of governments and other institutions.

In other words, we are moving toward a systematic, continuing scrutiny of this question, and we have been asked to consider whether this committee couldn't undertake an annual global population report that would discuss many of things that you and Jim Grant talk about—improvements in the quality of life index, improvements in motivation, improvements in family planning, and so forth.

On this one question of the social and economic status of women in their productive roles in society—could we develop the kind of index that Jim Grant has developed on the quality of life? Could we develop one for the status of women that would quantify progress from year to year?

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Subject to the caveat that I mentioned before, definitely.

Mr. SCHEUER. Their access to education, their access to jobs, their freedom to move about in society.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Sure. And, you could even have different indices for different classes of women, too. In any poor country situation, you have a modern and a traditional sector—basically those two sectors. They are really quite different from one another, and you could incorporate different things into those indices, or have one that ran across the board that could be very useful.

Mr. SCHEUER. Has this ever been done before? Are we re-inventing the wheel?

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. No, you would not be re-inventing the wheel. No such thing exists.

Mr. SCHEUER. Maybe, we will ask a couple of you—who are happily nodding your heads back there—to get together and prepare a memo on what such an index might look like.

A number of parliamentarians suggested that this Select Committee on Population take on the responsibility for monitoring barriers to the improvement of women's status. The simple reason is that we are the only parliamentary committee in the world exclusively concerned with population. None of the participating parliamentarians have been able, in their own parliaments, to set up a committee on population. They are active in health or welfare committees—and I'm sure Phyllis Piotrow can give you the whole run-down on the committees that they are active in—but there is no other parliament that has set up a committee on population. So, they are looking to us for this kind of input. One of these days we are going to take this matter up in a formal meeting of the committee, but I think a few of us are already moving in this direction, so we will ask you to do some thinking for us on this matter. You talk about the status of Bangladeshi women.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. That is an ongoing project. Some problems haven't been solved.

Mr. SCHEUER. You talk about the IRDP which is the—

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. The integrated rural development program.

Mr. SCHEUER. By the way, what is RIO?

Mr. GRANT. RIO—Reshaping the International Order. This is the report prepared for the Club of Rome by a group of experts under the leadership of Dr. Jan Tinbergen.

Mr. SCHEUER. Oh, thank you. My next question pertains to "purdah"—I take it that is the required seclusion of women.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Yes.

Mr. SCHEUER. Do you think that perhaps some quiet talk might come from the UNFPA to the countries that have deeply embedded social and cultural institutions that structure women into unequal and inferior roles, like purdah? Should the UNFPA be talking to Moslem countries about the effect that some of these religious and cultural traditions have on the ability of their women to exercise their own humanity?

It seems to me that in the developing world, where we are providing more and more capital and programs, everybody is avoiding this problem of the institutionalized inferiority of women. This would not be a very salubrious role for the United States. It would come much better from a U.N. agency and, actually, it would come best from a Third World group. The Group of 77 could take this on. Do you think pressure could come from within the developing world to examine the social and political institutions that virtually freeze their women into structured roles of inferiority?

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. I think it can be done; I think some of it is going on. I think U.N. agencies are certainly more appropriate than, for example, the U.S. Government is. I think it is terribly important to have sorted out in our minds exactly what we are heading toward.

I would argue, for example, sir, that it would not be a wise thing for any institution to go into Bangladesh and argue that purdah should be eliminated. Get all the Bangladeshi women short skirts. That is not the problem at all. As I argue in my testimony, as things now stand, purdah is a valuable economic asset for those women.

Mr. SCHEUER. Please elaborate on that.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Well, status. Seclusion equals status. Status equals economic security because in a society where a woman is basically a chattel, if she is a desirable chattel she is a more valuable one. If she is in purdah, her seclusion being unimpaired, she is a more desirable chattel. If she is a more desirable chattel, she is more secure.

Mr. SCHEUER. She has to be treated as well as a horse, or a cow, or a pig.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Maybe, even better, in some cases. It depends really on how poor the family is. But purdah is nothing more than a kind of an outward manifestation of a fundamental social situation, which it seems to me is best addressed in a positive way of talking with governments and with local institutions about recognizing the productivity of their women and including their women in the various possibilities for modernization as an overall part of the development of the economics of that whole country. They are part of the country.

As they're begun to be thought about as part of the country, these particular cultural manifestations will or will not change as are really appropriate in the local circumstances. I don't think we really need to concern ourselves too much about that. In fact, I think it is a mistake to concern ourselves about that.

I know of a project where one of the first actions to be taken was to provide uniforms for women who were going to be rural health workers. This was in a country, not Bangladesh, where women originally were required to be quite modest. The uniforms, although not racy, were hardly of the degree of modesty that women are accustomed to.

Mr. SCHEUER. What country are you talking about?

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. It was an African country; I just don't remember which one.

Mr. SCHEUER. I saw something very similar to this in Kabul, Afghanistan, where they bring in girls from remote mountain villages, ages 13 and 14, and they stay at a perfectly beautiful new school in Kabul, the only really new and gorgeous structure in the whole city. They stay there for two or three years and then they go back to those villages as the village health worker. They go back at 16 or 17.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Very similar.

Mr. SCHEUER. They become the outreach of the Government and are in charge of all health for women, including of course family planning. They built this perfectly beautiful little school and they outfit the girls in delightful uniforms.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. They are very modest.

Mr. SCHEUER. They're modest and they do that to send a signal to the parents who come in to deliver their kids that the Government looks upon these young girls as playing a very significant role and as valued, cherished and important people. The building and the uniforms and the whole gestalt, are designed to send a signal to the parents that they can afford to leave these young girls alone in Kabul, because the Government cherishes the girls for the contributions they will make.

Let me just ask you one last question. On the top of page 12, you say: "Only as the quality of life of the individual is altered will the demand for children be altered." Do you mean a quality of life primarily in terms of noneconomic, human and social equality or do you mean it basically in terms of consumption of goods and services?

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Both, but I believe that the economic situation has a tremendous amount to do with other social and cultural factors. I believe that cultural and social factors are in large measure responses to economic realities, although not exclusively, and I mean both.

I really mean that the family that wants six children is not going to be a family that wants two children unless it is a different family. It is not going to be made a different family by posters of red triangles or other posters that say: "Stop at two and you are better off." It will only be a different family if in fact its reality is different.

Mr. SCHEUER. The question is what reality is measured by whom? Jim Grant, in his testimony, discussed Sri Lanka and Venezuela. Venezuela has almost 10 times the per capita annual income that Sri Lanka has, something on the order of \$1,200—

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Who hasn't?

Mr. SCHEUER. As far as individual per capita incomes are concerned, I think he indicates that Venezuela's is about \$1,200 and Sri Lanka's is about \$150; yet, Sri Lanka had a higher score in the quality of life

index. This is a perfectly obvious case where noneconomic factors and nonconsumption factors are important.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Congressman, you say noneconomic and nonconsumption. I think that the basic elements in the Overseas Development Council's index have a great deal to do with consumption. They may be noneconomic with respect to the question of cash in pocket, but so far as available resources for consumption are concerned, that is very important. The thing that so distinguishes Sri Lanka and Kerala in India is that notwithstanding their seeming failure on any scale of economic growth as we thought of it, for example, in the ten years of development of Pakistan, what they have has been distributed in such a way that the consumption of vital resources by poor individuals has increased. In that way, they have become better off.

Mr. SCHEUER. So you would say exploding population is the result of poverty in the Third World, not a cause of poverty. You would say population can be affected by development, and that it really depends on what kind of development and how the benefits are distributed.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Yes. The type of development and how it is distributed is terribly important. We can say more, too. We can also say that the kind of development that we all thought was the right sort of development to move people ahead 10 years ago had a tremendous margin of error in it.

Mr. SCHEUER. Please elaborate on that.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Well, basically what we thought was that the way to move the world ahead was for individual countries to increase their overall wealth. The result has been just the situation that you mentioned in this paper: Venezuela versus Sri Lanka.

Obviously, the citizens of Venezuela have not advanced very much, notwithstanding that their Government or their country has increased its wealth. Pakistan increased its wealth immensely. It was the model that all of us thought so admirable, and then all of sudden it started to fall apart.

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. Thank you for the opportunity to speak.

Mr. SIMON. I would like to ask your panel to join us now and all of you could sit around the table—Mr. James Grant, Dr. Barbara Herz, Dr. Luke Lee, Dr. Phyllis Piotrow, and Ms. Karen Smith. May I suggest that with the concurrence of the chairman that each of you make your brief statement and then perhaps each of us could have 5 minutes for questions. We'll go around the panel and then at that point you may want to interact with each other and we may want to grill you some more.

If I may suggest the procedure—suggested a little earlier by Mr. Scheuer—since some of the statements are a little on the lengthy side, perhaps you can summarize your statements and then we can proceed. We will start with Mr. James Grant.

Mr. SCHEUER. May I just add one comment?

Mr. SIMON. Yes.

Mr. SCHEUER. If, in addition to chatting briefly about your prepared statement, you wish to address any of the questions that either

Paul Simon or I have asked you or any other questions feel free to do so. You have eight or ten minutes of time to talk to us about anything you want. We both have read all of your statements.

Mr. SIMON. James Grant is President of the Overseas Development Council. We are glad to have you with us here.

**STATEMENT OF JAMES GRANT, PRESIDENT, OVERSEAS
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, D.C.**

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 599.]

Mr. GRANT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee. It is a privilege to be here. Let me say first, that I want to commend this committee for putting the spotlight on the relationship of development assistance to the population problem.

I have five points that I would like to summarize from my statement, which I request be included in the record.

The first of these five was amply covered by Dr. Zeidenstein on the important relationship of development as a whole to the population fertility situation.

It is very clear that we need more attention to family planning programs than is being given today, but it is equally clear that far more attention needs to be given to the relationship of alternative development strategies to fertility rates.

This is the second point that I discuss in page 3, namely, that one really cannot separate the population crisis from the development crisis. Underlying the development crisis, as was mentioned a few minutes ago, lies the disease of poverty—the basic disease of poverty. Only as we overcome the worst aspects of poverty, can one get really comprehensive motivation for smaller families in most societies.

As I note on the chart on page 3 of my written statement, unfortunately there are still great numbers in absolute poverty. There are more people in absolute poverty and malnourished today than there were 25 years ago. If current trends continue, by the end of the century there will be considerably more people living in absolute poverty and malnourished than today because of the world's larger population at that time, even though the relative proportion will have gone down. Even if all goes well over the next 25 years, the Fourth World countries will have a per capita income that will be no higher than that of the United States in real terms in 1776.

The third point is that, fortunately, in the face of this rather dismal picture we have learned from the development experience of a series of countries as diverse as China, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, Kerala, and Costa Rica that overcoming the worst aspects of absolute poverty is not necessarily dependent upon achieving high per capita income.

These countries have demonstrated that with the right basic needs-oriented strategies, it is possible to achieve the levels of life expectancy, literacy, infant mortality, and birth rates achieved by the United States in the 1920's and the 1930's even though these countries had per capita incomes that in real terms were below that of the United States in 1776.

It is these facts and this very exciting concept—

Mr. SCHEUER. I have to interrupt and ask this question. Are you saying that development must precede fertility decline, in the sense

of economic development and a sheer increase in gross national product?

Mr. GRANT. What I am saying is that there must be the resources available so that people aren't dying of malnourishment-related causes. I would say, for example, today our studies at the council indicate that more than 10 million people each year die quite unnecessarily from causes related to malnutrition. Thus, measles, which doesn't normally kill children in this country, kill children by the tens of thousands in the developing countries, primarily because of the difference in the prevailing level of malnourishment.

So, there is a need to increase production.

Mr. SCHEUER. In countries where there are adequate means to feed all children with a minimum adequate diet. Are you saying that?

Mr. GRANT. The challenge then of course becomes one of distribution, and as we all know normally it is easier to distribute a growing pie than a constant pie. We have the problem in our own country. Basically, what I am saying here—and this was George Zeidenstein's first point it seems to me—is that the quality of life must improve if we really are going to get the rapid progress that will lead to population stabilization at an early date, through a combination of family planning programs and the change of motivation which results from socio-economic progress among the poor.

It is these facts and this sort of exciting concept—that at relatively low levels of income it is possible to overcome the worst aspects of absolute poverty, that we have seen evolving in the last 2 or 3 years—the concept that the world ought to try to set a goal of overcoming the worst aspects of poverty by the year 2000, a concept which the House International Relations Committee included by amendment in the foreign assistance legislation this week.

Now, like most great ideas, this concept of eliminating at least the worst aspects of poverty within a relatively short time is being nourished from many sources. I am very pleased and proud as an American that one such source was effectively identified by the late Senator Humphrey in 1973, when, in support of the pioneering "New Directions Legislation" introduced that year by the House, he spoke of:

* * * the veritable intellectual revolt among scholars of development who are turning against the long-held view that growth alone is the answer that will trickle benefits to the poorest majority * * *.

Senator Humphrey's comments paralleled thinking emerging in many developing countries, the World Bank, key U.N. agencies and many scholars in many countries.

In the years since then, we have seen this concept evolve as I mentioned on page 5 of my statement which presented a history of this. By the end of 1976, both World Bank President Robert McNamara and the Reshaping the International Order—RIO—Report, coordinated by Nobel prize winner Jan Tinbergen for the Club of Rome, had come to this conclusion.

McNamara explicitly endorsed the idea that goals be set for overcoming the worst aspects of absolute poverty in a given time frame in his address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank on October 4, 1976. At that time, he called for "a basic understanding" and a kind of "global compact" that would have as a major objective

“the meeting of the basic human needs of the absolute poor in both the poor and middle income countries within a reasonable period of time, say by the end of this century.”

Fourth, as the concept of overcoming the worst aspects of absolute poverty within a given time frame has gained support in both numbers and intensity, it is becoming increasingly evident as indicated in our earlier discussion here that some more readily usable measures of progress in meeting basic needs are required.

While the rate of increase of per capita gross national product indicates general overall economic performance, it does not tell us much about what happens to the human well being of individuals at different levels within societies. This fact has led the Overseas Development Council to introduce a new Physical Quality of Life Index—sometimes called the PQLI—which is designed to supplement GNP by providing a more specific measure of what actually happens to people.

As described in the appendix of my testimony, the PQLI is based on three indicators—infant mortality, life expectancy at age one, and literacy. Figures for these indicators, which are available for societies at almost all stages of development, are then consolidated into a single index of 1 to 100, with the best being at 100 and the lowest at 1, that can serve to indicate noneconomic human progress.

Among the PQLI's advantages is its ability to reflect distributional characteristics within countries, for countries cannot achieve high national averages of literacy, life expectancy, and infant mortality unless majorities of the populations are receiving the benefits of progress in these areas.

There is, of course, a general relationship between a country's per capita GNP and its PQLI rating. But there are also enough divergencies to indicate clearly that, as was indicated in the earlier discussion, a high per capita GNP does not insure a high PQLI level; and, conversely, that a high PQLI rating can be achieved at a low per capita GNP level.

That is where the Sri Lanka and the Venezuela comparison came in. Sri Lanka has an annual per capita GNP of below \$150 and a PQLI rating of 83, and a birth rate of 28. This is better than Venezuela with its per capita income of \$1,200, a PQLI of 80, and a birth rate in the 30's.

A country's birth rate, we find, is much more closely associated with its PQLI rating than it is with per capita GNP. Differences in PQLI scores, for example, can by themselves explain about two-thirds of the differences in birth rates among countries with annual per capita incomes below \$2,000 annually.

Differences in per capita GNP can by themselves explain only 40- to 45-percent of the differences in birth rates. This stronger relationship between the PQLI and the birth rate holds true for each region of the developing world, and also for the developed and developing countries when taken together.

Now, having said this, I do want to underline what George Zeidenstein was saying, that one needs to go behind indices. On the other hand, the reason we have the index is that policymakers, people who aren't academics spending days and hours studying these topics, need some more readily usable way of identifying change. This is one reason why per capita GNP has been so useful.

With this, may I call your attention to Table 1 on page 4 of the annex to my statement which gives the per capita GNP and PQLI of each country. It also gives further figures on life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy, and birth rates.

One can see there that countries and regions such as Kerala, India, having a low per capita income and a high PQLI tend also to have a very low birth rate.

Conversely, if you look at some countries such as Iran and Algeria, you can see that they have high per capita GNP's with low PQLI's which are about the same as India, and that they have high birth rates.

The second chart on page 5 is an illustration of how PQLI's can change over time. It also indicates the additional element that the Council has added to the Physical Quality of Life Index this year; that is, we now have a rate of change concept which is the rate at which the disparity in a PQLI in a poor country relative to that in a rich country is narrowed.

This can be used alongside GNP change rates. So, as you look at Table 2, you see from PQLI improvements in countries such as Sri Lanka and Taiwan, that those countries which have had very good performance on reducing birth rates are also those countries which have had very good performance on improving their PQLI. There is a strong correlation.

Now, the table on page 6 gives you information on the male/female situation. In other words, unlike GNP, you can use the PQLI to indicate differential status by sex. We now have for all countries in the world in which the data is available the female PQLI and the male PQLI.

One discovers that in most developing countries, as you would expect, the female PQLI is below that for the male. Infanticide, neglect of female children, lower literacy rates among women—all of these get reflected. When countries reach the more developed category, then one begins to find that women begin to have longer life expectancy and begin to pull ahead. That is shown in this chart.

There are some interesting factors here. For example, India is the only major country in which the women lag in all three indices. I don't know the reason.

On page 7 we give the table of the United States. On page 8, there is a very complicated matrix chart which goes to the point that George Zeidenstein was making. This chart shows that increasing life expectancy involves a very complex process of nutrition, environment, of doctor's services.

Ultimately, this gets back to income and jobs. We need far more research about the responsible inputs. If you ask why Sri Lanka has an average life expectancy roughly the same as that of Washington, D.C., on a \$150 per capita income, nobody can yet give you a definitive answer. There are series of back-of-the-envelope calculations. You can always generate a good argument in Sri Lanka about them. Conversely, if you talk about why Venezuela has done so poorly with respect to its PQLI, you again get into another set of arguments. We need to do much more investigation of the inputs and what happens to make these changes.

Now, you see at the very end of that annex a map of the world for which we give the per capita GNP and the PQLI of every country of the world. *Time* magazine ran that a couple of weeks ago. It is a rather interesting, useful check on GNP and PQLI.

My fifth and final major point relates to the year 2000 goal for overcoming the worst aspects of absolute poverty that the House International Relations Committee has tentatively identified and suggested that the President explore the possibilities of achieving: What specifically do we mean when we set the goal to overcome the worst aspects of absolute poverty by the year 2000? What does that phrase mean? How do we measure whether that objective has been attained?

The Tinbergen-RIO Report did suggest one standard for determining when the worst aspects of poverty had been overcome: That was that all countries, in order to overcome the worst aspects of absolute poverty by the end of the century, should have a life expectancy of at least 65 years as compared with 48 years at present; a literacy rate of at least 75 percent; an infant mortality rate of 50 or less, and a birth rate of 25 or less. This is the "floor" that all countries ought to achieve by the year 2000 in order to overcome the worst aspects of absolute poverty.

A second standard that has been proposed by the Overseas Development Council is that all countries by the year 2000 should try to cut in half the disparities among their current life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy rates. To do this would require about a 31½ percent annual rate of narrowing of disparities. This standard might be used in association with the RIO "floor."

This obviously needs to be accompanied by goals to double food production, as recommended by the World Food Council, and to increase income. We recommend a doubling of per capita income.

How much would this cost? Preliminary judgments of a series of current studies are that if the external world could provide to the developing countries who really want to do this, an additional \$12 to \$20 billion per year by the end of the century, these kinds of goals could be achieved.

Mr. SCHEUER. Excuse me, that is in addition to what? As to the current total donor contributions by the Western countries?

Mr. GRANT. That is right.

Mr. SCHEUER. It would be \$12 billion over what?

Mr. GRANT. It would be \$12 billion over the approximately \$6 or \$7 billion that is now going to the poorer countries for all purposes of official development assistance. The calculation would be that if the United States, for example, went to the level that the President has tentatively set within the executive branch for 1982, which is roughly a doubling of official development assistance—exclusive of the security aid for Egypt and Israel, the Middle East political money—that that would be our share. If we did that and actually voted that amount, that would be in our judgment an appropriate share for this kind of an effort.

Now, the human stakes in this are mammoth. We have a table on page 10 of my statement that indicates just how great the human stakes are. Currently, some 40 million people die in the developing countries each year. The U.N.'s best projections at this time are that somewhere around 43 million people will die annually in 1995–2000.

The population will go up, offsetting the influence of slow-rising life expectancy.

Now, if the target of cutting in half the disparity between the life expectancy of such countries as India and that of the best in the world—75 years, for Scandinavia—were reached, 4½ to 5 million fewer people would die every year. If the RIO target of reaching at least 65 years life expectancy for all countries were reached, 10 million fewer people would die each year.

An even greater number of births would probably be avoided. We know much more research needs to be done on this, but it appears that the kinds of improvements that would bring about that change in death rates would bring about even a greater reduction in birth rates. Therefore, for example, if all developing countries today had the death rates of Sri Lanka, 13 million fewer people would be dying annually in the developing countries. If they had the birth rates of Sri Lanka, some 30 million fewer people would be born every year. Or were all India to have the death rate of the State of Kerala, some 3½ million fewer Indians would die each year, and if India had the birth rates of Kerala, some 5 million fewer Indians would be born each year.

So, as these rates come down and reach these kinds of levels, they should have a significantly more beneficial impact on birth rates. We need more research on this.

Finally, in conclusion, I've been very pleased that in this discussion we have been able to get beyond what so often has been seen as the family planning versus development debate. It seems to me we need both. Development of the right kind increases motivation, and then family planning and greatly better service availability are needed so that when the motivation is there you can get a ready response. The two need to go hand in hand.

It is again against this background that I would hope this committee would feel free to speak out to the rest of the Congress about general importance of the development assistance program that is now under consideration of the Congress.

As I have tried to indicate, general development patterns are as essential to eventual fertility reduction as are family planning programs. The scope, magnitude and priorities of America's overall aid program are thus clearly central to the effectiveness of its contribution to fertility reduction.

The 1973 U.S. Foreign Assistance Act stipulation that an increasing amount of U.S. bilateral assistance go to the aid of the poor majority provides the appropriate programmatic focus for this purpose, but we are seeing that the programmatic focus is not enough. It must be supported by adequate funding and an effective administrative structure to enable the United States to participate effectively in a cooperative effort to overcome the worst aspects of absolute poverty in some kind of a time frame. I personally endorse the time concept of the end of the century.

It is toward the achievement of these two essential objectives, particularly the latter, a more effective administrative arrangement—we heard earlier testimony as to some of the problems that are faced today—that the new Humphrey bill is directed.

I thus hope that you and your colleagues will take an active interest in this and other legislation relevant to a strengthening of the

American development assistance program, not simply from the point of view of ensuring that a population sector is adequately and specifically incorporated, important as that objective is, but also with the much more important aim of working toward the strongest possible overall American contribution to the improvement of basic human needs in the Third World.

This will contribute importantly to advancing the date when population stabilization can be achieved. The Congress has played a pioneering role in this field over the last 10 years. Needless to say, my colleagues and I stand prepared to provide any assistance toward the development of more specific recommendations that you might consider helpful.

Thank you very much.

QUESTIONS AND REMARKS

Mr. SCHEUER. I hope that is not just a rhetorical offer. I assure you that we will take you up on it.

Mr. GRANT. I will repeat, sir, my willingness, and that of my colleagues to be of assistance to this committee.

Mr. SCHEUER. Good. I am extremely impressed by your testimony. I must say in passing that these hearings are a fantastic post-baccalaureate education for me.

I just wish we had had the two of you here when we had Ambassador Mills, the Chairman of the Economic and Social Council—ECOSOC—and Chairman of the Group of 1977. Many of the questions that you have raised would have been put to him.

I am very much impressed by this "Year 2000" concept because it solves a real problem that I see with the developed nations, with regard to the total stalemate in relations between the developing and the developed world.

They are talking about enormous resource transfers of an order of magnitude of hundreds of billion of dollars. They are also saying, "Don't interfere. We don't want any strings. We don't want you telling us what to do. We don't want any interference with our domestic institutions."

In effect they are telling us that we have to reorient our whole lifestyle. Maybe they are right about the impact of an American consumer on the environment and on energy in comparison to an Indian. They have a good point there, but it certainly involves massive changes in our society, massive restructuring and reordering—I won't say lowering of the quality of life—but certainly a changing of the quality of life we are accustomed to. Yet, there seems to me to be very little "complementarity" involved here. They are telling us to stay out and keep our noses out of their private internal affairs.

This "Year 2000" concept does two things. First, it gives me the feeling that I can put resources into this program with a knowledge that there is a light at the end of the tunnel, that there is going to be a structured way in which those resources are actually going to help people, improve PQLI's, and that the Sri Lanka model is going to be replicated. We're not just going to make the rich richer and sort of rely on a "trickle-down" effect.

As I see it, it would also give some of the more enlightened and intelligent leaders of the developing world an opportunity to lead their countries in a useful direction.

So, it does a lot for both sides, and it is perfectly clear that the comparative costs of funding this kind of a program, where you earn \$12 to \$20 billion a year, is a mere fraction of what they are asking for in the New International Economic Order quota. Even if we gave them their requested quota of trillions of dollars, there would be no assurances that the rural poor in Pakistan or in Venezuela would be helped at all.

Here we have a much more manageable dimension of resources that would be demanded from Western donor countries, promising very real and tangible results. I think that if we could somehow get some kind of an international imprimatur put on this approach so it wouldn't be considered a unilateral Western or American approach, it could be made real.

I would hope that, in some way, the UNFPA could adopt this kind of an approach. It is sort of a followup to the 1974 Conference, saying:

All right. We've had 4 or 5 years of experience since the 1974 Conference and there is a consensus among the developing countries of the world as to how we can best use and invest those funds in a most cost-effective way to helping our people.

I hope that all of you could give us some guidance as to how this concept of the "Year 2000," with your PQLI, could be institutionalized through multilateral and U.N. organizations to make it "their" program, rather than Jim Grant's program or Paul Simon's or Jim Scheuer's program.

MR. GRANT. May I say, Mr. Chairman, very briefly that I agree with you that this latter is the approach most likely to help the poor. One of the encouraging things at this moment is that in the United Nations, as the United Nations is preparing for what is now being called development decade three and beyond the 1980's and 1990's, this whole question of the year 2000 goal and overcoming the worst aspects of absolute poverty is actually being discussed and considered. One of the reasons why this concept of a goal with a specified time frame was not accepted at the World Employment Conference, when this was all discussed in 1976 briefly for the first time in a major way, was that the U.S. Government vigorously opposed both the basic needs concept, despite the congressional legislation, and any time goal.

This is why it seems to me that we are back in a situation where the leadership of the Congress—

MR. SCHEUER. It seems to me that it is perfectly clear that the demands on us to go the Sri Lanka route are greater than those to go the Venezuela route, hoping that it will bring the poorest of the poor in Venezuela up to some kind of tolerable standard of living.

MR. GRANT. The Venezuela route of the past will not do it within the century, whereas the other holds out the prospect that it can be done by the end of the century.

MR. SCHEUER. I think if the State Department, the Treasury Department and the Commerce Department think about it seriously, they would be more inclined to contribute their fair share. Let us say a third or 40 percent of \$20 billion a year. Let us take your maximum

figure and make that our obligation over the next 22 years. I think we would be getting out of this New International Economic Order thing in a humanitarian, compassionate, defensible, and yet very inexpensive way, with comparatively modest and meetable demands upon us.

Mr. GRANT. And, if I may conclude, Mr. Chairman, by simply saying that simply it is this emphasis on basic needs combined with increased family planning program support that holds out the prospect of stabilizing the world population at 1, 2 or 3 billion below the 11 billion people that is now likely on current trends. The stakes in the population field on this are tremendous.

Mr. SCHEUER. On page 5, you talk about basic human needs in a quantifiable way within a given timeframe. Could you put the same quantification on achieving improvements in the status of women?

Mr. GRANT. Yes. You can't really meet the human needs of the bulk of the population unless the needs of the women are being met because they are half of the population.

Mr. SCHEUER. Just one last question. When we were in Tokyo the week before last, Norman Borlaug was there. He felt very strongly that our Public Law 480 program was, in effect, a deterrent to the developing world to increasing their agricultural output.

He had basically two reasons. First, because many developing countries were taking Public Law 480 food commodities, selling them, taking the proceeds, and investing them in the cities. They weren't taking the proceeds of sales and investing them in the economy of the rural poor to improve farming techniques, to finance irrigation systems, better fertilizer systems, and better seeds. His point was that those monies were not being adjusted into the rural and agricultural economy.

Second, he felt that the price at which Public Law 180 commodities were sold was so low that it simply did not make sense for farmers to do any farming beyond satisfying their own minimum needs since they couldn't undercut Public Law 480 prices. It didn't pay the farmers to get into the market economy with their agricultural products, and Borlaug felt that the developing world should be strongly encouraged to offer a price for locally produced agricultural products that would stimulate their farmers to farm and produce. He felt that the whole Public Law 480 program, as it is currently structured, was a major disincentive for governments to pay attention to their agricultural sector.

Do you care to comment on that one way or the other?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, I will make two comments. One is that it need not necessarily be handled the way he described it, and I, myself, have been impressed with the work of some of the congressional committees in this. They have built in a series of incentives in the last three or four years. The current Public Law 480 bill has a Title III which in effect says that if a government would use the proceeds received from the sale of the grain for advancing the right kind of development priorities which are then described as those in the legislation—the poor majority, life in the rural areas, food production—they then get the Public Law 480 on a grant basis instead of a sale credit basis which is the title I. So, the United States is building in a set of incentives.

Secondly, if we accept this concept of what I call "triple targeting" to overcome the worst aspects of absolute poverty by the year 2000, where we are talking about doubling food production and per capita income as well as cutting in half the disparities in life expectancy and infant mortality—to do this the government will initially have to greatly step up their activities in the rural area. This will greatly increase food demand in the rural areas, before there is time for these activities to result in increased production. This will create great inflation, in those countries, unless there is a Public Law 480 type response capability. It is really how Public Law 480 is used that is important.

In other words, if, tomorrow, the Government of India were to put all the people in the rural areas to work so that they got some money with which they could buy grain, that would increase Indian's grain consumption by some 5 to 10 million tons a year. That would immediately put India back into a deficit situation again; there would be a major temporary support role for Public Law 480 for that kind of a program. So the key is to get the right program objectives. Then our food support does the right thing.

Part of our problem recently has been that we've been using food for all sorts of other purposes. We haven't really been looking at it from a developmental point of view. We've tried to make governments that have budget deficits; happy this has been a way for them to earn budget receipts, and they have been willing to keep prices down in rural areas.

So it is a question of having the right program direction; I would say this is indispensable to us.

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you very much.

Mr. SIMON. Just one question here, Mr. Grant. I like the concept of the physical quality of life index. One of the criticisms that has been made of it, however, is that it is too much geared to longevity rather than to some other factor. Referring to Table 3 on page 6 of your annex, I see that, or it appears so to me, when I look at the United States, for example.

I am not sure that there would be too many women in the United States who would agree with that particular index. I would be interested later on in getting the reaction of the three panelists to that. To what extent is simple longevity a factor and to what extent are other work opportunities and other things taken into consideration in putting together the quality of life index?

Mr. GRANT. Right. Well, there are three categories. There is literacy, there is infant mortality which really reflects very much the status of women and what is going on in the home environment, and then there is life expectancy at age one, and that would be your longevity factor because the infant mortality reflects quite a different set of circumstances.

We do have a cut off of 77 years as the hundred level for the life expectancy index component of the PQLI. Clearly if people live long enough, they get into senility; but we have not reached that in our society yet. It may be a problem on the way for some of the Scandinavian countries, but basically the life expectancy aspect is just one of three.

If life expectancy is to increase, the systems chart on page 8 indicates how complex it is to improve it very quickly. The right-hand

column deals with the nutrition that you are so familiar with. We know that something like 10 million or more people die each year largely because of malnourishment factors.

Life expectancy tells us quite a lot. It is interesting, for example, that Washington, D.C., which has the highest per capita income of the 50 States and Puerto Rico, has the lowest PQLI and the lowest life expectancy. The life expectancy in Washington, D.C., is lower than that of Taiwan or Hong Kong, about the same as that of Sri Lanka.

This is something that warrants examination.

Mr. SIMON. I agree on that. I have 22 counties in my own district, and there the disparity in full-time earnings for the average woman compared to the average man varies from 20 percent to 40 percent.

Yet, when you consider the factors you are mentioning, this disparity really isn't weighed. I am just referring to the United States, but I think it illustrates the same problem that may affect this PQLI in other countries.

I agree with you that the measures we are moving toward will have greater significance than the old GNP per capita measure which can present a distorted picture.

Mr. GRANT. It may well have been done by my colleagues, but I have not seen it yet. I talked in my testimony about the correlation between PQLI and birth rates. My guess is that the correlation between female PQLI and birth rates would be an even better measure than the use of the combined male/female PQLI.

Dr. PIOTROW. You asked for other comments from the women on the panel.

Mr. SIMON. I'll violate my own rules and let the three of you comment briefly here.

Dr. PIOTROW. If I could comment, I would say that I think if most women were given the choice of earning double the income through their working lives and dying at age 67 instead of 75, as is the difference in life expectancy in the United States today, or making half as much and surviving to age 75, spending the last 10 years of their lives as widows living on inadequate income—which is unfortunately the fate of many women in the United States—they would prefer double the income and feel that this was an improved quality of life.

The quality of life for many older women, especially after their husbands have predeceased them and they have inadequate income and are living alone, quite vulnerable to crime, inflation and poverty of all kinds, is not a very nice kind of ending of one's life to look forward to. My choice would be for double the income, in other words, and 7 years less life expectancy.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you. Mr. Kildee.

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You regard life expectancy and infant mortality as independent variables in your PQLI. Are these independent variables taken into account in arriving at your index?

Mr. GRANT. We picked them as separate. There is obviously a fair amount of overlap.

Mr. KILDEE. So, there is not a complete independence of variables.

Mr. GRANT. No. We find for example that on all three, literacy, infant mortality and life expectancy at age one, there is quite a high

correlation between all three. In other words, when one is high, the others, too, tend to be high.

But when you try to go back and diagnose them, from what we can see so far, the inputs do vary for them. Much better nutrition, for example, has a big impact on life expectancy beyond age one; and much less of one on that of small infants. The home environment is much more important for the infant mortality.

MR. KILDEE. These three standards or parts of your quality of life index really point to delivery of health services and educational services; it seems that they do not address themselves so much to agricultural development as to health services and education services.

I spent some time in Asia. The countries that were able to either produce their own food, such as Thailand, or acquire their own food through whatever else they can produce, seem to have a higher standard of living than other countries. I am wondering where the agricultural variable—the production of food—fits into the quality of life index.

MR. GRANT. Well, sir, this is the purpose of the chart on page 8 of the annex; it is really a systems chart. What we have discovered is that particularly in the poorer and the lower income countries, the availability of medical services is a modest contributor to life expectancy. Far and away the biggest contributor is adequate food intake—nutrition.

To get that adequate food intake, in most societies, at least one family member must have a job. That raises the whole question of employment. Since 80 percent of the people in the low-income countries live in the rural areas, you immediately get back to the question of the level of rural activity or rural employment. The choice of development strategies becomes very important.

Northern Mexico produces a large amount of food. It is a food surplus area, but it has a method of modern farming that employs only three or four workers per 100 acres; whereas the modern farms of Taiwan and Japan and Sri Lanka employ 60, 70, or 80 workers per 100 acres. This means that you have a lot of people with jobs and with income in those societies, whereas in Northern Mexico there are a very large number of people who have been displaced from the land. There is a lot of food being produced in Northern Mexico, but there is also a lot of malnutrition and hunger there. Therefore, the death rates are high.

Whereas, in the Sri Lanka case which has one-eighth or one-sixteenth the per capita income of Mexico you have lower mortality because the food gets to the people. Now, Sri Lanka has done something very unusual for a low-income society. The Government gave 2 pounds of free food each week to everybody who didn't pay an income tax—and they have been for 25 years. As of about 3 months ago, it is now provided only to the poor half of the population.

To give that 2 pounds of free grain a week costs about \$4.50 to \$5 per person per year. This amount of grain, of course, makes a big difference. In most other societies, Taiwan, Mainland China, et cetera, the way the people get their nutrition is more through the income that comes from having a job. Then, the next most important thing is the environment.

MR. SCHEUER. Did Sri Lanka stop that practice?

Mr. GRANT. They have just changed it so that only the lower 50 percent of the population now gets it. They took it away from the upper half and then they took some of the savings to start an unemployment compensation scheme for families who don't have any member working.

Now, in some ways this is the more efficient way to allocate resources. The big problem with this new approach is obviously the administrative one. The authorities now have to determine where that bottom half comes and whether in a very poor family nobody is working. They may have a nightmare on their hands with the administrative part.

Mr. KILDEE. Part of their problem seen then would be in the distribution of food produced.

Mr. GRANT. Right.

Mr. KILDEE. Northern Mexico produces surplus food, but they use a great deal of that for their balance of trade rather than feeding the people of Northern Mexico.

Mr. GRANT. Basically, Northern Mexico produces the surplus, that is right, and it is used for feeding other parts of Mexico, primarily. Some of it is exported, but a lot of people in the region don't get it.

Mr. KILDEE. Are the death rates in Northern Mexico significantly different than those in Sri Lanka?

Mr. GRANT. The answer, generally, is yes.

Mr. KILDEE. So the death rates in Northern Mexico would be higher.

Mr. GRANT. In fact for all of Mexico, the death rate is higher than it is for Sri Lanka, and I am certain that in the rural areas it would be significantly higher.

Mr. KILDEE. Would the distribution of food be one of the major factors?

Mr. GRANT. I would say it would be one of the major factors.

Now, Sri Lanka also has universal education, whereas Mexico, even though it is much richer than Sri Lanka, does not have universal education in the rural areas: and second, Sri Lanka has a simple universal health service that costs the country about \$1.50 to \$2 a year to reach each person. That works quite well. There is nothing like that in Mexico.

Mr. KILDEE. Get that information over to the White House on the cost. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you very much, Mr. Grant.

Next, Dr. Barbara Herz, the Acting Chief of Human Resources Division for the Bureau of Program and Policy Coordination of AID. We are very happy to have you here.

**STATEMENT OF DR. BARBARA HERZ, CHIEF, HUMAN RESOURCES
DIVISION, BUREAU FOR PROGRAM AND POLICY COORDINATION,
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 623.]

Dr. HERZ. In response to your request, I will very briefly summarize my written testimony in order to take advantage of this opportunity to respond to your questions.

Mr. SIMON. We appreciate that.

Dr. HERZ. I would like to say, however, at the outset, that AID believes its legislation enables us to address development concerns. In our view the focus on basic human needs does not suggest that we provide only welfare assistance.

Those are questions that I suspect you may want to ask Governor Gilligan or my colleague Mr. Shakow to address, but I did want to say at the outset that we believe our legislation is indeed on the right track as a means of enabling us to foster development.

Now, to the question you have asked me to address: The influence of development on fertility. Let me begin by giving you a thumbnail sketch of AID's own policy toward population. I will address certain questions somewhat more fully than others. In particular, I am not going to talk at length about family planning services because I know that you have other witnesses who will be addressing this question particularly next week. However, I will try to explain where we see family planning services fitting into our overall policy on population.

Population growth rates inevitably affect individual family's choices on family size. In order to understand how population growth rates emerge, you have to look at the way individual families make their choices on how many children they would like to have.

Now, a convenient way to summarize this is to say that completed family size represents the minimum number of children that parents want plus some additional numbers they may seek in order to insure the survival of that minimum number, plus any extra births that they may not affirmatively seek.

The minimum number of children that parents want inevitably reflects economic and social conditions facing them. The so-called insurance births—the number of births that parents want in order to insure the survival of say one or two sons or two or three children—in turn reflects child mortality. The extra births may reflect the presence or absence of family planning services in particular.

No one pretends these categories are sharply defined, or that parents necessarily think through their decisions with great care, but parents do behave more rationally than we often have thought. If you look at the research, the results are consistent enough to suggest that one can approach the problem this way.

Good family planning services are the easiest and the most straightforward way to tip parental decisions in favor of smaller families. Safe, effective, affordable, and accessible services should be made available to every couple in the world.

The World Population Conference, the U.N. Population Conference, the U.N. Conference on Women at the International Women's Year site in Mexico City, confirmed the right of every couple to have the means and the information necessary to plan their families.

AID vigorously supports the commitment of the United States to these principles. We take every opportunity to help extend safe, effective, affordable, and accessible family planning services. We are learning much more about what kinds of services are most welcome and most appealing to couples in the third world in both urban and rural areas.

I know that my colleagues next week will address this question more, but I can't resist saying at the moment that we are learning that it is crucial to provide a variety of methods—pills, condoms, IUD's, and sterilization—to give people a broad choice.

We are learning that it is important to provide the services in such a way as to reflect people's own feelings and sensitivities. This means using people from villages to speak to their neighbors, using women to speak to other women, using health auxiliaries who come from the local community, using local leadership and local organizations because those people and those leaders are best in touch with their own friends and neighbors. It is really commonsense. It makes sense. It works.

One need only look at Indonesia to find a really splendid example of how a successful family planning program works. AID is trying very hard to assist this type of program.

Now, there are other aspects of family planning services. We could discuss the need to integrate with health services for reasons of both appeal and efficiency, but I will try to withstand the temptation to talk about every interesting aspect of family planning in order to get into the basic subject of my testimony which is the influence of development on fertility.

I would like to start by saying once more that economic and social conditions inevitably and inescapably affect parents' views on how many children they want to have. Their decisions on whether to use a family planning method are indeed voluntary, but they are made in a context of economic and social conditions. They are not made in a vacuum.

Now, what kinds of conditions matter, and how do they influence parent's choices? Let me give you an example or two to start with. A young girl in India, a teenager, marries a fellow several years older than she is. She leaves her village; she moves in not only with her husband, but with her mother-in-law and other members of her extended family.

Under her social customs and because she is poor, it may be possible for her to return to her own village only for the birth of her first child. Her mother-in-law, who relies on her own sons for social security and old age support strongly urges her daughter-in-law to begin her own family, to have sons.

The whole social ethic facing that young girl suggests that she should begin to have a family soon and that she should be sure to have several sons. In that circumstance, not surprisingly, many of these young women choose to start their families quickly and choose to have children until they have several sons. That is the kind of economic and social context that we are talking about.

There are several keys to the question of how development influence parents' choices on how many children they want to have.

One is broader opportunities for women. This is absolutely crucial. The research turns up this result in any number of ways over and over again. A woman in a traditional society who has very few economic options open to her and who faces severe social restrictions is dependent both economically and socially on her family, as Dr. Zeidenstein has pointed out.

It is then especially important to broaden educational and employment opportunities for such women. Now, people always ask whether that means you have to give women a college education and a terrific job in the city. Aren't you, in fact, saying you need to develop the entire country? Isn't this a counsel of doom because countries can't afford this kind of development at present given the resources available to them?

The answer is that we don't know enough. It varies country by country, culture by culture; we must do more research. However, the research and analysis available today suggest very strongly that just a few years of education make a difference to women's ultimate fertility.

Exactly why this is so we are not sure. It may make them more employable; it may make them more open to all sorts of innovations like the use of family planning services. It may simply convince many women that life needn't be as it always was, that they do have options, that they can control their own destiny to some degree. But we do know that the research consistently shows that more education, even at the primary level, encourages women to have smaller families.

Another point that deserves elaboration is the strong relationship between employment opportunities for women and lower fertility. Now, this needs to be qualified. Not every employment opportunity for a woman encourages her to have smaller families. Women already work. Women probably do most of the agricultural work that is done in the Third World. In some countries it is roughly half and half. In other countries, particularly in Africa, women really do more. So, it is not a question of putting women to work. They are already there. It is a question of giving them jobs that are difficult to combine with endless childbearing and childrearing, and jobs that lessen their dependence on children.

When you give a woman this kind of a job, it needn't be in the capital city. Mr. Zeidenstein has mentioned two of my favorite projects—the Bangladesh project in particular which enables women to do a better job of growing and marketing the crops that they are going to be growing and marketing anyway. It has also enabled them to grow somewhat different ones.

It is this kind of imaginative program that gives women a chance that they didn't have before that really does encourage smaller family size.

Another key point is to reduce parents' economic dependence on large families. We need to know much more about the economic contribution of children both during childhood and during the old age of their parents. There is considerable debate on this, but it seems fairly clear that in many societies parents at least believe that it makes economic sense to have many children.

Now, if you look behind this, you find that parents don't feel they have a realistic option open to them for educating and really enabling their children to get better opportunities when they grow up. Let me elaborate for a second. If a couple in a poor, rural county sees that there are no schools, there are no health services, there are no good jobs available for their children, then they are likely to think that the extra cost of another child is no more than what it takes for that child to subsist—a little food, a little clothing, a little shelter.

They do not use the argument that American parents make that they can't afford to have more than two or three children because they won't be able to afford to send them to college. That is not a realistic option for Third World parents. So, they want several children until they see that choosing a smaller family and educating and caring for those children will enable those children to have a better stake in life. You also see that in the research.

Giving children a better prospect in life is really what development is all about. So when it comes to specific policies of AID to encourage lower fertility through development, we are focusing in particular on women and on women's opportunities.

I could elaborate, but let me briefly mention five or six things that we are looking at. We are looking at measures to encourage public opinion leaders and government leaders to speak out on this subject, to raise the age of marriage, to talk about broader opportunities for women.

We are looking at programs that do extend employment and at least basic educational opportunities for women. We are also looking at particular programs to investigate the economic costs and benefits of children—it is fairly arcane research—but it discusses the role of children in the family and what they actually do contribute.

We are, of course, looking at all sorts of programs to promote maternal and child health, and then we are looking at broader rural development programs designed to encourage smaller families, though, to be candid, those tend to boil down to efforts to broaden opportunities for women and to address the particular needs of children that I discussed.

Now, what you find when you look behind all of this is that the very same development policies and programs that most encourage lower fertility also best address basic needs. One needs to qualify that a bit so the overlap is not 100 percent, but the overlap is substantial.

So, what you end up with is the conclusion that by addressing basic needs, you will encourage parents to want fewer children, and as the population growth rate itself falls, it will, of course, become easier to address basic needs. So you have a real give and take between these two aspects of the problem.

Moreover, as development proceeds so as to make smaller families a more attractive option to parents, then they become more interested in using the family planning services available to them. There, again, you have a complementarity.

I am very glad that someone on the panel, I think Mr. Grant, mentioned the need for ceasing this debate about whether it is family planning services or development that reduces birth rates. We need to recognize that both help; both are complementary.

I read an article in "Family Planning Perspectives" talking about China, which often is portrayed as the classic case where services brought the birth rates down. This article dwelled on the importance of changing women's roles. Love of the ways workers persuade Chinese couples to use family planning services is by emphasizing that women no longer live as they used to, that they have new roles. The same, I understand, is true in many other developing countries. In Colombia, Indonesia, in a variety of countries—I won't belabor you with

examples—the same thing is true. If you compare the experience of Indonesia with Pakistan, you will see real differences in the role of women in the structure of society.

We feel very strongly that you do need both aspects of the equation. You need to address family planning services; you need to provide those services; and you also need to pay attention to the way that development can encourage parents to want smaller families, particularly by broadening opportunities for women.

Mr. SCHEUER. You left out the concept of integrating population concerns into development programs. This is the main thrust of the GAO criticism of AID: That AID has development programs that do not take population concerns into account and are not population sensitive. You have made that same omission within the last 30 seconds.

Dr. HERZ. In what sense?

Mr. SCHEUER. You mentioned designing good programs, delivering good programs, and having—

Dr. HERZ. And, understanding the way development programs and policies do affect parent's views on how many children they will have.

Mr. SCHEUER. Does that mean that your Pop-AID people would try to convince the other AID development programs to factor population concerns into those programs and, in effect, generally make them population relevant?

Dr. HERZ. Yes.

Mr. SCHEUER. This is a big problem that GAO and a number of us have with the AID programs.

Dr. HERZ. Sure. Actually, in April of 1976, we wrote a policy paper on population which at that point committed the agency to designing its development assistance with a view to its impact on fertility, to paying attention to policy and to projects.

Now, later at our own initiative we pushed for legislation which was ultimately enacted as section 104(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act. This requires the agency to consider the demographic impact of all development assistance under chapter I, which is the development assistance chapter. It further requires the agency to use all appropriate projects to build motivation for smaller families. Now, we are firmly committed to this principle, but like many things in life, it is easier said than done.

We need much more information country-by-country, culture-by-culture on just how development does influence parents' views and particularly women's views. In the meantime—

Mr. SCHEUER. Isn't that sort of a copout? Don't we already know enough? You, yourself, say we have enough now. How much research do we need?

Dr. HERZ. Yes, we have enough for a start, but we need more country-specific work.

Mr. SCHEUER. We're constantly making decisions on national legislation with far less data than you now have on the impact of certain kinds of development programs on fertility levels. We know about the impact of education. We know about the impact of job opportunities. We know about the impact of enabling a woman to function

in that world out there with credit and job opportunities. We know about the status of women. How much more do you have to know to act on what you already have?

Dr. HERZ. I am glad to see that you are convinced, but the debate still does go on. It is helpful to have evidence on a particular country so that when you go to that country and you begin discussing these issues with responsible officials, inevitably they say to you: "Well, is it true here? What can you show me about the relationship between fertility and, say, women's education?"

If I may give you a specific example that helps—last year I was on a trip to El Salvador to look at AID's strategy with respect to population in that country.

We were given to understand that the Government of El Salvador was interested in this particular question, but that they felt that while the broad outlines were clear, they still needed more particular information. So we provided some technical assistance and the gentleman who did this, Dr. William McGreevey, helped turn up the interesting finding that girls with education beyond 3 years, roughly third grade, had smaller families.

Mr. SCHEUER. As compared to girls with no education?

Dr. HERZ. Exactly. With 4, 5, or 6 years of education, one noticed a real impact on fertility. And of course, with secondary education, you get an even bigger impact. As it turned out in El Salvador—

Mr. SCHEUER. In other words, there is a critical mass.

Dr. HERZ. Yes, there was a first threshold in some sense at about 4 years of education. Now, as it turned out, El Salvador had a lot of schools where the third grade was being repeated. The kids were staying in school, but they didn't have a fourth grade curriculum established.

With this additional argument in favor of extending the curriculum, the AID mission and the Government of El Salvador began discussing a project that would extend the curriculum. I don't know exactly how far that project proposal has advanced, but it was a clear case of how a little precise information on a generally accepted hypothesis was essential to translate the overall policy into a practical, sensible project in that country.

Let me respond further to your basic question, which is: Are you just going to cop out by doing research? The answer is no. I do feel strongly that we need more research to develop programs tailored to specific countries, but we are going to do some projects and we are already doing some projects based on what we already know. In fact, my principal assistant is in Nepal now working on a project.

Mr. SCHEUER. I hope you are doing an oversight to the review and evaluation of those projects so that, in effect, they would be research material.

Dr. HERZ. That is what we need to do.

Mr. SCHEUER. They would become research and demonstration projects.

Dr. HERZ. That is what we need to do and we're trying the best we can to do that. I would be glad to tell you about particular examples.

Mr. SCHEUER. I am interested.

Dr. HERZ. Well, I don't want to scoop the testimony of my boss.
[Laughter.]

Mr. SCHEUER. We will have plenty of things to talk to your boss about.

Dr. HERZ. Let me talk on a general level and then on a more specific level. Generally, we are working through our program guidance and through our usual review process of projects to encourage people to do just what you have said, to consider how projects in rural development, in education, and so on do encourage smaller families particularly through their impact on women.

Now, I'm sure we don't always do what we should. It has been a very busy year, and we haven't always seized every opportunity to bring development concerns into our project development process. However, we are doing our best and we will do better next year as we are now able to expand the staff charged with this particular responsibility.

Mr. SCHEUER. One thing we would ask the staff charged with this responsibility is to give us a list of the major development grants that you have funded.

Dr. HERZ. Yes.

Mr. SCHEUER. In your statement on that subject you indicate what the population—sensitive elements of these programs are. You did actually factor population into these development programs?

Dr. HERZ. I am really glad that you asked that question.

Mr. SCHEUER. It wasn't a question; it was a request.

Dr. HERZ. All right, the request, because it is one that I have to deal with on a daily basis. A lot of our projects in rural development, in integrated health, nutrition, and family planning services, in primary education, as they involve girls as well as boys, are an ipso facto response to section 104(d). We can say, yes, these projects do address the concerns of section 104(d).

However, the purpose of 104(d) as we interpret it is to encourage more conscious or deliberate efforts in the design of those projects to consider their fertility impact. Not simply go through the portfolio and say, yes, this, this, and this respond to section 104(d), but to say in this, and this, and this case at the project design stage, people worried about how this project would enable parents or would encourage parents to choose families.

Of course, the commitment is only one year old. We haven't, as I have said, paid as much attention as we should in every project. We are definitely starting to see it in our health nutrition and family planning projects and those are expanding at a very rapid rate. We are definitely seeing it now in our primary education projects. The message is getting across. We are seeing it in our rural development projects, particularly the integrated projects like the one Mr. Zeidenstein mentioned that combined elements of agricultural development with, say, basic health nutrition and family planning services. And of course we are seeing it generally with projects that incorporate women into the process—let me add that my view is that this is the most sensible way to approach section 104(d), that it would be a mistake to have, say, an earmarking of \$3 or \$4 million which we then identify as our sole response to section 104(d).

It is crucial to bring ideas such as those expressed in 104(d) into the whole programming process, just as it is crucial to bring the women in development ideas into the whole programming process if you really want it to succeed.

However, we do have a small portfolio of activities that we are trying our best to develop at the moment which will respond to section 104(d). It would be disingenuous of me not to point out that there is no unanimity of views on the utility of these projects in AID, the population community, the American public, and probably even in the Congress.

One has to do a good deal of convincing. It takes time; it takes people; it takes a lot of very careful work. So, we have decided it is better to try to develop a few of these projects well in order to show people that they can help, that they can be effective, and that is where we are at the moment.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you. For our colleague who has just joined us from California, we are asking each panel member to make a brief statement. Then we each have 5 minutes of questions and also more general questions.

QUESTIONS AND REMARKS

Mr. SIMON. Has the restructuring that is taking place at AID impaired the population emphasis?

Dr. HERZ. Again, I don't want to prejudge the testimony of those who have been invited to testify on this, but I will be glad to respond as best I can.

Mr. SIMON. I am interested in a variety of perspectives.

Dr. HERZ. The purpose of the decentralization of our bilateral population programs was to integrate population concerns more fully into the country programming process.

Now, in the beginning when the population program was new, when it was starting, when it was controversial, a strong argument existed for protecting it. It is the infant industry argument that economists use. However, the infant has grown up at this point. It is alive, and well, and flourishing. We feel it is terribly important to encourage people who are concerned with family planning services to understand how those services, for example, can be provided through health projects, how education programs can do a better job of incorporating the family planning message—in short how their work relates to that in other sectors.

Conversely, it is extremely important for people whose principal concern is education or rural development or health to understand their responsibility to incorporate the family planning message and to understand how their own activities may affect parental views on the desired family size.

We felt that it made good sense to transfer responsibility for our country programs in population to the office that handled country programs in all other respects. Now, the transfer has not been 100 percent. We are still capitalizing intensively on the special expertise of the population office, and we continue to do that.

We also have special expertise in health, agriculture, and education from which our country program planners can draw. So what we are really doing is creating more of a parallel.

Now, it is particularly important at the mission level, at the country level, to encourage people to think about these subjects as a package. To make the answer short, I really feel it is going to help our efforts in population.

Mr. SIMON. We heard testimony earlier today that the restriction on direct assistance to the poor is in fact an impairment. Do you feel that that is the case?

Dr. HERZ. Well, in the beginning I said we feel the new directions legislation, the Humphrey bill, the whole emphasis on meeting basic needs that appears in the administration's bill are the best approach to fostering development. They are not synonymous with "welfarism."

On the other hand, the emphasis in our legislation must be interpreted with a fair amount of common sense. There are times when it is crucial to do a rural electrification project or even to dredge a harbor if what you are interested in is promoting food and nutrition for the poor majority.

Questions arise as to which particular donor may be best equipped to do a particular job, but I certainly think one has to interpret legislation with common sense and to work with the Congress to fulfill the intent—which is to benefit poor people, to provide poor people with what they need through such projects as may be most sensible now.

In terms of rural development projects that directly address poor people's needs, health services that really reach the people, family planning services that really reach the people—those measures have a welfare connotation in the sense that they are providing goods and services now to poor people.

But they are also crucial to enable those poor people to work and learn effectively. An LDC has to rely on its people; the people are its most abundant resource. If those people are to do an effective job of meeting their own basic needs at some point, you have to enable them now to be healthy enough and informed enough to work and learn effectively.

Mr. GRANT. May I intervene, briefly. There is a problem, it seems to me, that the legislation that was introduced in 1973 has been interpreted too restrictively in some ways. This really gets dramatized if you look at Sri Lanka right now. They have a good track record for looking after people and addressing their population problem. Their real need is in getting their production up at this stage to sustain the level of services that they have been providing. They have a major dam project called the Mahaweli which will take a river originating in the wet zone and divert it into the dry zone; this will provide farms for some 400,000 families. They have a ceiling of one hectare to a farmer so the end result is clearly going to benefit the little farmer.

This is a project that is going to cost several billion dollars over time. A debate is on about the extent to which AID can get into helping finance this project in a country which has a demonstrated track record of concern for development benefit reaching the poor majority.

It is very clear that the land that will benefit from the irrigation will be given only to small farmers. There is a limit on the holding. Some people say that AID shouldn't be involved in this project. I consider it to be clearly within the interest of the legislation.

Mr. SIMON. Our next witness is Dr. Luke Lee with the Office of Population, Bureau of Oceans, International Environment, and Scientific Affairs, the Department of State.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ASKED OF DR. HERZ BY THE CHAIRMAN

Question: To what extent do the development programs of your Office facilitate fertility reduction in developing (recipient) countries?

Answer: My own Office's programs relate to policy development in population, health, nutrition, and education; we do modest amounts of research and analysis. I know this work has influenced AID policy, and through that I hope it contributes to voluntary fertility reduction.

Question: Do you assess and evaluate the effectiveness of your programs in terms of their potential impact on fertility, as well as other objectives?

Answer: One of our responsibilities is to help the entire Agency do this job, which is part of our statutory obligations under Section 104d of the Foreign Assistance Act.

Question: How does the reorganization of AID encourage and promote the role of women in development?

Answer: The reorganization provides for decentralization of this and other responsibilities to field missions, with Washington coordination and guidance from PPC's Women in Development Office, in conjunction with Officers in other Bureaus especially charged with seeing that each Agency employee does his or her part to promote the participation of women in development.

Question: In most developing nations, especially those located in Africa and Asia, basic health services for rural inhabitants are wholly inadequate. One consequence is high infant and child mortality rates.

Given these conditions, is it important and advisable to provide a combination of basic health and family planning services?

Answer: Yes, sir, though the extent to which such services should be delivered as a package naturally varies with local circumstances.

Question: What should AID and other international population assistance agencies do to facilitate this process?

Answer: AID provides program guidance to its Missions encouraging integration of development projects and encourages collaboration with LDC's for this purpose. It supports research/evaluation to demonstrate the efficacy of this approach. It assists LDC programs aimed at providing integrated services by training personnel and providing key commodities and through other forms of support. And it discusses the subject with LDC colleagues. Some other donors have similar efforts.

Question: The status of women throughout the world is tied to longstanding and varying cultural traditions.

If fertility practices and perceptions are clearly tied to status, should and how can the U.S.—through its population assistance—initiate efforts to upgrade the status of women?

Answer: The U.S. should use some small portion of its population assistance to understand what affects birth rates—family planning services, socioeconomic conditions, etc.—and how these relate. Then development assistance as a whole can be designed with more conscious thought as to how it affects fertility and family planning programs can be made more appealing. Thus far the aspects of development that most encourage smaller families seem to involve upgrading opportunities for women.

AID's population assistance, like our other development assistance, should and can address opportunities for improving women as our legislation requires, or so I think. In population, this involves not only providing the fertility control techniques so important for maternal and child health, but also understanding how socio/economic conditions may leave women feeling obliged to have many children, and how these conditions may be changed to encourage voluntary family planning. All these issues are tied closely together and cannot logically be separated.

Question: By law, AID is required to produce population impact statements on the potential impact of AID development efforts.

Do you believe these reports are useful in the sense that they provide guidance for AID field activities?

Answer: We are at an early stage in developing guidance and reports on 104d, but believe from field reaction that guidance is helpful. As to project analysis related to 104d, we favor a selective approach, as my written statement and that of Dr. Shakow discuss, so that we concentrate our effort where it makes most sense.

Question: What kinds of outside consultants do you call upon to make these assessments?

Answer: Again, we are at an early stage, but we look for competent people who understand the fertility influence of various aspects of development (particularly women's opportunities) and who can work effectively in development countries. These include economists, anthropologists, health specialists, private-organization specialists, and the like.

Question: The General Accounting Office has recently released (April 5) a report entitled *Reducing Population Growth through Social and Economic Change in Developing Countries: A New Direction for U.S. Assistance*. The Report is highly critical of some aspects of AID's population programs. For example:

"Despite the widespread recognition of the need to interrelate and integrate development and population assistance to developing countries, AID appears to have segregated these forms of assistance * * * AID has made little effort or progress in the use of development programs to influence fertility." (p. 86)

The Report states that "AID's" program appears to have been inflexibly structured and focused on family planning services, "with up to 75 percent of all population assistance between 1965 and 1975 being spent on family planning activities (including the purchase and distribution of contraceptives), while only 4 percent of expenditures have been for projects that might help clarify the determinants of fertility—why people choose to have or not to have children.

If you were responsible for deciding AID's allocation of funds, how would you change those priorities if at all?

Answer: I believe in the Agency's population policy as enunciated in our policy paper on population (the Population Analysis Paper) and, indeed, as Congress has amended our legislation by adding Section 104d. Our early guidance on 104d seems sound but needs elaborating. Generally, the question before us now is how best to follow through. In my view, we should devote an additional \$5-10 million annually to high quality fertility determinants research, "project design," and other efforts to put into practice what we already know about fertility determinants.

STATEMENT OF DR. LUKE LEE, OFFICE OF POPULATION, BUREAU OF OCEANS, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 639.]

Dr. LEE. Mr. Chairman and members of the Select Committee on Population. I appreciate very much this opportunity to speak before you on the important subject of the World Population Plan of Action and human rights.

The Plan of Action represents a consensus among 135 governments meeting in Bucharest in 1974. Despite their divergent ideologies and politico-economic systems, these countries were able to reach an agreement on as difficult and sensitive a subject as population which in itself is a remarkable feat.

If there is a single dominant theme throughout the Plan of Action, it is the need to accord absolute respect for human rights even in the face of conflicting national policy. This elevation of human rights over national sovereignty marks a gigantic step forward in international relations hitherto constrained by the narrow approach of traditional international law.

If we accept the definition of Prof. Humphrey Waldo, who is now a judge in the International Court of Justice, that human rights are "rights which attach to all human beings equally, whatever their nationality," and if we accept that the economic and social components of human rights are just as important as their civil and polit-

ical counterparts, there is no denying the fact that population problems are in essence human rights problems.

What are these population problems, and by what means can they be resolved? They include: Illiteracy, to be resolved by the fulfillment of the right to education including compulsory education; malnutrition, by the right to food; lack of medical care, by the right to health; unemployment, by the right to work; lack of old age support, by the right to social security; over-population or under-population, by the right to the knowledge and means of family planning.

In short, family planning is not an end in itself, but merely a means to enable people to enjoy all the basic human rights mentioned above.

Contrary to the oft-held belief that human rights is a dull and theoretical subject with no practical value in terms of population issues, let me give two specific examples of how innovative approaches to human rights can indeed have significant impact on population.

To fulfill the right to the knowledge of family planning, for example, the municipal government of Cagayan de Oro in Mindanao, the Philippines, adopted an ordinance requiring every couple to undergo family planning counseling before receiving a marriage license. Before long, more than 200 other municipal governments in the Philippines adopted similar ordinances. In 1976, the Philippine Government made this requirement a nationwide law. I understand that several other countries are now attempting to do the same.

In 1973, a new labor code was adopted in the Philippines to further the right to the means of practicing family planning. Under this law, any factory or establishment employing more than a certain number of workers, must automatically offer family planning services in its health clinics. Up until then, a worker, even if very highly motivated toward family planning, could go to a clinic only with great difficulty because clinics were open only during the working hours, and were closed on weekends. By having the clinics on-site and available on company time, workers were greatly facilitated in their use of family planning services.

At the end of 1976, the Secretary of Labor of the Philippines was able to announce that, out of 2,400 family planning clinics existing throughout the Philippines, more than 1,000 had been created as a result of this new labor law.

This goes to show the practicability of human rights. It also goes to show that if you convert a physician to family planning, he might open up a clinic of limited usefulness, but if you convert a legislator or policy maker to family planning, he will open not one, but 1,000 highly useful clinics—which is why I sit in awe of you gentlemen this morning.

This also explains the indispensability of having the commitment of government leaders—from the very highest to the very lowest—if a nationwide family planning program is to succeed.

A number of success stories on family planning programs have appeared—in Sri Lanka, in Indonesia, in the People's Republic of China—and in every one of these cases you will note the strong commitment of government leaders at all levels.

In view of the shortage of time, I wish in the few minutes remaining to me to summarize the nature of government obligations imposed

by human rights. In this context, there are three specific obligations which we all must recognize.

The first is the obligation to allow the individual to exercise the right of free choice. This encompasses, among other things, the right to privacy, the right to freedom of conscience, the right to freedom of religion—which implies the separation of church from state, law from dogma—and the right to family planning, including access to contraception and voluntary sterilization as well as the use of paramedicals to prescribe pills and insert of IUDs. In regard to this point, it is surprising how many countries even now continue to forbid—by law—the advertisement, importation or even use of contraceptives.

The second obligation is to regulate the individual's legal status so as to ensure complete equality between men and women, to accord equal status for all children by removing discrimination against so-called "illegitimacy," to regulate child labor and women labor, to prescribe rules for marriage and divorce including the setting of the minimum of age of marriage and the restricting of the practice of polygamy.

The third obligation is to enable the individual to exercise, through the use of government resources, his rights pertaining to education, health services—including family planning—food and nutrition, housing, social security and an adequate standard of living.

It is obvious that the first of these two types of government activity required for the fulfillment of human rights are practically without cost to anyone. A government does not have to spend all money to change the legal status of the people under its jurisdiction. Likewise, a government does not have to spend any money to allow people to do what they want to do in the realm of family planning. Only the third type of government activity, which is bound up with problems of development as a whole, necessitates an expenditure or reallocation of resources—a particularly difficult task if the resources available to the government are already strained.

The high degree of economy with which the first two types of government obligations can be discharged does not suggest, however, that either of them is less important than the third. Nor does the lack of cost imply that these obligations have already been widely carried out. The removal of sex discrimination, for example, ranks among the most important of human rights' goals, but actual legal reforms have been slow and ineffective.

Surprisingly enough, most programs to date have emphasized the third category of activity requiring massive financial input, including foreign aid. Mr. James P. Grant has just mentioned the figure of \$20 billion as being needed over and above funds now available for family planning. Might it not be time for governments seeking international assistance in population matters to simultaneously undertake the first two categories of activity as self-help measures, given the fact that these involve so little cost?

It should be remembered that without self-help, no family planning program can ever succeed; indeed, the fulfillment of human rights is always essentially a matter of self-help.

Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you, Dr. Lee.

QUESTIONS AND REMARKS

Mr. SIMON. You said there are many countries—I'm not quoting you directly—which have serious restrictions on contraceptive services and promotions. How many countries are there? Also, can you give me a few examples of those restrictions.

Dr. LEE. I would be happy to. I just came back last weekend from Brazil, where the importation of contraceptives, for example, is prohibited. Consequently, the pill has to be manufactured locally at a much higher cost. In the case of the IUD, there is no domestic manufacturing in Brazil; at the same time there is a prohibition against importation of IUDs.

As a result of such factors, Brazilian family planning programs to date have been rather ineffective. BEMFAM, for example, has concluded agreements with four state governments and many municipal governments to distribute pills in the northeast areas. I visited a dozen clinics there, but reliance on pills alone, as all family planners would agree, cannot provide an adequate long-term solution. The use of pills requires a very high, sustained motivation by women, while the IUD, once it is inserted, remains effective for a considerable length of time. The irony of the situation may be seen from the fact that the Brazilian Government has come out officially in favor of family planning as a basic human right—starting with the pronouncement of Brazilian delegation at the World Population Conference in 1974, followed by the statements of President Geisel in Mexico in January 1978, and of General Figueiredo earlier this month, who is likely to be the next president. Yet, in spite of all this, the laws continue both to prohibit the importation of contraceptives and to restrict their use. Let me cite briefly one other case, that of the Francophone African countries. Almost all of them continue to retain the 1920 French anti-contraceptive or rather pro-natalist, law prohibiting the importation of contraceptives and even the dissemination of birth control or family planning information.

These are just two very broad examples of the restrictions imposed by many countries on family planning.

Mr. SIMON. Is anyone working internally to modify that policy in those countries?

Dr. LEE. There are a number of intergovernmental and private organizations working on the matter. Among them are the IPPF and its affiliated family planning associations, which are attempting to change various restrictive laws gradually through the establishment of legal committees attached to these associations. I myself have served as a consultant on law and population for the IPPF and have participated in starting a number of programs and enlisting lawyers to work toward the liberalization of laws in regard to family planning.

Mr. SCHIEUER. It was only as recently as 1965 that the Congress finally eliminated the Anthony Comstock laws, dated from the last century, which prohibited the importation as well as the mailing and interstate commerce of contraceptive information and devices.

Dr. LEE. Yes, that is true.

Mr. SCHEUER. Dr. Lee, I am absolutely fascinated by that list of categories of basic human rights which you enumerate and have adverted to, on pages 4 and 5 of your testimony.

We talk about the various elements of a quality of life index, we mention education, work, and especially the status of women. You have listed them here and have a route for them in some kind of international document which I didn't know existed.

It seems to me that, in compiling some kind of an index for the status of women, we could route each of them through a U.N. document to which the whole developing world as well as the developed world would be obligated to respond.

It should be quite easy for us to put together a list of items that make up an index on the quality of life, the basic human rights and the status of women, which would then be acceptable to the developing world. I wonder what you would suggest as the process by which we could make the effectuation of these rights part of the basic developmental process in the developing world.

It does place us in an awkward position for the West to give the developing world a list, or for America, the World Bank, or Mr. McNamara to give them a list.

How can the concept of population be integrated into the development process, whatever the source of the aid, whether it is bilaterally from the United States or from the World Bank, UNFPA, UNIDO, WHO, or UNESCO? All of these elements are part of the background from which that aid is given and part of a standard of development conduct, let us say, that they are expected to live up to because they themselves have established it.

Dr. LEE. I fully agree with your suggestion that the 14 human rights relevant to population enumerated in various fora could lend themselves to the formulation of an index, and I think the index would probably be more inclusive than the three specific elements which Mr. Grant defined earlier.

I think that one way to apply the index would be to see what percentage of the population of a country has been accorded or denied each of the 14 rights to which they are entitled, as for example, the right to work, the right to freedom from hunger, the right to education, and so on. This could be done either positively or negatively, as a kind of quality of life index.

Now, to turn to your question about how to integrate these human rights into development planning, I would like to cite a report produced at the request of the UNFPA by a committee headed by Mr. Ernst Michanek of Sweden to review how the UNFPA should conduct its programs. I included the committee's recommendations on page 24 of my written testimony, but was not able to reproduce its entire report because of the limitation of space. One of the strongest points made in the report is that there should be very close coordination among UNFPA, UNDP and UNEP. I would suggest that UNDP, for example, before approving a project, should take into account its potential impact on population problems, particularly on the 14 human rights. The same holds true with respect to the UNEP. Unfortunately, to date, each of these organizations has been wary about stepping on the toes of the other organizations, and their activities therefore continue to be rather compartmentalized.

I think that suggestions by your committee concerning the need for close coordination among these three organizations might well have a catalytic effect.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, you have given us a mission and we are very happy to accept it. Thank you very much.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Beilenson.

Mr. BEILENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that your Office of Population has been given the mandate of monitoring population activities, and assisting in the development of the diplomatic initiatives in these areas. Can you tell us just a little bit about what you do to fulfill that mandate, how many people you have, what your activities are? There are those of us who don't know about it.

Dr. LEE. Yes, I would be very happy to. In the first place, there is an overall division of labor between the office of Ambassador Green, the coordinator of population, and mine, in that Ambassador Green is responsible for the coordination of Government wide policies—involving not only the State Department, but also HEW, Labor, Agriculture, and so on—whereas the Office of Population Affairs, under my direction, is concerned exclusively with the State Department's own policy matters.

When I joined the State Department last November, one of my first tasks was to put together a document defining the responsibilities, objectives, and plan of action of the Office of Population Affairs. I would be happy to provide copies of this document to all members of the committee. There are so many activities proposed for my office that it would take a long time to describe them all to you.

Mr. BEILENSEN. Excuse me. Are these just proposed activities or have you done some of these things?

Dr. LEE. The activities I am referring to comprise the plan of action which we are actually implementing.

Mr. BEILENSEN. You are implementing?

Dr. LEE. Yes, we are implementing. For example, one such activity is to involve regional development banks actively in population and family planning matters. Until now, the World Bank has undertaken some work on population matters, but it continues to loan money at a rather high interest rate and requires repayment in hard currency—points on which regional development banks have greater flexibility.

The Inter-American Development Bank here in Washington, for example, is able to give soft loans to certain countries at one percent interest, repayable after a long grace period in the same rate as that of the original loan (with maintenance of value in terms of U.S. dollars). It also has a trust fund of over \$500 million earmarked for social development purposes. Given these facts, it would seem logical to try to encourage the Bank to go into the population and family planning field which, after all, is integrally connected with socioeconomic development—which the Bank was established to further. During the last few weeks, I visited the representatives of the Bank in Guatemala, Colombia, and Brazil, and brought up these same ideas with each of them.

Mr. BEILENSEN. Just a couple more questions, if I may. Dr. Lee. You mentioned something that sounded very intriguing about suggesting to the regional banks, I guess it was, some useful applications

for some of the money they have. Are you having any success with that? How are you going about trying to do it?

Dr. LEE. I'm sorry. Would you please repeat your question?

Mr. BEILENSEN. You were speaking, I think, about some of the regional banks and some of the money they have and some very interesting suggestions that you had as to how they could put that money to use. Have you had any success with that? How are you going about trying to get them to come around to your point of view?

Dr. LEE. All the country representatives of the IDB with whom I have talked are very supportive of the idea. Mr. William Ellis, who is the representative in Brazil, will be coming to Washington in the next 2 weeks and we plan to have further discussions on the matter. Meanwhile, Mr. Ralph Dungan has written a very long memorandum to the Bank's President urging greater involvement by the Bank in this field.

Mr. SCHEUER. Urging greater involvement of the Bank in what?

Dr. LEE. In population and family planning work.

Mr. SCHEUER. He is the president, is he not?

Dr. LEE. No, sir, he is the U.S. Executive Director of the bank. The Bank's president is a Mexican, a Mr. Antonio Ortiz Mera. The executive vice president is an American, Mr. Sternfeld. Then there are some board of executive directors, some of whom represent several countries together.

One of the major constraints characterizing the existing loan policy of the Bank is that the Bank will lend money only for construction and fixed assets. Consequently, in Guatemala for example, there are a lot of health clinics in rural areas, but very few people to staff them. The reason is that the Guatemala Government has not been able to provide sufficient counterpart funds to train the necessary personnel. So, if the Bank were able to relax its rules and loan money not only for construction, but also for operational purposes, I think the positive effect would be much greater.

Mr. BEILENSEN. How many people are in your Office of Population?

Dr. LEE. Four professionals altogether, including myself.

Mr. BEILENSEN. Are you in charge of it?

Dr. LEE. Yes.

Mr. BEILENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you. Dr. Phyllis Piotrow—

Mr. SCHEUER. May I ask a question?

Mr. SIMON. We recognize Mr. Scheuer.

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you. I am, again, referring back to this list of 14 points on the "human rights of women" question. Have countries of the developing world already signed on the line as obligated in some kind of international document with respect to these rights?

Dr. LEE. Yes, the developing countries have obligated themselves to fulfill 14 human rights through a number of documents or instruments which they have signed or adhered to.

Foremost, of course, is the U.N. Charter. Under articles 55 and 56, all members "pledge" themselves to cooperate with the United Nations in promoting universal respect for and observance of human rights. This of course is the most legally binding document possible

because the U.N. Charter prevails over any other conflicting agreements or treaties, whether concluded before or after the Charter's ratification. Second, you have the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the Teheran Proclamation of Human Rights of 1968, the United Nations Proclamation of Social Progress and Development of 1969, and the World Population Plan of Action reached by consensus among 135 countries at Bucharest in 1974.

Mr. SCHEUER. On page 4 of your appendix, I guess. Then, you have the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; then the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women; the Declaration of the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

And then on page 24—that is just a little unclear to me—at the bottom of “iv,” this is the fourteenth right.

Dr. LEE. Yes.

Mr. SCHEUER. The right to social, economic and legal reforms necessary to insure the above rights. Now, that is really the clincher.

Dr. LEE. Yes, sir, it is.

Mr. SCHEUER. You say this right flows logically from the fact that human rights are ipso facto legal rights, entailing legal obligations on the part of governments to undertake the necessary reforms to conform with such rights.

As a lawyer, could you explain to me how human rights get to be ipso facto legal rights, not in the sense that they are legally enforceable, but in the sense that the developing world would accept them as obligations that they have freely entered into and not perceived as obligations imposed upon them as an unacceptable type of linkage.

Dr. LEE. That is an extremely important question, and—to be frank—one for which I have not included as much material as I would have liked.

Mr. SCHEUER. Would you like to submit an extra statement on that?

Dr. LEE. Yes, I would.

Mr. SCHEUER. Because I think we are really getting to the nitty-gritty here and if you can show us that the developing nations have really agreed to these obligations and that they aren't something we are demanding they live up to, I think that is going to make the job of making them a reality much easier and simpler.

Dr. LEE. Yes, I agree.

Mr. SCHEUER. The next question is: What are the processes by which the acceptance of these rights and agreement to live up to them in tangible, practical, real ways would be fed into the grant-making, or contract-making process, both through our own bilateral programs and through such international agencies as the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, the IMF, and the whole consolidation of U.N. grant-making and loan-making agencies? How do we feed it into the process so that it really becomes a functioning part of the environment in which these programs are designed and administered?

Dr. LEE. On the multilateral level, ideally the United Nations Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies like the Population Commission and the Commission of Human Rights ought to be actively involved in the analysis of these rights working toward their dissemination and fulfillment, and integrating them in all developmental projects. However, to date, very little has been done, unfortunately. In fact, there is currently a discussion as to whether the Population Commission ought to continue in existence at all. If it should continue as a viable entity, I think the U.S. Government perhaps should try to urge it to look more closely into these human rights questions.

The Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations has been concerned until recently almost exclusively with civil and political rights; and again, I think it is time for the Commission on Human Rights also to be reminded that human rights include not only civil and political but equally economic and social rights.

With the support of your committee, our office will do our utmost to work toward these goals.

There are also a number of bilateral channels through which these 14 human rights could be made the subject of collaborative efforts with other countries. For example, the United States and Egypt have established a joint working group on health cooperation. Under this joint working group there is a subgroup on family planning. In view of President Sadat's concern over population growth rates and maldistribution, shouldn't the joint working group be more actively involved in family planning? I think they should. The next meeting of the group will be in early June, and I have tried very hard but in vain to have the U.S. delegation—which is led by HEW—raise the family planning issue.

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you, Dr. Lee.

Dr. Phyllis Piotrow is Executive Director of the Population Crisis Committee, and is one of the people responsible for the creation of this select committee through her quiet "behind-the-scenes" leadership.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ASKED OF DR. LEE BY THE CHAIRMAN

Question 1: The State Department Office of Population is charged with the mandate of monitoring population activities and assistance and assisting in the development of diplomatic initiatives in these areas.

What has your office done to implement this mandate?

Answer: The process of monitoring population activities and assistance and that of assisting in the development of diplomatic initiatives in these areas are in practice tightly interwoven, and to separate them risks the danger of oversimplification. However, in the interest of clarity, I will deal with them individually here, beginning with the matter of monitoring.

The Office of Population Affairs which I head carries out its mandate to monitor population activities and assistance in different ways, depending on the degree of opportunity for positive input offered by a particular situation.

On the simplest and most passive level, we keep track of a large quantity of literature, ranging from scientific material on such matters as birth control techniques, through inspection, audit and evaluation reports, to diplomatic cable traffic. The sources of this material are as varied as its contents. A large portion is from the United Nations' regular component elements, such as ECOSOC and its agencies. (We naturally pay particular attention to the activities of the UNFPA and the UN Population Commission.) A considerable amount originates

with private voluntary organizations, such as the IPPF, the Population Council and the Pathfinder Fund. In addition, a great deal comes from within the U.S. Government itself, and includes reports issued by other agencies such as the GAO. It also includes AID reports, both programmatic and fiscal, as well as communications on regular AID business and current airgram and cable traffic between Washington and our Missions overseas.

On a more active level, we are able to combine monitoring functions with participation in the case of certain types of processes. Thus, we sit in on AID's program and budget reviews and not only observe the proceedings but also offer suggestions and policy guidance as appropriate.

Finally, when possible, we monitor activities on-site through visits to countries which are of importance to the population effort. I myself have recently returned from a familiarization trip to Latin America and plan another such trip to Africa shortly. Visits of this kind allow conversations with all elements involved in the field, including Embassy and AID Mission personnel, UN and private voluntary organization representatives, host government officials, and—last but certainly not least—the people whom we are trying to help. Again, in this context, monitoring is not a one-way street, for we are able to offer our views in exchange for those of others.

Monitoring, in itself, is necessary, but is obviously insufficient to fulfill the basic responsibilities of my office—even when combined with participation of the kind mentioned above. In fact, it is really of value only insofar as it provides a basis for the development of more realistic policies or of more effective means of policy implementation. In my office, such development usually means the preparation of diplomatic initiatives to be used in different ways in a wide range of fora.

The most unique and effective channel which the Department can employ in developing its initiatives in population activities and assistance is its system of diplomatic Missions throughout the world. These Missions are inevitably the principal partners in our effort to assure that U.S. population policy is appropriately reflected in the actual conduct of our foreign relations.

A rather dramatic illustration of our means of operation in this context is provided by a cable drafted by my office which was recently sent out by Secretary Vance and AID Administrator Gilligan to our Ambassadors in 75 countries with food/population imbalances. The cable requested that the Ambassadors pursue and report on a continuing dialogue with the top host country leadership regarding the need to deal more effectively with food/population problems. The Ambassadors were urged to suggest joint exploration of ways to bring host country's supply of and demand for food into balance, and to point out that any approach which ignored control of population growth would provide at most a temporary or partial solution. Responses from the field which have been received so far indicate that the cable struck a responsive chord at most posts and resulted in direct action by a majority of Ambassadors and their staffs.

Encouragement of Mission initiatives by the Office is not limited to written communications. We participate in the preparation and, when possible, in the presentation of suggestions and plans for action to Ambassadors and other key Mission personnel when they are in Washington for consultations or when Office personnel visit them at post. I myself was able to discuss such matters with several of our Chiefs of Mission during a recent visit to Latin America, and plan to do so again during an upcoming trip to Africa.

We also work to encourage constructive diplomatic actions outside of Mission channels, frequently through the preparation (both on request and on our own initiative) of position and briefing papers on population issues. These country-specific materials are prepared for the use of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and other U.S. leaders during their visits abroad or during the visits of foreign dignitaries here. Similarly, we prepare papers for the use of American delegations to international meetings and conferences. Recent efforts have included papers for the President's visits to Nigeria, Brazil, India and Liberia; for the Vice President's trips to Mexico and the Philippines; for the Secretary's trip to Mexico; for the Paris meeting of the Consultative Group for Egypt; and for the visits to Washington of President Sadat of Egypt, President Senghor of Senegal and Prime Minister Desai of India.

Further, we have been active both in supporting and in helping to carry out multilateral initiatives, among them Law and Population Projects of the type encouraged by the UN World Population Conference held in Bucharest in 1974. The World Population Plan of Action adopted by the conference accords "high

priority" to the "review and analysis of national and international laws which bear directly or indirectly on population factors" (para. 78(h)). Since legal reforms of the kind envisioned here are essential to removing obstacles to the exercise of the right to family planning (as well as to enhance the well-being of the individual), this office has been providing support to the establishment of Law and Population Projects in countries where such projects do not yet exist, while carrying out backstopping activities on a continuing basis with regard to projects already established.

Similarly, we are now involved in support for the 1979 "International Year of the Child" (IYC) proclaimed by the United Nations. It is to be the occasion for a systematic global compilation and review of laws governing the rights of the child. This process should be followed by legal reform in light of human rights principles, so that each child will in the future be born wanted—wanted by the parents in the sense that the birth will not have been accidental and by the society in the sense that adequate food, education, health care, job opportunities and other essentials will be available to the child. We are currently attempting to assist in the exploration of funding possibilities for the project, which has been officially supported by the U.S. delegation to the May 1978 UNICEF Executive Board meeting. We are also investigating what assistance we may be able to provide to the convening of a global IYC conference as a follow-up to this project.

Because population and family planning efforts are pursued not only by governmental and intergovernmental entities but also—and on a very significant scale—by quasi-official and private organizations, our initiatives must extend beyond the narrowly defined diplomatic sphere if they are to have maximum effect.

One recent target of this type of activity has been the Inter-American Development Bank. Although the World Bank has been active for some time in granting loans for population projects in developing countries, the various regional banks—despite their greater familiarity with specific regions and their greater ability to provide soft loans—have not yet followed suit. We have been encouraging the IDB to do so through approaches made both to its headquarters in Washington and to its field offices in Latin America.

We also work together with private voluntary organizations in generating initiatives of various types. Currently, we are cooperating with the World Population Society in planning an October 1978 conference in Manila which will stress the value of rural village leadership in family planning programs. It is our intention that this event will lead to the recognition by foreign governments that no population program can be successful without community participation or social mobilization, and that local governments must therefore be given the initiative and authority to establish and coordinate programs in their areas.

At the end of June 1978, we will, at the request of the IPPF Africa Regional Office, participate in its Regional Workshop on Law, Status of Women and Family Welfare to be held in Nairobi. We will also assist the IPPF Western Hemisphere Regional Office in strengthening its activities in connection with the International Year of the Child.

Future office plans envision a continuation of these efforts and the addition of some new ones. Shortly, for example, we anticipate pressing for a further initiative, aimed at both donor and recipient countries, whose purpose is to increase the effectiveness of coordination in financing and implementing population assistance programs. Here, the Department's AID component would be the primary agent in attempting to institutionalize donors' consortia, particularly in countries where the United States is the largest single donor. Simultaneously, efforts would be undertaken through AID and our Missions to convince recipient governments of the value of coordinating their own population programs and requests for assistance. This project, however, must await the completion of the GAO's current world-wide survey of the relationships among the United States, other donor countries and private agencies, and of the effectiveness of present coordinating mechanisms.

In this manner, the Office of Population Affairs has been attempting to fulfill its monitoring and support functions in a wide variety of areas. The field of population and family planning, however, is as you know only too well an ever-changing one. I would therefore be most appreciative of any suggestions which the Committee may have for the extension of our operations in new and more creative directions.

Question 2: Is the State Department able to respond adequately to the global issues of the North-South dialogue, food and energy resources, population, human rights, law of the sea, etc., given its predisposition to *bilateral* diplomacy? How can/should it improve?

Answer: I wish to confine my remarks to only those global issues of a social nature—particularly the population-related issues—with which I am more familiar.

In my view, the State Department has responded quite well to the challenges posed by these issues. As example, I could cite the following:

The United States has been a member of the UN Population Commission since its creation in 1946, and has played a leading role in making that body an increasingly effective international forum for the discussion of population matters.

The United States played a leading role in the creation of the UN Fund for Population Activities in 1966, and has remained a strong supporter and the leading donor of UNFPA. On policy and program matters, close coordination is maintained with UNFPA by the State Department and its AID component, in order that its multilateral activities complement and are complemented by our bilateral efforts. Likewise, the United States has endeavored to strengthen the participation of other parts of the UN system (among them FAO, ILO, UNICEF, UNESCO, and WHO) in population-related area.

The United States was among the principal proponents of the World Population Conference held in Bucharest in 1974 which led to a new acceptance of population activities in the context of development.

The Department, under the aegis of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy, took the lead in 1975 in an interagency effort to develop a national policy on population. The same group has concerned itself with food and population relationships, performance criteria for population programs, and undertakes an annual review of the status of population trends and program implementation.

Notwithstanding the above accomplishments, there is of course room for improvement. Ambassador Green, in replying to a similar question from you, has made four very pertinent suggestions regarding the improvement of the Department. To these, I would like to add a fifth. Like Ambassador Green's, this suggestion is a purely personal one: Namely, the establishment within the Department of a Bureau of Social Development Affairs which would function as the focal point for all matters connected with social development. The establishment of such a Bureau with a clear mandate over social development issues would lend itself to a more effective coordination of international policies not only within the Department of State itself (including AID), but also with the various Departments, such as HEW.

Departmental precedents for establishing such a functional bureau are numerous: As presently structured, the Department has, in addition to its offices devoted to traditional diplomatic activities, functional bureaus dealing with such global issues as politico-military affairs, economic and business affairs, oceans and international environmental and scientific affairs, and human rights and humanitarian affairs. Conspicuously absent, however, is a bureau whose purpose is to assert the importance of social, as differentiated from economic, development and to take unified charge of such interrelated matters as the status of women, health, education, employment and population—which, along with economic development, are among the principal topics in the North-South dialogue.

The Department of course has to deal with many of these matters on a regular basis, and has offices to which responsibility for certain of the most important is assigned: population and health matters in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES); matters involving the status of women and children, in the Bureau of International Organizational Affairs (IO, which is not itself a substantive bureau); refugee and migration matters, in the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA). However, in the absence of a Bureau of Social Development Affairs, responsibility for several major areas of concern is not clearly lodged anywhere within the Department. Moreover, the scattering of social development activities among the present bureaus has not been conducive to the development of a coherent, systematic and integrated approach to this increasingly important area of international relations.

One example of how difficult it is to coordinate policy formulation on social development matters under the existing Department structure involves the need to integrate family planning into maternal and child health care delivery systems, especially for the rural poor. This need is generally agreed upon, both within and outside the Department. But this agreement can be translated into an effective Department policy only by the closest coordination among functional bureaus (OES and IO) and various geographic bureaus, as well as with AID and HEW—which has been assigned as the lead agency for operational as well as policy matters in the field of international health, both multilateral (*e.g.*, WHO) and bilateral (*e.g.*, U.S.-Egyptian Joint Working Group on Health Cooperation).

In making this personal recommendation, I do not intend to paint an overly gloomy picture of the Department's ability, both past and present, to respond adequately to global issues. The success of the Department in dealing with population issues as traditionally defined has already been noted at the beginning of my response. What I would like to see is more numerous successes in the future, when population programs will have to interact even more than at present with programs in other areas—food, health, education, employment, the status of women—if they are to achieve their objectives. The need to create a more effective organization to deal with these increasingly complex and inter-related global social issues deserves serious consideration.

**STATEMENT OF DR. PHYLLIS PIOTROW, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
POPULATION CRISIS COMMITTEE**

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 744.]

Dr. PIOTROW. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to congratulate you and the other members of the Select Committee on the excellent job you have been doing in elucidating and illuminating many different aspects of the population problem. I would also like to mention something that has not been mentioned, but for which Mr. Beilenson and other members of the International Relations Committee deserve special credit: The accomplishment of this Select Committee, in part at least, in providing additional funds for population as part of U.S. development assistance through the action of the International Relations Committee last week.

I think this is already a very substantial contribution in the population field and I am sure you will be making many more in the international field.

Mr. SCHEUER. On that point, we have done very well in the authorizing process, but we still have the appropriations process ahead of us.

Dr. PIOTROW. That is the first step.

I would like to focus my remarks particularly not on the past, but rather on the needs and challenges that we will have to face in the coming years if these programs generally are going to be successful.

I'll try not to repeat things that have been said by other people any more than necessary and will try to be very specific and even, I would say, rather legislative in some of my recommendations to get the committee reactions and comments.

The first need that I see follows very appropriately from the comments just made by Dr. Lee with respect to the whole human rights element of the population issue. The present AID authorization and legislation dealing with population programs make no reference at all to what is the basic human rights statement in the population field.

The language, which has been approved by 136 governments including our own, in paragraph 14(f) of the World Population Plan of Action, states:

All couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so; the responsibility of couples and individuals in the exercise of this right takes into account the needs of their living and future children, and their responsibilities towards the community.

That language, particularly the first portion of it dealing with the basic human right, was adopted as I said by developing countries and developed countries alike at Bucharest. It is not an issue of controversy like the New International Economic Order. It is an issue that all have agreed upon.

In a sense it can be seen as an element in what should be part of the overall plan to reduce absolute poverty by the year 2000, for instance. In fact, it is almost a prerequisite to achieving that goal. I would hope that we would achieve the spread of family planning long before the year 2000, but it belongs, I think, in that same context.

I must say in thinking over this language and reading and following the testimony that the Select Committee has been hearing from others, I find myself for the first time in some agreement with the testimony of Randy Engel from the Right to Life Organization. She, like a number of others from population groups, found the present language in the legislation somewhat offensive because it does not guarantee or make any reference to this basic individual right to services and education.

Because of the concern about the lack of this important policy language in legislation so far, a number of these groups got together, including the American Public Health Association, Population Section, Planned Parenthood, Alan Guttmacher Institute, Population Crisis Committee, Population Institute, World Population Society, Population Resource Center, Worldwatch Institute, and the Population Department of the Methodist Church to review the present language in the legislation and make suggestions. It was the unanimous view of that group that the language which I have here—I can make copies of it available to members of the committee—should be substituted for the present language.

Unfortunately, the present language does have a rather collectivist approach that talks about the right of countries to determine their own population policies. Especially after 3 nights of watching Holocaust, I feel a little bit uncomfortable about the U.S. Government approving the right of countries to follow their own population policies without any reference whatsoever to what should be the bedrock basic human rights.

The other suggestion that came from this group of population organizations deals with section 104(d). Although it is symbolic, it does go somewhat to the questions you were raising earlier, Mr. Scheuer, about some of these programs.

When AID first proposed section 104(d) last year, they proposed that it go into the preamble in somewhat stronger language to apply to the whole legislation.

It was modified by the Congress in such a way as to be really limited to adding a family planning aspect on to other programs and it was put exclusively into the population section of the AID legislation.

What that really means is first of all, the people in agriculture have probably never even read it, because it is not in their section of the bill and it isn't in the general portion of the bill. What happened as a result of this change, I think, was that it diluted the intent that section 104(d) should apply to the entire bill. Section 104(d) should cause people running completely different programs—agriculture programs, education programs—to look at the population impact and not just be a further invitation to the population people to look harder at the other programs.

My first specific recommendations would be similar to those recommended by these groups. I will say, defending the position Dr. Herz has taken, that I think AID has interpreted it as they originally intended, but I think it is the Congress that somewhat diluted the impact of it by putting it in the population section as another part of the population programs instead of leaving it as general recommendations for implementation throughout the entire program.

So my first specific recommendation is that some of this language be incorporated as can be done realistically in the new development assistance bill, whether the Humphrey bill or whatever the legislation might be.

Unfortunately, we slipped up and time escaped us. We did not have a chance—the various groups I mentioned—to get this language thoroughly reviewed and approved in time to go through the subcommittee process of legislation. Therefore it is not in the bill at this point. That would be my first specific recommendation.

MR. SIMON. Your suggestion will be entered into the record this morning.

DR. PIOTROW. My second recommendation though is really that we must focus on the fact that the issue is not words, but action. It is what is done in the field rather than the precise language in the legislation that really makes a difference in the long run.

It seems to me very significant that the data coming in from the World Fertility Survey, which is a demographic knowledge, attitude and practice survey going on in almost all of the developing countries around the world, shows that right now the percentage of currently married fecund women, age 15 to 49, who want no more children is extremely high. In most countries it ranges between 40 and 50 percent of the population. In Korea it is as high as 72 percent of the population. So, we have a very substantial percentage, an ever increasing percentage, and an ever increasing number of women, who want no more children. Therefore, I would emphasize strongly that we should give a high priority within our legislation to satisfying the needs of those who perceive those needs right now.

This calls for a broad range of services, but I think, somewhat to the surprise of practically everyone working in the population field, voluntary sterilization has proved to be exceptionally popular.

A woman marries at age 13, 14, or 15 and by the time she is 30 she has eight or nine children. By then, she is fairly well convinced that she doesn't want to continue to be bothered with pills or problems associated with IUD's. A one-time method like sterilization has a tremendous appeal.

I've had the opportunity to meet and talk with women in many hospitals and clinics in Asia about this. I am increasingly surprised at the gradually declining age of the women who come in for sterilization.

They are overjoyed to learn of this method. One finds that they are being brought into the clinics by their sisters and their cousins and their friends who have set up their own informal networks.

The specific recommendation that I would make with respect to this is that these services—voluntary surgical contraceptive services—be widely available and that there be language at some point virtually requiring that wherever substantial buildings are erected for the delivery of health or family planning services, sterilization services be included.

I think there is a great danger in building too many clinics because if you build clinics, the doctors put on their white coats, the nurses put on their white coats, they all stay in the clinics and the women by and large stay out of the clinics. One way to insure broader outreach programs is not to build too many clinics, but to require and encourage the field workers to go out to the women rather than the other way around. Where fixed health facilities are built, there should be a requirement that wherever appropriate, voluntary sterilization services be provided.

Mr. SCHEUER. You wouldn't oppose the construction of small clinics out in the rural areas and in the villages, would you?

Dr. PROTROW. Often in villages, it is better to go door to door to the women. The person who goes door to door needs some sort of headquarters, but the village midwives who traditionally provide all the care in the villages tend to operate out of their own houses. They don't usually have special buildings. I'm referring particularly to fancy brick buildings and hospitals that tend to be built in cities rather than other areas.

But even out in the rural areas, it is the nature of bureaucracy, it is even human nature. If someone will build you a nice building, you will stay in it. If you don't have the building, then you have to go out and circulate among the people. I think for various reasons there needs to be more of an emphasis on that kind of outreach program rather than the static ones.

My third recommendation really deals with the relationship between socioeconomic development and family planning to reduce fertility.

I think we really need to start out by admitting that it is not an "either" "or" proposition. There is no reason why we have to say it is family planning alone or it is development alone that reduces fertility. This is a false dichotomy and quite unnecessary.

But, I think we should recognize this when we look at family planning programs: Some of the experience we have had with various

social service programs like education in our own country show that the first requirement in delivering of social service is to design and deliver that social service well.

In our own experience with education in this country, we have found that schools that have concentrated on basic education have ended up with a better record on the various scores or tests that have been used to measure this than those that have pursued many supposedly relevant and certainly good and useful measures for community support at the expense of the rigorous focused education programs.

The preponderance of evidence today in the studies that have been undertaken in a great many countries suggest that about half of the impact of fertility decline is caused by family planning programs and the other half is caused by the entire gamut and range of socioeconomic development that is at the heart of our development program.

This is borne out again and again so that it seems a reasonable breakdown. It would be a mistake to expect socioeconomic development alone to reduce fertility because this is basically a trickle-down theory of fertility reduction. It is an approach that assumes that indirect measures will accomplish these objectives more effectively than direct measures.

In the short run, I think the evidence is pretty compelling that the direct measures get to the heart of the problem first. But, as I say, there is no real reason why we have to choose between the two. In fact, we are doing both at the same time and the dichotomy is not a real one.

I would point out that where countries are cited as examples of places where development and redistribution reduce fertility, such as Korea and Taiwan, what sometimes isn't mentioned is that those are also countries that had the first and best family planning programs. Where countries are mentioned as examples of places that don't have much redistribution of wealth and do not have evidence of declining fertility, like Brazil and Mexico, those are countries that until very recently absolutely prohibited family planning and had no programs at all.

Given the limitations of correlation and the association kind of methodology, what one can see by looking at the cases of these different countries is that the countries which pursue redistribution policies do want to help the poor, and are actively committed to doing so, and—China is certainly an obvious example—also have family planning programs. They see the two as linked and as part of this basic new strategy that they favor.

My recommendation then is to give highest priority to the needs of those who desire family planning services right now. We should not wait until there is a complete socioeconomic infrastructure existing before we make more of a push to improve the direct family planning services.

My fourth recommendation goes to the issue of women. I won't repeat the excellent testimony given by Mr. Zeidenstein earlier and Dr. Herz just now. The studies that have been made on those elements of socioeconomic development that contribute to reducing fer-

tility show that programs relating to improving the status of women one way or another seems to have the most certain relationship with lower fertility of any of the programs.

So my recommendation along those lines does call for more support of women's activities. Here again, I would strongly support and commend the action taken by the House International Relations Committee. The committee has already inserted into the foreign assistance legislation a provision earmarking \$10 million to encourage income-generating activities for women in various parts of the AID program.

We did not have quite as enthusiastic a report from all elements of the AID agency for this particular language as we would have liked, but in the end I think AID is firmly convinced that \$10 million can be spent. We, I think, would have liked to have seen \$100 million, but \$10 million is at least a start in this direction.

There was some opposition, probably more from the OMB than from AID, to providing any specific funds to help administer this program at a more extensive level.

We had hoped to have \$10 million for the programs themselves, and then to have several million dollars more for the consultants and staff who have to be sent out to all the AID missions around the world to stay there for 3 or 4 months to really develop the women's projects in these areas.

We had hoped for funding for that. That was, we hope, put in the committee report rather than the legislation, but we would strongly urge this committee—which I know has a strong feeling of support for women's activities—to support and strengthen if possible the language that is now in the Foreign Assistance Act.

My fifth recommendation deals with the funding levels of the programs and to what extent the funds should be spent for studies on the impact of socioeconomic development on population and otherwise.

You've heard much testimony on this. I have here a table that I would like to request, if I may, to be included in the record. It is not widely realized perhaps, but the funding requested for population programs in AID for fiscal year 1979 is actually less in terms of 1972 dollars than the amount that was approved in 1972.

So, although the 1979 figures look very large, there has really been a decline. Even with the increase that the International Relations Committee succeeded in making to the authorization, the funding level for population is below what it was in 1972.

I think that isn't widely realized because the effect of inflation has made it look as if all programs are getting a great deal more money now than ever before.

Population, I would add, is the only program of the functional AID programs that is getting less money now than it did earlier.

My recommendation would be that basically the committee should look hard at what should be the overall priority levels of funding and should think of raising those levels, almost doubling them in fact, to reach present needs. To the extent that studies are funded or what might be the impact of agricultural projects or education projects or other projects on population. I would urge that this not

be taken from the population funds which are already so low, but that they be taken either from the other funding of the agency, which was the original section 104(d) intent, or that a real move be made to increase the population funding from about 5 percent of the present legislation to a total closer to 10 percent.

My two final recommendations deal with the demographic facts that the world is going to be facing for the next several decades. Today, over 40 percent of the population of developing countries is under 15, a familiar statistic, I am sure. But, what it means in program terms is that 10 to 15 years from now there will be 1 billion or more young adults in the peak years of fertility.

These young people will not only be looking for jobs, they will not only be migrating over whatever national or international borders seem to stand in their way of improving themselves, but also they will be the people whose decisions as to family size will really determine the demographic pattern for the next half century.

What does this mean for the design of programs? I think it means one really has to go beyond looking at the traditional maternal and child health centered kind of family planning program—the health approach.

I think these people are in a situation similar to the American teenagers. They don't really look first to a health centered approach because they are not sick. They are also in the healthiest years of their lives. There is not a health motivation for a woman in her early twenties not to have more children as there is for the woman in her thirties with 10 or 12 children.

For this woman the motivation has to be motivation of her peer groups, of her community, of the people she associates. With whom she has to see how having a smaller family will fit in with her own aspirations and possibilities.

So, I think it takes a new approach. First, I think we have to put much more emphasis on reaching the half of this younger generation that is men. There are very few programs now that make any particular efforts to reach young men.

My own feeling, and I think AID is starting in this direction, is that subsidized social marketing programs where men can go to the tobacco store and buy condoms for a few cents apiece have been very effective. These programs have worked better than expected in very different social settings.

Second, employment-based programs should be expanded. As a wife, I would certainly speak to the point that husbands tend to pay more attention to what their bosses say than what their wives say.

Most men have some sort of employers, even if they only work in the village. The agricultural community in the village is often in a sense seen as an employer or employment community.

So, I think much more of an effort is needed to try to reach employers of one kind or another and convince them—you can't force them, you have to convince them—that it is in their economic interest as employers to encourage their employees perhaps through incentives, tax schemes, housing arrangements, village benefits, whatever, to have a smaller number of children.

Those programs where the government, itself, is an employer and sets certain standards for civil servants are far less dangerous, less objectionable politically, far easier to administer than universal, nationwide programs. I would think in the long run they might be far more useful than some of the proposals that have been offered for nationwide incentives and disincentives. Employer-based incentives and disincentives, services and education deserve much greater attention than have been given before, especially to reach the younger men.

To reach the younger women, door to door distribution, women's groups, peer groups, community-based distribution—again, a wide variety of services would be important.

So, my sixth recommendation would be to ask this committee to encourage AID to explore the political, legal, administrative, institutional, and programmatic constraints that can be expected to intervene in holding back and restraining these kinds of fairly innovative new programs.

I think AID might be asked to provide this Select Committee with a forward looking plan on exactly how it plans to reach this new, younger generation. In fact, one might even say if AID were to develop a 5- or a 15-year plan even to reach this younger generation, as HEW has been required to do for its domestic programs, that would be useful. You, Mr. Scheuer, were the author of that language in the domestic legislation. This might force more attention on the programmatic problems as this younger generation comes along.

My final point also goes to a matter that has been brought up by Mr. Zeidenstein, at least, and perhaps by the next witness also. The kind of programs that will be needed to deal with this sort of innovative experimental work are rarely initiated by national governments. They are almost always started by private organizations, tested out, shifted around, revised.

At one point, we thought that governments could do the job of fertility reduction. Just press the government policy button and somehow the services will reach out there in the field. Now I think we have all come to recognize the limitations of government and the need for private organizations to be out there in the field as well as trying all kinds of other things.

The United States has a better record than any government in encouraging private organizations to act in this field. We should be proud of that record. Yet private agencies have had trouble in recent years with AID.

What has tended to happen over time—and it probably happens with any agency over time—is that the initial impetus to bring private organizations into the field has become encrusted with the barnacles of bureaucratic practice. Some congressional requirements have probably been enforced overzealously within the Agency. The result is that the indigenous and international groups and those who get less than half of their funding from AID, find that they are often spending more than half of their financial officers' time entertaining AID auditors and answering questions:

Why didn't your people fly from Nigeria to Kenya on American Airlines; Why did you buy an operating table in Bangladesh that wasn't made in the United States?

There are a great variety of regulations going down to the fact that AID wants to send auditors down to every little clinic that is operated around the world to make sure that not a nickel is spent in any way that contravenes AID administrative requirements.

I think this is reaching the point now where it is self-defeating. It is self-defeating because it costs more money than it saves, but it is even more self-defeating because it is very much in our interest to strengthen the indigenous bodies and keep them from looking like creatures of American funding.

If we insist upon telling family planning associations exactly how they must all set up their books, they find themselves looking more and more like creatures of U.S. policy rather than independent groups.

So, my final recommendation to the committee would be to explore ways in which the committee could urge very strong support for the whole variety of private organizations working in the field, and also make recommendations—what Mr. Zeidenstein recommended was more grants, fewer contracts—for more general support, less project support, and a systematic review of what should be the role of the auditors, what should administrative requirements be that are realistic for overseas functioning of private voluntary agencies. I think everyone means well in this area, but so much time has passed. There have been many unnecessary barnacles encrusted in administrative regulations. It is time to start again on this with a cleaner slate.

So, with those specific recommendations I would like to thank you all once again for asking me to testify and in general for the leadership role which this committee is assuming in the population field. It is extremely useful.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you. I gather, Dr. Herz, that you would like to add a comment or did I misread a signal?

QUESTIONS AND REMARKS

Dr. HERZ. I promise to just take a minute, but I wanted to respond to a couple of things Dr. Piotrow mentioned.

In a random order, on the inflation question: We have looked at the question on the trend of population funds against other program funds in constant dollars, and I don't have constant dollar trends for the components of AID programs, but I am sure we would be glad to provide such a study to the committee. It would be very brief.

The point is, that inflation concerns not just the population component of development assistance, but all expenditures, and the interesting question is to look at the rate of increase in constant dollars of population as opposed to other sections of the program from the perspective of this committee.

I do have the current dollar figures and the rate of expansion is fairly substantial as I am sure you are all aware. And, just let me add that in developing our budget we do not fail to support good projects in the population area.

I go over the budget myself every year, and I know that we look very hard for any good population project. Now, we do have a fidu-

ciary responsibility to the taxpayer to see that funds are expended effectively and well, so that doesn't mean that AID is an open door on any type of project or program. We try as hard as we can to respond to good ideas in the population field that are consistent with our legislation.

Second, on the earmarking for women, the Agency's basic position as I understand it on earmarking is that it tends to inhibit flexibility. Our attitude toward the earmarking on women is just a part of that overall position.

We are, however, absolutely convinced that we must do everything possible to develop projects in the women in development area. The Women in Development office is part of my Bureau and I know hardworking—Mr. Scheuer.

Mr. SCHEUER. Would you provide us with a list of projects affecting the status of women that you already have funded. I think there is a widespread perception that you haven't really given that very much priority and that it is not reflected in your record.

Dr. HERZ. I would be glad to ask Ms. Arvonne Fraser to supply that if that would fill your need.

On the question of clinics and whether they should be required to include sterilization: There are, as several people have noted, different types of clinics suitable for different circumstances. In general, these broadbrush requirements are difficult to deal with in the field. A clinic may be a nice, brick building suitable for providing sterilization and any number of other services. It may also be a tent; it may also be just a backroom in someone's small house. I think our view would be that we try very hard to furnish a variety of services and not to restrict in any sense what those services might be except for obeying the provisions of our legislation.

We wouldn't necessarily want to insist that every clinic and every village contain any particular type of service, whether it is sterilization or, say measles vaccines which have to be stored at a cool temperature. There are practical problems in implementing broadbrush requirements of that sort.

On the question of Taiwan and Korea versus Mexico and Brazil, I am very glad to see other members of the panel sharing our view that if you look at Taiwan, Korea and Colombia, where birthrates are coming down, you do tend to see active efforts on the development side. Conversely, when you look at Brazil, Bangladesh or other countries which perhaps have had less of a decline in fertility, you also often see less progress on the development front.

So, it is dangerous to ascribe fertility changes either to just family planning services or just the development activities. It really is a question of both.

Mr. SCHEUER. Isn't it also a question of the kind of development?

Dr. HERZ. Of course.

Mr. SCHEUER. We've heard extensive testimony on that this morning.

Dr. HERZ. That is true. As to the administrative burdens imposed by our responsibility to account for expenditures of funds in certain ways and sometimes in order to reflect our legislative restrictions, these burdens can be substantial. It can be hard for people with

scarce time to both develop imaginative programs and projects and to comply with all of the administrative burdens that we now bear.

I think it is extremely useful for the committee to understand that this is a serious problem in an agency which doesn't have that much staff to deal with these questions.

The last point is on the language and the location within the bill of section 104(d). We are very happy with the language of section 104(d). We think it is workable language. It is welcome language; it is usable language. Rather than tinker with the language now, we want to get on with the job of implementing the sense of this initiative which we share with all of you.

Mr. SCHEUER. Now, wait a minute. I have been abroad and I have found that there is very little attention being paid to that language. At least, in the fall of 1976, when I visited six African countries, that language, as a practical matter, did not exist. Now, it may have been that it was only a few months after the passage. But, I really do think you have a question as to how to make that language a reality.

Dr. HERZ. Sure.

Mr. SCHEUER. And, it is not enough to simply say:

Well, we like the language. We'll put it in, but where we don't like it, in the sense of an administrative burden, we are not going to send out signals to our development AID offices that we mean what we say.

Dr. HERZ. Oh, I see. I didn't mean the administrative discussion to go to the question of 104(d). On that, where you are talking about putting a policy into practice whether it is 104(d) or the women in development language, then the question is whether to require a population impact statement for each project or to choose a more selective, concentrated and focused route.

I am not sure there is ever a right answer. It depends. Our feeling has been that because certain aspects of development are more closely related to fertility, it made sense to focus on those as a start. For example, we focused on all the efforts to improve opportunities for women—the primary education programs, seeing that girls are included, training programs for women, employment programs for women, and so on.

There were certain projects which were perhaps more tenuously related to fertility, so rather than ask people on those to spend a lot of time discussing how they were only tenuously related to fertility—I mean, there aren't that many of us in this, you know. We would rather focus more on getting the education people to understand that little girls' education matters to their subsequent fertility. It was that kind of a decision.

There is a great concern on the part of some people who are interested in the population issue that 104(d) is in some sense a scheme for diverting funds away from family planning services to broader development issues.

I think it is important to raise this issue, frankly, with the committee so that you see what we are trying to do is, indeed, the opposite. We're trying to bring the development programs in other sectors—in agriculture, education, and health—to bear on fertility by pointing out to these people that, as the posters say, "it is your baby,

too." What you do in education influences parent's views on how many children they want to have, and so on. So, it is really an effort to convince people who are not dealing with family planning that their own contributions to development will, in turn, influence fertility. The amount of population funds that can be attributed to 104(d) is really very small and modest, but it has proved useful as a way of demonstrating to OMB and indeed to the Congress that we are taking this broader view toward population.

In short, our willingness to address the so-called demand side of the problem as well as the supply side of the problem has enabled us, I believe, to convince the Congress and others that our population program as a whole deserved larger funding. So, to make a long story short, it helped increase the resources to address the supply side as well as the so-called demand side of the question. Thank you very much.

Mr. SIMON. Dr. Piotrow, you suggested greater assistance to private organizations. I think you were here when we had the breakdown of how the population funds were spent. I was, frankly, surprised at the extent of assistance to private organizations. How do you suggest that shift be made? In other words, universities get about 13 percent, direct assistance to countries gets 21 percent, U.N. gets 21 percent. Where do we cut back if we are going to provide greater assistance to private organizations?

Dr. PIOTROW. What is happening is that, more and more of the assistance to governments is coming from the United Nations Fund for Population Activities. Sometimes UNFPA is in a better position to influence these governments to do things that they might be a little bit more reluctant to do if it were at the request of the U.S. Government.

The UNFPA now has some 50 other donors contributing to it in addition to the United States. It is very much in the interest of the United States to continue and increase U.S. contributions to the U.N. and to persuade other governments to increase their contributions.

The unique role of AID which other governments are not carrying out as much is the seed money for the private organizations. We have had more problems with many of our bilateral programs than we have when we have brought in the UNFPA. They work closely with the World Bank. There has been less trouble in certain key countries with UNFPA than when AID has been the principal or single donor for population programs in these countries.

The negotiations and the relationships between the countries have been difficult. Pakistan is an obvious example and now family planning has been cut back because of a nuclear reactor. The Philippines could well be another.

So, I think over the long term as funding for the multilateral programs increases, the unique role of AID and of our bilateral programs is going to continue gradually to be with the private innovative agencies, starting the grass roots efforts that will then be picked up by the LDC governments, World Bank programs, and UNFPA programs.

The history of U.S. bilateral AID relationships is not a happy one in many cases. The reasons often have nothing to do with population. Pakistan has problems of nuclear reactors. But we often run into

problems on the bilateral side. Therefore, I would say that over the long run the record with the private organizations may be the particular and unique contribution that our AID program makes.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Erlenborn.

Mr. ERLBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Piotrow, I think we probably all would agree that family planning activities and facilities plus socioeconomic growth must go hand in hand. But you seem to feel the emphasis should be put on the former rather than the latter.

I just wonder if our experience proves that that is true, if we were to separate the two. It seems as though experience shows that where there has been socioeconomic improvement without formal active family planning programs, the means to achieve family planning seems to be found by the couples involved when they have the proper motivation.

On the other hand, all of the dispensing of the means for family planning without any motivation seems to give us little or no results at all.

It seems to me the socioeconomic improvement from my observation is much more important because that gives motivation. Without motivation, people don't have a positive manner.

Dr. PIOTROW. Well, I would break it down two ways. I would say that there is some question about the studies that have tried specifically to isolate these factors. You are really measuring apples and oranges, but to the extent that you try to do it, they show about a 50 percent effect with the edge often slightly on the side of family planning programs.

When you look at it from a program point of view at the allocation of funds, what you are seeing is that the roughly 2 to 5 percent of development assistance that goes into population and family planning specifically is achieving 50 percent of the decline, and the 95 to 97 percent that goes into economic development is achieving the other half.

I think there is no question as to where you are getting the most cost-effective dollars, if fertility reduction is the objective. Now, don't misunderstand me. I am not saying that you shouldn't spend the money on the socio-economic development because you are doing this not just because it reduces fertility, but you are doing it because it is good in itself. It is something that should be done.

But, when you look at that sort of breakdown between results and dollars invested, I think that then you have to consider very hard the marginal utility of the extra dollar you add and where it will be greatest. Secondly, when you look at the figures from something like the World Fertility Survey, you see what a high proportion of the women want services now. Still you go out in the field, and you see that the clinic or whatever is 15 miles away. The people have to take a long bus ride. The temperatures in those countries are very warm and uncomfortable indeed for a good part of the year. These village women have never seen a doctor before and they don't trust a male doctor any way. Often they have no idea what is going to happen to them. The context in which many clinics now serve women is a pretty frightening experience.

I think one can not help but feel that, particularly on the part of the women, there is a very great unmet need for convenient, sympathetic services. I would think from our point of view and from the point of view of the basic human right to have the services and information, we should put our emphasis there.

Our priority within the specific population program would be providing the services and means of education to satisfy those who right now want to use them, just as we do in the United States. We don't put a lot of money in running around in various areas motivating people to have fewer children.

We put our emphasis on serving those who are already motivated. This is still appropriate for the foreign countries.

Mr. ERLBORN. I really don't think you can compare the United States with the developing countries: the United States has social security, Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps and all of the other things we have that give people the security of knowing that their basic needs will be taken care of by society. You can't compare that with an agrarian subsistence farming backward community. You can give them all the family planning devices and information in the world, but it pays them to have children to work the farm and provides them with security in their old age. They are not going to change, in my opinion.

Dr. PIOTROW. I question how much a woman whose life may depend on whether she avoids getting pregnant again and who doesn't know where her next meal is coming from, is really thinking 10 years ahead as to who will support her in her old age.

Mr. ERLBORN. You are talking about motivation again.

Dr. PIOTROW. I've talked to these women out there. This planning far ahead to who will look after you in your old age may be a feeling in the back of people's minds, but if you say to a woman at any specific moment, "Do you want to be pregnant right now? Do you want to have another child right this minute?," the answer is usually "No!" They all already have children now. It is not that you are starting from no children. They have the children now and so the question really is, "Do you want the next child?"

I think that is where the figures from the World Fertility Survey are very high.

Mr. ERLBORN. Well, I don't want to belabor the point, but I think one of the other witnesses this morning made the point that on the economic side it pays to have children in those varying economies. It isn't the question of feeding that extra mouth. I have forgotten exactly how it was put, but usually feeding that extra mouth comes at a time when the mother and father are fairly young and better able to furnish the food. The need for their support in future years is imperative. Or, if the survival rate of the children they have—the kind of health services that may be available and all of these other—

Dr. PIOTROW. But, look at the mother's survival rate, too. The maternal mortality rate in those countries where infant mortality is high, is also very high. The mother is risking her life to have that child. From the women that I have talked with that is at least as big a concern as who will support them 20 years from now, if they live that long.

Mr. ERLNBORN. I believe one of the other witnesses, Mr. Grant, wants to comment.

Mr. GRANT. There is always a problem when one has to make the priority choices because then one begins to have to get into this kind of discussion. When one looks at the other side of it, 15.6 million children 4 years and under died in 1975, and of that 15.6 million 15.1 million died in the developing countries. The great majority of these deaths were associated with malnutrition and related circumstances.

It is very clear that as long as you have that kind of death rate among infants and small children, people are going to have more children. The answer that the House International Relations Committee is coming up with in the current bill involves taking a comprehensive look at how to overcome the worst aspects of absolute poverty by the end of the century.

What does it take to do this kind of job cooperatively with other donors, with the host Governments, using all the different tools that have been talked about this morning, getting rid of some of the institutional barriers? The financial cost really isn't that impossibly high.

At Overseas Development Council we try to look at the total picture and at the kind of program that would overcome the worst aspects of absolute poverty by the year 2000, including a doubling of food production. Done right, we probably would get back several dollars for every dollar we invest: successfully overcoming poverty in rural areas would require a major increase in food production in those areas because that is how people are employed.

Current ODC projections indicate that the cost of food production in the United States will probably double in the next 10 years and double again in the 10 years after that. We would have to ship so much food abroad that it would exceed our capacity to produce food except at much higher cost levels.

So, just in terms of our own inflation, we don't want to get that far into supplying those countries. There is a total picture here, and if one looks at the total picture, I think that the real cost of our putting in an extra several billion dollars a year to do our part in overcoming the worst aspects of absolute poverty by the end of the century will be amply repaid. The other payoffs in association with the population would be so great that this then would allow significantly more funding for the family planning programs that Dr. Piotrow was talking about as well as for getting at the socioeconomic side.

That is why I hope this committee will continue to take a comprehensive approach to the population problem. I think we all have an agreement that if what we are seeking is a world that is going to stabilize at less than 11 or 12 billion it is going to take this kind of a total approach to do it. Thank you.

Mr. SCHEUER. I think, particularly when you consider the total environment in which we are making these decisions, which includes unrelated demands, there is going to be an accelerated demand for a New International Economic Order.

Mr. ERLNBORN. One last question because we have to go and answer the bells, but I notice you do get to the question of motivation more positively when you talk about the status of women and you endorse

the allocation of \$10 million of U.S. economic assistance funds to develop women into income generating activities. This is sort of an irreverent observation. I wonder if that will survive if ERA is ratified.

Dr. PIOTROW. I think that would probably strengthen the chances for it.

Mr. ERLNBORN. I doubt it. It is discriminating on the basis of sex.

Dr. PIOTROW. I would add with respect to that though that I am really not advocating improving the status of women simply in order to reduce fertility anymore than I would advocate other socioeconomic measures simply to reduce fertility.

I think we do have to keep the means and ends clear in our own minds. Improving the status of women as well as other aspects of socioeconomic development are goods in themselves, I would argue, not merely means to encourage fertility reduction.

Mr. ERLNBORN. We tend to get back to the original observation that none of these things do operate in a vacuum. They all proceed together. It is a question of where we put our emphasis and, when we have a lack of sufficient resources to do everything we want, we have to decide priorities. Thank you.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Zeidenstein had a question.

Mr. ZEIDENSTEIN. It was a comment, Mr. Chairman, that was engendered by some of the conversation that just preceded the adjournment, growing out of some of Dr. Piotrow's testimony.

This is with reference to the marginal dollar invested in family planning programs. It is my perception these days that in fact there are no government sponsored family planning programs around the world that pass muster from the quality point of view that are going begging for funding.

Actually, the funds available from U.S. AID and UNFPA, together, probably exceed the number of official family planning programs available to absorb those funds. Where there is, however, an important shortage is again among the independent organizations—the organizations that are the ones who attempt to innovate, attempt to undertake applied action research kinds of projects.

For the reasons mentioned earlier today, those sorts of organizations are hurting for funds. The kind of innovation that we are talking about lends itself very poorly to project funding, especially in response to RFP's.

Mr. SCHEUER. Yes, indeed. Mr. Grant?

Mr. GRANT. Many people have been excited by the establishment of this Select Committee and it seemed to offer an opportunity for looking at this problem in the whole.

The ultimate objective we are looking for is how to achieve population stabilization in the world at a level 2 or 3 billion below that which is now likely. McNamara laid out a scenario last spring which you may remember that conceivably could lead to stabilization at 8 billion instead of the 11 billion that the World Bank says is likely.

It would be of great value if this committee could in some way express its views on whether or not the United States as a government ought to come up with some kind of an assessment as to what it would take for the world population to stabilize at close to the 8 to 9 billion level instead of at the 11 to 12 billion level.

Mr. SCHEUER. What kind of funds would it take?

Mr. GRANT. We would have to take a holistic approach, though we have been talking only about parts of it now. It is very clear to me from my own observation, and I think you sense this, that the kind of objective the House International Relations Committee is talking about is a major cooperative effort aimed at overcoming the worst aspects of poverty around the year 2000. If that kind of a program were to go through in association with a continued vigorous expansion of family planning funding, and attention to women, world stabilization at somewhere in the 8 to 9 billion level might well be very possible.

There will be a critical debate on the floor in the next month or 6 weeks as to whether that House provision, (a) and (c), stays in. It is really a mandate to the President to explore this whole issue of the year 2000 goal.

I myself think this could be a tremendous step forward. So if there is anything this committee could do both to ask the U.S. Government to provide a holistic response to what it is that would give us stabilization closer to the 8 or 9 billion level in the next century rather than the 11 or 12, and to support the House International Relations Committee pioneering move on this year 2000 exploratory goal, this could save a whole year.

This will compel the U.S. Government to move at the right time. The world community is now exploring this, but somehow the United States has been dragging its feet on the discussions of these kinds of goals. A little push from here—not out of hostility—would be of great value. I'm sure that President Carter, himself, if he focused on this, would say that it is well worth exploring. On the other hand, nothing has pushed this up to his attention.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, I couldn't agree with you more. As I have said, there are these insistent demands for a new world international order that are going to require, even if we meet them in small degrees, hundreds of billions of dollars of income transfers over the coming decades, and it seems to me that this is a far more acceptable way to do it.

It is far more cost effective and it is going to produce results with the rural poor all over the world. It seems to me that if we could factor some of Luke Lee's thoughts into the process, we could go the Sri Lanka route rather than the Venezuela route.

There are a number of us who are very skeptical of the way our dollars are not producing tangible results for the rural poor around the world. We don't think the system is working all that well.

Mr. GRANT. Sir, what the people don't quite recognize is that if we take this kind of timely initiative, it eases a variety of pressures. As we all saw from the oil price rise, the dislocation from those big, abrupt transfers can be very inflationary and ultimately affect millions of jobs in the industrial countries. Something generally breaks while waiting for the confrontation to get severe. That approach is much more expensive than taking some timely steps where you kill several birds with one stone.

Mr. SCHEUER. Dr. Piotrow, let me express our appreciation to you for your support and counsel along the way. I agree with you, from my own visits to the developing world, we are not providing sufficient

services for the women who do not need motivation or indoctrination. They know what they want in order to control their fertility. They know they have had enough children. It seems to me, that they are the target group which would be the easiest and cheapest to reach.

Having said that, I have also read pervasive criticism around the world of the way that our AID program functions. Many also criticize what they call "contraceptive inundation" because they find it personally, morally and politically offensive; they argue that it puts us in the posture of not really caring about the health of the children or the mothers, the standards of living or the quality of life, but just wanting to control population for the convenience of the West.

This is the posture that we are in, as perceived by many people around the world, not only in those developing countries but also by our own AID population people. Many of them feel that this perception of our mind set that we simply want to sprinkle the developing world with contraceptives of all sizes, shapes, and descriptions, has made the introduction of the concept of family planning much more objectionable.

This is a fact of life, just as I perceive the willingness of a large number of women to adopt rational fertility practices as another fact of life.

This perception that we are simply interested in inundating the developing world with contraceptives, apart from any concern for health, welfare, and the quality of life, in the opinion of many people is hurting our image and impeding the acceptance of rational family planning practices. Do you want to react to that?

Dr. PROTROW. Well, I think you have to recognize that this is a massive international program. It has been a surprisingly effective program in many areas and it is a field in which there is a great deal of controversy. I think it would have been absolutely incredible to have thought that such a program could have gotten anywhere near as far as it has without being controversial one way or another.

Mr. SCHEUER. I don't think family planning is controversial in the developing world. I really don't. I think the controversy period is more or less behind us. I think that family planning, as a concept, if integrated with general and maternal and child health concerns, has achieved acceptance.

I have already mentioned that it was standard for me, during my travels in the developing world, to be met by one of the young Foreign Service officers at the airport. He would drive me to the Embassy and tell me how sensitive the whole family planning issue is. Then the Ambassador would tell me how terribly sensitive and explosive an issue it was. Fifteen minutes later, I would be with the health or education minister, and he would be literally pleading for help and resources with which to plan programs and carry on an evaluation of the programs. They would request gas-fired refrigerators, gas-fired stoves to sterilize needles, baby scales, and adult scales. It is sheer nonsense to believe that the concept of family planning in an appropriate setting is controversial.

I think that, in the perception of a lot of people, the emphasis on what they described as "contraceptive inundation" has politicized family planning and has made it a sensitive and explosive issue. A

little bit more delicate and thoughtful handling of the matter and an attempt to include it in a health program would have depoliticized and desensitized it.

To the extent the family planning is sensitive, I think, it is largely due to the perception that all we want to do is sprinkle a multi-colored condom over the developing world.

Dr. PIOTROW. I would say I disagree with you very much. Here in this country we have taken the abortion issue and buried it in the middle of a great big huge health program. Boy, is it controversial. It is right in the middle of the maternal and child health program and it is still a very controversial issue.

Mr. SCHEUER. But its focus there isn't perceived as controversial.

Dr. PIOTROW. No, it's not that different because it goes to the motivation of women to exercise their rights to have the size family they want.

Mr. SCHEUER. I don't think there is any controversy about that, but it is the way it has been packaged—the perception of our motives—that has politicized something that shouldn't be politicized.

Dr. PIOTROW. Anything that the United States does on a visible scale in the world is going to be to some degree controversial. Something that affects the status of women the way this does, that goes to religious beliefs in as many societies as it does is going to be controversial.

The only way it wouldn't have been controversial is if it had been an ineffective program that had made no difference at all. I think we have to learn to live with a little bit of controversy.

Mr. SCHEUER. Yes, but we don't have to create the controversy. We don't have to create the resentment, alienation, and bitterness that come from the worst—case presentation that many people feel we have placed these programs in. In the countries where we have sponsored family planning as an element in maternal-child health programs, it is not controversial.

Personally, I believe we have long since passed the point where family planning in an acceptable context is controversial, and I believe, and there are many other people who agree with me, that the form and fashion in which we have tried to merchandise contraceptive devices without linkages to other concerns, has politicized and sensitized something that should not have been politicized.

Do you want to react further?

Dr. PIOTROW. Well, just briefly. I think I still do disagree with you. I think that something like this is always going to be controversial. We have helped to create the population problem because we did put the money into the health programs first and as a result death rates did go down.

I would rather see the United States be controversial because we provided too many contraceptives than because we tried to persuade people to do things that were not in their own best interest.

If there are a few extra contraceptives floating around the world and we are criticized for it, I think we are lucky for avoiding far greater controversies in this field.

Mr. SCHEUER. We obviously have a sharp difference of opinion here. I respect your professionalism and your knowledge, but I do disagree with you. Are you saying in effect that the AID program has

been diplomatic and sensitive to local perceptions in the way that it has functioned?

Dr. PIOTROW. In some areas it has been and in some areas there have been problems, but this has been true with other AID programs, too, and with other kinds of development and with U.S. domestic family planning programs also.

This is not an area that lends itself to making progress without conflict, as I think the present U.S. situation suggests.

Mr. SCHEUER. OK, I think our differences remain but I suppose we can disagree without being disagreeable.

Now we will hear from the last witness, Ms. Karen Smith, who is a private consultant in Mount Washington, Mass. Ms. Smith will discuss "Women's Organizations, Family Planning and Development in Indonesia."

[The material referred to follows:]

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ASKED OF DR. PIOTROW BY THE CHAIRMAN

Question 1: If you were responsible for deciding AID's allocation of funds, how would you change those priorities, if at all?

Answer 1: The General Accounting Office Report is not the usual financial or program evaluation but rather an effort to explore the hypothesis that development assistance can be specifically structured to influence reductions in family size. The report notes the comments of AID officials "that the state of knowledge about fertility determinants does not provide much in the way of useful guidance at country-specific and project-specific levels." The report notes that opinions at AID missions differed "on how and the extent to which development projects affect fertility and on the measures that should be taken to obtain fertility impact information related to development projects." In short, those in the field and most closely aware of the problems have serious questions about the reliability and concrete policy relevance of the hypothesis. Thus the report essentially recommends research to determine whether the original hypothesis is true, under what country-specific conditions it might be applied, and how.

Under these circumstances, it would appear to be an interesting academic exercise and an excellent subject for many country-specific and project-specific PhD dissertations to review the impact of various interventions on fertility, but it would not appear to be a cost-effective activity for AID to become deeply involved in these studies until more basic knowledge has been developed.

The figures cited by GAO for expenditures do not correspond with the published AID figures for the period 1965-1975. The actual AID expenditure figures are given below.

Percentage of AID population funding in specific fields, 1965-75

	<i>Percent</i>
Demographic data.....	8
Policy and social research science.....	6
Research on better means of fertility control.....	9
Subtotal.....	23
Information.....	11
Family planning services and supplies.....	45
Subtotal.....	56
Adequate manpower and institution building.....	16
Operating expenses.....	5

These figures suggest that 23 percent of AID funds in the period 1965-1975 were spent on research of one kind or another and probably more since much of the manpower and institution building funding was used to strengthen University programs. Overall this seems to be a high proportion for research and the 56 percent on services (including information) would be low in relation to pro-

gram needs. It is not unreasonable in general, however, to commence a program with emphasis on research, and gradually to shift more and more funding to services as research demonstrates the best ways to deliver different services to meet different needs. This should be done over the next several years.

I believe that at present an overall breakdown of AID funding as indicated below would be reasonable.

Family planning services-----	60
Demographic data-----	8
Policy and social science research-----	7
Information-----	10
Institutional development and training-----	15

With respect to policy and social science research and research on the determinants of fertility, AID initiated and funded the World Fertility Survey, an authoritative survey and analysis of contraceptive knowledge, attitude, and practice in developing countries. These findings can be of immense and immediate value in program development. Therefore I would give first priority to funding a comprehensive analysis of the program and policy implications of these internationally recognized data that link fertility with a great number of socio-economic, demographic, geographic, and programmatic variables that have been identified as determinants of fertility. For example, the fact that about half of the fertile women age 15-45 desire no more children has immediate program implications. Combined with the additional data on the number of those who have no adequate information and access to services in specific countries and other socio-economic data, this body of data was designed originally to answer some of the questions about determinants of fertility. Its full implications should be explored as rapidly as possible before extensive research is done on many different (and non-comparable) country-specific studies.

Question 2: Do you believe the reorganization of AID will effectively integrate population and development assistance?

Answer 2: There are three basic elements in the AID reorganization: (1) placing the Population, Health, Education and Training Offices in a single bureau; (2) removing from the Population Office to the geographic bureaus in Washington authority over the bilateral assistance programs; and (3) creating a unified personnel system.

The first shift, placing population, health, and education programs in the same bureau, is a useful move and, if properly implemented, could encourage useful cooperation. Unfortunately, the health and education offices have long been weak and understaffed. Because of their recent history of serving in a purely advisory function, it is not clear that they will be able in practice to pull their share of the load in designing strong integrated programs. Strengthening these functional offices should now have a higher priority.

The second element, removing Washington authority over government-to-government programs from the Population Office to the geographic bureaus (and in bureaucratic terms, not even allowing the Office of Population to "clear off" on country programs), will not per se increase or decrease the integration of population and development programs. What it will do is essentially give more influence and authority to those with fewer professional qualifications in the population field, to area specialists, development generalists, and those who would tend to give more emphasis to political, country-specific issues. This move within AID/Washington away from "professionalizing" the issues and toward "regionalizing" or "politicizing" them could result in a general playing down of population programs. The more politically oriented, geographic specialists tend to emphasize low profile approaches; program effectiveness may well be sacrificed to an overly cautious perception of political acceptability. Thus integration may become a code word for weaker population programs.

Rather than just reshuffling chairs in Washington, a more effective way to decentralize and link relevant programs would be to increase the number of population officers overseas. This number has declined from 79 in 1972 to about 35 at present. To achieve good country-programming, top priority should go to recruiting a sufficient number of experienced professional population officers.¹ Playing musical chairs in Washington is no substitute for top quality personnel and no guarantee of effectively linked programs in the field.

¹ A recent regional bureau recruitment listing for an Asian population officer requires four years of college training in *physical therapy* as a prerequisite, surely an odd qualification for a professional population officer.

The third element, a unified personnel system, is required by H.R. 12222, but the implications are unclear. AID's greatest personnel weakness at present is the limited number of qualified experts, now somewhat slightly referred to as "technicians." Only 15% of present agency personnel are actually subject specialists in a specific area of development where AID hopes to make an impact. The rest are administrators, support staff, generalists, auditors, etc. A high proportion of the real experts are in the GS rather than FS schedules. It is hard to see how a unified structure will attract more qualified "technicians" if it tends to emphasize overseas experience and willingness to live extended periods overseas over technical qualifications. It will also make it difficult for married women, or men who are married to women who want professional careers, to serve in AID. While there is great need for more flexibility now between Washington and field jobs, there is also danger that certain kinds of unified personnel systems would weaken rather than enhance AID's ability to grapple with the difficult substantive questions of development, whether "integrated" or otherwise.

Question 3: What are the relative merits of providing population assistance to developing countries via government agencies (i.e., direct bilateral assistance) in comparison to private, non-governmental avenue (e.g., IPPF, FPIA, IAVS, etc.)?

Answer 3: It was once thought that the goal of private voluntary agencies was to persuade governments to assume national responsibility for extensive family planning and population efforts and that governments alone had the resources and capacity to reduce population growth. As more experience is gained with government programs, however, it has become increasingly clear that even government cannot, under most circumstances, provide solutions to the problem of rapid population growth without the help and support of private voluntary organizations.

Government programs have the advantage of:

- (1) Being able to reach large numbers of people;
- (2) Being able to reach into rural areas;
- (3) Commanding greater personnel and money resources; and
- (4) Being able to utilize the authority of the State to support responsible family planning or other specific population programs.

On the other hand, government programs have the disadvantages of:

- (1) Requiring strong public leadership from the top;
- (2) Being vulnerable to changes in government or political leadership that can substantially weaken on-going programs;
- (3) Tending to create a costly extensive bureaucracy with inadequate supervision, commitment, and training among field employees.
- (4) Resisting rather than promoting new approaches, approaches such as use of paramedical personnel, community-based distribution, and extensive voluntary surgical sterilization services.

Private organizations were, of course, the first to enter the politically controversial field of population/family planning. They have the advantages of:

- (1) Being flexible, with the capacity to adapt to local situations;
- (2) Being sufficiently small that administrative problems and "red tape" associated with larger programs can be more easily solved or avoided;
- (3) Possessing, at least at the time of founding, dedicated, indigenous leadership;
- (4) Being willing to undertake new, experimental projects even at the risk of failure, projects which, if successful, can then become precursors of more extensive national programs, and
- (5) Being insulated from political changes and politically motivated attacks to some extent.

The main disadvantages of private organization are that they:

- (1) Do not have the clout, prestige, or resources of government;
- (2) Cannot provide nationwide services and have particular difficulty systematically reaching into the rural areas where 80% of developing country populations live.

In general, one would expect that population assistance programs would begin by supporting private agencies with about 2/3 of available funds and move increasingly toward support of governmental programs. To some extent this has happened with the AID program but, in addition to the disadvantages of government programs and the continued advantages of private programs (as listed above), there are several other reasons why the AID program has continued

to support private voluntary organizations at a high level. The reasons are:

(1) Some governments are reluctant to accept U.S. assistance directly in a controversial field such as population.

(2) The United Nations Fund for Population Activities has grown to have a budget of approximately \$100 million and has replaced the U.S. as the principal source of support for government programs. It receives funds directly from over 50 governments.

(3) The World Bank has also supported a number of population/family planning programs on a long-term basis, therefore also reducing the need for large components of U.S. bilateral programs.

(4) AID's reluctance to pay local currency program costs, such as salaries of local field workers, constitutes a major barrier to meaningful government-to-government assistance. The foreign exchange costs which the U.S. government can pay are generally related to U.S. commodities and U.S. technical experts.

Under these circumstances, it makes sense for AID to continue doing that which it has so far done best, i.e. to provide contraceptive supplies and commodities to governments and strong support to the private voluntary agencies that are building grassroots and national support within each country for the programs that governments will eventually support. It is important to provide adequate resources to private voluntary groups to continue their innovative and experimental work and, once their political successes can be demonstrated, to persuade governments to extend and improve the existing national efforts. There is no absolutely correct proportion for government vs. private assistance for the world as a whole since this proportion would vary greatly depending on the specific country, the extent of progress to date, and the willingness or unwillingness of specific governments or private voluntary agencies to undertake measures needed at any given time.

STATEMENT OF MS. KAREN SMITH, PRIVATE CONSULTANT, MOUNT WASHINGTON, MASS.

[Prepared Statement in Appendix on p. 758.]

Ms. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for this opportunity to be here today. I had, as I said in my written testimony, the pleasure of working with women's organizations in Asia for 6 years. The majority of that time I was in Indonesia.

I was aware in the course of that time that I was learning an immense number of things by just being there and having those people share their experiences with me. I was very much disturbed by the fact that I had no way to share that experience with other people. You have helped me solve that problem by giving me an opportunity to come here today and tell you about that experience and some of the impressions I gained from it.

Mr. SCHEUER. We're happy to have you. We appreciate your patience and forbearance in waiting until this late hour.

Ms. SMITH. I know that you have had the written testimony. I do not want to take any time to read it. I'd like to summarize very briefly if I could some of those points. I would also like to comment on one previous question which has been discussed a number of times.

My work in Indonesia was primarily with nongovernmental women's organizations that were spread throughout the country. This gave me an opportunity to travel and see many parts of the country, and to see how the women's organizations were active.

What I would like to stress is that the women of Indonesia, as I saw them, do not fit the stereotypical view of women in the developing nations or third world.

The women of Indonesia are not helpless; they are not oppressed; they are not docile; they are not under the control of their men. They

have influence and power to a considerable extent both in the home and in society. They do work very hard, and American visitors and other foreign visitors often tend to equate that work with oppression, because we think that people shouldn't have to work too hard.

But, in fact, it is not oppression; it is simply that everybody is working hard and the women are sharing the hard life with their men.

The operative word in Indonesia really is "sharing." The slogan of many of the women's organizations in the last several years has been "Partners in Development," and there has been a history of activity on the part of the women's organizations both on issues specifically related to women—maternal and child health, legal status of women, and things of this sort—and on areas of broad interest—political issues, issues of nationalism, issues of general development.

So, the women in Indonesia have a very good position in many, many ways.

In summarizing what I said for the recommendations I was making in my written testimony, I would say that the aim should be to discover a way to release the energy of those people and enable them to be more effective. Assistance must be made more available to these people in terms of it being more responsive, more accessible, more appropriate in scale, and based more on contact with people and less on simply paper processing.

When I said more responsive I meant not just that it is in the spirit of what people want, but literally responding to what people ask for. I was enormously impressed by the degree to which the women in Indonesia knew what their community's problems were, and knew what approaches people would accept. They would be willing to work hard to solve some of those problems if somebody could put modest resources in their hands to carry out these programs. That is what I mean by responsive.

By accessible I simply mean not too hard to get at. There must not be too many bureaucratic steps; it must not be too far away from where they are; there must not be too many forms to fill out, et cetera.

When I say appropriate in scale, I am referring to the general international assistance programs. In general, assistance both from the United States and from the multi-national funding sources is in sums of money which are of staggering proportions if one is concerned with community organizations.

Small groups consisting of the people we want to benefit from these funds simply can't handle hundreds of thousands of dollars. The result is either a waste of money or an imposition of a program which may survive as long as the money is available. The latter is not, in fact, based on what the people can handle and, therefore, when the assistance is gone the program will fizzle.

The other aspect of scale which is important is the issue which has been raised several times by other people, and I think by yourself as well: The problem of how the project looks to the people who are involved. If the scale of outside assistance becomes too large, it no longer appears to be their program. It appears to be somebody else's. Interest falls off, commitment to work falls off, effectiveness falls and ultimately the program is likely to be less effective.

The fourth thing that I have said is that assistance must be based more on contact with people rather than paper processing. This is a fairly straightforward thing: People who have assistance to give must spend more time talking with people who need assistance.

If I were going to coin a phrase to describe the posture that I would like to see in American assistance, I would encourage a posture of aggressive availability, not aggressive programing and not passive availability.

Passive availability isn't enough. You have to go out and meet people and talk with them and say, "We are interested. We do care. We want to know what you have in mind." So I would like to see a pattern of aggressive availability particularly to help deal with this problem which you have raised a number of times yourself: These are issues which are sensitive, and we care to see them work and we know local people care to see them work, but somehow every time we try to talk about them in full voice everybody begins to get shy and uncomfortable.

If there is this sense of "we are available; we can help if you want it," it returns the sense of control to the people who are carrying out the program. This is not promoted in my experience by papers, by descriptions of positions or programs. It is promoted by people meeting other people and talking about it. I came to the hearings on Tuesday and Wednesday in order to hear what other people were saying—they have been dealing with high level important, broad issues. My concern is how to get from that level to the level of the people whom we are trying to benefit. On the basis of this Indonesian experience and some experiences in other parts of Asia, it is my feeling that in many cases citizens groups—men's groups, women's groups, combined groups—are the missing link in what I would call a development chain.

Yesterday a witness made reference to the food chain. I am talking about the development chain. I am thinking of the progression from philosophy to policy, to program, to projects, and finally to the person. Very often, we get so tied in knots trying to work on the philosophy and the policy and programs that we never make it down those last couple of steps to be sure that in fact things will go to the people.

People often raise the question: "We spent all those millions of dollars. Why didn't our development assistance have more impact?" This is a very legitimate concern for you as Members of Congress and for the taxpayer.

I think part of the answer is because very often that last step is overlooked. Now, one of the reasons it is overlooked is because that takes time and it takes people power. I suspect that in practice what that means in terms of budgets is that it appears to use more money in administrative ways than one likes to see. I don't know how to resolve that dilemma, but it stated a very serious concern of mine from my experience in the field.

Mr. SCHEUER. The kind of activity you are talking about shouldn't be looked upon as a sort of administrative, supervising, paper-shuffling element. It is a substantive part of the project.

Ms. SMITH. I salute your wisdom. I agree. If that vision can somehow be put into legislation which controls AID and which has influ-

ence on our participation in other international assistance agencies, I think that would be an enormous benefit. It is not administrative overhead; it is in fact what makes the program work.

Mr. SCHEUER. I think it is probably true that if you look around the developing world and find the countries where family planning programs have worked—and Indonesia is a perfectly good example—one of the indispensable elements is some kind of community organization, some kind of structure where people can be reached with ideas and concepts of how life can be made better for them.

One of the problems in Africa, in particular, which was described to me again and again, is that people live in such an isolated fashion. A dozen or two families live in their dozen or two huts out in the bush, totally separated from the rest of the world. There is really no contact, even between villages, much less between a village and some central government. The kind of structure you have in Indonesia is probably the element that has made it possible to have such a high acceptance rate. People are socialized in community organizations where they have contact and are reached because their society is organized to reach everybody at the grassroots level.

Ms. SMITH. Well, I agree with you that that is very important and it is not a frill; it is an essential thing. I think that it gets lost in the shuffle in areas where it is perhaps not as easy to see the importance of that as it is in a place like Indonesia.

Mr. SCHEUER. The administration is not only essential, but it is also a substantive part of the programing and service delivery and should be viewed as that.

Ms. SMITH. Yes. I would repeat simply that in terms of my experience in Indonesia, if one is concerned with that country it is terribly important that the women's organizations be included in activities. They should be working on projects which they have come up with, not simply working on somebody else's master plan.

Mr. SCHEUER. Or, if they haven't come up with the program, at least one in which they have been given involvement and participation and can make their own. It could very well be that the concept, the service, and the delivery do not come from within the particular organization, but at least if women are involved in the formulation of it and feel that they have some input, the connection will be real.

Ms. SMITH. Yes. I think there is really a role for both. I think sometimes it is appropriate for people to be included in programs which somebody else has designed, sometimes you include them in a design process, and sometimes people bring up the initiative themselves. These should all be seen as alternatives.

I would leave that as the brief summary to what I have said. Before I ask for your questions, I'd like to make one comment in response to an issue which you have raised a number of times this morning.

In reference to the ODC's PQLI: Congressman Simon asked how the three of us who were sitting here would respond to the figures that turned up in the United States.

My own feeling would be that something like the Physical Quality of Life Index—PQLI—is enormously useful in a variety of ways. Obviously, one of them simply is giving us a sense of the physical quality of life and that is an element which should be paid attention to.

I would say that it is no more able to stand by itself than a variety of other indexes can stand by themselves. If one is concerned with the status of women, I would suggest that you use that as one element. As I traveled in Asia, I discovered a set of other issues which seemed very useful in terms of getting a sense of the status of women, not just that physical side; one might call it an involvement in national life index.

If one looks at both access to and use of education, at the legal status of women, at what custom and religion in a given place say about women, at the role which women are permitted to play and do play in the economy, and at the role that women do play and are permitted to play in politics and government, it seems to me you then get a very good sense of what the status of women is in a given country.

Some people say, no; education is the answer. Education alone doesn't do it. If one compares, for example, the sort of overall status of women in Korea you have a very high educational level, but law and custom are very, very hard on women there.

In Indonesia, the educational level of women is nowhere near as high as Korea, but in many other ways the status of women is rather higher. It seems to me that you have to look at a combination of things and use them as companion pieces to the PQLI. This combination would begin to give a very good sense of the status of women in any given country.

QUESTIONS AND REMARKS

Mr. SCHEUER. Earlier I asked Dr. Grant and Mr. Zeidenstein whether they thought it would be possible to develop an index on the status of women. In some cases, education was important and in other cases there would be other impediments or roadblocks that should be considered. I suppose the very reason for wanting such an index is that it is a complicated thing; there are all kinds of variables which have to be balanced and weighed against one another. I think such an index would be very useful to have. Maybe you could give us an informal memo, based on your experience in the field.

In fact, I would appreciate it if all of you would give us your thoughts, informally and briefly, on the elements that you think should go into an index that would quantify the status of women.

Ms. SMITH. I would be glad to do that. Thank you. I would be happy to have any additional questions if you have any.

Mr. SCHEUER. I think your input to this morning's hearing was extremely valuable and it gave us a real focus. Once again, referring to the time I spent in Indonesia and Africa, I think one hour out in the bush is worth 10 hours of talking to health ministers.

Ms. SMITH. I agree with you. Also, much more fun usually.

Mr. SCHEUER. A lot more fun.

I thank you for having given us that one hour in the bush. I thank the entire panel for a marvelous day of hearings. We are all in your debt. We hope you will come back to us with your thoughts on this particular matter and on some of the other things we have discussed.

I thank you all very much. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:48 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED
FOR THE RECORD

POPULATION, NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS,
AND THE UNITED STATES STAKE

A Statement by

Ambassador Melissa Wells
U. S. Representative to the ECOSOC,
U. S. Mission to the United Nations

April 18, 1978

Select Committee on Population
Population and Development Assistance:
An Overview

Population, North-South Relations
and the United States Stake

I am pleased and honored to have been asked to appear before this important Congressional body as one of its lead-off witnesses. I hope that my personal experience at the country level in the field, as well as the opportunities I have had at the United Nations to observe and learn from a large group of informed international representatives working on common problems, will make my appearance here worthwhile to you. While I cannot claim to be speaking in any way for Ambassador Young, whose presentation to you, had he been able to accept your invitation, certainly would have been substantially different in style and approach than my own, I do believe he shares in substance the views I am about to offer.

I. Introduction

At first glance, we might wonder whether, aside from overly broad conceptual considerations, there is a meaningful operational thread connecting the components of the topic before us: population, North-South relations and the United States stake. My conclusion is unequivocally that there is such a thread, and one very much worth spinning out as one would a spool--starting from the outside and working our way into the core of the subject

matter before this Committee.

In capsule form, that is to say:

-- the U. S. stake in helping to create a more viable and just international economic system is enormous, whether viewed in narrow national self-interest terms or in terms of shaping the global environment in ways supportive of our way of life;

-- the international economic system is changing, whether we like it or not, and the challenges we are facing transcend north-south issues--they also concern intra-western, east-west, and intra-southern relationships; and,

-- among the most fundamental and unsettling factors generating pressures for change and encouraging north-south discussions is that of population pressure, which is hampering achievement of developmental goals in much of the third world and which consequently both conditions the framework of those north-south discussions and increasingly is receiving direct operational attention at the national and inter-national level.

II. The U. S. Stake in North-South Issues

There are several ways to assess, not whether the U. S. has a stake in shaping the changes which are already taking place in the international economic system and, more particularly, in north-south relations, but rather the nature of that stake and the degree of importance it

represents for our national interests:

1. Statistically, aside from oil, the third world, illustratively:

(a) provides the U.S. with over 90 percent of its tin, 65 percent of its copper and aluminum, 55 percent of its lead;

(b) accounts for about three times our exports to Japan. Our exports to Mexico are about equal to those to the Federal Republic of Germany, and Brazil buys about as much from us as does France. Moreover, U.S. exports to the third world are among the fastest growing components in our international trade, having more than tripled in this decade alone; and,

(c) U.S. direct foreign investment in the third world represented 45 percent of total such investment in 1975.

2. Qualitatively, present world trends, if continued, could exacerbate the present range of problems to the point where solutions--even partial ones--would be out of reach. Here, I am referring not only to economic matters but to the entire range of activities which interact on each other and create our environment socially, politically, militantly, and so forth. Time is of the essence in meeting the challenges, if we are to have a positive influence on

the shape of things to come. Nothing better illustrates this point than the very subject of the Select Committee: the actions of governments and individuals today throughout the world will determine whether, by early next century, we have a global population of 8 billion or 11 billion-- with all the implications for quality of life attendant on those figures. Similar examples can be selected from almost any sector of concern to us to illustrate that our stake in making purposeful choices today will bear positive results for the world we live in:

--today's pattern of investments in the developing countries will largely determine the extent to which those concerned economies will be able to distribute the national product for the benefit of the many and not mainly for the gain of a few;

--actions now in support of key social measures will go a long way toward assuring improved status of women and enhanced educational opportunities for youth at a time when the societies of the third world are adjusting to modern industrial conditions; and,

--systematic progress toward establishing effective international programs of economic cooperation can make the difference between maintaining a constructive dialogue between north and south or working out issues between

these two in a hostile atmosphere not conducive to cooperation.

3. In sum, the U. S. stake in these and other matters self-evidently is significant and worth acting upon at this moment in history, while forces are still shaping up and the situation remains in flux. Our interest is not only in striving to forward our long-term goals of maintaining a healthy world environment in which the U. S. can prosper, but also in responding to the deep-felt traditional American concern for the welfare of the majority of the world's poor, who reside in the third world and whose immediate living conditions can be alleviated through the combined efforts of national governments and the international community. Even though the U. S. G. ranks low in the list of donors according to the percentage of GNP devoted to official development assistance (ODA), we still are the major single source of bilateral aide and, in absolute terms, as such, we have a large stake in seeing that our resources have maximum impact on the real developmental problems of the third world.

In closing this section on the U. S. stake, I'd like to recall Secretary of State Vance's statement that: "We have concluded one era when the question was whether to cooperate. We have begun a period in which we must develop the means and institutions for cooperation." And: "Solutions

to our problems rest on the realization that our problems are linked to those of the Third World--and that the aspirations of our citizens are similar to theirs."

III. North-South Relations

1. A simple recital of the major components and issues of the north-south dialogue, as embodied in discussions initiated by the south on establishing a new international economic order, would be an instructive device for shedding light on the degree to which population-related factors figure expressly in that dialogue--it is a limited degree:

-- commodity trade: creating a common fund for some 18 prospective international commodity agreements.

consideration by the south of establishing OPEC-type organizations for other commodities;

-- manufactures and semi-manufactures: assuring meaningful adoption in the north of generalized non-reciprocal tariff preferences for LDC exports.

--science and technology: promoting efforts specifically oriented toward meeting developmental needs in the south including transfer of technology. Facilitating transnational investment through, among other things, consensus on codes of conduct;

-- international monetary reform and development finance: assuring long-term balance of payments support, renegotiating of debt increasing ODA to at

least .7 percent of GNP, linking SDRs with development finance;

- exploiting the sea-bed and ocean floor in an equitable way;
- protecting the environment;
- increasing domestic savings of the LDCs;
- increasing agricultural output;
- increasing industrial production in the LDCs, capital formation, infrastructure;
- improving LDC health and educational conditions;
- promoting population policies where governments so wish it and as part of a multi-dimensional approach to social and economic development;
- providing special assistance for the least developed of the developing countries, the landlocked and island developing countries, and the "most seriously affected" developing countries; and,
- promoting economic and technical cooperation among developing countries.

2. In this context, it is worth noting that the International Development Strategy (IDS) for the 1970's, as approved by the UN General Assembly, includes such provisions as:

- the ultimate purpose of development is to provide increasing opportunities to all people for a better life. This requires a more equitable distribution of income and wealth;

--6% is the target for average annual growth in the gross product of LDCs, so as to permit a per capita growth rate of 3.5% on the assumption of an average annual population growth rate of 2.5%. "In this context, each developing country should formulate its own demographic objectives within the framework of its national development plan.... Those developing countries which consider that their rate of population growth hampers their development will adopt measures in accordance with their concept of development."

3. The U.S.G. has made clear its commitment to discuss all these matters, including the means for achieving agreed goals, in fora likely to produce results. While there are major questions which remain to be resolved, e.g., the common fund, generalized debt rescheduling, measures for energy cooperation, the target for ODA, the U.S.G. is prepared to contribute all that it can to the construction of a new international economic order

which would assure growth, efficiency, equity and adaptability. We consider the UN system as encompassing good fora for negotiating agreements and the General Assembly for discussing the major economic issues.

IV. POPULATION

1. As noted in a recent World Bank study, "the growth performance of developing countries during 1950-75 is marked by three outstanding characteristics: the rapid average growth rate; the wide diversity of experience; and the increasing disparity between richer and poorer developing countries". While the GNP per capita of the developing countries as a group grew at an average rate of 3.4% a year during that period, the large, poor countries of South Asia and many countries in Africa, with a total population of some 1.1 billion people (over half of Third World population), grew in per capita income by less than 2% a year.

But even in developing countries which experienced more favorable per capita growth rates, population pressure has undoubtedly been a most critical factor

in limiting improvements in material living standards. As reported in another recent World Bank study, in 1975 more than 700 million people were living in absolute poverty, defined as those lacking the basic requirements for a decent life: adequate food, minimal clothing and shelter, and access to safe water and decent sanitation, to basic health facilities and to primary education for their children. These people are highly concentrated in South Asia, East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, and over 80% of them live in rural areas. Aside from those in absolute poverty, there are, of course, tens of millions more elsewhere in the developing world, 100 million in Latin America alone, who are experiencing great hardships by earning less than one-third of the average per-capita income in their respective countries where the average per capita income already is low.

It is in this context of continuing mass poverty, exacerbated by average annual population growth rates of 2.4 % (compared to 1% for OECD countries), that the objectives to which development

efforts have been directed are being questioned. Is maximization of GNP per capita too narrow and difficult an aim, and should it be supplemented by others, such as: improving income distribution, increasing employment, fulfilling basic human needs? A global consensus indeed is growing in favor of these broader objectives, which in fact are not new at all. Most of the early postwar literature on development expressly incorporated such "basic human needs" goals. One interesting feature of current discussions on this topic is that evidence is being developed to suggest that meeting basic needs as a developmental objective contributes to maximization of GNP per capita.

2. Recent surveys show that most Third World governments do consider that the current rate of natural population growth imposes severe constraints on the attainment of their developmental objectives. Over 80% of them have a central planning authority to integrate population factors with development planning. Most now have operational programs in this sector. Perhaps this trend, together with general socio-economic improvements, accounts for

the fact, noted in a recent U.S.G. report, that birth rates are beginning to decline in a mounting number of developing countries, overtaking declines in death rates. But it remains true that there is a need for far greater efforts and more innovative approaches toward the population problem. In the poorest of the developing countries, for example, containing over 1 billion people, food production is not keeping up with the population growth rate and per capita GNP is increasing only by about \$1/yr.

3. The treatment of population-related policies in the North-South dialogue is rather circumspect. As stated in the World Plan of Action on Population, adopted at Bucharest in 1974: "The formation and implementation of population policies is acknowledged as the sovereign right of each nation. It is to be exercised in accordance with national objectives and needs without external interference, taking into account universal solidarity in order to improve the quality of life of peoples of the world". The last phrase in this quotation

is a new and fundamental change as compared with the pre-1974 North-South dialogue and provides the basis for a prevailing world-wide consensus on five basic propositions: there is a basic human right to decide on the number and spacing of children; there is governmental responsibility to provide the information, education and means to all citizens to carry out their decisions in this area; the concept is accepted of establishing quantitative goals by a certain date to reduce mortality, increase life expectancy and reduce fertility and rates of population growth; there should be equal status for women; population policies and programs should be integral components of a multi-dimensional approach to economic and social development.

IV. Concluding Observations

1 Overall, notwithstanding the developments described earlier, the North-South dialogue does not treat population growth as a major threat to development. One tactical reason for this, aside from genuine views supporting this position, is southern concern that the north not substitute family planning-type aid for broader and more expensive cooperative programs to promote socio-

economic development. Another is that, as I have already noted, there is substantial disparity in experience and hence views among developing countries regarding this sector (as well as disparity in attitude on the northern side). A third is sensitivity on national sovereignty grounds. This hesitant approach in the dialogue is reflected in the low-key, often indirect manner of treating the subject in key resolutions: except for a reference to "maternal and child health and family welfare", the resolutions on a New International Economic Order and on the Special Program for Most Seriously Affected countries are silent regarding it; and, the World Plan of Action on population states that "the basis for an effective solution of population problems is, above all, socio-economic transformation . . . Population policies are constituent elements of socio-economic development policies, never substitutes for them".

An analysis of sectoral expenditures by the UN system also reflects the relatively modest allocation of funds for population activities (defined as dealing with the causes, conditions and consequences of changes in fertility, mortality and morbidity as they affect developmental prospects and the human welfare

resulting therefrom):

	<u>\$ Million</u>			<u>Est.</u> <u>1978</u>	<u>Projected</u> <u>1979</u>	<u>Projected</u> <u>1980</u>
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>			
Total Expenditures (Population)	1,890 66	1,982 74	2,260 81	2,484 89	2,723 98	2,995 108

The bulk of these expenditures on population activities is by the UN Fund for Population Activities, which in the few years of its existence has performed impressively in its own terms and as promoter of the overall UN role in this sector. The distinct trend of increasing LDC contributions to UNFPA, coupled with the abundance of requests from them for assistance at levels exceeding the funds presently available to UNFPA, argues strongly for continued and intensified U.S. and other donor support to that organization.

2. Looking forward to future policy actions on population within the framework of the north-south dialogue, I would hope that the International Development Strategy for the 1980's will devote more direct attention to this matter as it relates both to national development efforts and NIEO. I also would hope that progress is made on technical aspects of the population problem, so that, when governments decide to act, they have available to them an

assured range of program activities which they can undertake with confidence of success; such technical progress presumably would encompass both technological and sociological aspects, such as utilization of grass-roots, community-level personnel in population programs integrated with other local developmental activities. Finally, there are any number of issues being addressed under the NIEO label which, more than hitherto, should expressly include consideration of the population dimension, such as:

- implications for investment, industrialization and employment policies of demographic patterns of growth and internal migration;
- implications for expanded, improved health and education services of population trends; and
- implementation of developmental programs in agriculture which take into account the productive capacity as well as consumption requirements of all components of the affected population.

Thank you.



UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

May 19, 1978

Honorable James H. Scheuer, Chairman
Select Committee on Population
U.S. House of Representatives
3587 House Office Building Annex 2
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Congressman:

Thank you for your letters of May 9 and 11, 1978, regarding my testimony at your recent hearings. In a separate letter to you, I have amplified my response to two questions which were addressed to me during my appearance. In this letter, I shall respond to the additional questions which were transmitted under cover of your letter of May 11, as follows:

- 1) Is the State Department able to respond adequately to global issues such as those of North-South dialogue, food and energy supplies, population, human rights, and the like given the Department's predisposition to bilateral diplomacy?
- - How could and should the ability of the State Department to respond in a cooperative manner to international concerns be improved?

The State Department has had extensive experience as the lead U.S. agency in negotiating matters of global concern, such as those cited above. Significant diplomatic activity already extends into international organizations. Bilateral diplomacy is often a complement to, rather than substitute for, multilateral negotiations concerning these global issues. The State Department has established an office expressly to relate our activities in multilateral organizations to our bilateral interests (and vice-versa). Also, there is an increasing number of career officers who have had substantial experience in working with international organizations, and I believe the Department is considering giving added

emphasis to developing a core of career personnel to provide assured, continuing expertise to it regarding our participation in these organizations. Therefore, given the Department's experience and its internal plans for strengthening its ability to deal with global questions, I believe it is able to respond adequately to international concerns.

- 2) How do other governments view U.S. and U.N. population assistance?

Most developing countries in fact operate national programs dealing with population activities and family planning services. They are receptive to international assistance to these efforts, as demonstrated by the scope of bilateral aid programs in this Sector and by the fact that UNFPA is a fully accepted UN agency whose range of activities and resources are expanding annually. Finally, most OECD countries along with the U.S. financially support international population assistance programs.

- 3) Should U.S. Development assistance be tied to a developing (recipient) country's priorities and actions with respect to population? Human rights? Income distribution? Etc.?

- - If bilateral assistance is precluded because a developing country cannot meet the prerequisites for U.S. bilateral assistance, should U.S. aid be extended through multi-lateral avenues rather than be totally dismissed for that particular country?


U.S. bilateral aid is extended on the basis of a range of judgments regarding the cooperating country's overall development performance, credit worthiness, relationship to the U.S., and human rights and related policies. Generally, a judgment on one specific component of development performance (such as population) would not determine whether the U.S. cooperates or not - often, such cooperation could contribute to a beneficial change in that country's policy regarding the component at issue. As regards substitutability by multilateral channels, this would have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, although usually there is a close correlation between bilateral judgments and those of international financial institutions on a country's development performance.

- 4) The funding figures for sectoral expenditures by the U.N. system cited in your testimony (page 15) work out to an average of 3.6 percent per year spent on population as compared to other forms of population assistance.
- - Is this an adequate percentage?
 - - Should this percentage be increased?
 - - How receptive would the U.N. be to devoting more effort to population issues and programs?
 - - (For FY 1979, AID has devoted 12.3 percent of its development assistance budget request to population programs - by way of comparison.)

There undoubtedly is room for an immediate expansion in U.N. technical assistance for population activities, but any sizeable expansion would have to be more gradual over a period of years in line with an expansion in the technical absorptive capacity of the cooperating countries. On the other hand, there probably is more ready scope for expansion in financial and capital assistance from the international financial institutions for population-related needs in terms of commodities, equipment and infrastructure.

For reasons stated in my formal presentation to the Committee, the member governments of the U.N. have not placed population matters expressly at the head of their list of international priorities. However, they have endorsed international action, and, as noted, the developing countries generally do conduct national programs in this Sector. Therefore, the problem really boils down to availability of financial and technical resources and, perhaps, more emphasis by international program managers themselves on developing more population-related activities as compared to the more traditional types of projects and programs.

Sincerely yours,


Melissa Wells

Statement of
the Honorable Robert H. Nooter
Deputy Administrator
Agency for International Development
Before the
House Select Committee on Population

April 18, 1978

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

The opportunity to share my thoughts with the members of this Committee is most welcome. I recognize that you are already knowledgeable about population growth and the effect it has on the development process; nevertheless, I would like to start by reviewing the basic facts.

The first billion population was reached in about 1830, the second in about 1930, and the third in about 1960 -- but the fourth was accomplished between 1960 and 1975. Estimates of the World Bank point to a population of 6.3 billion by the year 2000. At the present rate of growth the world population could stabilize at roughly 11 billion. Since the problem of meeting the basic human needs of the current population of the developing world is a difficult challenge, clearly the challenge in the future will be much greater.

The pressure of growing demands on each of the earth's four major biological systems--oceanic fisheries, grasslands, forests and croplands--has reached the point where the limit of their productive capacity is being seriously strained. Overfishing is leading to a decline in the supply of marine protein: the demand for edible fish has increased to the point where we are exceeding the capacity of the oceans to regenerate supplies. Overgrazing in many parts of the world has led to erosion and together with deforestation has already expanded the Sahara Desert along its southern fringe from Senegal to the Sudan. The loss of forests will additionally lead to increased water management problems and loss of many species. By the year 2000, it is estimated that an additional 30% of the remaining forests will be gone and as the population expands, croplands continue to be lost to erosion, cities, roads and industry.

Since World War II the world has become increasingly dependent on grain exports from a few countries--mostly from North America. North America in the 1937-38 period accounted for about 20% of the grain trade, whereas today North America accounts for about 80% of the world grain trade. To meet this demand, U. S. agriculture has generally been producing much

closer to capacity in recent years than in previous decades. Fifteen years ago there were 50 million acres of idle U. S. cropland. Much of this cropland has been brought back into production, and while land is currently being taken out of production, this may well be a temporary phenomenon. As recently as 1976 carry-over stocks of food grain equalled only 31 days of consumption, down from the equivalent of three times that amount in 1961. We are faced with the irony that as the world demand for food increases, the ability of croplands is declining in several regions because of such factors as desert encroachment, soil erosion, shortening of fallow cycles and conversion of land to urban and industrial uses. Furthermore, in the developing countries, population growth is a major factor explaining the increasing demand for food. Efforts at achieving domestic food self-sufficiency in LDCs have been severely hampered by the ever-increasing demand for food from the growing population and from increased capacity by the more affluent to produce food. The real increases in domestic food supply are generally very small and some countries are losing ground. Reducing the rapid rate of population growth in LDCs is an essential element in expanding the relative domestic food supply.

Other consequences of over-population are manifold.

Pollution is not solely a problem of numbers of people but the consumption behavior of each additional person. As standards of living are increased, the relative per capita impact on the earth's ecosystem increases. Chemical fertilizers, petroleum products, radioactive wastes, mercury, carbon monoxide, asbestos--the list of pollutants with serious ecological and human health implications is enormous. Rapid population growth has made provision of adequate shelter, particularly in burgeoning urban areas, an increasingly urgent problem.

Considering the impact of population growth, it is important to look at what A. I. D. is doing to deal with the population problem. Until 1964 A. I. D. was prohibited from involvement in family planning programs. In 1964, a population unit was established for the first time in the Latin America Bureau of A. I. D. This led to the establishment of a Population Branch in the central Technical Assistance Bureau by 1966. It was a cautious beginning since the field of population was considered highly sensitive and politically volatile and most of our activities were restricted to the area of research and institutional support.

Now, fourteen years later, population growth has been recognized as a major problem and there is some measure of achievement toward reduction of growth rates. Although this is a remarkable accomplishment, we still have a long way to go.

It has been 10 years since Congress, recognizing the importance of population activities, passed the Title X amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act earmarking funds for the Agency for International Development's population activities. During this decade A. I. D. has provided one billion dollars for population program assistance--about 60% of all such international assistance to date.

With the strong support of the U. S. Congress, A. I. D.'s population program has given impetus to many other activities during the last decade as follows:

- Support for the United Nations Fund for Population Activities to respond to official requests of developing countries for population assistance.
- Development of more adequate demographic data.
- Assistance to countries for population policy development.

- Training for administrators, physicians, nurses, paramedicals and village health workers.
- Research on determinants and consequences of fertility
- Research and development of new and improved means of fertility control.
- Purchase and transportation of contraceptives and surgical equipment.
- Assistance to country programs and international private voluntary organizations in the provision of family planning assistance.
- Information and education to leaders of developing countries and to the mass public regarding population growth and its impact.

Of the 4 billion world population, A. I. D. 's program has been directed to about half, or 2 billion people with high fertility, who live in more than 100 less developed countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

- In considerable measure, because of resources provided by the United States, other donors and increasingly effective action by many developing countries, the world population scene has changed with great speed during the past decade.

- The majority of nations especially in Asia and Latin America now recognize population growth as a key developmental variable.
- There have been indications of sharp declines in the birthrate over the last decade in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Costa Rica and Mauritius, for example. Other, well-documented cases of substantial declines in birth rates during the past decade include: Indonesia, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia; Barbados, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela; and Fiji. Recent census and survey findings indicate declining fertility in other areas of the developing world as well.
- In all of the countries where birth rates have fallen sharply, family planning information, services and supplies have been made generally available and developmental progress has been substantial. Indeed, over the past 15 years, there has been a spectacular rise in the number of family planning programs throughout the less developed world. From only two government-supported family planning programs (India and Pakistan)

in 1960, there are now 63 countries in the developing world which have either launched official programs or officially sanction the activities of private family planning organizations.

- Thailand and Indonesia are examples of countries where effective donor action, mainly by A. I. D., has made a crucial difference in the speed with which these two countries have been able to deal with their serious population and development problems. In 1967, when A. I. D. began population program assistance in these countries, their birth rates were at the traditional high level of more than 42 births per 1000 population, their national policies and laws were opposed to family planning, there was a great dearth of trained personnel, and the people were almost entirely unfamiliar with modern family planning techniques. Today, both of these countries have revised their relevant laws and policies, thousands of persons have been trained, national programs achieving extensive availability and use of contraceptives have been implemented and birthrates are rapidly falling.

The Agency is now focusing on programs which can blend the provision of services approach into an over-all development plan. Through Section 104(d), we are involved in looking at those factors of economic and social change which will encourage smaller families, especially focusing on expanding women's opportunities. Several areas in the reorganization of the Agency and recent policy initiatives reflect this change in emphasis.

- Through a shift in the organizational structure the geographic bureau technical staffs are being strengthened to include population specialists so that the population perspective becomes a part of the development of the total bilateral assistance program. These staffs will be supported by the central technical population office in the Development Support Bureau.
- The Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination has included instructions on the incorporation of population and fertility reduction facets into non-family planning programs in program policy guidance to field missions. The bureau has additionally added a fertility determinants component to its intersectoral and economic policy research portfolio which will complement the work of the Office of Population.

- The Development Support Bureau has established a position for a Deputy Assistant Administrator for Human Resources with responsibility for the Offices of Health, Population, Education, and Training. This will provide a mechanism for interrelating projects which can provide a multi-sectoral approach to meeting human needs. The bureau has already established a Health/Population/Nutrition Coordination Group to provide a mechanism for coordinated activities.
- The Agency has initiated a multi-year population program strategy effort aimed at integrating all components of U. S. initiative into a logical framework of action. The strategy takes into account the efforts of the host country and other donors. Strategy teams have already worked with missions in Pakistan, El Salvador and Morocco. In addition, A. I. D. participated in a collaborative effort with the World Bank and UNFPA in strategy planning for Bangladesh.
- Moreover, A. I. D. is currently working with the World Bank, UNFPA and the Ford Foundation to increase policy level dialogue between major donors. There is an increased exchange of ideas with the World Bank on

population programs and approaches in specific countries such as Pakistan, Philippines, Egypt, Thailand, and Mexico. In another action, UNFPA was given an added contribution to enable that organization to increase its initiatives in maternal/child health/child spacing activities in Africa as a more responsive and acceptable approach to addressing population needs of that continent.

Population growth continues, and there is a continual need for increasing funds for assistance. Our own requests to the Congress have reflected the priority we place on funding for population as we seek to respond to the needs of the developing world. Over the next five years, we will be asked to respond to increasing requests for population and development funds. It is our hope that the Congress will continue to support the Agency's efforts in this vital area.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT:
THE THIRD WORLD.

Statement submitted to the Select Committee on Population of the United States House of Representatives by Carmen A. Miró, President of the International Review Group of Social Science Research on Population and Development.

I. Brief Background on IRG.

If I may, I would like to preface my presentation with a very brief reference to the nature of the work of the International Review Group of Social Science Research on Population and Development (IRG).

Early in 1976, few social science scholars from developing and developed countries met with representatives of donor agencies in the population field and agreed on the advisability of setting up a small group of widely respected international experts who would arrive at a systematic, interdisciplinary evaluation of the state of knowledge regarding issues perceived as population related problems. The premises underlining the establishment of the Group were the following:

1. Policy makers and the social science community in the developing countries and the international agencies in general share a common concern: that of increasing within these countries the pace of development. The latter broadly defined

as the process through which improvements in the levels of living (as reflected by material well-being, access to culture, participation in political decision making, etc.) of the population, particularly among its less favoured groups, can be obtained, sustained and expanded.

2. In practically all developing countries -in varying degrees- the structure of the population, the pace of its growth and the pattern of its geographic distribution, influence in an important and interrelated manner the efforts towards development.

3. Coherent developmental efforts should therefore take into consideration the direction in which population factors -among others- should be modified in order to attain the goals of development.

4. Population policy should be understood as measures adopted by governments to deliberately modify population variables.

5. When this policy (whatever the variable or variables it aims to modify) is part of a constellation of other policy measures and seeks to reinforce them in the attainment of the development goals or these other policy measures are adopted

to increase the potential desired effect of the population policy, one can say that the latter is integrated into development efforts.

6. Therefore, in order for a population policy to become operative within the context of development, an understanding of the processes through which population and development interact is indispensable.

7. It is widely accepted that knowledge regarding these processes is incomplete and inconclusive and that whatever findings are generally known in this field they are too global to be safely applicable to concrete situations.

8. The need to better and to increase knowledge in this area to put it at the disposal of those responsible for policy making is also generally accepted. Even more, it is felt that this knowledge should actually be used to try to influence the decision making process.

The final goal of IRG, therefore, is to recommend directions for research that will contribute to the formulation and the improvement of population policies in the developing world.

At its inception the Group was organized as an ad-hoc, independent and autonomous body of seven members with its Secretariat located at El Colegio de México. IRG activities are financed by grants from a broadly based group of institutions (Ford Foundation, the International Development Research Centre, the Norwegian Agency for International Development, the Population Council, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Swedish International Development Authority, the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, and the World Bank. The members, appointed by the President of the Group, were selected on the basis of their expertise on matters of population and development of the regions to which they belong. The members and the areas for which they have special responsibilities are:

- | | |
|------------------|---|
| Bernard Berelson | President Emeritus and Senior Fellow, Population Council, New York, N.Y., U.S.A.

Policy concerns in developed countries and within the donor community. |
| P.D. Desai | Professor, Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi University, Delhi, India.

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (Middle South Asia). |
| José Encarnación | Dean, School of Economics, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezón City, Philippines. |

Other countries within the area of ESCAP, particularly those of South-East Asia.

Akin L. Mabogunje

Head, Department of Geography, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.

All African countries not in the Arab League.

Riad B. Tabbarah

Chief, Population Division, United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA), Beirut, Lebanon.

The South-West Asian countries normally included in the ECWA region and the North African countries within the Arab League.

Raúl Urzúa

Senior Researcher, Central Unit of the Program of Social Science Research on Population Problems Relevant for Population Policies in Latin America, CELADE-Latin American Demographic Center- Santiago, Chile.

All of Latin America and the Caribbean.

For my statement here today I have drawn on the findings so far obtained as a result of the Group's work^{1/}. These findings have been arrived at after a careful perusal of an extensive bibliography that includes not only research studies but also statements by policy-makers and reports of international conferences in population. The reviews undertaken by the members and some consultants hired specifically for the task, summarize the state of knowledge more relevant to the understanding of the

relationship between population and development, pointing to gaps therein, that are, of course, suggestive of the directions future research on the topic should take. The reviews also reflect the concerns of policy makers of the various regions in matters related to population, concerns that were taken as one of the guidances for the evaluation of the state of knowledge referred to above. The Group's work in each of the regions covered has evolved having as a background the general demographic situation as it relates to the process of economic and social development. Any attempt at foreseeing how the population dynamics and the economic and social factors would interact in the future, in other words which are, in this connection, the perspectives, would rest necessarily on an appraisal of the present.

II. Overview of the Demographic and Socio-Economic Situation in the Third World.

I should begin this section of my statement with two warnings. The first one, is that related to the limitations in the data used. It is a well known fact that statistical information in most of the developing countries is either deficient or totally lacking. Population data cannot be excluded from the preceding generalization, while it is perhaps even more applicable to data on socio-economic indicators. Because of this, one should

be aware that when describing a given situation we are dealing more with order of magnitudes than with precise figures. As a second warning, it should be made clear that I shall be referring to regions or subregions that comprise groups of countries that in some instances might present quite different behaviour in terms of the variables examined. In other words, the regional treatment of the data might in certain occasions tend to blur individual differences between countries. I shall try to remedy this by pointing out, whenever possible, the deviant cases.

According to United Nations estimates^{2/} the population of the developing world has passed recently or will soon be passing the 3 billion mark. The indications are that in recent years a probable deceleration of the aggregate rate of demographic growth has occurred. If this is confirmed, this trend in no way should lead anyone to believe that the population question in the developing world will begin to lose some of its polemic connotations. Far from it: the present overall growth rate, well above 2 percent per year, implies a doubling of the population in periods of about 30 years. This occurs against a background of slow economic and social progress, where inequalities between developed and developing nations tend to widen, as do disparities between social groups within developing countries themselves. Interest about how average income per-capita could be increased has been replaced by concern on how to achieve a more equitable

income distribution, among other measures, by expanding health and educational services, improving access to more and better food and open more possibilities for productive employment to the less privileged classes of society. Let us examine the question as it appears at the level of the regions or sub-regions of the Third World.

If we accept that the stage of demographic evolution of a population can be characterized by the transit of fertility and mortality from certain levels to lower levels and, as a corollary of this, by the modification of the pace of its overall growth rate, we could place the developing regions of the world with which IRG has been concerning itself, as to their progress along the path of the demographic transition in the order set below, which is also the one guiding the discussion to follow:

1. Africa South of the Sahara
2. Arab Countries
3. Middle South Asia
4. Latin America
5. South-East Asia

1. Africa South of the Sahara^{3/}. Africa South of the Sahara is a region of diverse demographic features. Although the

sub-continent is generally sparsely populated there are obvious features of the population pressure syndrome in certain areas. It is a region at the pre-transition phase of demographic evolution. Taken together the countries of this part of Africa, constitute the most fertile among the major sectors of the world. Recent estimates place the average annual crude birth rate of these countries around 49 per thousand. It is generally accepted, though, that the levels of fertility are not evenly distributed and also that in some countries these levels are affected downwards by the high incidence of infertility and sub fecundity.

Magobunje^{4/} lists the following factors as broadly related to the persistence of high fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa:

- (i) overwhelming illiteracy of the population
- (ii) limited urbanization or widespread rural dwellings
- (iii) preponderance of farmers and related workers in the work force
- (iv) high mortality, especially at infancy
- (v) traditionalism and religiosity
- (vi) low age at marriage, universality of marriage and polygamy
- (vii) poverty of the population
- (viii) limited knowledge of, unfavourable attitude towards and restricted practice of modern methods of fertility regulation

In this connection he points out that education appears to be the most important single variable commonly cited in association with variations in fertility and family planning practices. He also indicates that the emergence of rural-urban fertility differentials in parts of this region is seen as evidence of an imminent fertility transition, especially in urban places.

The conditions of mortality are precarious. In spite of the limitations in data, already pointed out, all available reports coincide in generalizing that the levels of mortality within the nations of Africa South of the Sahara are among the highest of the world. This can be particularly portrayed by the level of infant mortality (usually regarded as a more reliable indicator of the health conditions of a population than any other mortality measure). Rates of more than 200 annual infant deaths per thousand live births have been recorded, thus placing the average expectation of life at birth at the lowest world level (around 40 years).

In all African data, urban areas exhibit lower mortality rates than rural districts and it is generally assumed that this differential will continue to increase in the years ahead. The differential is attributed to better economic status and

better standards of living of urban dwellers as well as to the concentration of medical facilities in urban areas. From this it is argued that an improvement in economic conditions would be more effective in reducing the overall level of mortality than a direct public health programme.

The behaviour of fertility and mortality described above gives rise to a moderately high level of growth, but which cannot be identified as the highest among the developing regions. Taken together the sub-saharan countries seem to have recorded during the last quinquennium (1970-1975) an average annual growth rate (2.6 per cent) below that estimated for the Arab countries and for Latin America. Another consequence of the prevailing African demographic dynamics is the youthful character of their populations, that in turn, in the absence of significant changes in their reproductive patterns, implies a strong potential for future population growth.

Africa is the least urbanized of the inhabited continents of the world and within the continent itself, Tropical Africa is the most rural. Yet one of the major problems of population in the sub-continent is the rapid rate of urbanization and the inability of the urban place to play a dynamic role in the process of development. It is even argued that in spite of the

overwhelming rural character of its population, Africa is probably overurbanized: of every 100 persons living in urban areas, 16 were living in 1975 in 6 cities of more than one million inhabitants.

The preceding are in very broad lines the most salient present demographic characteristics of the countries of Africa South of the Sahara. The total number of people involved are just over 300 million. If one considers that in 1975 the Gross Domestic Product per capita (at constant prices) was estimated at 285 US dollars, showing an annual increase of only 2 percent, during the period 1950-1975^{5/}, against a much higher average rate of increase of the population, it is not difficult to imagine that, in order to be able to offer some promise of a better life to the majority of the 600 million that will constitute the population of these countries in the year 2000 strong and concerted efforts will have to be made to improve the prospects for accelerated economic and social development and for creating the conditions for reducing fertility and mortality.

2. Arab Countries.^{6/} The Arab region, which encompasses countries located on both the African and Asian continents, is also one of demographic diversity. Here, although fertility continues to be rather high, mortality has declined more rapidly.

The arab countries of Northern Africa have on the average expectations of life at birth well above 50 years and among those of Western South Asia, Kuwait, for example, is approaching the 70 years level and Lebanon has exceeded the 60 years mark. The transition of mortality has resulted in very high rates of natural growth. In fact, some of the highest in the world today (comparable only to those of some countries in Central America and Tropical South America). In this connection, it is important to underscore that some Arab countries have seen considerable increases of their populations due to immigration, that in some cases has contributed a larger proportion to the overall rate of increment than natural growth proper.

Migration, particularly from the rural to the urban areas, that contributes to the rapid growth of primate cities, is a problem which a number of Arab countries share. It has been pointed out that in many instances urban growth has been due as much at least to natural increase than to internal migration. There is agreement that the pressure on services in metropolitan agglomerations has reached intolerable proportions in many Arab countries and that this has been due not only to the rapidly increasing population in them, but also to the lack of appropriate and visionary city planning.

A significant flow of workers toward the oil-exporting countries has occurred. In fact, many Arabian Gulf countries have experienced such high rates of immigration that the majority of their population is non-native.

Finally, the emigration of highly qualified personnel from the Arab countries towards Western Europe and the Americas is a population issue of major concern to those members of the Arab League whose extremely rapid development sparked by oil revenues has created a considerable demand for highly skilled personnel.

The broad characterization of the present demographic conditions of the Arab countries and their relation to certain aspects of their economic potentialities, show very clearly that this group of countries, although included among those of the Third World, primarily because of the stage of demographic evolution at which they are, will face in the future different problems from those suggested by the discussion of the sub-saharan countries.

3. Middle South Asia^{7/}. This sub-region, growing at a rate of 2.4 percent per year, accounts for roughly one fifth of the world's population. Crude birth rates range from 25.9 per

thousand in Sri Lanka to 49.7 per thousand in Bangladesh. Levels of mortality show similar regional disparities. While life expectancy at birth in Bangladesh is only 36 years, Sri Lankans may expect to live until age 68. One peculiar feature of the mortality situation in this region is the higher death rate of females, a phenomenon that is especially pronounced in Pakistan.

The age structure of the population of Middle South Asia is on the average also a very youthful one, a feature that, as indicated above, implies a high growth potential.

As anticipated by the already well established decline in Sri Lanka and by the incipient decline in India, fertility in this sub-region appears to have entered already into the downward transitional phase. Discussions underway have failed to clarify to what extent the decline already experienced is due to the impact of family planning programmes as opposed to other factors of socioeconomic change.

As regards the migration variable a sequence similar to that mentioned for other regions may be observed: because of growing pressure of population on land, accelerated pace of rural to urban migration, sprawling metropolitan centers, and shortages of basic services and opportunities for employment.

When the overall demographic performance is set against the background of the achievements in economic development, it becomes obvious that these countries retain most of the characteristic features of economic backwardness. With the of exception Iran, with an oil based economy, the rest of the countries of the region showed during the period 1968-1973 very modest figures in average annual percent increases in per capita gross domestic product (from 0.1 in Nepal to 1.4 in Pakistan, with Bangladesh showing a negative figure of 2.4, that can undoubtedly be attributed to the political strife it was subjected to during the years examined).

4. Latin America. Latin America while undoubtedly part of the developing regions occupies what might be considered an intermediate position in terms of the basic demographic indicators when compared with the rest of the Third World. Certain United Nations studies even place Temperate South among the "More Developed Regions". If the comparison is made with reference to the stage of socio-economic development, Latin America can in general be placed well ahead of the other regions.

Early in the present century, at least two countries (Argentina and Uruguay) were already entering the demographic transition characterized by declining mortality and fertility:

These were followed later on by Cuba and Chile and more recently some significant ruptures with past behaviour of fertility have occurred in Colombia and Costa Rica. There are clear indications that the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Panamá may also be entering the transitional phase of fertility. Some signs already observed in Brasil are being studied more carefully in order to determine whether they would indeed represent also a modification of the trend so far followed by the reproductive pattern of the population. In any case, it would appear that the rate of growth of the latinamerican population, that until very recently was the highest in the world, seems to have arrived at a point of inflection, from which it has started to decrease.

The gains in mortality occurred in the region much earlier than in the rest of the developing world, and the expectation of life at birth is estimated to have approached or be approaching the 65 years level. The significant declines experienced by the mortality of important latinamerican social groups have been associated with the availability of health services but more so with the improvement of the general living conditions. One recent happening is cited to underscore the direct link between the level of mortality and socio-economic factors. Infant mortality (that was cited before as the best indicator of general health conditions) has been detected to have risen in at least

five Brazilian cities (among them, Sao Paulo). The researchers that have studied these changes, attribute them to a significant decline in the acquisitive power of the minimum salary and to a higher concentration of income in the cities studied.

Whatever the future course of overall mortality in the region would be, there does not seem to exist doubt that fertility is firmly in a downward course.

Past fertility and mortality behaviour like in the other regions already discussed, has left its imprint in the age structure of the population. As late as 1970, the proportion of the persons under 15 years of age was tending to rise from an already high level of around 40 in every 100 persons in the population. If as expected, fertility will continue to decline this would imply an important change in the age structure of the population, tending to produce an increase in the proportion of young adults, a fact that would further complicate the already almost impossible task of providing gainful employment to the growing potential labor force.

Latin America has experienced during the last decades massive population redistribution. The proportion of total pop-

ulation living in urban areas of at least 20,000 inhabitants jumped from roughly 26 per cent in 1950 to 45 per cent in 1975.

City primacy and metropolitanization is also a growing concern. Few indicators could serve to underscore how dramatic this process is turning to be. Latin America appears to be competing with the developed world for the dubious honour of having the largest city (México); in 14 countries more than half of the urban population resides in the primate city and the number of cities over 1 million inhabitants increased from 6 in 1950 to 21 in 1975.

In sharp contrast to the high demographic concentration of urban areas, rural dispersion is a salient characteristic of latinamerican population distribution patterns.

Intra-regional migratory movements within Latin America as well as emigration from the region towards the developed countries have assumed importance in the post-war period. The majority of these movements involve unskilled labourers who migrate illegally. Of course, highly skilled latinamerican professionals also migrate to the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other developed countries in substantial numbers. It has been pointed out by those studying these movements, that

as mentioned above are also present in other developing regions, that they imply a number of negative consequences for the sending country: the direct economic losses derived from investments made in professional training, the indirect economic losses derived from the income that these professionals cease to produce in their country of origin and the social costs involved in losing persons with organizational and leadership capacities. On the other side, it has been mentioned that, in many instances, countries of origin do not seem capable of offering adequate employment to these professionals.

Against the broad demographic background described above, of past high growth rates and massive population redistributions we find that the region as a whole has been experiencing high rates of economic growth, measured either in a historical or a comparative perspective. According to the most recent data available the average annual growth rate of the gross national product rose from 5 percent during the 1950s to about 5.5 percent in the 60s, and to 6.3 percent in the first half of the 1970s. Of course, the high rates of population growth led to a less significant 2.6 per cent per capita average increase of the gross domestic product between 1950-75, although in the more recent period of 1966-1973 the per capita average increase moved to 3,7 per cent in the region as a whole.

5. South-East Asia^{8/}. South-East Asia constitutes a very varied group of countries, whether we compare size (ranging from countries such as Brunei and Singapore to Indonesia and Philippines), level of development (ranging from Laos to Singapore), stage of demographic transition (again ranging from Laos to Singapore), rates of population growth (ranging from 2.8 per cent per annum in the Philippines and Democratic Kampuchea to 1.3 percent in Singapore), or political systems (ranging from Communist to right wing military governments). These differences together with the paucity of data in several of these countries make it even more difficult than for the other sub-regions to attempt presenting a picture that would reflect the region as a whole. The comments that follow are primarily based on developments in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Taiwan, that represent 65 per cent of the total population in the South-East and East Asian region, when China and Japan are excluded.

Much more than in the case of Latin America, and different from the other developing regions, there is now conclusive evidence of quite substantial declines in fertility in several south east asian countries. Declines have been particularly striking in Singapore and Thailand. Throughout the region, rising age at marriage and descending infant mortality are claimed to be an important part of the explanation for these declines, but

certainly social and economic factors also appear as having played a role as well.

As far as mortality is concerned, differentials between countries in the region are quite wide, with rates in Indonesia, Burma and Laos three times as high as those registered for Singapore and Malaysia. For the former group of countries, improvement in welfare is considered a basic condition to further reductions in morbidity and mortality.

No large-scale or long-term international population movements are occurring in the Southeast Asian region, although the "brain drain" problem is a concern. Rather, migratory movements have been of the officially sponsored resettlement programme type such as those in effect in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The supply of land suitable for agricultural production is rapidly dwindling in certain areas of the countries concerned. Thus the fate of future generations is said to depend heavily upon such transmigration projects that attempt to alleviate population pressure in densely populated areas while accelerating the economic development of underpopulated areas. So far, though, these schemes seemed to have had rather limited success.

Like in the case of Latin America, measured in terms of broad economic indicators, countries of this region appear to

have been able to moved ahead of demographic growth. For the East Asian region as a whole^{9/} the average annual increase of the per-capita gross national product was estimated for the period 1951-1975 to be at 3.9 per cent. But as Jones^{10/} has stated, "the heart of the development process is the transform^uation of economic structure, a transformation which includes the massive rise in the share of non-agricultural product and in output per worker in all sectors; the shift of the population focus from rural to urban and the shift in structure of the labour force from agriculture to non-agriculture and from low-productivity to high-productivity occupations in each sector". With very few exceptions, countries of this sub-region are far from have been able to achieve or to set in motion this type of trans^uformations. On the whole, it appears as if the growing rural populations in some areas of these countries will have to be accomodated through changes in rural employment patterns and through increase employment opportunities in cities within the areas themselves.

III. Population Policies in the Third World.

1. Africa South of the Sahara^{11/} Widespread concern with population-related problems in Africa is yet to emerge.

The reasons for this lack of concern are many. First, the idea that Africa, or at least large parts of it, is underpopulated is still prevalent in official circles. The presence of mineral reserves that insure a steady source of foreign exchange also influences policy decisions, with the current value of the resources and the projected revenue they will generate being weighed against the growing number of persons in the country. Finally, African leaders seem to be suspicious of the sudden Western eagerness to help them "control" their populations, when aid actually granted for projects considered more urgent by them does not appear to be commensurate. Mortality levels also play a role in policy decisions. In the African case, high death rates (especially high infant mortality) militate against the adoption of a fertility control policy.

In summary, the majority of the Tropical African countries can be considered as having assumed a neutral policy position with respect to population growth. There are, however, important exceptions to this rule. Eight countries (Cameroon, Central African Empire, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic of Rwanda) favor a pronatalist policy orientation, while Ghana and Kenya for some time now have pursued anti-natalist policies.

With regards to rural-urban migration, the main policy objective has been to provide the infrastructure and other social services necessary to improve the quality of life in rural areas, under the supposition that this would tend to diminish to flow of people to the urban areas.

At the international level, almost all the countries of this region maintain policies designed to control the flow of immigrants from foreign nations. Such policies are based upon the argument that uncontrolled immigration of foreign labor tends to reduce employment opportunities for its own citizens. In several instances, this protectionist stance has led to the expulsion of thousands of aliens.

In short, most governments of Sub-Saharan African countries have adopted a laissez-faire position vis-a-vis population growth, emphasizing instead the need to accelerate socio-economic development. Virtually all are concerned with reducing the drift of population from rural to urban areas and limiting the immigration of foreign labour.

2. Arab Countries. Except for Egypt and the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), interest in population matters is of relatively recent origin in the Arab countries. As stated above, generally these nations do not view their rather

high population growth rates as constituting a barrier to their development. However, signs of interest in some of the negative effects of high population growth rates have begun to appear in some countries (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Kuwait) while two (Egypt and Tunisia) are implementing clear anti-natalist policies.

Some concern has been expressed with regard to high fertility rates, but mostly in relation to certain socio-economic groups and their effects on the health, welfare and status of women. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that since, as already mentioned, in some Arab countries the demographic growth rate is affected more by immigration than by natural increase, under these circumstances a reduction of total growth may be initially achieved by means of restrictions on immigration rather than on fertility.

Differential mortality, particularly mortality among selected socio-economic strata and in certain less developed areas, is another major population concern with policy implications.

Intraregional migration of Arab labourers is, on balance, viewed as a positive contribution to Arab development and integration. However, it has been recognized that in the

future efforts must be made to harmonize relevant policies among sending and receiving countries in order to maximize the benefits of these movements to the nations involved and to reduce the hardships borne by migrants and their families.

The emigration of highly skilled workers to the developed areas has led a number of countries in this region, such as Iraq and Libya to adopt vigorous policies designed to attract Arab talent. The limited success of such policies is reflected in the shortage of skilled personnel, a major bottleneck in Arab development.

Finally, one population issue common to practically all nations in the Arab world is rural to urban migration and the concomitant rapid growth of primate cities and other metropolitan centres. Here governments are attempting to provide social services to nomadic peoples and to increase arable land area as well as agricultural productivity.

3. South Asia. Governments response in this region to the acceleration of population growth as a result of declining mortality and invariant fertility was the official adoption of what was claimed as population policies. India was in this sense, the pace-setter. With the First Five Year Plan, years before entering into the 1960 decade, India made a rather modest beginning of introducing positive measures for the inculcation of the need

and techniques of family planning and decided that measures relating to family planning should form part of the public health programme. For many years after that, the policy remained confined to the objective of propagating contraception and creating the necessary delivery system of family planning clinics within the health programme. More recently the Government^{12/} decided on a series of measures to complement family planning, among others: passing legislation to raise the minimum age of marriage to 18 for girls and to 21 for boys; freezing, on the basis of the 1971 census figures, the representation in the state legislatures and house of parliament; assigning Central assistance to State Plans against performance in family planning; giving higher priority to raising levels of female literacy; introducing population values in the educational system; making motivation of citizens to adopt responsible reproductive behaviour, an integral part of the normal programme and budgets of the Ministries and Departments of the Government of India as well as of the States. Payment for compulsory sterilization was part of the "package" of measures proposed. It is a well known fact which were the political consequences of at least this latter component of the package.

Population policy until very recently in most of the other countries of the region remained in scope largely confined

to similar attempts at propagating family planning among the people. From the level of fertility still current in these countries, it would appear that in their case too the success of the population programmes must be equally modest. The recent rapid decrease in fertility levels in Sri Lanka appear to be an exception but several studies seem to provide conclusive evidence to show that the causal factor is not so much the family planning acceptance as the increase in age at marriage and also some reduction in overall nuptiality rate.

In Bangladesh the government officially recognises the population as the most severe socio-economic problem of the country. It aims at bringing down the present number of 6.4 children per woman to a replacement level of 2.6 by 1985. The population control and family planning programme is an integral component of total social mobilization. The government is committed to following a deliberate policy of population growth reduction with supportive legal, administrative, and socio-economic measures implemented through community involvement.

Nepal seems to be the only country in the sub-region whose official policy goes explicit beyond population control to cover such other population aspects as immigration, rural-urban migration, geographical distribution of population and development of small towns.

In summary, it appears as if the original emphasis on isolated family planning programmes begin to be complemented by other measures in the economic and social fields.

4. Latin America. Until roughly the beginning of the sixties, there was little or no awareness in the region of the way demographic factors relate to employment, income distribution, poverty, malnutrition, housing, health or education, and are relevant for the success or failure of socio-economic policies aimed at solving these problems. The situation is dramatically different now: not only two regional conferences of Latin American and Caribbean governments have been convened with the specific purpose of analysing population problems and a technical exchange meeting of governmental entities in charge of population policies has been held, but also most Latin American governments have at this moment some kind of administrative unit in charge of implementing population policies of one sort or another. At the same time, after a period of heated arguments in pro or against population policies and, more specifically, fertility-regulating policies, the debate has now become one of determining how, when and for what purposes population variables can be introduced into social and economic planning. Finally, while up to the sixties every national policy was either officially or in fact pro natalist, only Argentina and Uruguay, keep maintaining such policies in 1978. Of course the degree of commitment of the

different governments to the implementation of family planning programmes varies widely from Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and the Caribbean Countries, highly committed, to Brazil, where the Government has adopted a permissive attitude towards non-official family planning programmes and some official activities have appeared in some States, passing through Venezuela where the Health Department implements a not very strong programme.

Distributional population policies have been a concern for latinamerican governments for at least the last two decades. They took primarily the form of regional and urban development policies from which population redistributive effects were expected. The same effects were also expected, to some extent, from some of the agrarian reform programmes implemented in certain countries of the region. In spite of the above, it can be generalized that the majority of the latinamerican countries have not included population redistribution as an explicit objective to be reached among some of the policies and programmes adopted. The exceptions to this generalization are perhaps Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico.

Most of the Caribbean countries have at least an implicit policy of trying to slow down the rate of growth of the principal urban center, mainly through rural development measures and through redirecting the allocation of industries.

As regards to international migration, a negative evaluation of the impact of immigration of unskilled workers has led countries to establish legal restrictions to it, although a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements attempting to protect this type of migrants have been signed by Latin American Governments.

Finally, a number of governments have attempted to reverse the trend towards the emigration of professionals and skilled workers through waving the payment of custom duties, and making other legal exceptions to those returning home.

All the above developments are clear demonstrations that latinamerican governments are ready and willing to integrate population policies into regional and sectoral policies, and more generally, into development plans. At the same time, the number of national population councils already organized to that purpose provide the institutional arrangements for formulating and implementing such policies.

5. South East Asia. Most of the countries of this region have specific targets for the reduction of either fertility rates or rates of population growth and, by standards of developing countries as a whole, very active family planning programmes.

Although no country of the region integrates goals for migration or population redistribution into an articulated population policy, some common threads can be detected in attitudes to migration in the region: a desire to even the regional distribution of population through resettlement schemes; a basic antagonism to rural-urban migration directed to the big cities, and a desire to limit it in countries as ideologically different as Indonesia and Vietnam; and a feeling that smaller cities should be encouraged to grow at the expense of bigger cities, though clear policies to achieve this aim are lacking.

International migration has not been a subject of perennial interest to this region, because, as mentioned above, there are no large-scale and long-term population movements occurring or in prospect. Most countries of the region have very strict controls on immigration and emigration flows are not large. Singapore is the only country in the region where substantial immigration and short-term inflow of less skilled workers has been permitted in the past decade. Although, some of the movements are illegal, the Singapore government appears to have the situation well-monitored and has even adopted a battery of administrative restrictions on marriages between aliens and citizens to prevent foreign workers from adding to the longer-term growth of the Singapore population.

Summarizing, South East Asia seems to be tackling with a certain degree of success the population growth problem. This should not be implied as assuming that South-East Asian Planners in general would not welcome a slower population growth. Unresolved problems of labour absorption and land settlement will continue to claim the attention of policy makers in the future.

IV. Concluding Remarks.

As it is quite evident, this statement has concentrated on the recent evolution and present demographic situation and some of its socio-economic correlates in the regions and sub-regions of the Third World. It has also highlighted how governments in the respective regions perceived the population question. The statement has dealt only in passing with population and development perspectives. This, of course, has not happened by accident. It reflects my personal attitude that to a great extent the forecast of what these perspectives are, hinge on an interpretation of what the future course of many imponderable factors would be: What would the future international economic order be? What course present internal political events in the countries of the Third World would follow? How successful present policies to take care of basic needs would be? What break-

throughs infertility control and regulation can be expected for the immediate future? How successfully would mankind overcome future resource and environmental constraints?

The future population and development perspectives depend on the answers that the world gives to these and other crucial questions, because as the 1974 World Population Conference came to underscore, "the consideration of population problems cannot be reduced to the analysis of population trends only"^{13/}.

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- 2/ UNITED NATIONS. "Action by the United Nations to Implement the Recommendations of the World Population Conference, 1974. Report on monitoring of population trends." Tabulations. E/CN.9/XIX/CRP.5/Add.1 Table A.II.1.
- 3/ In the document that served as a basis for preparing this subsection of the statement, countries have been grouped into four subregions: West Africa, East Africa, Middle Africa and Southern Africa. The countries included in each sub-region are as follows:
West Africa: Benin, Cape Verde Islands, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea (Bissau), Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta.
Middle Africa: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Empire, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe, Zaire.
East Africa: Burundi, Comoro Islands, Ethiopia, French Territory of Afars & Issas, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Reunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Rhodesia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.
Southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland.
- 4/ MABOGUNJE, Akin and AROWOLO, O., Op. Cit.
- 5/ MC NAMARA, Robert S., Address to the Board of Governors. Washington, D.C., September 26, 1977.
- 6/ The Arab Countries are the 21 members of the Arab League, namely, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lybia, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, PDRY, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen Arab Republic.
- 7/ Middle South Asia comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

- 8/ Countries included in this sub-region are: Brunei, Democratic Kampuchea, Indonesia, Laos People Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Philippines, Portuguese Timor, Singapore, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, and Thailand.
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TWO AND A HALF YEARS AFTER BUCHAREST:

SEARCHING FOR MEANS AND WAYS TO IMPLEMENT THE WORLD POPULATION

PLAN OF ACTION (WPPA)

Carmen A. Miro¹*Introduction

Dissatisfaction with the 1974 World Population Conference (WPC) and with its main final product, the World Population Plan of Action (WPPA), has been voiced repeatedly in several quarters and by different types of students of population phenomena. In a somewhat different vein, others have tried to interpret the "message from Bucharest."¹ This paper attempts to show that the WPPA has the potential to stimulate and guide future national and international action in the field of population. The following review of events and developments that have taken place since the WPC indicates, however, that this potential is far from being fully realized.

It should not have come as a surprise to either the developed nations or to the United Nations Secretariat - as it apparently did - that most of the Third World would have assumed such a militant stance at Bucharest, with the evident support of the Socialist countries. In the first place, it had insistently been said, prior to the WPC, that its great merit stemmed from the fact that for the first time in history the topic of "population" was going to be considered at the political level by high ranking government officials. This represented a significant departure from the two previous world population conferences (Rome, 1954 and Belgrade, 1965), organized by the United Nations with the collaboration of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population. Nobody should have expected that government representatives would behave in a strictly aseptic scientific manner, disregarding the political positions adopted by their governments with their potential attendant advantages and

*The author is indebted to Joseph E. Potter for numerous editorial suggestions.

disadvantages and their commitments in terms of allegiances and cleavages. It should be added that "population" had already been for more than two decades a very controversial topic, laden with considerable ideological content. "Objectivity" in this field, as in others involving different interpretations of the causal relation among social phenomena, has been perceived as being represented by how each group of the participating actors judge the problem.

No less important for the direction taken by the deliberations in Bucharest is the fact that the commitment of the developing nations to achieve more equitable international economic relations had advanced during the previous decade in a crescendo from the First UN Conference on Trade and Development (1964), to the 1974 Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, during which, precisely three and a half months before the WPC, two very significant resolutions were approved: the 3201 (S-VI), "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order," and 3202 (S-VI) on an action programme for its establishment. It does not seem a coincidence that during that decade two conferences in which developing nations coordinated their positions had been held in Algiers and that it was one of the representatives of this country who led the challenge to the Draft WPPA, as submitted by the UN Secretariat. By shifting the explicit aim of WPPA stated in the first paragraph of the draft from "to affect population variables," to the broader objective, "to help coordinate population trends and the trends of economic and social development," as finally adopted, the Third World was only being consistent with the recommendation included in Chapter IX, paragraph 2 of the already mentioned Resolution 3202 (S-VI). This paragraph made explicit reference, among other things, to the planned WPC, 1974, recommending that its activities should be so developed as to contribute to the Programme of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order.

Two years earlier the UN Economic and Social Council had already underscored the importance that it attributed to population policy within a developmental context. In both the introduction and an operative paragraph of Resolution 1672 (LII) adopted in June 1972,

endorsing the programme and arrangements for the WPC, the ECOSOC clearly established what would later turn out to be the leit-motiv of the conference:

Convinced that economic and social development is an essential element and a prerequisite to an effective population policy, and being aware that further action and expansion of activities is needed to this end at both the national and international levels...Requests the Population Commission and the World Population Conference, 1974, to give the highest priority² to the consideration of social, economic and other conditions conducive to the attainment of national demographic objectives.

Even the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment, which was followed by the UN Secretariat as model for the WPC, had adopted "Principle 10," that referred to "stability in prices, adequate income from basic products and raw materials" as "essential elements" in developing countries, for the enhancement of the environment.

Furthermore, the International Youth Population Conference held in Bucharest a few days before the WPC could have served as a premonition of the character that the deliberations concerning the WPPA could take. When the WPC convened, the World Youth had already taken the stance that any attempts at reducing rates of population growth would "only be effective if they are part of a comprehensive and integrated strategy for rapid social and economic development."²

In short, Bucharest only came to reinforce what had been voiced before by social scientists from the developing world and by several organs of the UN system, namely that it is impossible to separate the population issue from its economic and political context.

Considering all these antecedents, it is a pity that the WPC Secretariat did not pay enough attention to the sensitive political situation that the Sixth Special UN General Assembly had stirred up among its members, a situation that was further complicated in Bucharest by the controversial nature of the "population problem."

A clearer insight into the potential political complications of the WPC probably would not have helped to avoid the discussion of some of the most controversial issues raised during the conference. But, it surely would have resulted in a smoother running of the

conference, and in a more productive use of the time of the important government representatives gathered there. The basic papers of the conference and the corresponding background documentation may constitute the most complete and indeed technically sound set of documents on population subjects ever to be prepared internationally. It is to be deplored that conference participants did not have time to study their content, and discuss some of the substantive issues that they raised. In fact, it would probably have been useful for those government representatives responsible for examining the draft WPPA in a Working Group to have benefited from a prior discussion of the topics that were dealt with by the Plenary, and the First, Second and Third Committees.³

The WPPA: A Potentially Strong Political Instrument

But what many people have considered to be perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the WPC, the highly politicized atmosphere in which the debates took place, can be turned into one of its assets. The World Population Plan of Action, while a consensus document, was arrived at after considerable discussion between ardent opponents, and it emerged from the confrontation establishing certain fundamental premises on which the commitment for future action in the population field at the political level, rests. A perusal of the Plan reveals, among others, the following:⁴

The promotion of development and improvement of quality of life require coordination of action in all major socio-economic fields including that of population (1);

The Plan of Action must be considered as an important component of the system of international strategies (1);

Where trends of population growth, distribution and structure are out of balance with social, economic and environmental factors, they can, at certain stages of development, create additional difficulties for the achievement of sustained development (2);

Individual reproductive behaviour and the needs and aspirations of society should be reconciled (7).

In addition, certain principles of the Plan clearly attest to a consensus on the importance of demographic variables. For example:

The principal aim of social, economic and cultural development, of which population goals and policies are integral parts, is to improve levels of living and the quality of life of the people (14a);

Population and development are interrelated: population variables influence development variables and are also influenced by them (14c);

The primary aim of this Plan of Action is to expand and deepen the capacities of countries to deal effectively with their national and subnational population problems (15).

In regard to the general objectives of the Plan the following excerpts stand out as recognition, on the part of national representatives attending the WPC, of the political nature of the task to be undertaken under the guidance of the WPPA:

To recommend guidelines for population policies consistent with national values and goals and with internationally recognized principles (15f);

To promote the development and implementation of population policies where necessary, including improvement in the communication of the purposes and goals of these policies to the public and the promotion of popular participation in their formulation and implementation.

The Bucharest consensus can indeed turn out to be rather strong as a political instrument, if one considers that it went as far as recommending that all countries "respect and ensure, regardless of their overall demographic goals, the right of persons to determine, in a free, informed and responsible manner, the number and spacing of their children." (29a)

A Review of Events and Developments Since Bucharest

Even if one would be tempted to discard the WPPA as an instrument with little political leverage, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the interest in and discussion of this document has

not died down in the two and a half years that have elapsed since its adoption. Rather the WPPA continues to capture the attention of different sectors, both at the international and national levels. While previous World Population Conferences were responsible for basic contributions to the fund of scientific knowledge on population, in comparison with Bucharest their repercussions on what might be called the political action front were practically non-existent. While the interest the 1954 Conference generated within the UN towards the creation of the regional demographic training and research centers had considerable impact in the field through the years, the direct influence of the Conference at the political level was meagre. The 1965 event came closer to the concerns that prevailed at Bucharest; several meetings dealt with relationships of demographic and socio-economic factors. Its second main contribution was that of helping to increase awareness of these interrelations and inducing important changes in the content of the UN Population Division work programme. Aside from that, its effects on the national political sphere, if any, died down very soon.

The following review of events and developments in the period following the 1974 Conference demonstrates that the WPPA has had an important and probably unparalleled impact on various sectors. It also shows, however, that in many respects, the international community has failed both to make more than nominal progress towards achieving the fundamental purposes of the Plan, and to take advantage of its potential as a "policy instrument within the broader context of the internationally adopted strategies for national and international progress."⁶

Direct Follow-up Activities

Among the events that have taken place within the United Nations system since 1974, there are some that constitute follow-up activities directly related to the implementation of the WPPA. Those identifiable are: 1) The Population Commission 18th Session in February, 1975; 2) The five Regional Post-Bucharest Consultations, held between

February and July, 1975; 3) The UNFPA-UN Interregional Consultative Group of Experts on the WPPA, convened in September 1975, and 4) The Population Commission 19th Session in January 1977.

1. In connection with the first of these, two decisions adopted by the Commission, and later ratified by ECOSOC, are worth particular mention, namely the requests to the Secretary-General to:

- obtain "at the national level, in consultation with Member States, a report of the measures adopted, and work being undertaken and planned, by Governments, which they regard relevant to the implementation of the WPPA"²; and
- prepare "guidelines to assist...development planners at the national level to take into account population-related factors when drawing up plans for development."

The first of these requests gave rise to the UN "Third Inquiry among Governments: Population Policies in the Context of Development, 1976," that gives insight into the changes occurring at the national level in the perceptions of demographic levels and trends and related policies. It also laid the groundwork for the continued surveillance of events at the country level. In response to the second request a document (E/5780) was, in effect, prepared and submitted to the 61st Session of ECOSOC under the title "Guidelines on Population Related Factors for Development Planners." Promotion of work on this difficult and, up to now, rather undeveloped subject can be traced back to principles enunciated by the WPPA. If, as Article 14 (d) states, "population policies are constituent elements of socioeconomic development policies," it is important to learn how to insert the consideration of demographic factors, their potential consequences and presumed determinants into developmental planning. Evidently in this respect the UN Secretariat is far from being able to give assurance of ability to render adequate advice. After considering the "Guidelines" the ECOSOC returned them to the Population Commission with the request that a "manual on population and development planning"⁷ be prepared, a task on which the Population Division expects to work during the biennium 1978-1979.⁸

2. The five regional post Bucharest consultations were undertaken in response to Article 103 of WPPA which invites "countries sharing similar population conditions and problems...to consider jointly this Plan of Action, exchange experiences in relevant fields and elaborate those aspects of the Plan that are of particular relevance to them." Indeed the reports of the consultations reflect the different approaches to the WPPA taken by the five regions, and they provide valuable guidance to the international community, when considering means and ways of helping countries of these regions implement the WPPA. Without claiming to be exhaustive⁹ the following summaries illustrate the diverse manner in which regions reacted to the WPPA a few months after its adoption:

The ESCAP region reiterated its support for the reduction of population growth, having set quantitative targets for declining rates of growth, mortality and fertility. Perhaps a new consensus appearing in the consultation as an outcome of Bucharest, is the reference to the fact that "development is a central factor in the solution of population problems."¹⁰

The countries of the ECLA region, while recognizing that certain critical situations could arise from the demand for educational, health, housing, and other services generated by their particular population dynamics, persisted in their position of not making any specific recommendations in relation to the rate of population growth. No quantitative targets were proposed, though indirectly some were approved in connection with morbidity and mortality when explicit reference was made to "the goals laid down in the Ten-Year Health Plan of the Americas."¹¹ Undoubtedly the most important recommendation adopted by the Latin American countries is that related to setting up "high level councils, commissions or other equivalent units, empowered to coordinate action in the field of population," in the countries of the region.¹²

The African consultation revealed more clearly than in any other region the diversity of situations and positions. The report

reflects a consensus between "countries with vast natural resources" where "a high rate of population growth could provide added benefit for development" and those "able to hold larger population" but in which "certain circumstances (economic, social, cultural or otherwise) may not make it possible."¹³

Many of the recommendations contained in the Plan were reiterated in the African context. The most prominent departure was that of urging African Governments "to pass legislation permitting qualified medical practitioners to perform abortion on request and on grounds of the health, welfare² and survival of either mother and child or both of them." This recommendation is even more striking if one considers that the subject of abortion was completely silenced at the WPC.

The ECWA region took the most radical position in regard to population growth when it declared that "rapid population growth in the area does not constitute an obstacle in the way of socioeconomic development," adding that "there are further indications that the development process may overcome the implications of the continued rise in reproduction rates and the natural increase of population." It emphasized more than any other region the need for adequate statistical data on the various demographic variables.¹⁴

The ECE countries agreed that the adoption of the Plan had "resulted in the speeding up of the enactment of legislation and the undertaking of organizational and research programmes that might otherwise have been allocated a lower priority." In the majority of countries it has caused "Governments to realize that where previous approaches were not coordinated to resolve population problems, these approaches might be transformed into a considered comprehensive population policy, within the context of social and economic development strategies and plans."¹⁵ The ECE representatives also paid special attention to the recommendation contained in Article 22 of the

WPPA to reduce "national and subnational differentials" of mortality, calling on WHO to "initiate and coordinate studies of differential morbidity and mortality both in developed and developing countries."¹⁶

The different regions coincided in recognizing the right to access to information and services, provided by the State, enabling persons to achieve desired family size. There was also generalized agreement on paying particular attention to the topic of geographic distribution of the population with special reference to internal and international migration. The need for research also received wide recognition.

3. The UNFPA-UN Interregional Consultative Group of Experts on the WPPA was convened with the avowed purpose of considering "overall programmes, priorities, sources and coordination of assistance in relation to the implementation of the WPPA." A reading of the Draft Report of the Meeting¹⁷ reveals that it came far from accomplishing this objective, and that there was considerable dissensus among participants. The recommendations are numerous and of a rather general character. In all likelihood they have been of little practical value to the organizations convening the meeting. In the opinion of the writer the reason for the apparent failure of the consultation was the attempt to get advice of general application from scholars and technicians coming from regions and countries with very diverse developmental and demographic situations, and at different stages of "maturity" in the formulation and implementation of population policies. Any attempt at implementing the WPPA has to take well into consideration one of the principles stated in its paragraph 14 to the effect that "(i) Recommendations in this Plan of Action regarding policies to deal with population problems must recognize the diversity of conditions² within and among different countries." In other words, to proceed with the implementation of the Plan at the national level requires at least an approximate knowledge of the conditions of the country in

question in terms not only of its population trends, but also of its economic, social and political situation, not disregarding the position prevailing at the governmental level in relation to population policies. Of course, from these individual diagnoses some generalizations would eventually be possible and some programmes of wider application could be developed.

4. The 19th Session of the UN Population Commission is the first in which the results of the monitoring of population trends and policies requested by the WPPA (Article 107) was examined by Government representatives. At the time of writing, the author has only had access to the basic documentation prepared for the meeting. Perhaps the Report on the 19th Session contains very specific references to implementation of the Plan. The impression received from reading the documentation available, though, is that the Commission concentrated on examining demographic trends as reported by the Secretariat, and trends in policies as reported mainly through the Third Inquiry Among Governments. It also paid particular attention to the organization of the review and appraisal of progress made towards achieving the goals and recommendations of the Plan to be undertaken every five years by the United Nations system (Article 108).

Other Post-Bucharest Activities

Four World Conferences on Food, Women, Habitat, and Employment plus the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly took place in the two-year period following the adoption of the WPPA. The preamble to the Plan declares it "a policy instrument within the broader context of the internationally adopted strategies for national and international progress," and the Background to Plan states that it "must be considered as an important component of the system of international strategies." This being the case, one would expect that instruments emanating from these four conferences would have made very explicit references to what could legitimately be called the world strategy on population matters. Unfortunately this did not happen: there were few references to the WPC and the WPPA,

and, in some instances, no reference at all. Very little recognition was made of the apothegm so insistently repeated in the Plan that "population and development are interrelated" and that "population variables influence development variables and are also influenced by them," (Article 14 (c)). This could be interpreted as implying that the international community still has a long, and perhaps very difficult, road to follow in order to move from mere declaration of principles to effective action in understanding the network of relationships among economic, social, cultural, and political factors determining demographic processes, and the possible avenues of intervention to affect these processes in order to "coordinate population trends and the trends of economic and social development" - the explicit aim of the WPPA. The evident lack of coherence and continuity cannot be attributed only to the fact that, in some cases, government representatives, not being the same at all meetings, might emphasize different aspects of the constellation of problems. The idea that the most promising approach to the problems of development is through a coordinated attack on all of the underlying factors responsible for a given socioeconomic situation has yet to permeate most national political structures.

1. The World Food Conference adopted only one short Resolution (IX) specifically devoted to population in which it recognized "that the increasing demand for food is related in particular to the unprecedented population growth."¹⁸ But when referring to the "right to determine the number and spacing of births," the same resolution failed to go as far as the WPPA by limiting that right with the provision that it should be exercised "in accordance with national needs." By contrast, there is no reference in the Declaration adopted by the Conference on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition to population policies or their relation to agrarian or other policies. Perhaps greatest complementarity between the two conferences can be found in the recommendations regarding rural development (Resolution II in Food Conference and Article 46 (e) and Resolution I of the Population Conference).

2. The World Conference of the International Women's Year came closer to reinforcing in several respects the decisions taken at Bucharest. Article 32 (b) of the WPPA states that among the development goals having an "effect on the socioeconomic context of reproductive decisions that tend to moderate fertility levels" is that of "the full integration of women into the development process," and goes on to point to some of the means by which this might be accomplished. Here one can point to perfect coherence between the approaches of the two conferences. Implementation of their recommendations should be mutually reinforcing: fuller integration of women into societal roles should have a significant impact on reproductive behaviour. Both conferences recognized: a) the need for achieving equality of status for men and women in the family and in society; b) the right to enter into marriage "only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses" (WPPA Article 39 (d)); c) "the right of individuals and couples to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children"¹⁹; d) the close interrelation of social, economic and demographic factors ("Change in one or more inevitably² involves changes in others")²⁰; and e) the legitimacy of having population policies and programmes, within the framework of overall development plans.

3. Only in the Final Report on the Conference on Human Settlements did the author find an explicit reference to the WPPA. The reference appears in Chapter II devoted to "Recommendations for National Action,"²¹ where it is determined that each country must act with urgency to establish a national policy on human settlements that takes into account the distribution of the population in the national territory.

It is stated that the WPPA is one of the items to be considered (the last one on the list). Perhaps it is a biased interpretation, but it appears to the author that the recommendations adopted in Vancouver remove the whole area of population distribution from the domain of those responsible for population policies both at the national and international level. A careful study of the

recommendations of the two conferences is needed in order to find out where their recommendations are, indeed, complementary and where they might give rise to uncoordinated action.

4. At the time of writing the author did not have access to the Report on the World Employment Conference, but judging from the content of the Report submitted to the Conference by the Director General of ILO, it can be surmised that the population topic, more precisely that of population policies, was noticeable by its absence from the deliberations. In part II of that Report dealing with National Strategies under the section on Social Policies, it is stated that "it would not be appropriate to discuss in this report the still controversial issue of population policies."²² From the ensuing discussion it appears as if these policies were considered as referring primarily to family planning.

5. The main agreements reached during the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly were registered in Resolution 3362 (S-VII) adopted on September 16, 1975. It is not possible to find there even an indirect reference to population. Barnett F. Baron²³ has tried to discover a link in a recommendation included in Part III Paragraph 9 of that Resolution, to the effect that WHO and UNICEF intensify efforts aimed at improving health conditions in developing countries by providing, among other things, "primary health services to the communities, including maternal and child health and family welfare." Baron offers some interpretations of the lack of attention to population by the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly, namely the desire to avoid an ideological issue that can be divisive; the acceptance by the Assembly that population need not be a separate issue when discussing socioeconomic transformation, in line with the spirit of WPPA itself; and the fact that the Special Session was mainly understood by the developing countries as an occasion for stating what the developed world "owed" them and not for dealing with matters of national policy.²⁴

Without denying that some of the preceding statements help to explain what happened to the topic of population at the Seventh

Session, the author believes that it constitutes another example of the lack of general agreement on the need to tackle development with a coordinated attack on a constellation of socioeconomic problems, one of which is population.

The Post-Bucharest Response of UNFPA and the Specialized Agencies

Perhaps one of the most direct responses to the WPC and the WPPA on the part of UNFPA, in terms of definition of principles and statement of aims and purposes, is contained in the Report submitted by its Executive Director to the Twenty-second meeting of the UNDP Governing Council in June 1976.²⁵ In that document the Executive Director, while reaffirming the aims and purposes which ECOSOC originally assigned to the Fund, pointed to the need of changing emphasis in certain areas. For example, he recognized that awareness-creating activities should focus "more on reaching important population groups such as women, youth, local community leaders, religious, and political groups." He foresaw that assistance to countries will have "to be limited in time and phased out gradually"; and that, in this connection, priorities will have to be applied. The idea of adopting some "population-related grouping of countries" to organize the granting of the limited resources of the Fund is mentioned in this context as a means of assigning priorities. In fact, the Report proposes a group of 54 countries to be designated Priority Countries for Population Assistance (PCPA) which would receive 75 percent of the funds available. These countries are identified on the basis of the following demographic threshold levels:

- rate of population growth of 2.5 percent per annum;
- level of fertility in terms of gross reproduction rate of 2.5;
- infant mortality of 160 infant deaths per 1,000 live births; and
- population density on arable land of 2 persons per hectare.

Support to countries would include advice regarding the "setting of priorities in accordance with their established population objectives." Preference would be given to "activities designed to strengthen

the recipient countries self-reliance in population matters and benefit disadvantaged population groups." Among the projects promoting self-reliance which the Fund would be sympathetic to funding are "operational research and pilot projects exploring innovative approaches." UNFPA is "seeking ways to identify development programmes into which population activities can be integrated....In such collaborative efforts, the UNFPA should be prepared to fund the population components while other development assistance bodies support the other components of integral programmes." The Fund intends to pay particular attention to "disadvantaged and vulnerable population groups."

The UNFPA decided, as directed by the UNDP Governing Council, to give preference to country and regional projects, and to devote a rather modest proportion of its funds to interregional and global projects. A proposed "thorough study by region or subregion on the types of basic population activities required" should prove useful in further refining priorities. These could undoubtedly be revised periodically with the help of the "newly established machinery for monitoring UNFPA supported activities."

After the approval by the UNDP Governing Council of the UNFPA criteria for setting priorities, the Fund had to translate these into the proposed budget for 1977-1980. A review of this budget reveals that the project category to which the majority of the funds have been assigned is that of family planning (58.8 percent). This constitutes a significant departure from the period 1969-1975 when family planning was allotted 39.3 percent.

Because of the manner in which the report on activities of the UN specialized agencies for submission to the Population Commission²⁶ is prepared, it is difficult to pinpoint activities by organization and to establish clearly whether or not they were on-going projects at the time of the WPC or constitute a response to it. The report emphasizes activities in two categories of the Standard Classification of Population Activities (SCPA), namely Population Dynamics (SCPA 200) and Fertility and Family Planning (SCPA 400). The first of these

categories includes activities under the heading of population and development. While the pertinent part of the report claims that "work programmes of the bodies of the United Nations System...have expanded significantly," it is difficult to discover new innovative approaches to the study of the subject. Perhaps among the most novel subjects mentioned in this section are one on "income distribution and social disparities as related to mortality, fertility and migration," and another, a programme which "focusses on the integration of demographic variables in development strategies and population policies." Several projects seem to be planned or already underway trying to relate income to demographic factors.

One development is evident from the description contained in the document referred to above in regard to expansion of Fertility and Family Planning. This expansion was already underscored when discussing the UNFPA 1977-1980 budget allocations. On a more positive note, it appears that some attention will be devoted to the analyses of the World Fertility Survey data that are starting to become available. Another approach which would be considered as attempting to answer some of the concerns raised as a consequence of Bucharest is the involvement of the UN Division of Public Administration in the study of certain pertinent aspects of family planning programmes.

The UNFPA budget allocation assigns 2 percent of the total budget for 1977-1980 to the Population Policy category, the same proportion allotted during the years 1969-1975. But while for the earlier period the annual average assigned to this category was U.S. \$580,000, this average will amount to \$2,418,000 in the next four years. It is to be regretted that the document describing the activities of the bodies of the UN system working in the field of population did not attribute more importance to the description of projects in this area. Apparently the newest addition to the programme is that related to "institution-building" for population policy purposes. It seems as if the pertinent members of the UN system are still in search of means and ways of collaborating in this important field.²⁷

The Post-Bucharest Response of the Community of Donors

Inertia is not only a characteristic of demographic behaviour and international bureaucracies; it also affects the community of donors in the population field. Two and a half years is, however, too short a time to expect pronounced changes in the priorities donors attach to different components of the field. There are, as in other cases, commitments to on-going projects, mechanisms for approval of programmes and budgets that operate under schedules difficult to modify, and, above all, deep-seated convictions as to what is important and pertinent in the population field. Because of all these constraints, earlier evaluations of the impact of Bucharest upon donors' attitudes have arrived at the conclusion that it has been rather insignificant.²⁸ The author tends to disagree with that perception. Perhaps she can be told that some of the signs of change pointed out below were already in the making when the WPC met. Even so, they represent in her opinion changes that relate to the approaches that were so ardently discussed in Bucharest.

The first symptoms of change are the "introspection" exercises which have recently been undertaken by some of the donors, in some instances through external advisers, as in the case of the World Bank and the IPPF, and in others as an internal review, such as that conducted by the Population Council. The International Review Group of Social Science Research on Population and Development, which is being sponsored by nine donors, including UNFPA, could also be taken as an indication of their desire to receive guidance in connection with important aspects of the implementation of the WPPA.

It is perhaps too early to evaluate the influence of the Berelson Report on the World Bank's population programme. There are some indications that the Bank will consider utilizing some of its projects for what has been termed "controlled experimentation." There should also be no doubt that the Bank will attempt to evaluate and monitor the population impact of its activities in sectors other than population more closely. In-depth studies of population and development in a half dozen countries are a strong possibility. The research

programme would include topics such as: Population Growth and Savings, Women's Activities and Fertility, and Education-Fertility Relationships, all of great current relevancy.

The internal review undertaken by the Population Council led to a significant reorganization of its structure and objectives. Paramount among the changes is the establishment of the Center for Policy Studies. While retaining interest in the development of new contraceptive techniques and the delivery of family planning services the Council is broadening its field of concern to include topics that fall in line with issues arising from Bucharest.

A significant new approach may be developing within the USAID population programme, judging from a study conducted in Pakistan with AID's support entitled "Population Impact of the Development Perspective." The preface to the Preliminary Report states that the idea "originated with the observation that it might be possible to assess the impact on population growth of government policies, programs and projects which have specific objectives other than that of affecting the rate of population growth" - a concept closely related to the discussions held at the WPC. An extension of this approach is presently included in pending legislation that would require assessment of the impact on growth of all development projects financed with U.S. foreign assistance. Implementation of this proposal would present challenging difficulties considering that existing socioeconomic research provides a less than completely adequate base for such evaluations. Nevertheless, the proposal might have an important impact, provided that those responsible for its execution do not fall into the simplification of once more attributing miraculous benefits to fertility reduction, or into the danger of selecting projects on the basis of criteria to which host countries attach minor or no importance.

The Ford Foundation appears to be giving "major emphasis to development of capacity for research and linkages to policy in the developing world."

A closer scrutiny of the programmes being supported by other donors might also reveal some change in emphasis. Unfortunately the author has had access to rather broad descriptions of these programmes where she has been unable to detect any significant reorientation of efforts.

The preceding comments refer to modifications in donor attitudes, not to changes regarding the actual amounts available for support of new innovative projects. While there is no denying that funds for population have apparently been more difficult to obtain and have not increased in the last few years, the author has not given much importance to a comparison of the funds available for population projects before and after Bucharest because of her conviction that "where there is the will, there is the power." The somber predictions about diminishing funds for population, while certainly not unrelated to the economic situation of the donor countries, is also perhaps related to the dissatisfaction of an important group of donors with the results of the WPC.

Recent Demographic Trends and Positions of Governments Post-Bucharest

As would be expected when an instrument such as the WPPA is adopted to guide the actions of countries and international organizations in the population field, many sectors (governments, UN organs and Secretariat, donors in the field, non-governmental organizations, population scholars, journalists, etc.) become interested in learning about its impact through time. The information sought relates both to the behaviour of governments vis-à-vis the adoption of measures to implement the recommendations of the Plan and to the evolution of given demographic variables.

Under the Chapter on "Recommendations for Implementation," the WPPA itself contains a section comprising three articles devoted to the "monitoring of population trends and policies" and to the "review and appraisal of progress made towards achieving the goals and recommendations" of the Plan.²⁹

It vested responsibility in "appropriate bodies of the United Nations system." Complying with these provisions, the UN Population Commission met last January to examine the results of the first exercise of monitoring population trends and policies. The comments below draw on the two documents³⁰ submitted by the Population Division to the 19th Session of the Commission.

Changes in Governments' Perceptions of Demographic Factors
and of Population Policies

The first evident fact, when evaluating changes in the population policies field since Bucharest, is that the number of countries whose governments have adopted population policies with whatever content, remain significantly the same (around 40), with Peru (September 1976) being perhaps the latest addition to the list. The Bucharest impact can be primarily detected in the efforts of several governments to streamline their programmes (even designating such changes as the adoption of a "new policy") and to the overhaul of the corresponding administrative machinery. Perhaps the best examples are India, where compulsory sterilization has been suggested at the state level and an increasing use of abortion is being attempted; Bangladesh, where the policy has been broadened towards a multi-sectoral approach; and Pakistan, where efforts are being made to adopt the so-called "development perspective" in connection with modification of the variables towards which the policy is aimed.

The document in which the UN Population Division summarizes the result of monitoring population policies is based primarily on the replies to the "Third Inquiry among Governments," and refers to the situation existing around July 1, 1976. The document does not attempt to present the current situation regarding the operation of population policies in countries having one, and limits itself to recording what have been labeled government "perceptions" regarding certain demographic factors and population policies. Some very striking facts emerge from an examination of the pertinent tables.

1. In 48 developing countries, comprising 81 percent of the population of the less developed regions, governments express the desirability of lower rates of population growth; a situation that cannot be considered significantly different from that prevailing before the WPC, but which, if the desires were accomplished, would have important implications for the projections of the world population to the year 2000. If the actual evolution of the growth rates were to follow the trends desired by governments, the UN estimates that the world population in the year 2000 would be 5,972 million, implying a reduction of more than 280 million from the total calculated with the "medium variant" of previous projections. In the face of this conclusion, the document stresses the importance of better helping "governments realize their aspirations, rather than to try to change them." This conclusion undoubtedly constitutes a guide for action both at the national and the international level.

2. "Only 24 countries out of 156, divided equally between developed and developing countries, perceive no problems related to their rates of natural increase."

3. "The number of countries having recourse to exclusively demographic options (in their efforts to modify population variables) is very limited," but "only 13 countries use the whole range of possible options."

4. "In the developing countries, two main trends are emerging in the perception of problems related to mortality: a virtual universal awareness of excess mortality among very small children, and of the disadvantaged position of the rural population."

5. A significant change has occurred as to the number of developing countries (54) that in 1976 considered their levels of fertility as "too high" as compared with those in 1974 (42). Even after considering that the total number of countries surveyed has changed in the intervening period, the proportions continued to show an important shift of opinion (39.6 percent in 1974 against 47.4 percent in 1976).

6. Of the preceding 54 countries, 40 have actually taken measures directed toward reducing fertility.

7. "Only 15 countries in the world limit access to modern contraceptive methods." This number is split almost evenly between developed and developing countries.

8. "Abortion has made little progress as an instrument for action on the overall fertility level."

9. Only 19 countries (13 developed and 6 developing) find acceptable the spatial distribution of their populations. "A majority of 100 countries wishes to slow down the flow of migration" and "only 17 have policies aimed at reversing migration."

10. Governments' attitudes toward international migration, both immigration and emigration, have changed, but mainly as a result of considering other than its demographic consequences.

11. There has not been any significant action taken among most developing countries to establish administrative machinery for dealing with population policies. "The establishment of permanent or temporary institutions of the above-mentioned type has been more widespread in the developed than in the developing countries." Because of this and other obstacles, the integration of population policies into overall planning continues to remain little more than an aspiration.

12. "In 1976 a dual trend in the formulation of demographic policies may be observed: on the one hand, there has been a universalization of some forms of intervention which are purely demographic but which have elements that they had previously lacked; and, on the other hand, there is almost general recourse to intervention designed to act on several levels at once."

13. The interest in population matters is reflected by the fact that the number of countries responding to the different inquiries carried out by the United Nations has been increasing, as witnessed by the following figures:

1963	53
1974	74
1976	103

While these figures should be considered in relation to the number of United Nation members in each of the years mentioned, they do reveal an increasing concern on the part of governments for population issues.

Demographic Trends

As has been pointed out repeatedly, any efforts at detecting changes in demographic trends among developing countries, especially within rather short spans of time, are always faced with the deficiency and in certain cases, the unavailability of data. It is very difficult, unless one refers to a rather limited number of cases, to have an overall view of a country's demographic situation. This is why recent reviews³¹ have referred to groups of countries or regions, highlighting certain cases deemed important because of the size of their populations. Even in these cases the situation is examined at the aggregate national level, which gives only partial insight into possible on-going changes. This difficulty points to the need for devising and applying means of obtaining current data on the basic demographic variables and making an effort to go beyond national aggregates so that a true monitoring of emerging trends can be established.

In spite of the shortcomings mentioned above, it is possible to advance certain conclusions as to how general demographic trends have been evolving since 1950. The Population Division document mentions:

1. "Momentous breaks with the past."
2. "Enormous regional disparities." The present overall difference of more than 1.5 percentage points between the growth rate of the less and more developed regions "might well be found to exceed the largest disparities at any period in human history."
3. In the developed regions, "rates of natural increase have slowed down to a point where near-equality of births and deaths could soon be in sight."
4. In the less developed regions the average rate of growth "is today not far below 2.5." Increasing numbers of developing nations "give recent signs of decelerating growth."

5. One of the striking features of observed patterns of demographic change has been "the speed with which they have emerged." Precipitous declines have occurred in the fertility of the developed regions and an equally precipitous decline in the mortality of the less developed.

6. "For the first time in the modern era, a technological ceiling on length of life is being approached throughout today's developed regions." The average longevity in the less developed regions rose significantly more than the increase experienced by the developed regions, thus creating a "massive international convergence of survival prospects" that "matches or exceeds the degree of convergence to be found in any major sphere of social behaviour during the 20th century."

7. International migration movements have not escaped the "innovative patterns of change." The European Continent turned from being a net sender to becoming a net receiver; there has been an acceleration of migration from the less developed to the more developed regions.

8. "Unprecedented change and drastic transitions in the scale and growth of world urbanization." The global urban population more than doubled in the last twenty-five years, "implying a greater increase than in all previous history." Last year "a new demographic milestone was reached when the urban size of the less developed regions became equal to that of the more developed regions."

9. Contrast between trends in the rural population of the more and less developed regions are also outstanding. The former have been losing rural population in the last 25 years, while in the latter rural population continued to increase at rather high rates. The ratio of rural inhabitants in the less to the more developed regions "has accelerated in probably an unparalleled fashion" from over a 3 to 1 in 1950 to a 6 to 1 margin in 1975.

10. It seems fair to infer that "the gap between infant mortality in the less developed areas and the more developed regions as a whole, has fallen greatly since 1950."

11. Contrary to what has happened with mortality, the gap between the levels of fertility of the two areas not only has not narrowed, but has probably increased. "The current ratio may well be the highest in centuries, perhaps the highest in millenia."

12. While convergence of fertility trends is apparent in the developed regions, "significant widening of national differentials" seem to be the case in the less developed areas.

13. "Fertility has begun to decline by significant amounts in a growing number of countries, which had presented until very recently high levels of fertility." It cannot be discarded that this downward trend will be more rapid than that experienced by the industrialized nations.

The preceding summarizes the main perceptible demographic trends. Their aggregated nature provides an insight as to how the world population variables are evolving. They are of less direct value for specific programmatic action at the country level, but nevertheless point to areas to which action should be directed in order to strengthen the continuation of emerging positive trends and to avoid the continuation of undesirable ones.

Conclusions

This review of the gamut of events and activities, and changes in attitudes that have taken place since the adoption of the WPPA should not leave any doubt that the WPC had considerable repercussions in the population field. If anything, these repercussions are only beginning to become evident and more changes should be expected, especially if all interested sectors (national governments, inter-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations) continue to look to the WPPA for stimulus and guidance in the search for ways and means of changing those demographic trends considered as unacceptable or unsalutary.

The WPPA stands out as a potentially strong political instrument. A re-reading of the preceding pages has led the author to advance some recommendations to strengthen its implementation.

The preceding analysis of post-Bucharest events shows that there continues to exist an incongruity between the declared aims of the WPPA and the treatment of population matters in other spheres of activity within intergovernmental bodies, particularly those of the United Nations. A concerted effort should be undertaken to achieve a convergence of positions regarding population in all economic and social strategies guiding efforts at the country level. The reports of the world conferences on the Environment, Food, International Women's Year, Human Settlements, and Employment should be reexamined for leads as to how to accomplish stronger coordination and complementarity of efforts among the different institutions with specific responsibilities in areas related to topics covered by those Conferences. The UN Population Division in collaboration with UNFPA could possibly play an important role in this regard.

There are other actions that could help to produce the needed convergence of efforts. Some stand out not only as evident, but as rather easy to take. In certain instances the actions suggested below are perhaps not even original, since they have undoubtedly been advanced on other occasions. Their only merit may arise from the fact that they are placed against the background summarized in this paper.

Apparently, creating an awareness of population issues continues to be of paramount importance among the countries and organs of the UN system, as well as among the Secretariats of the latter.

The population activities of the Secretariats of certain intergovernmental bodies within the UN system and of some departments of the United Nations proper, appear to be marginal to the efforts to implement the WPPA. Special efforts should be made to develop a coherent and integrated "population programme" for the entire UN system. The programme should be geared so as to deepen and expand activities in those fields for which significant support exists among member countries, giving emphasis to those activities that are already showing some promise of stimulating desired changes in demographic behaviour. In this regard, particular attention should be

paid to the diversity among regions, and among and within countries. A careful rereading of the reports and documents of the post-Bucharest regional consultations is bound to give greater insight into potential lines of action for a concerted attack on some of the problems highlighted at those meetings.

One would have thought that two and a half years should have been ample time to have overcome existing limitations and to have effected innovations within the system. The statements recorded elsewhere in this paper show, however, that the system is still seeking to define the type of collaboration needed in order to "further develop" activities related to the formulation and implementation of population policies.

It appears that an in-depth study should be undertaken to determine how the existing "population programme" might be revised to reflect more clearly the concerns that were expressed at Bucharest.

A field which is in evident need of a wider commitment from the UN system is that of the integration of population policies into overall planning. A related subject is the development of institutional organizations to deal with these policies. It might well be advantageous to organize an active technical assistance programme at the international level to render advice to developing countries attempting to set up or reorganize high level government units responsible for population policy. The international character of the programme would help overcome the potential limitation that arises from the shortage of skilled professionals experienced in bridging the gap between population studies and public policy. Furthermore, it would facilitate standardization of procedures in areas where this would not interfere with the required specificity at the national or subnational level.

In line with the basic principle emphasized in the WPPA that population and development are interrelated, institutions of the UN system granting financial support to development programmes should seriously investigate the possibility of including a population component in their assistance, and should also attempt to evaluate the impact on population variables of selected projects that they

are endeavouring to finance upon termination of these projects.

The donor community plays an important role in determining the direction to be taken by population activities. This paper has pointed to what have been identified as changing emphases in certain aspects of the donors' programmes. The trends toward new approaches should be reinforced, paying particular attention to leads emanating from Bucharest. One can be hopeful that a new, less pessimistic evaluation of the potential impact of the WPPA would be conducive to the enlargement of funds available for population projects or, perhaps, to a reorientation of investments toward new initiatives likely to be less expensive than those insistently applied in the past with rather modest results.

The monitoring undertaken by the United Nations, and to which reference was made above, revealed the emergence of important changes in demographic behaviour. Events such as rapid declines in fertility from "pre-transitional" levels offer researchers unprecedented opportunities to study the origins of fertility decline and to discover the factors that lie behind these phenomena. Knowledge of how these behavioural changes are determined would have implications not only for the type of policy decisions that could help reinforce these new trends, but also for the possibilities of replicating them in other contexts. Similarly, the results of the Third Inquiry indicate that there are new opportunities to study countries in which several policies for stimulating demographic change are being implemented at the same time. Understanding how different policies operate could help to strengthen those deemed more effective for the attainment of the goals in question.

This paper has shown that some new initiatives in population assistance are being explored or are being proposed for exploration. Some of these innovations should be more carefully studied before firmer and wider application is made of them. Two examples are discussed below.

1. While the proposal made by UNFPA for adopting a "population-related-grouping-of-countries" criteria could turn out to be a useful

tool for devising programmes applicable to several countries at once, the "thresholds" that have been proposed have several defects. The values of the relevant demographic variables are often difficult to establish, even within quite wide limits. Also, since these values refer to national averages, in concrete cases they could hide important differences between sub-groups of the same population. In these respects the grouping of countries proposed leaves much to be desired. Furthermore, even though priorities are indispensable to the granting of international aid, the strict application of the UNFPA criteria might not necessarily lead to helping governments fulfill their expressed aspirations regarding demographic goals, a principle that should constitute the cornerstone of international technical assistance.

2. The second example concerns experimental projects which have been cited as a means to explore innovative approaches. These are usually plagued by numerous problems, as Cuca and Pierce³² have shown, and it seems that greater attention should be paid to their true potential.

Finally, it is evident that detecting progress in the implementation of the WPPA will depend, among other things, on close scrutiny of developments at the country level. Considerable attention should be paid to the plans for the review and appraisal called for in Article 108. These reviews should go beyond the global and regional levels, even if selectively, so as to be able to identify activities that could have multiplicative effects. It should also be recognized that there will be few opportunities to periodically monitor trends in demographic behaviour unless current demographic data become more widely available. The implementation of innovative methods for early detection of changes in demographic variables is, therefore, indispensable.

In connection with the review and appraisal, perhaps it would be advisable to study carefully the situation in the few remaining countries that impose restriction on access to modern contraceptive methods in order to understand the motives behind the disregard of this basic human right.

A final rather broad conclusion emerges from the preceding pages: the task of implementing the WPPA, and eventually modifying it, must

be a continuous one. Ingenuity, intent of purpose, and devotion to the higher values of mankind are required from all sectors concerned if the goals of coordinating population trends and the trends of economic and social development are to be accomplished.

OVERVIEW OF RECENT POPULATION POLICIES*

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In the course of the past few years there has been a burgeoning of new population policies and a strengthening of existing policies, some of which have been the object of swelling political controversies, such as that which occurred last year in India, when the Government was vigorously criticized for its family planning activities based on more or less forced sterilization. In the area of population, as well as in that of the environment, it is apparent that popular opinion has become an important political force.

There has also been considerable progress in the implementation of population policies, that is, a greater emphasis on measures, whether they be methods for the regulation of births or the increased availability of services.

One might emphasize that population policies have never before elicited the attention of governments to the extent that they have in the past few years, particularly within a political context, largely as a result of the growing interest in development problems on an international scale.

The present decade might well figure in the history of ideas as one in which there was the awakening of a nearly universal conscience as to the necessity and urgency for action in the realm of population, in spite of the ideological quarrels which have long clouded the discussion and inhibited decisions. However, any attempt to establish clear links between the major ideologies and present attitudes of governments toward demographic matters has become a nearly impossible task.

The definition of population policy should be construed in a broad sense, that is to say, all factors which have a bearing on demographic parameters, whether in a quantitative or a qualitative sense, have a direct influence on a population's well-being, whereas economic and social policies have in turn an indirect influence on demographic parameters. This definition of population policy conforms with the letter and the spirit of the World Population Plan of Action adopted at the Bucharest Conference, and, notably, with paragraph 31, which states:

*The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

It is recommended that countries wishing to affect fertility levels give priority to implementing development programmes and educational and health strategies which, while contributing to economic growth and higher standards of living, have a decisive impact upon demographic trends, including fertility.

Of course, in the area of population, as in many others, the absence of action, that is, the laissez faire option, may represent a decision not to intervene and must be considered a policy as well.

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An analysis which has been undertaken of 156 countries permits one to arrive at conclusions which are rather clear.

1. First, there is no longer any existing doubt that the populations of the Third World desire to reduce their rate of growth. The analysis showed, in effect, that 81% of the Third World's population resides in countries whose governments have declared a lower rate of population growth to be desirable, 16% in countries whose governments consider the rate of growth to be satisfactory, and only 3% in countries whose governments desire higher rates. Of course, the term "satisfactory" might be interpreted as reflecting an attitude of laissez faire, or a desire not to express an official opinion, or perhaps an attitude of watchful waiting.

2. In contrast, in the developed countries, nearly all Governments have expressed a desire to increase their rate of growth, or, at least, to prevent it from declining further. This is especially the case in the socialist countries. This contrast between the Third World and the industrialized countries exists on a number of points, as will be noted in the course of this analysis.

The industrialized countries, many of which have lived for a long time with the idea of moderate growth, are now beginning to question if the decline in fertility, first discernible shortly before the Second European Demographic Conference in 1971, will not give way to a sustained decline, and is considered by some to be a disturbing sign of a perhaps more profound societal crisis. Europe wonders if, carried along by the momentum, the decline will not go too far.

It would seem that it is the strong desire of most of the industrialized countries to remain as close as possible to a stationary level.

The fear which is aroused by the prospect of a demographic decline is a longstanding one, and one which evokes perhaps greater concern than the prospect of moderate growth, or even of rapid growth.

3. Looking at the question in terms of numbers of countries rather than in terms of population size, the results of the analysis are slightly different. For example, 16 of the industrialized countries--with the exception of New Zealand--have expressed a preference for a rate of growth at least as high as they have at present. In the Third World, however, 48 countries--compared to 21--clearly would prefer a lower rate. The difference in the responses when the question is considered in terms of numbers of governments rather than population size points up the fact that it is the larger countries of the Third World which have generally tended to desire to reduce their rate of population growth. Indeed, 6 out of the 8 countries in the Third World with more than 50 million inhabitants desire to reduce their rate of population growth. The two exceptions are Brazil and Nigeria. However, since 1976, the date of the inquiry, it would appear that the position of both of these countries has somewhat softened, and they have accepted at least the principle of the regulation of births, if not for demographic reasons, at least as a right of the individual and of couples.

4. In four-fifths of all countries, both the Third World and the developed countries, governments consider that the rate of population growth is an important factor in relation to development, whether they consider their present rate to be too high or too low. Less than a fifth of all countries consider that, although an important factor, population growth is not of major importance.

What is important to note is the significance attached by governments to demographic growth, whether they consider it to be too high, as is often the case in the Third World countries, or whether it is seen as insufficient, as is more often the case in the industrialized countries, particularly among those in the socialist bloc. Indeed, there is hardly a country which does not consider population growth to be an important factor in relation to development. The World Population Plan of Action, in its chapter on principles and objectives, sums up this attitude when it states: ...the formulation of a World Population Plan of Action

reflects the international community's awareness of the importance of population trends for socio-economic development... (14c).

5. It is generally the most populous countries of the Third World which consider demographic growth to be a constraint on their development. Not a single country in the Third World with a population of more than 20 million inhabitants desires to increase its rate of population growth. It is true, of course, as previously noted, that, with the exception of China, these are generally the countries which presently have the highest rates.

Thus, there exists something of an inverse relationship between size and Governments' perceptions, since those countries in the Third World with the largest population tend to be the ones where demographic growth is regarded as being too high--a phenomenon which is perhaps linked to administrative difficulties arising from their large size, particularly in countries such as China and India, which will have some one billion inhabitants before the end of the century (One is aware, for example, of the efforts in certain Indian political spheres to "regionalize" the country.) The most populous countries have also been among the first to adopt policies for the regulation of fertility: India in 1952, China in 1956, Bangladesh and Pakistan in 1958, and, more recently, Indonesia in 1967, Mexico in 1971 and Brazil in 1977.

6. It is interesting to note that if the desires expressed by governments in the inquiry should become a reality by the year 2000, the total volume of the world's population by that year would hardly be greater than the low variant of the United Nations projections, or 5.84 billion, compared to the medium variant projection of 6.25 billion or the high variant of 6.64.

The degree of uncertainty surrounding the medium variant projection is on the order of 7 per cent; the final figure will no doubt depend on the magnitude of the reduction in Southern Asia. The margin of uncertainty would seem at first to be small, and might give the impression that one can not hope for too much from population policies, given the accumulated growth potential in population structures, resulting from high levels of fertility in the past.

However, a difference on the order of 400 million inhabitants between the last decades of the present century and a more or less distant point in

time is far from negligible. First, this difference would be largely concentrated in certain Third World countries, notably in those which have experienced the most acute demographic pressures. Second, since the demand for food already exceeds the supply in four out of five Third World countries; by the end of the century, when the world's population will increase by some 104 million inhabitants per annum, the deficit will be considerably greater, in spite of considerable technological progress in agriculture. With regard to employment, it will be necessary to train and to absorb nearly one billion new entrants into the labour market in the course of the next 25 years, nearly as large a contingent as is presently available, and, given the overall context of under-employment, a difference on the order of 7 per cent would be of considerable importance. Similar calculations might be made with respect to education, housing and so on. But, above all, if those population policies which have been freely adopted by governments were to be effective even to the extent that has been indicated, they would serve as a sort of "rocket launcher", providing the needed impetus for countries to attain a stationary population. Although most countries in the Third World will not attain a stationary population until the middle of the next century, the point at which their populations level off will largely depend on their trajectory at the beginning. Of course, it is in the truly long-term, rather than in the short or medium term that the impact of these actions will really be felt, at a time when those who initiated these actions will no longer be witness to their results.

7. The correlation between Governments' perceptions of the acceptability of their rate of population growth and the actual level of their population growth is not without certain ambiguities. For example, Brazil, with a rate of growth of 2.8, Algeria with 3.2, Madagascar with 2.9, Kuwait, with a rate of natural increase of 3.5 and a rate of growth of 7.1, consider their population growth to be acceptable, whereas India, with a rate of 2.4, China with 1.8, Bangladesh with 1.7, and the Republic of Korea, with 2.0, consider their rate of growth to be excessive. Thus, it is clear that one must not stop at an analysis of the figures, since the attitude of a government is not merely a function of its rate of population growth but

of the overall standard of living. Taking into account such factors as the relationship between population size and the space which a population occupies, between consumers and the resources which they consume, is of great importance. The attitudes of governments may depend on demographic considerations which may vary from one country to another. The quality of life rather than ideologies often influences decisions taken with respect to population matters, a fact which has been previously noted.

The fact that one finds countries with a high rate of population growth in the "acceptable" category is also explainable, since those governments which have not adopted a policy of intervention with respect to the regulation of births are often content with a laissez faire policy; conversely, one finds countries with a lower rate of growth in the excessive category since these countries may have adopted an effective policy at some time in the past which has already had an impact on the country's demographic trends.

8. One notes, therefore, that the great majority of countries attach great importance to the subject of population growth but most are not satisfied with their own position. However, it must be noted that not all countries desire to intervene to redress this situation. Only three-fifths of the developing countries and two-fifths on the industrialized countries have indicated a desire to intervene to modify their rate of demographic growth. However, if one takes into account the size of their respective populations rather than the total numbers, one notes that 80% of the inhabitants of the Third World and 40% of the inhabitants of the developed countries reside in countries whose governments consider that action is necessary to modify global demographic trends.

9. Those countries in the Third World which desire to attain a lower rate of population growth have generally indicated preference for direct methods of intervention rather than for indirect ones, without, of course, abandoning the latter. The prevailing sentiment is that one must place greater confidence in methods capable of bringing about more rapid solutions--to problems whose urgency has been widely recognized.

This would appear to be in contradiction to the frequently expressed opinion that the problem of rapid population growth must not be conceived

solely in terms of fertility and techniques for the regulation of births, but should be considered within the broader context of policies directed at socio-economic change. In the industrialized countries the preference is likewise for more direct methods, the access to which is considered to be a fundamental right.

As previously noted, the decline in fertility in the Third World has been due up to now largely to changes in economic and social factors rather than to family planning programmes, although this is not to say that an intensification of these programmes in the future will have less of an impact than that of development policies.

10. The arguments which are most frequently advanced by Third World countries which desire to reduce their rate of population growth are those of excessive unemployment, the need for preservation of the environment, for the conservation of natural resources, and for a more equitable distribution of income, greater savings generation, and a greater efficiency in the overall workings of society. In those industrialized countries which desire to increase their rate of growth, the arguments advanced involve the need for more abundant manpower, the need to stimulate their economies and to achieve economies of scale, as well as for various reasons in the national interest. It is interesting to note that in 1976, the date of the analysis, the governments of the industrialized countries did not attribute the problem of unemployment to demographic growth, in spite of the fact that the economically active population in these countries was increasing as a result of two factors: the entrance of large numbers of women into the labour force and the arrival of the post war "baby boom" generation in the active ages, factors which explained the subsequent rise both in employment and in unemployment. In the United States, it is estimated that the arrival of this group in the productive ages, the increase in the rate of female activity, and the reduction of unemployment to 5% will, during the period 1975-1980, require the absorption of some 13 million new workers, more than the size of Canada's entire labour force-- a situation which might be compared to the arrival of massive contingents of migrants during the period from the 1880s to the First World War.

11. Perhaps the most remarkable result of the analysis is the following: a majority of the inhabitants of the Third World live in

countries whose governments consider that the present level of fertility is too high and which have authorized their populations to have access to modern methods for the regulation of births, whether for direct or indirect objectives. Those governments which have not adopted such a stance are chiefly those with small populations whose weight in the total is not significant. In contrast, in the industrialized countries, suprising as it may seem, there are a significant number of countries (24%) which either do not allow or which restrict access to methods for the regulation of births, chiefly within the framework of governmental efforts for demographic expansion. These countries contain 12 per cent of the inhabitants of the industrialized world.

One cannot help noting how the situation has changed during the course of the last few years, for it would now be clearly incorrect to state that the governments of the Third World still are reticent on the topic of the regulation of births. What is now required of the countries of the Third World is less a willingness to act than a need to find the technical, financial and administrative means to convert principles into concrete programmes. The limits are now less those of politics than of the need for knowledge and resources.

13. In the Third World one notes the following changes in attitude between 1974 and 1976 with regard to rates of demographic growth.

A number of governments/^{have} continued to maintain the same position, or, indeed, have strengthened it, whether they consider it to be too high, as in the case of China, Barbados, the Republic of Korea, Bangladesh, Trinidad, Sri Lanka, Iran, Haiti, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Vietnam, Ghana, Pakistan, or too low, as in the case of the Korean Democratic Republic, Mongolia or Saudi Arabia.

A number of Governments have recently changed their policy, such as Mexico, which, at the time of the Bucharest Conference, clearly indicated its objection to the adoption of quantitative targets, but which, during the last year, identified the objective of lowering its rate of population growth, which is presently on the order of 3.0 per cent, to 2.5 per cent by 1982.

14. If one takes into account only those actions limited to demo-

graphic variables, there exist a variety of options. Take, for example, the case of Pakistan. According to projections calculated by means of a macro simulation model developed by the Population Division of the United Nations, it would be possible to reduce Pakistan's birth rate from 47 per thousand population to 28 per thousand by the year 2000 by adopting the following strategy: progressively raising the age at marriage of women from 16.6 to 20.0 years, decreasing the desired number of children from 4.2 to 3.4, raising the level of life expectancy at birth from 49.8 to 61.9, the percentage of couples practicing contraception from 21 to 65 and of those spacing births from 4 to 30, and by slightly raising the effectiveness of contraceptive methods, the percentage of abortions and that of sterilization. During the course of the past 20 years China has adopted a far bolder policy, which largely explains its subsequent results.

For the moment, we are incapable of quantifying the effects of indirect action--of improvements in educational levels, changes in the status of women etc.

It seems clear, however, that, generally speaking, since the Bucharest Conference the governments of the most important Third World countries have affirmed the necessity to lower their rate of population growth and have recognized that this will require concentrated efforts.

15. An additional problem which has received great attention from Third World governments is that of environmental sanitation, particularly as it affects mortality. Most governments in Third World countries are no more satisfied with their present level of mortality than they are with their fertility. Approximately 76 per cent of the governments of the industrialized countries consider their average level of life expectancy at birth to be satisfactory; however, one finds exactly the same proportion in the Third World which consider it to be unsatisfactory. This is the case of nearly all governments--indeed, there is only one exception--which have a level of life expectancy at birth of less than 50 years, and of three-fourths of those countries where the level of life expectancy is less than 62 years. (One will recall that the World Population Plan of Action set 62 years as the objective to be attained by all countries by 1985.) However, United Nations projections are based on the hypothesis that this objective will not be attained by 70 per cent of all countries, representing some 40%

of the world's population. According to United Nations projections, all of Africa, with the possible exception of North Africa, and all of the countries of Southern Asia, will not attain the level of 62 years before the end of the century, and then, this figure will represent more or less the average for the remainder of the Third World.

16. Governments have also strengthened and diversified their population policies in areas beyond those of fertility and mortality, taking a growing interest in the geographical distribution of their populations and in internal and international migration. Nearly all of the governments of Third World countries and the great majority of the industrialized countries have expressed dissatisfaction with regard to the distribution of their populations and have expressed a desire to adopt measures to resolve related problems. Internal migration streams are generally judged to be excessive. Governmental opinions with respect to international migration are far more varied, and it would be difficult to present a comprehensive view.

Increasingly, Governments desire to intervene on many fronts rather than to limit their actions to a single demographic variable, and not a few have clearly indicated a preference for actions which give priority to development as a means of resolving population problems.

Thus, since Bucharest we have seen the development of two movements: on the one hand, the desire to enlarge the scope of action with respect to population, and, on the other, the development of ideas and the intensification of efforts to bring about a deeper understanding of population problems in relation to development. More than ever, one has become aware that the problem of population is linked to all the other large problems that humanity must face, none of which should be considered in isolation.

Appendix IAttitude of governments toward rate of demographic increase in industrialized countries 1/Rates too low

a. Strong intervention of government desired	Argentina Bulgaria France German Democratic Republic Greece Liechtenstein Luxembourg Monaco Uruguay
b. Support of government desired	Byelorussian SSR Finland Germany, Fed. Republic of Holy See Ireland Ukrainian SSR USSR

Rates acceptableNo intervention desired

Albania
Australia
Austria
Canada
Chili
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Hungary
Iceland
Italy
Japan
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
San Marino
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Yugoslavia

Rates too highSupport of government desired

New Zealand

1/ For more detailed tables see World Population Trends and Policies, 1977. Monitoring Report. Vol. II. Part two: Population Policies. (United Nations publication Sales No.: 78.XIII.4).

Appendix II

Attitude of governments of developping countries toward rates of demographic increase by rate of increase(Countries with more than 35 million inhabitants in 1975 are underlined^{1/})

	<u>less than 2%^{2/}</u>	<u>2 to 2.5%^{2/}</u>	<u>more than 2.5%^{2/}</u>
<u>Rates too low</u>			
a. Strong intervention of government desired	Cameroon Central African Empire Gabon	Guinea Lao People's Democratic Rep. Mozambique	Bahamas Israel Ivory Coast Korea, Rep. Dem. Rep. Libya Mongolia Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates
b. Support of government desired		Bhutan	Kuwait Paraguay
<u>Rates acceptable</u>			
No intervention desired	Burundi Cap-Verde Chad Cyprus Cuba Ethiopia Gambia Guinea-Bissau Mauritius Singapour	Afghanistan Benin Burma Congo Malawi Mali Niger Rwanda Upper Volta Zaire	Algeria Bahrain Bolivia <u>Brazil</u> Guyana Honduras Iraq Jordan Lebanon <u>Nigeria</u> Panama Peru Somalia Sudan Syrian Arab Rep. Tanzania Togo Venezuela Yemen Yemen, Democratic Rep. Zambia

^{1/} For more detailed tables see World Population Trends and Policies, 1977. Monitoring Report. Vol. II. Part two: Population Policies. (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 78.XIII.4).

^{2/} Rate of increase in 1970-1975.

Appendix II (continued)

Attitude of governments of developping countries toward rates of demographic increase by rate of increase(Countries with more than 35 million inhabitants in 1975 are underlines^{1/})

	<u>less than 2%^{2/}</u>	<u>2 to 2.5%^{2/}</u>	<u>more than 2.5%^{2/}</u>
<u>Rates too high</u>			
a. Support of government desired		Liberia Senegal Sierra Leone	Costa Rica Ecuador Guatemala Madagascar Nicaragua
b. Strong intervention of government desired	Bangladesh Barbados China Grenada Haiti Jamaica Mauritius Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia	Botswana Egypt Fidji Ghana Korea, Rep. of Lesotho Nepal Sri Lanka Turkey Viet Nam	Colombia Dominican Rep. El Salvador India Indonesia Iran Kenya Malaysia Mexico Morocco Pakistan Papua New Guinea Philippines Samoa Seychelles South Africa Swaziland Thailand Tonga Uganda

^{1/} For more detailed tables see World Population Trends and Policies, 1977. Monitoring Report, Vol. II. Part two: Population Policies. (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 78.XIII.4).

^{2/} Rate of increase in 1970-1975.

Appendix VII

Per cent of countries whose Governments have the indicated view of their domestic demographic trends and policies, by world, more developed and less developed groupings, 1976

Government	World	More developed regions	Less developed regions
Natural increase makes positive contribution to development			
Major contribution	82	86	80
Minor contribution	19	14	20
Natural increases places constraint on development			
Major constraint	55	40	61
Minor constraint	30	31	29
None	14	29	11
Positive contributions outweigh constraints	47	67	39
Constraints outweigh positive contributions	44	21	52
Different natural increase rate desirable			
Higher rate	24	38	18
Lower rate	31	2	42
Direct intervention desirable to affect natural increase rate			
Upward	17	21	6
Downward	25	0	34
Attempts to affect natural increase rate undesirable	45	60	39

NOTE: Totals may not equal sums of components because of rounding.
 SOURCE: "Report on monitoring of population trends" (E/CN.9/XIX/CRP.5, dated 15 December 1976) presented to the nineteenth session of the Population Commission, 10-21 January 1977, Tables IX.1 to IX.5.

Appendix IV

Per cent of population whose Governments have the indicated view of domestic demographic trends and policies, by world, more developed and less developed groupings, 1976

Government view	World	More developed regions	Less developed regions
Natural increase makes positive contribution to development			
Major contribution	75	92	69
Minor contribution	24	7	31
Natural increase places constraint on development			
Major constraint	70	39	83
Minor constraint	15	25	11
None	14	36	6
Positive contributions outweigh constraints	36	83	17
Constraints outweigh positive contributions	62	10	82
Higher natural increase rate desirable	13	39	3
Lower natural increase rate desirable	58	0*	81
Direct intervention desirable to affect natural increase rate			
Upward	5	10	2
Downward	57	0	80
Indirect support			
Upward	8	29	0*
Downward	1	0*	1
Attempts to affect natural increase rate undesirable	29	61	17

NOTES:

* Less than 0.5 per cent.
Totals may not equal sums due to rounding.

SOURCE:

See Table 30.

Appendix V

Governments' perceptions of the impact of natural increase on development, its acceptability and the desirability of intervention to change rates: Countries in less developed regions having moderately high average life expectancy at birth (80 years and over, 1970-1974), July 1976

Governments' perceptions of the impact of natural increase as a constraint on development, and desirability of intervention		Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high		Rates too high	
		(A) predominant	(B) significant	(C) minor	(C) minor	(B) significant	(A) predominant
Governments' perceptions of the impact of natural increase as a positive contribution to development	(1)	higher rates desirable		higher or lower rates not desirable		lower rates desirable	
		full intervention appropriate	some support appropriate	no intervention appropriate	no intervention appropriate	some support appropriate	full intervention appropriate
(A) predominant	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
(B) significant	Demeratic People's Republic of Korea b/ Meyan Arab Republic b/c/ Mongolia b/ Nauru b/ Qatar b/c/ United Arab Emirates b/ Kwairt d/ Paraguay	Egypt Brazil Cuba Guyana e/ Singapore	Cyprus	Lebanon g/ Paraguay Venezuela	Costa Rica b/ Barbados China Colombia Fiji Grenada Mauritius Mexico Republic of Korea Seychelles Togo Tunisia and Tobago	14	
(C) minor	Bahamas Israel		5	Surinam g/	1		
TOTAL	8	2	5	5	1	14	

Appendix VI

Governments' perceptions of the impact of natural increase on development, its acceptability and the desirability of intervention to change rates: Countries in less developed regions having moderate average life expectancy at birth (between 50 and 59 years, 1970-1974), July 1976

Governments' perceptions of the impact of natural increase as a contribution to development	Governments' perceptions of the impact of natural increase as a constraint on development, and desirability of intervention					
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high		Rates too high	
	(A) predominant	(B) significant	(C) minor	(C) minor	(B) significant	(A) predominant
	higher rates desirable	some support appropriate	higher or lower rates not desirable	lower rates desirable	some support appropriate	full intervention appropriate
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(A) predominant			Algeria Iraq	Burma b/	Ecuador Guatemala Nicaragua f/	Iran Malaysia Morocco Philippines South Africa Thailand Turkey Uganda
(B) significant				Cape Verde c/ Honduras d/ Jordan e/ Peru Syrian Arab Republic		
(C) minor						Dominican Republic Egypt El Salvador Haiti Kenya Tunisia
TOTAL	-	-	2	6	3	11

Governments' perceptions of the impact of natural increase on development, and desirability of intervention to change rates: Countries in less developed regions having low average life expectancy at birth (under 50 years, by 1976), July 1976

Governments' perceptions of the impact of natural increase as a contributing factor to development, and desirability of intervention		Rates too low			Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high				
		(A) predominant	(B) significant	(C) minor	(A) predominant	(B) significant	(C) minor	(A) predominant	(B) significant	(C) minor		
(A) predominant	Higher rates desirable	full intervention appropriate	same support appropriate	no intervention appropriate	higher or lower rates not desirable	no intervention appropriate	no constraints	minor	no constraints	minor	same support appropriate	full intervention appropriate
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(B) significant	Lower rates desirable	same support appropriate	higher or lower rates not desirable	no intervention appropriate	higher or lower rates not desirable	no intervention appropriate	no constraints	minor	no constraints	minor	same support appropriate	full intervention appropriate
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(C) minor	Higher rates desirable	full intervention appropriate	same support appropriate	no intervention appropriate	higher or lower rates not desirable	no intervention appropriate	no constraints	minor	no constraints	minor	same support appropriate	full intervention appropriate
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
TOTAL		10	1	8	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	11

(A) predominant: Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Mauritius, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, United Republic of Cameroon, Liberia, Madagascar, Senegal, Somalia, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe.

(B) significant: Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Mauritius, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, United Republic of Cameroon, Liberia, Madagascar, Senegal, Somalia, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe.

(C) minor: Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Mauritius, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, United Republic of Cameroon, Liberia, Madagascar, Senegal, Somalia, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe.

The significance of the Bucharest conference on population

Léon Tabah

Our issue on 'Contributions to Population Policy' (Volume XXVI, No. 2, 1974) was given a special print run and copies were made available for wide distribution at the World Population Conference in Bucharest in August 1974. The article which follows is not only an acute assessment of this same conference by an eminent demographer but also contributes to the discussion on meetings in general as means of communication which is reported as part of the symposium on communicating and diffusing social science in our issue on that theme (Vol. XXVI, No. 3, 1974), especially pages 434 to 437. Léon Tabah, formerly of the Institut National d'Études Démographiques, Paris, is currently Director of the Population Division in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations. The opinions he expresses are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

Participants in international conferences are often said to spend their time discussing problems that have been threshed out thousands of times and evoking indisputable truths, only to end up by blurring all distinctions in an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable.

Anyone who follows these conferences closely, however, cannot fail to notice how increasingly worth while they are. First they bring together the representatives of some 120 to 130 countries, that is, of almost the whole world, giving them the opportunity to speak freely, generally at a high level, on problems which are of course mundane, pertaining as they do to everyday life, but which call for immediate action: food, environment, population, human settlements, emancipation of women, etc. All these problems are closely related and give the United Nations a chance to set an example by promoting unified development—economic, social and cultural—as opposed to purely quantitative growth.

Such meetings also afford an opportunity of testing the solidarity of the nations and reviewing in public the attitude adopted by each one.

They have the merit of alerting public opinion to fundamental transformation affecting mankind. Never have the mass media covered what are, after all, arid subjects with such earnestness as they have in recent years. No one seems to have tired of them, and yet these conferences follow one another at the rate of one or two a year. The net result of the operation is undoubtedly favourable, if only because of its instructive and educational effects on public opinion and even on the politicians themselves.

Then again, international conferences afford an excellent opportunity of seeing which way the political pendulum is swinging in regard to a particular problem and what is the fashion or ideological mood of the day. The attitude adopted towards vital problems such as population, trade, raw materials, reflect the pattern of alliances between nations just as faithfully as do the attitudes towards localized territorial conflicts. Those who pull the strings behind the international scene are just as clearly apparent. These problems offer a fertile field of activity for the chancelleries where, before each conference, everyone wonders whether it will be a Papin¹ meeting, merely intended for letting off steam, or whether a general political turning-point will be reached. Will one extreme be replaced by another or will conciliatory trends carry the day?

The role of the United Nations often consists of lending respectability to ideas formerly considered as unacceptable, and this it does

1. Denis Papin, seventeenth-century French physicist, author of precursory works on the use of steam and pressure-cookers in particular.—Ed.



Organization

admittedly at the cost of much repetition and in some cases tediously voluminous documentation. An instance of this is the world population problem, long regarded as taboo by international bodies. The time when contraception was denounced by many delegations as tantamount to genocide is still present in our memories. No delegation would venture to adopt such an attitude today for fear of ridicule. The population problem was always approached delicately, that is, from the technical standpoint, a veil being drawn over the more intimate aspects. Since the Bucharest population conference the problem is no longer the exclusive concern of the demographers and their social-scientist colleagues, now engaged on preparing the material for the politicians, who are alone responsible for taking the decisions. The essential give and take between knowledge and action comes into its own.

What were we to expect from Bucharest? Was the relatively faint echo of Dr Malthus to be picked up, or was there to be talk of great empty spaces, the boundless resources of technology and the treasures hidden by the earth's crust, justifying an encouraging view of the 'carrying capacity of the planet'? Which would predominate, obsessive anxiety or delirious optimism? Would it be finally a more reasonable attitude, in accordance with the wishes of a majority which is not always brave enough to express its opinion, a majority which is not silent but ashamed, with a sense of guilt, and which acclaims those who deny its existence—paradoxically to have a clear conscience.

Nothing new was said at Bucharest, no new idea enlivened the discussion. Yet this conference assumes exceptional importance through the message it transmitted to the international community. I am going to attempt here to give my own interpretation, guided solely by a concern for impartiality. Reading intentions is not easy. The best way to capture the true 'Bucharest spirit' is not just to peruse the text finally adopted, the result of those compromises which make United Nations documents at once insipid and ambiguous, but also to compare this text with the draft which the Secretariat prepared, trying to make it absolutely neutral.¹

First, a few words on the organizational aspects. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations secretariat, under the direction of Philippe de Seynes, was responsible for organizing the conference and it conferred the functions of Secretary-General on Antonio Carrillo-Flores, a prominent figure in Mexican diplomacy. Within this secretariat, the Population Division had the task of preparing for the discussion of the basic problems, and in particular of compiling, with the help of many experts of international repute, one of the most exhaustive collections of documents on the subject, which will be brought out in a forthcoming publication.² The Population Division was also entrusted with the organization of four symposia: one in Cairo, in June 1973, on population and development; one in Honolulu, in August 1973, on population and the family; one in Stockholm, in October 1973, on population, resources and the environment; and one in Amsterdam, in January 1974, on population and human rights. A sequence of operations had been decided on with the idea that the scientists should reflect individually or take part in a seminar on these questions before the politicians concerted.

Another task of the Population Division was to prepare, again under the direction of A. Carrillo-Flores, a 'World Population Plan of Action', which was submitted to the conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations after much refurbishing and many negotiations, having already been discussed prior to the conference at three sessions of an expert committee and two sessions of the Population Commission, and the Secretary-General of the conference having had consultations with many governments and Specialized Agencies on the subject. Several versions and successive alterations, intended to smooth over difficulties, resulted in a draft which

1. A detailed analysis of the Plan of Action will be found in Riad Tabbarah, 'Population Policy Issues in International Instruments: with Special Reference to the World Population Plan of Action', *Journal of International Law and Economics* (Washington), December 1974.
2. United Nations, *The Population Debate: Dimensions and Perspectives*. (In press.)

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was submitted for consideration at five regional consultations and approved in general outline. This draft, first carefully studied in Bucharest by a working group, which introduced a flood of amendments—rather unexpectedly after the favourable reception of the draft at the regional consultations—some delegations having been anxious not to disclose their arguments too soon, was then transmitted for consideration in plenary meeting, where it was adopted by 137 participants, the Vatican alone not joining in the consensus. This document, with the reports and recommendations of the commissions, has real historic value, being the first of its kind. It is bound to be construed in many ways for it lends itself to widely differing interpretations.

In conclusion, it might be mentioned that the conference was financed largely from the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, responsible for World Population Year, of which the conference was an essential feature.

Ralph Townley and the author of the present article fulfilled the functions of Deputy Secretary-General to the conference.

The principles

What were the main conclusions and trends emerging from the Bucharest conference?

I shall pass rather quickly over a few fundamental principles, not that they are negligible (far from that), but because they now appear self-evident and serve as the background—or prelude, if I may say so—to all discussions in international bodies whenever the problem of population comes up. They were not fully debated, moreover, and those speakers who referred to them were concerned with upholding them rather than questioning them.

First, there is the principle of respecting national sovereignty, which implies eliminating any control or coercion, even in disguised form, over the application of resolutions, and particularly coercion in the form of making the adoption of a demographic policy the condition for granting economic aid, especially food products, which seems hateful.

Nor does anyone believe today that a demographic policy can serve as a substitute for a development policy. This idea did in fact occur to some people in the past, but there is no point in reviving it.

Then again, a generally acceptable defini-

tion of a population policy cannot be limited to birth-rates, and still less to a decrease in fertility, although it must be admitted that the main problem is still that of excessive fertility, particularly in Asia, as both couples and the government themselves agree. It is essential to take the very great variety of situations into account, the problem consisting in the long run of improving the relationship between population and resources. Any population plan of action must be flexible enough to allow emphasis to be placed on this or that aspect. It may be birth control, designed to favour the planning of families of whatever size desired by couples, rather than an attempt to solve the demographic problem at community level. It may be health—let us not forget that in forty-five countries in the Third World life expectancy at birth is under 50 years. It may be migration within a country, to allow of implementing a scheme for simultaneous urban and rural development. It may be international migration, some countries generously taking in immigrants, whilst others resort to emigration as a safety-valve to protect them from demographic pressure. Or, it may, on the contrary, be controlling the brain drain. Such a plan of action represents so many different, not to say conflicting, policies when one considers their effects on population growth.

The ultimate principle on which the Plan of Action was founded was of course that the plan should be regarded as confined to population, that it was not intended to deal with the whole range of disasters afflicting mankind, although it should take into account existing strategies and programmes, such as those for agriculture, food, employment, education, the environment, and the application of science and technology, falling within what the United Nations calls the Second Development Decade. As Antonio Carrillo-Flores said in his opening speech, '... this is a world conference on population and not a world economic conference,' although participants often succumbed to the temptation of addressing themselves to other problems, especially general policy problems, so as not to miss such a golden opportunity of airing their differences, which is current practice in all international conferences, whatever the subject, as I mentioned earlier.

This being said, what was the original contribution of the conference? I shall sum it up under a few main headings:



*Recognition of the existence
and extent of the problems*

First, the conference recognized the existence of global population problems. The expression 'global population problems' is constantly recurring in the report, and often not even in the plural, and it is used as a title in the summary of the general debate. It is found, for example, in the idea that demographic inertia will impede the achievement of self-sustained development for many decades to come or when it is a matter of finding more equitable ways of using resources in order to solve these problems, or again in the key statement in the 'Background to the Plan' that 'the basis for an effective solution of population problems is, above all, socio-economic transformation', or the clearly perceptible concern in the plenary discussions at the imbalances caused by demographic processes outrunning social and economic development in the Third World, or finally in the constantly emerging idea that the problems posed by the massive increase in the world's population demand a global strategy. In this connexion the most important statement is the following: 'Where trends of population growth, distribution and structure are out of balance with social, economic and environmental factors, they can, at certain stages of development, create additional difficulties for the achievement of sustained development' (paragraph 2 of the plan).

The rock on which the conference was in danger of foundering was the admission that there were population problems on a global scale. It had been said that the greatest pitfall at Bucharest would be globalization and the illusion that a world plan could be worked out by representatives of peoples with different cultural backgrounds. It seemed difficult, too, to adopt priorities at the international level. However, while the diversity of national situations was generally recognized, '... many speakers ... argued that the problems created by massive global population growth required a global strategy' (paragraph 10 of the summary of the general debate). The word 'global' thus constantly comes up in the text. Generally speaking, everyone tried to put on one side individual concerns and seek common ground, though the desire to see things from another's point of view was not always uppermost in the minds of participants from countries not suffering from strong demographic pressure, including countries

in the Third World, and Asia's acute problems were not always understood by participants from the African and Latin American countries. However, in the long run, reservations were overcome and broad agreement was reached, admittedly after heated debates and negotiations which often obliged us to hold night meetings.

Optimism about the future

Having recognized the existence and the extent of population problems, the conference refrained from making prophecies that no one would heed or saying the usual conventional things about the salvation of mankind. A rather optimistic atmosphere prevailed. There were many references to the quality of life, now a current expression, and the rosy side of life was paramount. The best illustration of this is the following statement in the section on the principles of the plan: 'Mankind's future can be made infinitely bright.' This sentence obviously did not appear in the draft text, its style being far removed from that of international civil servants.

*Growth potentials
and the need for anticipating action*

However, the conference did recognize that the problems could not be solved quickly. It was just as well to accept the idea from the start that the world population would go on increasing. There are always accumulated potentials which end by materializing. We know this only too well in connexion with the raw materials which, for decades, were not paid for at a fair price. It was acknowledged that the population problem, which first arose some thirty years ago, at the time when mortality rates began to drop in the Third World, could not be solved except by a reversal of the current trend, spread out over three-quarters of a century, and that this could be achieved only by discreet, unflagging efforts, almost entirely at national level. Inertia was much more marked in matters of demography than in agriculture, for example, and yet it was obvious that methods of cultivation could not be changed overnight.

This idea of the growth potential that has accumulated in demographic patterns is clearly apparent in paragraph 13 of the Plan of Action, where it is intimated that even if replacement levels of fertility were achieved in the developing countries

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right now—an obviously absurd assumption—the population of the world as a whole would still increase from 3,600 million in 1970 to 5,800 thousand million at the time when, at long last, it reached stabilization point. It is interesting to note that the idea of the necessity of anticipating action, a logical consequence of this demographic inertia, emerged from the discussion. Paragraph 13 ends with the statement that ‘countries wishing to affect their population growth must anticipate future demographic trends and take appropriate decisions and action in their plans for economic and social development well in advance’. This is very wise, for we know that if the demographic problem cannot be solved quickly, it can be said that what is done patiently in the next few decades will inevitably affect the destinies of generations to come. It is a question of hindering or not hindering an evolution whose consequences are tending to become irreversible.

*Which comes first—population
or development?*

The essential message which most observers picked up was that a demographic policy could not succeed unless it was integrated in development. The whole document revolves around the idea that the principal cause of population problems is underdevelopment. As international meetings are generous when it comes to redundancies, this idea constantly comes up in the report.

This being so, the conference had to recognize the existence of a complex retroactive interplay between demographic variables and social economic and cultural variables. The culminating point was the debate, conventional though it was, on which came first—population or development—that is, between those who consider that population problems cannot be solved in the absence of social progress and a better economic order and those who consider that the situation has deteriorated to such an extent that no improvement in the standards of living in the Third World can be hoped for unless population policies more strictly confined to the population question are adopted. In other words, we heard on the one hand delegates who regard demographic variables as being solely dependent on development and social justice, and therefore passive, and, on the other hand, delegates who regard demographic variables

as active components of development and therefore naturally tend to stress the setting of targets with figures and dates, especially for population growth. It was the former school of thought which carried the day. Many proofs of this are to be found, in particular the fact that in the secretariat’s draft, the statement ‘The explicit aim of the World Population Plan of Action is to affect population variables’ was changed in the report to ‘The basis for an effective solution of population problems is, above all, socio-economic transformation’.

Those who have a liking for intermediate positions will find consolation, however, in statements such as ‘The explicit aim of the World Population Plan of Action is to help co-ordinate population trends and the trends of economic and social development’. The discussion seems to have shown that while development is a sufficient condition for change in demographic behaviour, which no one denies to be necessary, it is not a prerequisite. Demographic variables had to be made to play some part in influencing development and not just be consequent upon economic progress. While a population policy could not be a substitute for a development policy, conversely a development policy could not adequately take the place of a demographic policy.

This intermediate position was very well summed up at the Population Tribune—one of the activities associated with the conference and a lively and highly successful one—by a well-known figure, John D. Rockefeller, who for decades upheld family planning as the answer to the problem of the Third World and then, changing his tune, said that the demographic factor was certainly not the sole cause of the difficulties the developing countries were up against, but it amplified them and stood in the way of their solution in the foreseeable future.

Broadening of the concept of population

The draft plan prepared by the secretariat concentrated on demographic variables, although it did emphasize indirect means, that is, economic and social policies that could influence demographic parameters. A great many participants criticized the draft as being ‘too demographic’ or ‘technical’ and not comprehensive enough, neglecting relations with other factors. The chapter of the draft entitled ‘Recommendations for Action’ had a



first sub-chapter entitled 'Population Goals and Policies', by far the most important, bearing on six demographic variables. On a proposal of the Argentine delegate, supported by all but two of the participants in the working group responsible for examining the plan, the conference inserted immediately after this sub-chapter another one—fairly short, it is true—on 'socio-economic policies'. Whereas the chief concern of the secretariat was to avoid watering down the population problem by incorporating it in texts dealing with every aspect of a complex problem, the 'majority' decided otherwise.

For example, during the two weeks of discussion, many problems were raised—the priority that should be given to agriculture, food production and fertilizers, rural development and the links between malnutrition and population trends. The attention paid to these problems in Bucharest was much greater than that accorded to population questions in the documentation for the Rome conference on food, where population was touched upon gingerly, as if it were still 'taboo', and a resolution on the desirability of a balance between population growth and food production was only grudgingly accepted. These two international events were of an entirely different nature, as if population were an omnipresent variable, cutting across everything. In Bucharest, whereas food was a preserve in Rome.

The connexion is first of all quantitative, however. Population growth is obviously an important factor in an additional demand for food products. In a world where population growth reaches 75 million a year, and will continue to do so for at least seven or eight decades, cereal production would have to be increased by about 30 million tons, i.e. by the equivalent of two-thirds of the amount imported by the Third World in 1973, merely to maintain the present level of consumption, which is already tragically low. Around the year 2000, when there will be about 6,400 million people to feed and an annual growth of 120 million, all else being equal, the deficit will have increased by some 70 per cent. For India alone, the annual population growth—around 12 million—demands an additional 5 million tons of cereals, i.e. almost half as much as the 10 million tons required for the Third World—which the Rome conference has still not been able to find. In all these purely hypothetical calculations, which

are not meant to be taken as forecasts, one of the two estimates, population, is subject to a small margin of error, while the other, the food variable, is less reliable, depending on the steps taken and their measure of success. This is another difference between the two conferences. It was anticipated that the Rome conference would make decisions that could take effect in a relatively short time, if only in regard to international co-operation, whereas the Bucharest conference was concerned with the very long term and a subject which does not readily lend itself to an exchange of views.

At Bucharest not only was interrelation of the population problem and the food problem debated, but much time was given to discussion of the status of women—they being at the centre of demographic evolution both in the industrialized countries and in the Third World (it must be admitted that the secretariat had not given this problem the prominence it deserved), relations between population, resources and environment, which was the theme of a very interesting symposium held in Stockholm in October 1973, regional co-operation, apartheid, etc.

So the conference strongly endorsed the idea that demography, considered in isolation from economic and social factors, had no significance, that it was a demography of bare facts, superficial, unconcerned with explanations and action.

Application of the principles of human rights

The problem arising from international injustice constantly came up in the discussion, and, to a lesser degree admittedly, social injustice at the national level. While it is not easy to assess the importance of the demographic factor in the difficulties experienced by the Third World in crossing the threshold of development, many speakers wanted this complex problem to be considered in its historical and social setting and maintained that these difficulties could be ascribed to the international economic order, which was still characterized by inequity and exploitation. Some maintained that it was not only the rapid population growth in the Third World that had pushed up the demand for food products over the last few decades, and hence prices, and had led to the squandering of unreplenishable resources and the deterioration of the environment, but quite as much, if

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not more, changes in the patterns of consumption of the wealthy countries. The crisis we were passing through—a crisis with repercussions which had hit certain countries in the Third World, especially in the more densely populated areas of southern Asia, even harder than the rest—was largely due to the three 'mortal sins' of the mass consumption societies: armaments, motor-cars and overeating of meat.

The international community should clearly choose a civilization involving simultaneously two types of action: first, the adoption of a concept of development designed to enable us, changing the patterns of consumption in the wealthy countries, to put surpluses to deliberately chosen uses and, second, the adoption, in the Third World, of demographic policies deliberately chosen by the governments. A policy of slowing down population increase in the Third World in those areas where governments deem it advisable will be accepted only if, at the same time, the necessity for changes in the international economic order is made explicit. It was for this reason that the conference was constantly referring to the conception of a new international economic order, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its sixth special session in May 1974, which the secretariat was of course unable to mention at the time when the documents had to be prepared.

So the conference, while recognizing that rapid population growth in many Third World countries was a matter of concern for their development strategies, declared that the problem could not be dissociated from that of economic and social injustice as between social groups and as between nations. The time seemed to have come to apply the principles of human rights to the sharing of resources between the rich and the poor. This is stated clearly in paragraph 70 of the Plan of Action: 'It is imperative that all countries, and within them all social sectors, should adapt themselves to more rational utilization of natural resources, without excess, so that some are not deprived of what others waste.'

Role of the family

The conference attached particular importance to the family, as much as it did to fertility. It expressed the view that the fertility of populations did not merely involve a demographic problem or a physio-

logical problem. What held its attention was the couple, marriage, the role and status of men and of women, the relations between generations and, through them, present-day societies and the societies of the future. A society's whole attitude to the world and its whole system of values are reflected in its attitude to the formation of the family and to family life. So the discussion had to be raised above questions of birth control, and the family had to be given the attention it deserved in the fantastic reappraisal of political and social patterns which were corroding the traditional bases of society. This is clearly stated in paragraph 14(g) of the 'Principles and Objectives of the Plan': 'The family is the basic unit of society and should be protected by appropriate legislation and policy.' An entire resolution (XVII) is devoted to reaffirming and improving family rights and responsibilities, and yet another (XIII) is devoted to the rural family.

On the other hand, nowhere in the Plan of Action or the resolutions is there any mention of the various methods of birth control or of abortion, nor did the latter come up in the discussion.

Similarly, the conference rejected the idea of a world family-size norm valid for all time (paragraph 27 of the Plan of Action).

However, what appears to have aroused the opposition of the Vatican and countries with a strong Catholic tradition is that, after a stormy debate, the basic right not only of couples but also of individuals to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children was recognized in the 'Principles and Objectives of the Plan'. A similar text approved by the Tehran conference in 1968 refers only to couples.

*Birth control: closer to Margaret Sanger¹
than to Malthus*

It would be quite wrong to imagine that the conference, in giving priority to economic development as a means of solving population problems, in any way rejected the principle of birth control. On the contrary.

1. Margaret Sanger (1883–1966), founder of the birth-control movement in the United States and first president of the International Planned Parenthood Federation.—Ed.



In the first place, this principle, being mentioned in the 'Principles and Objectives of the Plan' on an equal footing with the sacrosanct principle of the safeguarding of the sovereign rights of each nation, is given prominence, whereas in the text prepared by the secretariat it was not mentioned. This was because it was considered that population policies should not be limited to the formation of families and that preference should not be accorded to any one of the six demographic variables concerning which recommendations were made in the plan, even in regard to such an important matter as births. The conference decided otherwise.

Then again, in the paragraph establishing the basic right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of children, it is made clear that people are entitled to the information, education and means to do so. In other words, it is recognized in the plan that a right not accompanied by the means of exercising it would be only a pious wish, without any real value.

Going beyond the Tehran statement, the plan indicates that, in the exercise of this right, couples and individuals must take into account the needs of their living and future children and their responsibility towards the community. It does not say, however, whether the word 'community' is to be understood in the narrower sense of the group in which the individual, or couple, lives, or in a broader sense, extending to the nation and even to the international community, as some suggested.

But what is more important is the spirit in which the Bucharest conference unreservedly accepted the idea of birth control, not so much as an aim *per se* justified everywhere as out of a concern for family welfare. The principle of birth control is justified in the first place from the standpoint of couples, control of reproduction being an essential unifying force for the harmony of the couple and the family as a whole. However, I cannot affirm that in the minds of some who carry things to their logical conclusion the interest of the community, which should come after that of the individual and may conflict with it, should not be considered too, for in the long run it will have repercussions on the interest of the individual. It also emerged from the discussion that some governments harboured the idea—though they were careful not to express it openly—that a large population is a guarantee of

power, much as Jean Bodin said that the only wealth is manpower.

At all events, the predominant idea was that birth control was not intended to relieve demographic pressures so much as to promote fertility more in accordance with the wishes of couples and that it was not therefore contradictory to accept a liberal policy, even where birth-rates were extremely low, as was the case in some of the Eastern European countries, in particular Romania itself, and where a high rate of sterility among couples had gradually to be eliminated, a problem with which many African countries were concerned. It was at the individual level and in accordance with the definition of health laid down by WHO, 'a state of mental and physical well-being', that birth control was most justified, especially through medical and social services affording an ideal opportunity for action (see paragraph 30 of the Plan of Action).

While the conference recommended making the means of birth control directly available (see the long paragraph 29 of the plan), it expressed a marked preference for indirect means (reduction of infant mortality, improvement of the status of women, promotion of social justice, establishment of an appropriate lower age-limit for marriage, development of education, old-age pensions, particularly in countries where women are disinclined to stop having children until they have at least one son to count on in their old age, etc. (see in regard to these points paragraphs 31, 32 and 33 of the plan). The emphasis laid on indirect means clearly shows that the conference considered the real problem to be one of the general organization of society rather than of contraceptive techniques and advocated above all promoting schemes facilitating a change in behaviour (see paragraph 34).

What emerges from all this is the twofold obligation, first on couples to adopt a responsible attitude towards parenthood and, second, on the State to provide direct, and more especially indirect, means of birth control. No other text of universal import is as clear and complete as in this respect.

Allergy to target figures and dates

One of the most controversial points was whether or not the goals of the plan should be expressed in terms of figures and dates whenever possible. Not

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only would they be clearer in that form, but there would be the additional advantage that their attainment could be followed closely. Indeed, a genuine plan is scarcely conceivable without quantitative elements enabling its intentions to be summed up, as was the case for example with the United Nations Second Development Decade which set as a target an annual increase of 6 per cent in revenue.

Considerable reticence in regard to this point was observed, even prior to the conference. There are several explanations for it: the fear that quantification might eventually lead to control of the action taken and encroach on the principle of national sovereignty; the impracticability of such an operation owing to the great diversity of situations; and, finally, the aversion of many delegates from any attempt to generalize, even at the European level.

What variables could be quantified?

With regard to population growth, it was stated in the secretariat's text that many Third World countries had already set targets and it was merely pointed out that if those targets were actually reached, the rate of population growth in the Third World countries would be 2 per cent in 1985 instead of 2.4 per cent as forecast in the United Nations projections, in which it is assumed that a drop in fertility will be offset by the continuing decline of mortality. The rate of growth of the world population as a whole would then be 1.7 per cent instead of 2 per cent. The underlying idea is that the plan, by drawing attention to these figures, should endeavour to assist governments in reaching the targets which they have set themselves of their own volition.

The conference preferred to ignore these factual data and included instead a paragraph (16) referring to the 'United Nations low variant projections'—which lead to exactly the same figures—without saying that they were goals, although the paragraph is placed under the title 'Population Goals and Policies'. So the text finally adopted is ambiguous, lending itself to several interpretations.

In the following paragraph (17) of the Plan of Action, 'countries which consider that their . . . rates of population growth hamper their goals of promoting human welfare are invited . . . to consider adopting population policies . . .'. This is not going nearly so far as the secretariat's text, in which the same countries are invited 'if they

have not yet done so, to consider setting quantitative population growth targets . . .'. This is further evidence of reticence with regard to the idea of quantification.

The idea of zero growth for the industrialized countries was also rejected. In this connexion it is stipulated in paragraph 19 of the plan: 'Recognizing that *per capita* use of world resources is much higher in the developed than in the developing countries, the developed countries are urged to adopt appropriate policies in population, consumption and investment, bearing in mind the need for fundamental improvement in international equity.'

With regard to mortality, the question is much simpler, all governments obviously expressing a desire to reduce it and often giving this goal highest priority. Here, in contrast to views on the rate of growth, all wishes converge. The goals proposed by the Secretariat, ambitious and perhaps even rather unrealistic in view of the present and future food situation, were adopted: to increase average life expectancy in the developing countries from the present 55 years to 62 years in 1985 and 74 years in 2000, the latter goal requiring an increase of 11 years in Latin America, 17 years in Asia and 28 years in Africa in the space of a quarter of a century. It must be admitted that we have no way of foreseeing the future in the industrialized countries, where average life expectancy has for some years now remained stationary or even increased slightly. The subject was not dealt with.

With regard to the birth-rate and fertility, it was stated in the secretariat's text that if the goals set by the Third World governments and the goals formulated in regard to mortality were reached by 1985, the average birth-rate would fall from the present 38 per 1,000 to 30 per 1,000, whereas according to the United Nations 'average' variant projections it would be 34 per 1,000. The conference regarded these figures not as target figures but as an indication of the considerable efforts which would have to be made in respect of both economic and social development and population policies if this were to be achieved.

The conference rejected the paragraph in the secretariat's document in which it is proposed that 'countries which have a very high birth-rate may consider taking action compatible with the principles and objectives of this Plan . . . to reduce



these rates by about 5 to 10 per 1,000 before 1985'. This paragraph had given rise to no controversy at the regional consultations that preceded the Bucharest conference, but the latter ruled it out.

Finally, taking as a basis the texts of various resolutions of the Economic and Social Council (June 1972) and the United Nations General Assembly (December 1970) the secretariat proposed in its text that all countries 'make available, to all persons who so desire, if possible by the end of the Second United Nations Development Decade, but not later than 1985, the necessary information and education about family planning and the means to practise family planning effectively and in accordance with their cultural values'. The conference replaced this paragraph by the following (29(b) of the Plan of Action): 'It is recommended that all countries encourage appropriate education concerning responsible parenthood and make available to persons who so desire advice and means of achieving it.' This text is more cautious and, above all, it excludes any time-limit for the proposed action.

Conclusions—a 'committed' conference

Many other questions were discussed during our ten days in Bucharest, which I cannot review here for lack of space, in particular, the status and role of women, a combined strategy for urban and rural development, and the necessity of strengthening international co-operation, for all this is going to require considerable efforts in the way of organization for many years to come.

First of all, this conference afforded an opportunity of approaching a subject which is decidedly not one where concord reigns, no matter how much ideas have progressed, of comparing our knowledge of it—although it is regrettable that full advantage was not taken of the documentation assembled and the findings of previous scientific symposia and of sizing up the political positions. The population problem, perhaps because it is fundamental, is not proof against ideologies, for attitudes are based more on them than on the material aspects of existence, the objective relations between the population and the area it occupies or the resources it possesses.

The Third World clearly predominated in the voting—each State had one vote irrespective of the size of its population—but the Asian countries

with very high birth-rates were noticeably rather silent. There is little doubt that extrinsic considerations constantly influenced the discussion. Some observers were of the opinion that there was a gap between what governments admitted individually and their attitude in an international forum. Judging from the discussion, it is difficult to believe that, according to a recent United Nations survey¹ the governments that consider their growth 'excessive' represent 81 per cent of the population of the Third World and—interesting detail—have on the average a population double the world average, that is, exceeding 50 million inhabitants. Most of these countries, which are characterized by an abundance of people and a shortage of resources, kept out of the discussion or took sides with the countries which regarded their growth rates as 'deficient', for reasons of political strategy connected with the international situation in general.

As was to be expected of representatives of governments, the conference gave the Plan of Action a less technical character than the secretariat had done and made of it a politically committed document within the more general framework of the other major problems under discussion in the United Nations and of a new conception of collective responsibilities, in accordance with the international instruments pertaining to human rights. It wanted to attach to the population problem a significance which was not merely demographic. The idea of integrated development demanding a radical transformation of the social order was ever present in the discussion. The value of the documents adopted is beyond question and they will require further detailed study.

Governments and international institutions will now have to set to work on the more practical task of finding suitable methods of harmonizing the principles adopted and their application. The time for preliminaries is past.

[Translated from French]

1. 'Population Policies and Programmes', document prepared by the United Nations Secretariat for the World Population Conference. (E/CONF.60/CBP/21.)

WORLD POPULATION AND THE PHYSIOLOGY OF HUMANITY

TESTIMONY OF

RANDY ENGEL

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES COALITION FOR LIFE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POPULATION

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WASHINGTON, D.C.

APRIL 18, 1978

Mr. Chairman:

I am Randy Engel, Executive Director of the United States Coalition for Life - an international prolife research agency specializing in federally sponsored and promoted population control programs and policies. As an active United Nations Non-Governmental Organization, the Coalition has participated in every UN-sponsored world conference since 1975 including the Bucharest World Population Conference, the Rome World Food Conference, Habitat, and the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City. We are currently serving on the International Committee for the International Year of the Child. Our organizational structure is such that through an international advisory board system, the Coalition is able to draw on the expertise of world recognized authorities in a wide range of population concerns including food production, energy and environment, economics, maternal and child health, fetology, natural child spacing, and marriage and the family.

As you know Mr. Chairman, the Coalition since its founding in 1972 has been the nation's most vocal opponent of the Hellmanization and Ravenholtization of our country's domestic and foreign population policies administered under Title X of the Public Health Service Act and Title X of the Foreign Assistance Act respectively.

Last year, our agency completed an in depth overview of USAID Population Director Dr. R.T. Ravenholt's billion dollar international birth control empire with specific emphasis on violations of basic human rights and illegal abortion enterprises covering the gamut of dummy corporations designed to circumvent the Helms anti-abortion amendment to prostaglandin research of abortion suppositories which in the words of Dr. Ravenholt , " will insure the non-pregnant state at the end of each monthly cycle. " (See Pro-Life Reporter, Vol. 5, No. 14, 15; 1977).

Its domestic counterpart The Ford Report - The Harmful Consequences Among Unwed Teenagers of the Related Epidemics of Promiscuity, Venereal Disease, Out-of-

Wedlock Pregnancy, and Contraception Usage was released by the Coalition last week. The conclusions of this White Paper on teenage sexuality and the devastating implications of federally-financed birth control programs for minor children are relevant to this particular series of hearings on foreign population policies since the sexualization of youth in Third World countries is one of the principle objectives of current USAID programs. Both The Ford Report and the USAID Population Reports are available on request to any member of this Committee or his staff who wish to broaden their population perspectives beyond the narrow limits of the Neo-Malthusian.

At this time, I would like to open the formal text of my testimony with a singular quotation - one which may on the surface appear to be totally irrelevant to the issues at hand but which in reality expresses the current state of the art of population politics in Congress with stark simplicity.

Speaking of the popular political trend which attempts to divorce politics from morality, the brilliant early 20th century writer Charlos Peguy states, "It is not true that a political event cannot, in another aspect, be a matter of morality ... to the politician everything is a question of politics, to decent people everything is a moral question... Of course, the politicians don't admit their real attitude, they dare not deny morality; what they do is to ask in the interests of expediency for a moratorium. They say: 'You are quite right in principle, but in this particular case, just this once, shut up and leave us to our politics; this case is an exception, once it is over your morals can have full play... but just now, just at this particular moment be immoral and be political...' The politicians spend all our todays telling us that tomorrow we shall be able to be free and moral... However we know that 'tomorrow' will never dawn for, if it were to, it would mean an end to all political careers...."

One does not have to delve too deeply into the pathogenic politics of USAID

to appreciate the wisdom of Monsieur Peguy's insights into the political nature of the modern secular state where the dream of Republicanism - that is a system based on honour has degenerated into a government based on satisfying the lowest appetite.

Since its inception in 1965, the Office of Population- USAID has successfully channeled more than a billion dollars into the coffers of the international population control establishment making Uncle Sam the largest dispenser of prophylactics and fertility control drugs and devices in the world and the universal mouthpiece for anti-natalist propaganda in developing nations. Yet, almost without exception, members of the House and Senate have, year after year, refused to call the issue of population control into public question preferring instead to quietly slip the USAID authorization and appropriation bills through Congress with as little public coverage as possible. In short Congress desires to be left alone in its political judgement to continue funding USAID population control schemes thus avoiding the nasty task of weighing the serious moral and ethical issues at stake when government takes it upon itself to become the sole arbitrator in matters related to morality - which federally funded and promoted birth control programs and research certainly are.

Population control touches upon a number of fundamental questions not the least of which are related to one's concept of man and his right to existence. Such programs go beyond mere demographic data and technological means of birth limitation into the realm of man's deepest emotional and spiritual experiences. The Coalition does more than merely state this point. We insist upon it as the basis for any rationale discussion and debate on governmental birth control programs. For us it represents the first stepping stone in evaluating USAID Title X programs and policies, not the last. Let us then consider what moral or ethical principles are to be found in Title X Foreign Assistance programs including those based solely on a materialistic as opposed to realistic view of man and his ultimate destiny.

TITLE X - PROGRAMS RELATING TO POPULATION GROWTH*

In dealing with Title X of the Foreign Assistance Act one is confronted with a masterpiece of ambiguities, assumptions, and contradictions - the perfect bureaucratic foil for USAID population control architects.

The first assumption which is commonly found in most birth limitation legislation is that birth control (euphemistically referred to as 'family planning') is a matter of universal obligation - that is a 'service' to be not only provided by but promoted by public authorities as a means of improving the common welfare. Among the supposed benefits of so-called 'voluntary family planning programs' contained in Title X are improved "health", "family stability", "greater individual opportunity", "economic development", "a sufficiency of food" and "a higher standard of living". The issue here is not whether or not these goals are desirable, but whether or not government family limitation programs provide the means of achieving such goals.

The Coalition's position on this matter is that 1) there is no objective standard whereby one can argue that obligatory governmental birth control services are necessary for the survival of humanity or the enhancement of the common good, and 2) that where such programs and policies are envisioned as a collective prophylactic for the 'disease' of 'overpopulation'; the end product runs counterproductive to the stimulation and expansion of human energy necessary for nation building and true human progress - both materially and spirituality. In terms of practical political action, this means that any demographic policy or program which ignores or repudiates the principle that sexual discipline and the sacrifice of the gratification of innate desires so necessary to achieving the high degree of social and mental energy

* See attachment for full text.

required for economic, agricultural, and social advancement is harmful to the common good at both the national and familial levels of society. Closely allied to the norm of sexual restraint are the concepts of freedom and responsibility. All together they characterize the nature of a vibrant, healthy and progressive people. In sharp contrast, is the sexual patterns of the totalitarian state which in terms of initial sexual behavior is marked by sexual license, manipulative sexual propaganda and the destruction of family life - all factors contributing to the mass man who is alienated and without roots and whose conscience is molded and formed by public authorities.

When USAID officials with Congressional and Executive branch approval, promote and finance massive anti-natalist campaigns in developing nations as well as provide the means to carry out such programs of birth limitation such as sterilization fairs, menstrual extraction and abortion equipment, Depo-provera injections and other modern technological fertility control procedures, they place in the hands of the ever-growing powerful State the motivation and mechanisms by which it can control and manipulate who shall be born and eventually who shall die. Rather than maximizing human freedom and choices, governmental birth control programs curb these rights for now the person is seen in relationship to the needs of the State rather than the State in relationship to the needs of its people. In the proper order of things, the State exists for the individual and not the individual for the State.

Title X states that USAID - supported programs be "voluntary" in nature and empowers the President of the United States to establish "reasonable procedures" to insure American population control schemes abroad do not violate an individual's moral, philosophical, or religious beliefs. In practical application should an American President ever get around to drafting such guidelines they would be as meaningless and wothless as the original Congressional recitation guaranteeing

freedom from coercion in the broadest sense of the law. It should be noted that any birth control program - financed and promoted - by public authorities contains a built-in coercive power since the population target is generally poor, weak and powerless in relationship to State upon which they may depend for their daily bread and butter. To suggest that freedom exists by affording a selection of family limitation means is to be ignorant of the very meaning of the word for true freedom implies the right to reject birth control totally.

We can gauge somewhat exactly how "voluntary" some USAID programs are by noting that material bribes and house-to-house canvassing i.e. "outreach" programs are a routine part of almost all national birth limitation programs. Obviously they are necessitated by the fact that persons do not voluntarily seek them out. Using modern psychological mass media techniques and so-called "incentives" and "decentives" the individual must be propagandized and manipulated by public authorities into accepting such "services" .

Along a similar vein, it should be stated that all government birth control programs are by their very nature standardless, for by what measure can we weigh the merits or lack of merits of the birth of a single human being.

Obviously, if a program is implemented on the basis of purely subjective materialist goals, the success or failure of a population control programs can be judged by demographic charts, sterilization quotas, abortions performed ect. But if such programs are judged by a wider universal and realistic standard, the answer must be - we have no way of knowing since we have no means to measure the worth or contribution of a single person in relation to all of humanity.

A logical question at this point might be , "Who really profits from massive population control programs?" The answer can be found at least in part by examining the USAID birth control budget from 1965-1975 which shows that of the \$ 732,344,000 appropriated for such programs in developing nations, HALF of the

funds never leave the United States! Population control programs involve huge profits for drug and birth control devices manufactures; university bases such as Chapel Hill, N.C. and George Washington University; international and national Sangerite agencies such as Planned Parenthood and medical and para-medical personnel and governmental administrators; and educational and propaganda centers such as the University of Chicago and the Population Reference Bureau. It can be said that the colour of population control whether by artificial contraception, sterilization or abortion is green.

Please note that I have specifically included induced abortion as a primary form of birth limitation in national population control programs. This is not merely an opinion. It is fact. There are no exceptions. Once a country embarks on an aggressive, tax-funded program of population limitation abortion provides the logical compliment to massive contraceptive and sterilization agendas. Any elected official who votes for population control funding under Title X as an "alternative to abortion" policy is either playing the fool or he expects his constituents to assume such a role.

Role of Induced Abortion in Fertility Control

" Abortion and contraception have a common objective, the prevention of unwanted births. When societies and individuals are motivated to begin the effort to control their fertility, abortion and contraceptive use can rise simultaneously... In any case, abortion is part of the overall package called 'family planning'...."

Tietze and Dawson as quoted in DHEW Publication PHS 78-1455 Statistics Needed for National Policies Related to Fertility 1978.

" I think it is fair to say that most professionals and volunteers with Planned Parenthood have accepted, for a long time, the necessity of abortion as an integral part of any complete or total family planning program. The dilemma of any woman who has a legitimate method failure, or any type of unwanted pregnancy cannot be avoided by Planned Parenthood clinic personnel..."

Planned Parenthood Medical Director

George Langmyhr, M.D. 1971

" It will be difficult to control world population if contraceptive methods are not combined with abortion...."

Dr. Benjamin Viel, IPPF 1971

" Contraception and abortion are complexly interrelated; they are competitive methods of controlling family size but each offers supplementary protection to the other. They may be mutually stimulating as well as mutually competitive."

Sung-bong Hong, Seoul, Korea 1970

" If voluntarism is to have a significant effect on population growth, temporary contraceptive methods will have to be supported by an increased use of sterilization and legalization of abortion..."

Dr. Louis Hellman Former Population Affairs

Officer, DHEW 1971

" Valid scientific surveys from four different countries have shown that increasing motivation for family planning brings in its wake an increasing incidence of induced abortion."

Bernard Berleson, Population Council

Concluding Remarks

For more than a decade the American tax-payer has been the primary financial backer of Ravenholt-USAID's Great Population Control Experiment. The guinea pigs have been human beings, usually poor and powerless, from the developing nations of the world. It's time to bring the experiment to an end and to transfer Title X funds into positive programs which enhance human dignity and contribute to the common welfare. Many of Coalition's "alternatives to population control" are found in our Bucharest Report available from the main office in Pittsburgh(Export), Pennsylvania. I hope that some of our recommendations will be included in the final report of the Select Committee on Population to Congress, which, despite its known Malthusian sympathies has at least offered the Coalition an opportunity to let in a little fresh air into the population debate.

At this time I shall be happy to answer any questions the Chairman or members of the Committee may have.

TITLE X-PROGRAMS RELATING TO POPULATION GROWTH¹²³

SEC. 291.¹²⁴ GENERAL PROVISIONS.--(a) It is the sense of the Congress that, while every nation is and should be free to determine its own policies and procedures with respect to problems of population growth and family planning within its own boundaries, nevertheless, voluntary family planning programs to provide individual couples with the knowledge and medical facilities to plan their family size in accordance with their own moral convictions and the latest medical information, can make a substantial contribution to improve health, family stability, greater individual opportunity, economic development, a sufficiency of food, and a higher standard of living.

(b) To carry out the intent of Congress as expressed in subsection (a), the President is authorized to provide assistance for programs relating to population growth in friendly foreign countries and areas, on such terms and conditions as he shall determine, to foreign governments, the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and other international organizations and programs, United States and foreign nonprofit organizations, universities, hospitals, accredited health institutions, and voluntary health or other qualified organizations.

(c) In carrying out programs authorized in this title, the President shall establish reasonable procedures to insure, whenever family-planning assistance from the United States is involved, that no individual will be coerced to practice methods of family planning inconsistent with his or her moral, philosophical, or religious beliefs.

(d) As used in this title, the term "programs relating to population growth" includes but is not limited to demographic studies, medical, psychological, and sociological research and voluntary family planning programs, including personnel training of doctors and paramedical personnel, the manufacture of medical supplies, and the dissemination of family planning information, and provision of medical assistance and supplies.

SEC. 292.¹²⁵ AUTHORIZATION.--Of the funds provided to carry out the provisions of part I of this Act for the fiscal year 1969, \$50,000,000 shall be available only to carry out the purposes of this title and, notwithstanding any other provision of the Act, funds used for such purposes may be used on a loan or grant basis.

In 1973, Section 114 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, added legislative restrictions on the use of funds relative to abortion. The restriction is popularly known as the Helms Amendment.

"Section 114. Limiting use of funds for abortion--None of the funds made available to carry out this part [Part 1 of the Act] shall be used to pay for the performance of abortions as a method of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions."

Statement of Pro-Life Bucharest Team***August 1974**

The United States Coalition for Life Delegation to the World Population meetings in Bucharest, and other allies, while fully recognizing the many social and economic evils which exist in the world, wish to emphasize that action intended to remedy such evils must be based upon a sound view of human nature. Any other alternative leads to greater injustice than it purports to avert.

In particular, we wish to assert that the value of each human individual is absolute. In other words every human life has to be valued absolutely, precisely because it is a human life — not depending merely on its social value, state of development, likelihood on enjoying health, wealth, longevity or well-being in general.

We utterly reject all concepts of "unwanted people" or "Lives not worth living" or "Too many people", as being a denial of human rights and pointing in a totalitarian direction.

We apply this specifically to the unborn, the incurably sick, the abnormal and the old.

We utterly reject the practices of abortion, euthanasia, infanticide, and unnatural methods of fertility control.

In so far as our respective Federal or State Governments, or their representatives give assent to those practices or policies which lead to them, we wish to disassociate ourselves from them.

We call upon men and women of good will — of all countries and all religions, or none — to join with us in fighting for the most fundamental basis of all human institutions, a profound and protective respect for human life, at every state of development from conception to natural death. The right to life does not come from laws or governments, but from God.

**“MAN -
HOW WILL HE
SURVIVE?”**

Edited by

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Pollution of the Environment — Control of Pollution

Dr. J.D. Smith.

INTRODUCTION

Pollution is a detrimental change in the quality of the environment caused by the activities of people. It follows that if pollution is to be limited despite the rapid growth of population, then the impact of each individual must be decreased. Problems due to the presence of people are most acute in cities. With increasing mechanisation since the Industrial Revolution there is now a capacity for remote areas to be polluted; this is seen in some mining and power generating centres.

Industrialisation has made possible, and encouraged, the movement of people from the land to live in the cities. The most pressing problems of pollution exist where there are great concentrations of people supported by an industrial system.

Industry and the population it supports are attracted to water. Estuaries are ideal locations, but navigable rivers and lakes are also attractive. Initially industry and dwellings discharge wastes into the water, where they may be dispersed and consumed by natural processes. As the centre grows there comes a time when the capacity of the water for self-purification is exceeded and the concentration of wastes in the water becomes so high that the water is unfit or unsafe for its previous beneficial uses. The water is polluted.

There has been a long line of legislation aimed at controlling water pollution. Legislation follows public demand but rarely leads it, and is a compromise with the demands of local pressure groups. Hence legislative control has usually been well intentioned but too little and too late. In the early stages of industrialisation of a country the demand is that industrial development be unhindered to allow rapid improvement of the material 'standard of living'. When a suitable state of affluence has been achieved by a large proportion of the population, it then changes its demands to requiring control of pollution and with increasing emphasis on 'quality of life'.

At any time our Earth has countries in all stages of development, with populations demanding different proprieties and with a variety of legislation aimed at satisfying these demands. The difference between the attitudes of affluent and developing countries was a major barrier to consensus at the 1972 Stockholm conference. The affluent nations wanted strict pollution controls to be adopted world wide, and the developing nations would not agree to this unless they were recompensed to maintain their rate of economic growth.

The effectiveness of good legislation, well administered, was dramatically shown in England with the introduction of the Clean Air Act of 1956. The use of fuels other than 'smokeless' fuels was banned progressively in defined areas, and cost of conversion of equipment to burn smokeless fuels was subsidised by the Government. Within three years the 'London Smog' with its associated high incidence of deaths from respiratory problems was past history. At the same time it became worthwhile cleaning the historic buildings of their layers of soot.

WATER CONTROL MEASURES

A. ENGLAND

Improvements in water quality are less dramatic and take much longer. In 19th century England, many streams and rivers were foul with waste and were a serious public health problem. The Houses of Parliament on the bank of the River Thames were at times intolerable because of the smell from the river. This brought the problem to the attention of parliament. By 1865 a Royal Commission was investigating river pollution, and a Public Health Act was passed in 1875. This Act required that sewage '...not deteriorate the purity and quality of the water in any stream into which it is discharged'. This was clearly the wish of the people, but it was impractical as the technology of sewage treatment was not sufficiently advanced to meet the demand.

A second Act was passed, the River Pollution Prevention Act of 1876, and this prohibited the discharge of sewage into a river. This 1876 Act was however amended to say that proceedings could not be taken if injury would be inflicted on the interests of industry. As the Act was also administered by the very authorities who were the major polluters, it is not surprising that the results achieved were not satisfactory. About 15 years later, River Authorities were set up and took over administration of the 1876 Act and progress then accelerated.

By that time, it was clear that the key to achieving clean rivers was the diversion of domestic and industrial wastes to sewers, adequate sewage treatment, and proper disposal of the treated sewage. A Royal Commission on Sewage Disposal was set up in 1898 and carried out monumental work culminating in a Final Report in 1915. The findings of the Commission are still valid. It is unfortunate that nowadays their recommendations are usually taken out of context and used to justify an inadequately treated effluent.

As a result of all this work the basic requirements for healthy streams and rivers were known by 1915. The legislation to allow compulsory restrictions to be placed on all waste discharges to streams was not enacted in England until the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act of 1961. Now the river systems are managed by River Authorities who control abstraction of water and the discharge of wastes, and steady improvements are being achieved.

B. AUSTRALIA

In Australia, which is a federation, pollution control is the responsibility of each of the six State governments. Within each State, control has been fragmented, and here in Victoria water pollution control is mentioned in 27 separate Acts of Parliament administered by various government agencies. These arrangements have grown up in response to the occurrence of particular problems, and are not the result of long term planning. At present, not only is it difficult to implement control of pollution, but some dischargers who are willing to assist in abating water pollution are frustrated by a lack of clarity in the official requirements.

Within the last ten years a change of heart in relation to water pollution control has spread slowly round the world. It has now become an urgent necessity for many elected governments to change their philosophy from 'pollution control' to the 'maintenance of water quality' in response to public demand.

Industrialisation has changed our pattern of living so that now, even in vast countries such as Australia and the U.S.A., more than 75% of the population live in urban areas. Not only are these urban areas centres of pollution, but the people who live in them now have education, material possessions and leisure time, and are demanding a less polluted environment.

They are demanding that legislations be enacted to bring about a pollution free environment. It sounds simple, but there are two problems. First, when we get down to detail, people do not know what quality they want. Second, it is not legislation that cleans up streams, but the actions of people motivated by the administrators of the legislation.

ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AUTHORITY

Here in Victoria, the recently formed Environment Protection Authority is preparing for its big day. On 1st March, our new act, the Environment Protection Act will come into force. This act recognises the two problems in pollution control which arise from the involvement of people. It also recognises that pollution control should be vested in a central organisation with clear responsibility for the management of all waste discharges into the environment.

To make clear what the Environment Protection Authority is aiming for, and to allow everyone to make his or her views known, and have them taken into account, we are preparing draft policies for the waters of the State. The centre of each policy is a statement of the beneficial uses of that water. This is something that is easily understood. You know that if a stretch of river contains your favourite fishing spot then you want the river to be maintained at a quality suitable for fish to live in. You may, however, be in a more common situation where you remember what a good fishing river you used to have, and you may wish to see the situation restored. All views on the beneficial uses of the water are taken into account when an official policy is eventually prepared, and the policy thus reflects the wishes of the people affected.

In addition to the list of beneficial uses for the water, the water quality to be maintained is defined. The definition of water quality in relation to beneficial uses is a difficult task. It is an infant science and as present the only beneficial use with clearly defined quality criteria is drinking water supply. Research on water quality criteria for other beneficial uses is fragmented, and we are assembling information from research all round the world.

Some idea of the problems of specifying water quality criteria is gained if you think of the variations that occur in natural waters. A grossly polluted stream may have a composition which is no worse than that of water in a swamp which is completely unpolluted.

The management part of the administration comes in the form of a licensing system for all waste discharges. Anyone wishing to make a waste discharge to the environment will first be required to obtain a licence from the Environment Protection Authority. The licences will be issued only with conditions limiting the discharge to a volume and composition which will not allow a state of pollution to arise.

With the complexity of environmental problems there is room for a variety of opinions, and administration of environmental control legislation will always be difficult. The situation is viewed differently by a discharger and by those affected by the discharge, although both are often sincere in their differing views. There is a need for legislation to protect the interests of the majority of people, but to ensure respect the legislation must be administered openly, with decisions and the evidence on which they are based made freely available.

As rivers and lakes develop, so do nations, and it is understandable that nations have different needs at the present time. Each must determine means of environmental control to suit its needs, but all must have the same goal, the betterment of man's estate.

SUMMARY

The major problems of pollution arise where there are great concentrations of people supported by an industrial system. Industrialisation has made possible, and encouraged, the movement of people from the land to live in the cities.

Industry and the population it supports are attracted to water. Estuaries are ideal locations, but navigable rivers and lakes are also attractive. Initially industry and dwellings discharge their wastes into water, where it may be dispersed and consumed by natural processes. As the centre grows there comes a time when the capacity of the water for self-purification is exceeded, and the concentration of wastes in the water becomes so high that the water is unfit or unsafe for its previous beneficial uses — the water is polluted.

There has been a long line of legislation aimed at controlling water pollution. Legislation follows public demand but rarely leads it. Hence legislative control has generally been too little and too late. Because the main problems are in densely populated areas, legislation has been aimed at dealing with these. In England legislation has been developed from the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act of 1876, and in the U.S.A. there has been rapid development since the first Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948.

There are wide variations in natural water quality, and unpolluted swamp water can have a composition similar to that of grossly polluted stream water. Eutrophication is a natural ageing process in lakes but can be accelerated by man's activities, and it is difficult to determine to what degree acceleration is due to pollution.

With the complexity of environmental problems there is room for a variety of opinions, and administration of environmental control legislation will always be difficult. The situation is viewed differently by a discharger and by those affected by the discharge, although both are affected by the discharge, although both are often sincere in their differing views. There is a need for legislation to protect the interests of the majority of people, but to ensure respect the legislation must be administered openly, with decisions and the evidence on which they are based made freely available.

Decisions on waste treatment or location of industry should not be based only on the cost to industry, but with consideration for all affected people. The views of affected people should be heard and given due consideration as part of the formal processes so that every man, even in densely settled cities, has some personal control of the quality of the environment in which he must live.

As rivers and lakes develop so do nations, and it is understandable that nations have different needs at the present time. Each must determine means of environmental control to suit its needs but all must have the same goal, the betterment of man's estate.

DR. JAMES D. SMITH

Dr. Smith holds the position of Chief Water Quality Officer with the Environment Protection Authority in the State of Victoria.

He graduated as a Bachelor of Science with a major in Chemistry from the University of Durham in 1960 and obtained his Ph.D. in Oceanography from the University of Southampton in 1970.

From 1960 – 63, he was a Scientific Officer with the Department of Supply in Melbourne and from 1963 – 67 was a Research Officer with the Colonial Sugar Refining Company in Sydney.

Following a period of renewed study into recent advances in Marine Chemistry, he was awarded a Royal Society Grant to work in Naples Zoological Station in 1969.

In 1970 he was appointed Senior Scientific Officer with the Natural Environmental Research Council in London, and carried out surveys on the condition of the marine environment around Britain.

The Effect of Pollution on the Health of Man

*by Dr. W.N. Sloan, E.D., M.B., B.S., D.P.H.,
D. Obst. R.C.O.G., F.A.C.M.A., F.A.I.H.S.*

1. INTRODUCTION.

There appears to be a widespread belief today that the world is about to die of pollution, and that we necessarily will die with it. There is one theory that a "green-house effect" will enable the sun's energy to raise the earth's temperature, melt the ice-caps and those of us who don't fry will drown. An alternative proposal states that the persistent contrails of S.S.Ts will prevent the sun's rays from reaching the earth and we will all freeze to death. Now, I am not going to discuss these aspects of pollution — this is not my field. I am a Public Health Doctor. My work is to protect the health of the community and the effects of our changing environment certainly come into this.

My job today is to discuss with you the effect of environment on human health. I am selfish enough to believe that the paramount reason for cleaning up pollution is the survival of man, a creature which, like the lemming, appears intent on his own destruction. The field of my work is wide indeed, because our environment appears to be receiving novel and increasingly insults, and to compound the complexity, we have widened the definition of health. It is now "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely an absence of disease or infirmity". Our knowledge in this field is incomplete and fragmented: "experience is fallacious and judgement difficult".

Before I discuss the various segments of the universe which can harm man, let me point out that the definition of health says "complete", "physical", "mental" and "social". While we conveniently discuss the environment under the headings of water, air and noise, the additive effects of small amounts of pollution in each of these areas must be realised.

2. WATER POLLUTION.

There are three ways polluted water can cause disease in man. He must either drink it, bathe in it, or he must eat the product of a "food chain" which has concentrated a toxic pollutant.

(a) **Drinking Water.**

The main problem with drinking water is that it may carry bacteria and viruses which cause disease. With our increasing population causing an increase in water pollution, and with the increased demand for water forcing us to re-use it, there has arisen a group of experts who will take highly polluted water and, for a cost, render it safe to drink. There is another group of experts who scientifically polish effluents until they can safely be put into streams. As both approaches rely upon 100% peak performance from both man and machine, it is better to combine both ideas: for the sake of environment every effluent must be as pure as possible and for the sake of man, his drinking water must be safe.

(i) **Bacterial pollution.**

What are the diseases spread by imbibing polluted drinking water? They include cholera, typhoid fever, bacillary dysentery and infectious hepatitis. Water is not the only means by which these diseases are spread, but it has often been responsible for the explosive epidemics which get into history. For example, the agony of Bangladesh was worsened by the epidemics of cholera which followed the refugees into India. One of the classical tales of medical history concerns cholera and a pioneer London Anaesthetist, John Snow. In 1854 he proved that an outbreak of cholera in Soho was due to polluted water from the well serving the Broad Street pump and he is said to have stopped the epidemic by recommending the removal of the pump handle. Another brilliant piece of detective work by the same man proved that it was safer to reticulate drinking water from the Thames upstream of the points of discharge of London's drainage.

Public Health books abound with epidemics of typhoid fever caused by the reticulation of polluted water, although in this State of Victoria, milk appears to have shared the spotlight. Delhi in 1955 produced twenty eight thousand clinical cases of hepatitis with jaundice, due to pollution of the River Jamna with sewage. One minor problem with the control of polluted water arises from the fact that certain disease producing viruses appear to be more resistant to natural and chemical disinfection than *Escherichia coli*, our indicator organism. Again, viruses cause sub-clinical infections and the disease may only appear in the secondary contacts. We don't know just what threat these pose to the public health, but they make it hard to detect a common vehicle of infection.

(ii) Chemicals in water.

We know a lot about bacteria and something about viruses, but we know very little about the effects on human health of the large number of chemical compounds discharged into our rivers: in fact, I am sure that we can't even identify many of them. Water treatment plants may destroy bacteria and most viruses, but chemicals pass through into the water reticulation unchanged. As far as we can tell at the moment, no episodes of acute health effects have resulted, but we have no knowledge of the chronic effects caused by lengthy exposure to pollutants in low concentration. There is some evidence that people who drink "hard" water do not develop arteriosclerosis as much as do those who drink soft water, and even excess salt may help cause hypertension.

(iii) Mercury.

Some of the chemicals in water may be concentrated in the food chain of which man is the top link. Mercury is a very good example. Until a few years ago, we all thought that mercury discharged as waste to water lay inert on the bottom as metallic globules. Then, coastal communities on Minimata Bay, Japan, showed evidence of a mysterious illness, eventually diagnosed as mercurial poisoning. Investigation showed that the fish upon which these communities depended for a large portion of their protein had high concentrations of mercury in their tissues. A chemical factory discharged mercury into the Bay. Subsequent work in Japan and Sweden showed that metallic mercury under certain conditions is changed in the bottom muds to the more soluble and toxic methyl mercury. This concentrates in the food chain all the way up to the fish which man eats. In this country, we have a limit of 0.5 parts per million of mercury in fish and this has caused a great upset in the shark fishing industry in the State. We Australians have alternative sources of protein, but what happens to the people in underdeveloped countries?

(b) Recreation Use of Water

Another problem with polluted water arises from its use for body contact sports. Well meaning people ask us to close beaches "because the health of the public is in danger", but unfortunately experience does not back up this statement. There have been two major investigations into the dangers of bathing in polluted waters, one in America and the other in England. Apart from proving that all bathing is accompanied by illness (man is a terrestrial animal after all), the major result was that there was

no danger to the public health, provided that there was no possibility of swallowing intact pieces of faeces infected with pathogenic organisms. Please don't get me wrong. I am not saying that people should swim in diluted sewage: I am merely pointing out that with our present knowledge, one cannot use the health of the public as a reason for a clean-up campaign.

3. AIR POLLUTION

We can treat water before drinking it, but we must breathe the air that comes to us. People have complained about the quality of air for centuries, but only in the past fifty years have we known that polluted air kills. Within my lifetime, we have had the three infamous air pollution episodes — the Meuse Valley in December 1930, Donora, Pennsylvania, in October 1948 and London in December 1952, — which really alerted the world, and started scientists on a ceaseless round of investigations. Work has been done on whole populations living in cities, and upon vulnerable sections of the population.

This method makes comparisons a little difficult because people in cities are made up of differing racial groups, smokers and non-smokers, foundry workers and gardeners, showing a spectrum of reactions to pollutants. Many laboratory animals and some human volunteers have been exposed to single and multiple pollutants in various concentrations and for various periods. Diseases in workers as a result of industrial exposure have provided valuable clues, although the two samples are not strictly comparable.

All this ferment of investigation has really only confused us. There are reports that link certain elements of air pollution with stomach cancer, prostatic cancer, arteriosclerosis and cirrhosis of the liver. There are endless reports that certain concentrations of various pollutants interfere with the workings and structure of the lungs of various animals from mice to beetles. In effect, what emerges is that certain levels of pollution, measured as concentrations of smoke and sulphur dioxide are harmful to people who have impaired lungs and hearts. It appears that these levels of pollution are not being reached, even in London. Professor Lawther, Director of the World Health Organisation (Air Pollution International Reference Centre) has said "I am now only dealing with history". He is also responsible for the statement that the worst form of air pollution comes in packs of twenty.

4. NOISE POLLUTION

Pollution by noise is regarded as a modern invention, but the first report of noise induced hearing loss was written in 1700 by the Italian physician, Ramazzini. This has become enshrined in medical lore as "boilermakers deafness", but this is of course occupational in nature. Community noise, despite its loudness, does not appear to be causing any problems, but is the normal hearing loss, which we put down to old age, due to the repeated insults offered by our communal noise?

The British have an investigation under way, but it will extend over twenty five years. On the more general ground of social and mental well-being, two investigations in England showed that people living near London Airport did not use more sedatives or sleeping pills than the national average: however, more than expected were admitted to psychiatric hospitals. It is very hard to judge whether this is due to noise levels or to the fear that a heavier-than-air machine is about to prove the Law of Gravity.

So there is my very confusing list of health effects from the environment. Apart from the aggregation of people and industries, and the new synthetic chemicals, I wonder if in fact our personal environments may not have improved over the last century. I wonder how many nineteenth century death certificates said "phthisis" when in fact they should have said "effects of air pollution". We are at least starting to measure pollution and its effects on man, and to do something about it.

DR. W.N. SLOAN

Dr. Sloan graduated from the Melbourne University in 1950, and carried on his residential training at the Gippsland Base Hospital and Royal Women's Hospital, Melbourne. Following overseas experience, he entered General Practice.

He joined the Department of Health, Victoria, in 1964 and has held the positions of Medical Officer and District Health Officer; he is now Assistant Chief Health Officer.

He is a Lieut-Colonel on the Reserve of Officers, in the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps, and was formerly Assistant Director of Army Health.

April 18

World Hunger

Too Little Food?



or



Too Many People?

The Environmental Fund's statement on "The Real Crisis Behind the 'Food' Crisis" has been challenged by Bread for the World, and we think this difference of opinion is important.

Here is our statement, their reply, and our answer to it verbatim. These were requested by the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food and Energy of the U.S. House of Representatives, but have not yet been published.

Statement on **THE REAL CRISIS BEHIND THE "FOOD CRISIS"**

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The world as we know it will likely be ruined before the year 2,000 and the reason for this will be its inhabitants' failure to comprehend two facts. These facts are:

1. World food production cannot keep pace with the galloping growth of population.
2. "Family planning" cannot and will not, in the foreseeable future, check this runaway growth.

The momentum toward tragedy is at this moment so great that there is probably no way of halting it. The only hopeful possibility is to reduce the dimensions of the coming disaster.

We are being misled by those who say there is a serious food shortage. This is not true; world food production this decade is the greatest in history. The problem is too many people. The food shortage is simply evidence of the problem.

It makes no difference whatever how much food the world produces, if it produces people faster.

Some nations are now on the brink of famine because their populations have grown beyond the carrying capacity of their lands. Population growth has pushed the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America onto lands which are only marginally suitable for agriculture. No amount of scientific wizardry or improved weather will change this situation.


For a quarter of a century the United States has been generous with its food surpluses, now vanished. We have given at least 80 billion dollars worth of food and development aid since World War II. The result? Today, the developing world is less able to feed itself than it was before the massive U.S. aid program began. A generation ago, the population of poor countries was increasing by 16 million a year; now it increases by 67 million each year and the imbalance grows.

Furthermore, our past generosity has encouraged a do-nothing policy in the governments of some developing nations. At the 1974 United Nations meetings in Bucharest and Rome, spokesmen for these nations asserted, incredibly, that they had no population problem. They defended these twin policy statements:

1. The hungry nations have the right to produce as many children as they please.
2. Others have the responsibility to feed them.

We believe that these statements are irresponsible and indefensible. Any nation that asserts the right to produce more babies must also assume the responsibility for taking care of them.

Some speak optimistically of progress within the hungry nations as evidenced by the modest acceptance of family planning programs in many countries. "Family planning will succeed," they tell us. But how is this possible? Family planning advocates, to gain acceptance, insist that parents everywhere may have as



*Figures used are from reports by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on non-communist countries.

many children as they desire. If the number of children wanted had always been two (on the average) we would not now have a population problem. The crisis exists because parents want more than two children.

In Moslem countries, for example, the desired number of progeny per couple is "as many as God will send." This turns out, on the average, to be seven.

The country which has spent the most money on family planning over the longest period of time (India—24 years) has accomplished virtually nothing. Its population in 1951 grew by 3.6 million. Now it grows 16.2 million each year. Mexico adopted family planning only three years ago and the birth rate there has abruptly risen.

Yet many people insist that it is our moral obligation not only to continue but to increase our aid, totally overlooking the fact that it is impossible, from a practical standpoint. Eighty percent of the world's grain is not grown in the United States. All that we can sell or give away amounts to only 6% of the world's production and less than three years' population increase, alone, would consume this.

THE STATEMENT continued

There can be no moral obligation to do the impossible.

No one really likes triage — the selection of those nations most likely to survive and the concentration of our available food aid on them. The question can only arise if we should reach the point where the world population outruns food resources. When such a situation arises, some people will die no matter what the disposition of the inadequate food supply will be. In that event, some hard decisions will have to be made.

At some point, we in the United States are going to find that we cannot provide for the world any more than we can police it.

BREAD FOR THE WORLD'S REPLY

The Environmental Fund's statement, "The Real Crisis Behind the 'Food Crisis,'" fails both the test of realism and the test of moral responsibility.

THE TEST OF REALISM

1. *The statement perpetuates the myth that the real problem behind world hunger is too many people.* Readers are led to conclude that unless and until people in the poor countries have smaller families, efforts to assist in their development are doomed to fail, and may in fact be counterproductive.

The statement is correct in recognizing the seriousness of rapid population growth as a factor contributing to hunger. But its preoccupation with this factor in isolation from other factors encourages us to get at the problem backwards.

A peasant couple in India, for example, has no social security except for sons who survive to adulthood. Because adequate nourishment and basic health care are often beyond reach, the chance of the couple's losing several children through death is high. Under these conditions a couple typically makes an intelligent economic decision by choosing to have many children. Only when the insecurities of hunger and poverty are subsequently reduced do parents voluntarily decide to have small families. Consequently the general rule is that hunger spurs population growth.

China, Taiwan, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and even Kerala, a poor state in India, have sharply lowered their population growth rates. Why? Because minimal but adequate nutrition, health care, basic education, and in most cases jobs are available to all or virtually all of their people. In this context parents tend to have fewer children. Without these gains parents will continue to have many children, no matter how vigorously birth control measures are pushed, precisely because it is not in their best interest to do otherwise. What developing country has substantially lowered its population growth rate apart from social and economic gains that reach the poorest half of its population? Not a single one.

2. *The statement implies that the world is producing people faster than it is producing food.* According to The Environmental Fund, "It makes no difference whatever how much food the world produces, if it produces people faster." As the graph on the next page indicates, however, for the past two decades world food production has exceeded population increases on a per capita basis — although food production gains have occurred disproportionately in the rich nations. Poor countries have lagged behind in food production largely because their farmers have not had access to appropriate technologies—including sufficient fertilizer, improved seeds, irrigation, pesticides, storage facilities and transportation—or to basic services such as credit on fair terms, extension services and health care. The result: hunger and rapid population growth.


3. *The statement misrepresents the position of developing countries at the Bucharest and Rome conferences.* As misrepresented, that position is indeed "irresponsible and indefensible."

In summary, our position is this: The sovereign right of each nation to control its own reproduction creates the reciprocal responsibility to care for its own people. The U.S. can help and will — to the limits of our available resources.

The belief that our crisis results from a "shortage" of food leads to disaster. Attempting to deal with this by producing and distributing more food, while doing nothing about population, is incubating disaster.

We must not permit our aid to undermine the failure of some nations to take care of their own. When aid-dependent nations understand that there are limits to our food resources, there is hope that they will tackle their population problems in earnest.

We owe it to posterity — and ours and that of the rest of the world — to promote policies that lead to solutions instead of catastrophe.



Source: U.S. Agency for International Development

In fact, however, representatives of those countries took a sharply different position. They said:

A. The hungry nations have a right to reduce their population growth rates the same way that the United States and other industrialized nations have reduced theirs: within the context of social and economic gains. (Bucharest)

B. The entire community of nations must work together to overcome hunger, and the most important single goal is to enable small farm families in the developing countries to become more food productive. (Rome)

A fair representation of the views of the developing countries at Bucharest and Rome refuses, rather than documents, the position of The Environmental Fund.

4. *The statement implies that the United States has done just about everything possible to assist the developing countries, and that "to increase our aid . . . is impossible, from a practical standpoint."* This position is simply not true. Our development assistance since World War II was mainly concentrated (a) in Western Europe; and (b) in a few countries, such as South Korea and Taiwan, where security considerations were uppermost. Assistance has often served to meet our own needs rather than the needs of hungry people. Today U.S. development aid to poor countries is 0.24 percent of our national production (GNP). That places us 13th among 18 donor nations. Measured as a percentage of GNP, U.S. assistance is not even one-tenth as much as it was for Europe during the peak of the Marshall Plan. The United States can be generous, but the truth is that we have not yet committed ourselves to a serious global effort against hunger, either in our assistance or in other policies that might give the rural poor access to needed technology and other resources.

5. *The statement is unduly pessimistic.* It says that "there is probably no way of halting" the world's "momentum toward

BREAD FOR THE WORLD'S REPLY

(continued)

tragedy." Such pessimism invites despair and moral cynicism, and becomes self-fulfilling because it tends to immobilize people.

THE TEST OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

The test of moral responsibility does not pit soft-headed sentiments against hard reality. The biblical view knows no such dichotomy. A misunderstanding of reality and an immoral position often reinforce each other. The statement by The Environmental Fund reflects this weakness. Consider these objections:

1. *The statement encourages us to play God with the lives of others.* This is an especially acute temptation when we are defending positions of privilege for ourselves. The statement implies that we should hold the line or retrench on assistance, and fails to suggest any other initiative toward enabling development to occur in the poor countries. "We must not permit our aid to underwrite their failure to control population growth," it says. This reflects the mindset of "triage" and "lifeboat ethics." It fails to reflect the fact that "the earth is the Lord's" and that we are stewards, not owners of his earth, accountable for the way in which we use its resources either to enhance or to diminish the lives of others. And it fails, above all, to reflect the extraordinary value that God, our Creator and Savior, places on human life.

2. *The statement overlooks our own complicity in the hunger crisis.* If the earth's carrying capacity is limited, who is consuming the earth's non-renewable resources? Who are the waste-makers? And who is polluting the environment? Not primarily the people in poor countries, but we in the rich countries. Or why, for example, is most of the fish caught off the coast of Peru used to feed livestock in rich countries? Clearly economic imbalances make many poor countries net exporters of high protein foods to the rich ones, and we are part of this arrangement.

Although it is unfruitful to become preoccupied with the question of who is to blame for hunger, the fact is that *some* hunger and poverty today is a legacy of practices that were carried out over a long period of time by Western nations, such as the carting off of raw materials from overseas colonies; or having those col-

onies produce crops for sale abroad rather than for local nourishment; or the bringing of Africans to this country as slaves. Some of these practices are still in effect.

3. *The statement blames the victims (a conventional response of the privileged) and offers the rest of us an excuse for doing nothing.* It encourages throughout a *we/they* mentality: "We" the generous are pitted against "them" the irresponsible. Missing is any sense of our common humanity or a recognition that we are all children of God, albeit living under strikingly different circumstances.

4. *The statement carries an unspoken value judgment that our lives are more important than millions of other lives.* "The problem is too many people," it says. Could the problem instead, or at least also, be too little willingness on our part to share and to create more just conditions? Instead of suggesting that we make modest adjustments so that the poor have access to means that will enable them to work their way out of hunger, the statement invites a siege mentality in which we preserve and enhance our own inordinate share of the earth and let others starve.

5. *The statement should be read with these questions in mind:* Does it turn us inward or does it help us to reach out to others? Is it life-affirming or life-denying? Is it concerned with the well-being and preservation of others or solely with the protection of ourselves and our own advantages? These questions help us to assess the statement and they lead us to find it morally unacceptable.

CONCLUSION

The statement represents a position that has been overwhelmingly rejected by the churches as incompatible with Christian faith. For some of the same reasons noted above the statement is clearly incompatible with the religious and ethical tradition of many others, as well.

July, 1976

bread for the world
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Our Answer to BREAD FOR THE WORLD

Justin Blackwelder, President
The Environmental Fund

The Environmental Fund did indeed write and circulate a statement entitled "The Real Crisis Behind the Food Crisis." The Fund has already received more than 15,000 congratulatory messages, hundreds of which came from religious leaders, some of whom specifically encouraged the Fund to spread the message to Bread for the World.

I appreciate the thought and fairness that BFTW brought to their analysis of this Statement, and in the best tradition of civility, seek to respond to their challenge.

Obviously, we share the concern of Bread for the World for the hungry of this planet. Otherwise we would not have published our statement. Nevertheless, concern by itself will feed no one.

In order to accomplish our shared goal—the elimination of hunger—we must deal with the situation as it is, not as we wish it to be. Therefore, analysis is crucial; and there are several elements of BFTW's reply to our statement which need further consideration.

THE TEST OF REALISM

"The Statement perpetuates the myth that the real problem behind world hunger is too many people."

This is no myth. It is true.

World grain production has not again equalled the 1973-74 yield. Even in that peak year, people went hungry. Since that year, the world's population has increased by 270 million people. The hunger problem cannot be attributed merely to financial,

transportational or storage problems or to the faulty distribution of food. It cannot even be explained by misuse of political power. All of these factors are real, and serious; we do not underestimate them. But any permanent improvement is impossible unless population increases are halted.

"A peasant couple in India, for example, has no social security except for sons who survive to adulthood."

It is quite true that a peasant couple in India regards many children as social security and that they probably produce more children for this reason. BFTW ignores the fact that there is nothing the United States can do to alter either the culture or the social system of any other nation. To increase nutrition (a good idea) in a culture which values many sons (and accepts many daughters as an incidental consequence) has the inevitable effect of increasing population size and, consequently, worsening the problem.

BFTW contends that birth rates will decline, once nations have met minimum human needs such as food, shelter, employment and health care. They give no evidence to support this thesis, and available evidence from other sources does not support it.

Dr. Rose Frisch, of Harvard's Center for Population Studies, has recently completed work on the relationship between fertility and nutrition. She found that undernourished women are less fertile than well-nourished ones. Thus, improving the nutrition of poor women *increases* their fertility. Her work aptly demonstrates that simply sending food assistance to hungry nations, or even helping them grow more food, isn't enough. It simply makes the problem worse. From a *humane* point of view, the important

OUR ANSWER continued

thing is to provide adequate nutrition but *also* to control population growth. To do one without the other certainly does not meet the tests of realism or moral responsibility.

"What developing country has substantially lowered its population growth rate apart from social and economic gains that reach the poorest half of its population? Not a single one."

This is simply not true.

The theory that economic development will assure that birth rates will fall to manageable levels is just that: a theory. The facts we presented certainly make the theory an unacceptable basis for planning the future of the human race.

Costa Rica, for example, has experienced one of the most rapid declines in its birth rate, from 47.5 in 1960 to 31.5 in 1974 (and this decline pre-dated family planning programs). Yet Costa Rica ranks 11th in GNP per capita among Latin American nations, 11th in educational enrollment, 11th in infant mortality and 18th in total gross national product. Its per capita income is approximately the Latin American average.

Six Latin American nations with higher GNP per capita, higher energy use per capita and fewer people in the agricultural labor force have higher birth rates than Costa Rica. They are: Surinam, Venezuela, Panama, Mexico, Jamaica and Brazil.

The world's birth rate, according to the UN *Demographic Yearbooks*, has declined from 34 to 33 in the past twenty-five years. At this rate, the world's population might stabilize in 500 years, with people standing on each other's heads.

I quote Coordinator-General Ojeda of Mexico's National Population Council: "Mexico is building one school-room every 50 minutes; but in 50 minutes are born 240 Mexican children."

While many assert that the world can feed 40 billion people in the future, that doesn't make it true. The fact is that we can't feed one-tenth that many now.

BFTW mentions China, Taiwan, South Korea, Sri Lanka and Kerala (a state in India) as having sharply lowered their birth rates by development practices and better health care. This contention probably is false. Certainly, it cannot be demonstrated to be true. Partly, it is a *post hoc ergo propter hoc* argument and it neatly overlooks the fact that these things have been tried elsewhere with opposite results.

I regret that BFTW included China in the list, as, of course, BFTW does not know what China's growth rate is or whether or not it is falling. Even the Chinese don't know, and apparently do not wish to know. If they did, they would arrange for a census, which they have not had for almost a quarter of a century.

"The Statement implies that the world is producing people faster than it is producing food."


The Statement certainly did lead to that conclusion.

Food resources are *not* keeping pace with population growth. The world has done an excellent job of producing food. It has never produced so much before. The world can, probably, produce more food than it is producing today. But the world population is doubling every twenty-five years and food production cannot match that.

World grain production in 1974-75 decreased 40 million metric tons from 1,217 million metric tons in 1973-74. World grain production was down 45 million metric tons in 1975-76, as well. World per capita consumption of grains in 1973-74 was as high as it's ever been, 311 kilograms. Yet in 1974-75, world consumption fell to 274 kilograms, as low as 1964. Since 1973, we have added 270 million more people. The world cannot be *better* fed on *less* food for *more* people. That is not an opinion; it is simply a fact.

The past generation has witnessed population growth outstripping the monumental efforts to increase food production and alleviate poverty. Between 1948 and 1952, the poor nations of the world were exporting cereal grain products. Today they are importing 55 million metric tons of cereal grains. An FAO study recently concluded that these import needs will triple in the next decade and by 1985 widespread famine will occur—unless population growth rates are dramatically reduced. And FAO is assuming "normal" weather.

BFTW's attention should be drawn to another chart, which shows that during the period when food production made the most progress, the world was enjoying the most favorable climate for agriculture in possibly 1,000 years.



Variations in mean temperature in Iceland during the past 1100 years. (Figures from Berghorssen, Drawing from Reid Bryson)

From the diagram, it can be seen that the mean temperature called "normal" in 1970, which lasted from about 1931 to about 1960, was, in fact, the warmest weather that has occurred in the North Atlantic area in centuries.

Temporarily, at least, this phenomenon has ended. Climatologists estimate that the chance of returning to "normal" in the next few decades is very slim.

"Poor countries have lagged behind in food production largely because their farmers have not had access to appropriate technologies . . . including sufficient fertilizer, improved seeds, irrigation, pesticides, storage facilities and transportation . . ."

The export to the poor world of US agricultural technology involves a conversion from labor-intensive agriculture to a system which requires capital and energy. To substitute capital for labor in a system that has an abundance of labor and no capital makes no sense whatever, and may even be a recipe for revolution. But to build an agricultural system on an energy-intensive basis at a time when the world is running out of energy resources is an even greater error; it is a recipe for ultimate disaster.

To understand this more fully, let's examine the process of desertification. Erik Eckholm's recent book *Losing Ground* graphically describes the environmental tragedy caused by rapid population growth in the poor world:

"While the Southward movement of the Sahara has been generating headlines in the early seventies, the desert is also creeping Northward toward the Mediterranean. The population of arid North Africa has multiplied sixfold since the beginning of the century, and the destruction of vegetation in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya has accelerated in this period, particularly about 1930, when the population of these countries began to climb steeply. Intense overgrazing, the extension of unsustainable grain farming, and firewood gathering have all contributed to a deterioration of the agricultural environment. The result, calculates H. N. Le Houerou of the UN Food and Agriculture Association, is the loss of more than a hundred thousand hectares of land to the desert *each year*. With increasingly eroded lands in the Atlas Mountains to the North, and an encroaching desert to the South, food production has stagnated in many areas of North Africa. This one-time granary of the Roman Empire is a chronic, major, food-importing region now."

And in the hungriest area of the world, the Sahel: "Disasters in the desert are nothing new: droughts and crop failures have always plagued arid lands, as Joseph recognized when he advised the Pharaoh to set aside grain reserves in ancient Egypt. But both the scale of suffering when the rains fail, and the scale of destructive human pressures on delicate arid zone ecosystems are reaching unprecedented proportions in the Sahel and many other desert regions. Populations are, in effect, outgrowing the biological systems that sustain their lifestyles, and it is an open question whether their ways will change in time, or their life-support systems disintegrate irrevocably."

OUR ANSWER continued

In the Sudan, often referred to as the future 'granary' of the Arab world, population pressure is resulting in "the gradual shifting of vegetational zones toward the south, with an ever-increasing loss of forest and widening of the desert. Desert creeps into steppe, and while steppe losses ground to the desert it creeps into the neighboring savannah, which in turn creeps into the forest."

And, in summary, Eckholm writes, "The littered ruins and barren landscapes left by dozens of former civilizations remind us that humans have been undercutting their own welfare for thousands of years. What is new today is the awesome scale and dizzying speed with which environmental destruction is occurring in many parts of the world. The basic arithmetic of world population growth reveals that the relationship between human beings and the environment is now entering an historically unique age of widespread danger. Whatever the root causes of suicidal land treatment and rapid population growth—and the causes of both are numerous and complex—in nearly every instance the rise in human numbers is the immediate catalyst of deteriorating food production systems." (Emphasis supplied.)

"The number of humans reached one billion about 1830, two or three million years after our emergence as a distinct species. The second billion was added in one hundred years, and the third billion in thirty years. One day in late 1975, just fifteen years later, world population reached four billion. At the present rate of growth, the fifth billion will come in thirteen years and the sixth billion in ten years after that."

To describe this situation as a problem of food production is to turn reality on its head. Yet the technological optimists (rarely the technologists themselves) offer us these solutions to the problem: irrigation, dams, wells, pesticides, fertilizer, and improved seeds. Let us take a hard look:

Irrigation—To expand food production, Pakistan built irrigation systems throughout the Punjab. As a result, the water table drastically rose; evaporation dramatically increased, and the salinity of the water jumped by 1000% in a generation. By 1960, two million hectares of fertile land had been lost, as a thin layer of salt covered the Punjab fields.

It is no consolation to learn that about 1200 years ago, the cradle of civilization—Mesopotamia—was once the most fertile area of the world. It was reduced to a few dusty villages by exactly the same process. The Pakistanis have a major handicap: 75 million people, and a doubling time of 25 years.

Dams—Dams are another panacea. Eckholm describes the blind rush to "develop" the poor world this way:

"Engineers build one dam after another, paying only modest heed to the farming practices and deforestation upstream that will, by influencing the river silt loads, determine the dam's lifespan. Agricultural economists project regional food production far into the future using elaborate, computerized models, but without taking into account the deteriorating soil quality or the mounting frequency of floods that will undercut it. Water resource specialists sink wells on the desert fringes with no arrangement to control nearby herd sizes, thus ensuring overgrazing and new tracts of desert. Foresters who must plant and protect trees among the livestock and firewood gatherers of the rural peasantry receive excellent training in botany and silviculture, but none in rural sociology; their saplings are destroyed by cattle, goats, and firewood seekers within weeks after planting."

Wells—The New York Times last year printed the following article:

"Well-meaning aid projects over the last decade or so have resulted in an overpopulation of men and livestock that makes the current reduced ability of the land to support them far more disastrous in terms of lives than it might have been before. In the Sahel, the good years began shortly after 1961. There were six years of unusually high rainfall, which improved the thin and scraggly desert pasture. Then came the aid projects—US AID built more than 1,400 wells where more people seemed to need them most, which meant where there were most people and most cattle. In a desert society, which exists in a subtle ecological balance, one of the key restraints upon the size of the herds has been the amount of water the tribe can haul up for its cattle by hand.

The new power wells were soon surrounded by too many cattle for the available pasture. And with the vaccination programs, fewer cattle died prematurely. The human population explosion, fueled by the beginnings of health care, needed the extra cattle and the frail ecology of the Sahel began to crumble. Even in 1968, a relatively mild drought led to the desertification of vast areas, as the herdsmen cut down trees so their cattle could eat the foliage, as the hungry and numerous goats ate the very roots in the ground. 1969 was an almost normal year for rains, and the crisis was avoided, but the diminished rains of 1970, '71, and '72 condemned the bulk of the Sahel herds to death in 1973, and brought the Sahara into thousands of square miles of hitherto fertile land. The sheer scale of the human population increase terrifies local aid officials. Achim Kratz, the director of the European Development Fund mission in Niger, last year produced an authoritative report that concluded that even with good rains for the next ten years, the food-population ratio will be worse in 1982 than in disastrous 1973."

Pesticides—Eckholm writes, "Pesticide and fertilizer runoff has already reduced fish production in farm ponds in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia; this problem will certainly intensify throughout Southeast Asia and elsewhere as governments strive to boost agricultural yields."

Fertilizers—A number of Sahelian governments put forward their fertilizer needs to feed their current populations in 1975. An American soil expert noted that the estimate "would have poisoned every river and every acre of the Sahel for a decade."

Improved seeds—"Miracle seeds" are highly dependent on enough water, pesticides and fertilizer. And there is not enough.

The transfer of technology is no answer to overpopulation. As Dr. D. J. Greenland points out in *Science*, "For the great majority of farmers in the less developed parts of the tropics and subtropics, who farm poor soils unsuited to intensive mechanized agriculture, transfer of technology is not possible. Farms of less than two hectares on poor, highly erodible soils, cover a large proportion of the humid tropics. They cannot be cultivated by standard mechanized techniques without consolidation into larger holdings, and they cannot produce enough financial return to give a profit that justifies investment on farm inputs such as pesticides and fertilizers."

In spite of all these difficulties, farmers in the third world have dramatically increased production. Since the 1948-52 period, when they were grain exporters, they have increased yields in Asia by 350%, in Africa by 250%, and in Latin America by 250%. The very fact that these nations are still hungry after increasing grain production should clearly illustrate that population growth in the past several decades has outstripped the heroic efforts to improve the lot of the poor of the world.

For the United States to compound these difficulties by "transferring" a petroleum-based technology borders on the criminal. It certainly fails both the tests of realism and moral responsibility.

"The Statement misrepresents the position of developing countries at the Bucharest and Rome Conferences."

Not only did the delegates from many countries, assembled at Bucharest, say that it is their right to have as many children as they wish, while it is the responsibility of others to feed them, but they also repeated this at Rome, Lima, Mexico City and at the UN. BFTW confirms this: "The hungry nations have a right to reduce their population growth rate the same way the United States and other industrialized nations have reduced theirs: within a context of social and economic gains."

This means that they have the right to do so if they wish, but they recognize no duty to do so. Accordingly, it is not being done, and many countries are producing millions of additional people whom they cannot feed.

But, according to BFTW, "The entire community of nations must work together to overcome hunger." In other words, it is definitely not the responsibility of those who produce excess numbers of people to feed them; it is everybody's responsibility.

To maintain these two assertions is, as we said, irresponsible and indefensible.

OUR ANSWER continued

It took Western civilization about 150 years to bring down the birth rates. Where in the third world is there that much time? The sad reality is that today in most areas of the world, birth rates are not coming down.

Delegates from Brazil came to the Bucharest conference for the purpose of advocating higher birth rates and growth rates. So did the delegates from Argentina. So did the delegates from the Moslem countries. Argentine and Chinese delegates said that population control is unnecessary, and that a socialist revolution would solve the problem.

A study done for FAO in late 1975 of the Sahel region, Brazil, Haiti, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, underlined the fact that although billions of dollars in food assistance had been sent to these hungriest of nations, all of them resisted implementing a sound population program. Those of the Sahel emphatically opposed any population control.

Reid Bryson has stated the problem clearly: "With finite resources, an exponentially increasing population means an exponentially decreasing amount of resources per person. It is not logically possible to reconcile this mathematical fact with the current wave of world-wide 'rising expectations' and clamor for a 'new economic order' which will bring affluence to all. Put in a different way, this can be extended to the statement that there are no 'have-not' nations—only overpopulated nations. We often think of India as a poor nation, but if the resources of India were divided among 100 million instead of 600 million people, would not Indians be six times as affluent on the average? As the world population grows exponentially, will we rapidly become a 'have-not' world?"

"The Statement implies that the United States has done just about everything possible to assist the developing countries, and that to increase our aid . . . is impossible from a practical standpoint."

BFTW seems to have taken our statement out of context. We were talking about food assistance. Since all that we can sell or give away amounts to only 6% of the world's total grain production, and less than three years' population increase alone will consume this, our food assistance is limited, and any substantial increase is impossible.

We support additional assistance, where it will help, but all the assistance in the world will make no difference if population outstrips available resources.

Almost five years ago, a noted supporter of assistance warned us, ". . . Essentially, the question is whether we are prepared to recognize the limits of our own capacity—the moral and political as well as the technical and economic limits—and allow nature to take what may well be an uncongenial course in many countries of the third world. The question, to put it another way, is whether we simply recognize that there are some things we simply cannot do—such as restructuring another country through our own efforts—and other things we cannot permanently prevent—such as social revolution, where and when its time has come."

Senator Frank Church, *A Liberal Takes His Leave of Foreign Aid*, Congressional Record, Oct. 29, 1971, p. S 17185

In recognizing the limits to what we can do, we also need to recognize the reciprocal responsibilities of others to help themselves.

Nowhere in Bread for the World's statement was any such challenge issued. In fact, these other countries were excused from any responsibility on the grounds that they were former colonies. This approach is the most subtle kind of paternalism, implying that no one in the third world is capable of handling his own affairs and that we must take care of him.

THE TEST OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

"The Statement is unduly pessimistic . . . it tends to immobilize people."

The Statement is true; therefore, by definition, it cannot be pessimistic. People who are prepared for what is going to happen will fare better, even if it doesn't happen. Those who refused to face reality may be dead.

"The Statement encourages us to play God with the lives of others."

It encourages no one to do any such thing, just as it did not recommend a "triage" solution. But while the United States does not practice triage, and probably never will, it certainly plays God. It has no other choice. We have a limited supply of something which others want, but not enough for all. We can throw it away, sell it to the highest bidder, bribe a friendly dictator, or feed a few of the hungry. Whatever our choice is, we are playing God today. It is my opinion that we are not playing God wisely.

Mankind does have a responsibility to use the world's resources wisely. But the poor and the rich nations both have a strong responsibility, indeed a duty to limit population growth so that catastrophe doesn't occur. Limitless population growth cannot be sustained on a planet with limited resources.

BFTW attacks a "mindset" of triage and "lifeboat ethics" neither of which was endorsed by the Fund's statement. The exact words were, "Nobody really likes triage—the selection of those nations most likely to survive and the concentration of our available food on them. The question can only arise if we should reach a point where the world population outruns the food resources. When such a situation arises, some people will die no matter what the disposition of the inadequate food supply will be. In that event, some hard decisions will have to be made."

The phrase "lifeboat ethics" never appeared in the statement—or indeed any statement The Environmental Fund has ever published.

It appears that BFTW has used this "mindset" argument speciously to attack a statement which contained no mention of one concept and only a passing reference (but not an endorsement) of the other.

"The Statement fails to reflect that 'the Earth is the Lord's' . . . and that we are stewards."

It is not our purpose to dispute religious or theological arguments, but to tell the truth.

However, if we are stewards (and we certainly should be) we are not very good ones. We have destroyed half of the farmland on the mainland US already, and we are exhausting the other half. If, in our greed for foreign exchange, we seriously attempt to make up the food shortages elsewhere in the world, within a decade or two we will not even be able to feed ourselves and provide for our children. It is presently profitable to do so, but we are stealing from our children's bank account. Is this good stewardship?

"The Statement fails, above all, to reflect the extraordinary value that God, our Creator and Savior, places on human life."

It is precisely because we value human life that the statement was written, in an overpopulated world, all of our lives become increasingly less human.

BFTW also said that the Statement "fails to suggest any other initiative toward enabling development to occur in the poor countries."

We suggested, in the strongest language we knew, that they stabilize their numbers. Only with population stabilization can development efforts succeed.

"The Statement overlooks our own complicity in the hunger crisis." BFTW then asks, "Who is consuming the earth's non-renewable resources? Who are the waste-makers? And who is polluting the environment?"

The correct answer is: everybody.

It is certainly true that the United States is a wasteful country as well as a productive one. We should reduce our waste, for many reasons, but it won't solve the population problem.

We could stop fertilizing our lawns, our golf courses, our cemeteries, stop drinking alcoholic beverages altogether. But that would not solve the problem.

The Club of Rome noted in *Mankind at the Turning Point* that even with an impossible redistribution of resources to South

OUR ANSWER continued

Asia, resulting in the cultivation of all potentially arable land, growing miracle strains of grain, the area, by 2025 would still require the importation of 200% of the total US annual cereal crop just to maintain today's nutritionally inadequate diet. And this assumes declining fertility. The redistribution of resources, no matter how massive, will not and cannot solve the population problem.

Can it be anything but self-evident that the redistribution of the world's resources will accomplish absolutely nothing until the difficult ethical, political, social and economic decisions are made by each and every national government to bring population demands in equilibrium with the scarce resources of this planet?

As for pollution, only the developed nations are doing anything at all about environmental deterioration at the present time . . . perhaps they're the only ones who can afford to, but the fact remains that the ecological degradation is worldwide.

"Why, for instance, is most of the fish caught off the coast of Peru used to feed livestock in the rich countries?"

The fish caught off the coast of Peru are a tiny anchovy, which neither the Peruvians, nor anyone else, will eat. If it were not sold for chicken feed, the Peruvians would not catch it. In that case, they would not have the money to buy the food which they are presently importing.

The West has a broader guilt in the hunger crisis than colonialism; we brought death control, before the necessity of birth control was understood and accepted.

"The statement blames the victims (a conventional response of the privileged) and offers the rest of us an excuse for doing nothing."

On the contrary, only *optimism* "offers us an excuse for doing nothing." We must try to cut the birth rate, before Nature raises the death rate.

"The Statement carries an unspoken value judgment that our lives are more important than millions of other lives."

The statement uses the phrase "posterity—ours and that of the rest of the world," listing our children first, because that is where we perceive our *primary* responsibility to lie. Other nations seem to think so, too.

Tunisia, in 1960, withdrew the tax benefit from families with more than four children. Singapore, Sri Lanka and Hong Kong legislated economic and social disincentives for families with more than two children. These small nations *have* made the difficult decisions which BFTW would have us believe do not, in fact, have to be made.

The world has made heroic efforts to increase food production in the past generation. In the poor nations, food production in the past twenty-five years has increased between 200 and 300 per cent, more than in the United States and Europe. The tragedy of our times is that unprecedented population growth threatens to undo all our best efforts. We saw this in 1974 when millions of people starved to death in South Asia, the Sahel, Brazil, Haiti and elsewhere.

We ignore the ominous growth in population only at our peril. The facts *are* unpleasant. They do *not* call for normal, easy, or common solutions. They call for unprecedented action. We will gladly join with BFTW in that effort. But only if it is understood that this fragile earth, regardless of our best efforts, cannot support a limitless population. In fact, it is having a desperately difficult time supporting its present population.

Nature is sending us danger signals every day. We ignore them at our peril, too . . . just as did Mesopotamia, the Indus and Mayan empires, the Americans of the Dust Bowl era, and the Africans scratching out a living from the leached-out sands of the barren hills of the Sahel.

"The Statement should be read with these questions in mind: Does it appeal to the best or the worst in us? Does it turn us inward or does it help us to reach out to others? Is it life-affirming or life-denying? . . . these questions lead us to find it morally unacceptable."

The Statement was not written to be "acceptable."

It was written because it is true and because it is important. It was intended to appeal to people who agree with Patrick Henry:

"For my part, whatever anguish of spirit it may cost, I am willing to know the whole truth—to know the worst and to provide for it."

Virginia Convention,
May 23, 1775

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LATIN AMERICAN REPORT

INTRODUCTION :

It is my privilege to speak to you, dear friends of the Alternative to Abortion Organization as a representative of the Latin American people. Of course I must apologize, since I am not a "Latino" myself, but I sincerely believe that the 12 years that I have lived in Colombia, plus my trips all over the continent as a specialist in the family give me certain credit. The fact that I am a Canadian helps to give me special insights regarding the topic of this conference.

First of all, let me make three preliminary remarks :

1. It is practically impossible to talk about Latin America. It is too big, too complex.
2. I do not have personal knowledge of all the twenty countries of Latin America. My personal experience is mainly limited to Colombia and this explains the content of my speech.
3. It is impossible to cover everything in a short speech; you have to limit yourself to a specific topic.
I intend to outline for you the situation of contraception and abortion in Latin America by covering four points :

- I - Data pertaining to contraception and abortion in Latin America.
- II - How antinatalist campaigns have been and are being implemented in Latin America.
- III - The point of view of several Latin America citizens.
- IV - What many Latin Americans expect from North America.

I - DATA ON CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN LATIN AMERICA :

We are living in a changing world. Everyone agrees with this statement, I am sure. Changes are evident in every aspect of the life of groups and individuals in politics, economics and social and cultural activities. As far as human population is concerned, changes are seen in demographic statistics, life styles, the family unit, sexual behavior, psychological approach and ethics.

Attitudes towards human love and life are shifting, with changes taking place at both macro and micro levels. New international and national population policies have been born in the last twelve years. The family unit is faced with a tremendous challenge; a sexual revolution is taking place.

In this context family planning is a reality in Latin America as is the case everywhere all over the world. Politicians, doctors and educators are working in almost every country. But the continent is poor and many families live in mountainous areas, so not everyone is reached by the people involved in population activities. Health specialists influence couples sexual behaviour more and more, as they gradually assume the place formerly held by religious leaders.

New types of social attitudes are appearing : artificial contraception, sterilization, abortion. Those factors have always existed, but now they are much more popular for two main reasons: the population explosion and the activities of population experts from the developed world in Latin America. The law forbids sterilization and abortion but it is not strictly enforced. Politicians and lawyers are pressed to obtain legalized abortion. So far only El Salvador has introduced some liberalization elements, but in many countries efforts are being made to obtain a legal change. Changes are also being seen from cultural and ethical stand points. Latin American professionals who study in North America and Europe come back with new ethics. Most of them have been trained and paid by neo-malthusian experts and institutions, and they practice their profession with a new philosophy once they return. They leave Latin America with a weak Christian philosophy and they cannot ward off the materialistic pressures of North America and Europe.

Let me tell you briefly what happened in Colombia between 1965 and 1975 in connection with family life and activities related to sexual behaviour. In short, Colombia has been submitted to an intensive malthusian campaign, promoting family planning with contraception, sterilization and abortion. How did that all happen ?

II - ANTINATALIST CAMPAIGNS IN COLOMBIA :

1. A link exists between United States population policy and the population policy implemented by the Colombian Government. Antinatalist campaigns in Colombia did not originate in the Colombian Congress but in the United States Congress, on

July 22 1965 , to be exact . On that day , Bill 1976 determined, that public funds would be destined to family planning programs, both within the United States and abroad , through the Assistance International Development Agency . Those Colombians who share the same capitalistic ideology agreed with that decision ; for instance Alberto Lleras Camargo , former Colombian president , stated before the U.S Congress , on July 2nd , that the first step should be the establishment of demographic centers in Colombian universities .

In Colombia two specialized malthusian population organizations have been particularly active : the Population Council , whose President , as you know , is David Rockefeller , and International Planned Parenthood Federation , whose Colombian branch is called " Profamilia " .The current IPPF president is Fernando Tamayo , a Colombian .

It is easy to prove that the experts of USAID Population Council , and other groups have gradually had real influence on Colombian's population policies . The Ministers of Health and Education have been advised by population experts from Population Council , while money has been provided to teach the contraceptive and abortive approach to the physicians , sociologists , nurses , social assistants and priests who are trained in the United States . Clinics have been opened all over the country . At first they were independent , but after a while they became part of the country's health system . Orientations given by Population Council experts have been followed step by step by the Colombian Government under the label of " International Cooperation " .

As a Colombian lawyer puts it : " Dr. Berelson from Population Council , personally , wrote , the guidelines for the antinatalist program for Colombia . . This plan has been fully and perfectly

enforced for the last five years ". (Colonialismo Demográfico, p. 123) . Berelson himself wrote : " The acceptance of abortion, and its evident effectiveness in reducing the birth rate in underdeveloped countries , means that it could be used as a normal means of birth control ". (Estudios de Planificación Familiar, Vol VI , T.2 , Bogotá , 1971 , p. 92).

There is no doubt that contraception practices have been imported from North America and Europe to Latin America and that, in certain cases , population policies have been oriented by neomalthusian experts . These experts have invited Colombians to study abortion " without prejudice " and to consider the legal ban on abortion as a way of discriminating against the poor . The Peace Corps has been used to promote contraception and sterilization in Ecuador and other Latin American countries .

2. Internationally and politically wealthy countries are pressing poor countries to adopt family planning programs using contraception , sterilization and abortion .

In order to explain the poverty of underdeveloped countries , some administrators of the international agencies , Mr. McNamara of the World Bank , for instance , believe that it is due mainly to their high birth rate . Hence , it is essential to give priority to a population program which will reduce births . Mr. McNamara said that these countries needed a " strict strategy " . Exactly what does this mean ? . Mr Berelson from Population Council is more explicit : " We should deny " , he said , " Our foreign aid to any country which has a increasing birth rate that we consider undesirable ... the U.S. should use its power and its prestige to bring diplomatic and economic pressures to bear on any country or organization which is opposed to a solution to the world's most serious problem " .

The Colombian Government has been criticized for signing alleged contracts with the U.S. Government . The charge was denied and no legal proof can be given , but everyone can see the power of dollars in the universities , medical schools , which are only open to artificial means of birth control. Demographers and sociologists can study in the United States if they accept the malthusian philosophy . Priests and other specialists in the educational fields can study for years and years if they agree to spread propaganda favoring contraception . Congresses and meetings are organized for newspapermen and specialists of the mass media .

Former President Johnson's formula is applied everywhere : " It is better to invest five dollars in a population program than a hundred dollars in a development program " .

Sometimes even statistics are misinterpreted . In the theological field , articles written by Catholic theologians who disagree with Pope Paul's encyclical Humanae Vitae are translated from English to Spanish in order to convince Latin American Catholics that artificial contraception is the only solution to their population problems . One can see that euthanasia is the next step.

All that propaganda , intelligently and intensively promoted by well prepared mass media technicians tends to create demographic panic .

The Colombian people are urged to convince themselves that the number one cause of their poverty is their high birth rate . In their " Directory for Family Life " Colombian Bishops declared: " We do not ignore the strong pressures , national and international which are exerted on public opinion and our country's government , with a view to adopting any kind of means favoring demographic control " .

This thought is similar to a statement made by the American Hierarchy in 1966 and 1970 : " In 1966 we noted that birth control programs , in connection with public welfare , could not avoid coercion . Today this coercion is openly favored as one of the most important factors in demographic control " .

It is evident to all that the contraceptive market in Latin American's numerous and populous countries is excellent business for American companies . This fact must be taken into account when studying contraceptive and abortive campaigns in Latin America .

3. Tactics used in Colombia by malthusians:

Hypocrisy is the first characteristics of the tactics used in Colombia to introduce contraception and abortion . Antinatalist campaigns have been funded with the money offered by international organizations , but without publicity . Intentionally , any public discussion has been avoided in the field of politics , science or religion .

Secondly , the facts about the population explosion have been exaggerated and a myth has been created , thus producing a kind of panic with the help of extensive mass media propaganda .

Thirdly , the ethical aspect is not based on dignity and respect for the individual , but rather an appeal has been made to ease the unconscious feeling of guilt of the wealthy. Thus the poor were made responsible for all the evils of the country ; in other words Colombian's high birth rate is portrayed as the main reason for the country's underdevelopment .

Fourthly , campaigns , theoretically , stress people's ^{freedom} to use contraception , but in practice sophisticated tactics are employed

to limit couples liberty especially in lower income groups .

Mr. Berelson , from the Population Council and advisor of the Colombian Government , suggests prudence . He wrote :

" (It would be) wise ... to authorize a quiet family planning program under the banner of maternal and child health , thus moving in the right direction but subsuming controversial demographic means under accepted health ends " .

The means suggested include the following elements : voluntary fertility control , liberalization of induced abortion , compulsory fertility control , intensive educational campaigns, incentive programs , special social welfare grants and financial privileges , fines and " sanctions " , changes in social and economic institutions and lobbying among politicians .

Among the incentives , let us mention the following : sum of money given to couples who accept contraception , free medical care and contraceptive materials , milk given without charge to children of mothers who attend contraceptive clinics and free transportation for the customers of family planning clinics .

Cardinal Muñoz Duque , Archbishop of Bogota , said that international family planning agencies resembled violent " skirmishes " . I quote " These agencies want to anesthetize consciences ; they are one aspect of the modern phenomenon of manipulation which seeks to change man's personality, indirectly influencing his will and , without man himself being aware that he is the object of such manipulation " .

The Cardinal added that others contribute to that manipulation : the country's mercenary officials , the criminal complicity of the local wealthy people who have refused to give food to the poor who sit at the table , and the priests who destroy the unity of the Hierarchy and the official teaching of the Church , while , they also lack a genuine love for the poor .

Cardinal Muñoz Duque asked why the contracts between the Government and the international population agencies were not made public. " Why ", said the Cardinal, (I quote) " is the money given by a wealthy country always the expression of a new colonialism which attacks peoples's freedom and dignity?. Those people offended by these campaigns are entitled to state protection to defend their dignity. Dignity, as defined in our National Constitution, is the sum of life, honor and goods".

The Population has especially emphasized the educational field in its pursuit of three main objectives: first, it seeks to create a contraceptive mentality among young people. Second, it strives to divorce ethics from sexual behaviour, thus reducing sexual activities to the sphere of health. And third, it aims at establishing an ethical separation between sexual function and the transmission of life.

Hence according to this philosophy, the only immoral act is involuntary pregnancy.

4. The insults to the country and to the persons:

Undue pressures are exerted on poor countries to force them to accept family planning programs.

At a lower level, in the clinic, doctors and nurses use their education and social prestige in such a way that they influence poor women to accept contraception and sterilization. For instance, they use the postnatal period for psychological persuasion, there have been cases of poor women having a tubal ligation without being aware of it.

One doctor lost his job because he did not insert 500 DIUs during a certain period of time , pursuant to his contract.

5. Cultural and ethical changes are imposed on the Third World by North American and European countries .

Recently , I had the opportunity to see a Swedish movie in a Colombian cinema . According to the producer, this film was a service of the Swedish Ministry of Education to the Third World countries. In fact , it was nothing more than a course on contraception , pornographic attitudes , sexual techniques and premarital relations .

A few years ago , you could not buy pornographic literature in Colombia . It was prohibited . Now , it is easy to find erotic publications , most of them in English and published in the United States or Canada . In a word , North America sells its immorality and its decadent civilization to Latin America .

And since our people are not firm in their moral principles , they easily yield the temptation .

The antinatalist presents a new ethic. As Mr. Cook said in a bulletin of the Population Reference Bureau : "..... the basic problem is a moral one . Up to now , ethics were abstractions and reconstructions of tradition, revelation and experience. Today in the vital renovation era , there are fundamental ethical challenges to which the past cannot give an answer ".

At the seventh Latin American Congress of Gynecologists and Obstetricians held in Quito in 1973 , it was suggested that abortion be made official , in order to combat the death of those women

who are pregnant against their will and resort to illegal abortion practices .

The tendency of many physicians is to affirm that contraception , sterilization and abortion are not ethical issues , but medical ones .

In our countries the ethical formation of our doctors is very deficient . They are too willing to accept this immoral statement made by Tietze of the Population Council : " The most rational means of fertility regulation is abortion when contraception practices have failed " .

III. POINT OF VIEW OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES :

Opinions and solutions in Latin America are not unanimous as far as the population explosion is concerned . Two main theories divide public opinion : the neomalthusian school promoted by most of the wealthy countries , and the doctrine of the Catholic Church which stresses international justice and integral development of the people on the basis of solidarity .

a. Points of convergence :

When we comparing both tendencies we find convergent elements but we mainly have to deal with opposite points of view .

There is agreement pertaining to the existence of the population explosion and the need to take this factor into account in an overall view of the socioeconomic situation.

The government , as the first party responsible for the common good , has the right to remind its citizens of the importance of responsible parenthood and to propose adequate means

which conform to moral laws .

The husband and wife make the final decision about the number of children they want , and , there is an urgent need for family and sex education for that purpose . The birth rate is lower in a society where education , wealth and welfare are widely spread. But we must recognize that the points of divergences are much more frequent and much more serious .

b. Points of divergence :

We could say that the divergences appear on four points :

1. The overall view of the demographic problem.
2. Politics
3. Economics
4. Ethics

1. Divergences regarding the overall view of the demographic problem :

Malthusian organizations intend to organize drastic family planning programs because they claim that the high birth rate in Latin American countries is the main cause of their underdevelopment . This simplistic view is unacceptable . Poverty is caused by numerous factors , mostly , the unjust international economic order whereby wealthy countries abuse of their power and maintain the rest of the world in economic dependency .

Latin America is an empty continent . Theoretically it can feed many more mouths . The countries need psychological security in order to promote investments and create new

industries . These nations need peace and order to enable them to work harder .

It is not sure that it has been " proven mathematically" that a high birth rate destroys socioeconomic progress. The example of Brazil is clear . With a high increase in population , Brazil has made tremendous progress. Wealth should ^{be shared} equitably among nations and distributed fairly within each country . Contraceptive devices are distributed everywhere in the United States, but this does not mean that poverty does not exist .

The first Latin American Congress of Resident Physicians held in Bogota concluded with these words:

" We , as physicians , reaffirm that in our countries the population explosion that foreign organizations depict and exploit does not exist . Population phenomena are caused by the unjust and unequal distribution of wealth . As a result , the solution lies not in family planning but in an improvement in the economic system , and mostly in increased production"

2. Political divergences :

Many Latin Americans believe that the United States and other wealthy countries are afraid of the Third World's growing population . They fear that they will lose their privileged economic position , so they limit population growth in poor countries . By so doing they offend national sovereignty and personal dignity . Many times they impose their view by using economic conditions which are particularly compelling .

In their recent " Directory for a National Family Pastoral " , Colombian Bishops said : " The demographic problem requires an urgent solution . Colombian Bishops are ready to back any measure favoring an integral answer and genuine development . But , we denounce , any foreign intervention in the country's demographic policy and the conditioning of financial aid to antinatalist campaigns " .

Serious concern exists regarding the increasing funds for family planning and the decreasing effort in favor of development . New policies introduce important cultural changes ; sexual behaviour is modified and venereal diseases become a greater burden due to sexual promiscuity . It is feared that , in the long run , present antinatalist campaigns will produce a negative aging process . All this can be considered as yet another expression of unacceptable colonialism .

3. Economic divergences :

A well known Colombian lawyer wrote : " There are 27,965,9 tillable hectares in Colombia , and at the same time - 9,000,000 Colombians suffer from hunger according to FAO . The crucial problem lies in the agricultural structure and our socioeconomic system . If we say that the cause of our problems is the population explosion , we are confusing the effect with the cause " .

Many advocates of drastic birth control are rich people who , instead of investing their resources in Latin America , deposit their money in foreign banks , thus depriving the local economy of the capital it needs.

Prominent economists , like Clark and Besserup , theorize that a high birth rate is not necessarily bad for the economy of a country . No doubt that poverty and unemployment are frequently the result of a selfish system where money comes first , and man second .

The most enthusiastic fans of antinatalist campaigns are the rich landowners and industrialist, who are not willing to accept the social changes , which would permit to the poor to eat at their same table .

4. Ethical divergences :

In their book entitled " Demographic Colonialism " Carlos Corsi and Luis Rueda state : " We pretend that a policial system based on an atheistic humanism will harm human life ; later snuff out lives in gestation and then lead to sterilization On the contrary , an integral humanism favoring the development of each human being and of mankind is the ethical premise of a demographic policy which safeguards individual and social rights in any society ".

Indeed , this is the fundamental principle .

The American Bishop said something similar in their declaration in answer to the information published by the committee chaired by John Rockfeller : " Population growth is somewhat more than a matter of statistics . Any decision on this problem reflects an overall view of man as seen by society . We insist on this point -- one of the most serious of our technical society is its tendency to adopt a narrow-minded view of man , considering him only for what he does or what he produces and not taking his dignity into account , forgetting that he was made in

the image of God , and that man as of his very conception is worthy of full support from the entire human family into which he enters " .

Antinatalist campaigns are undesirable for two main reasons : First , theoretically , they seem to be right but in practice , they slow down the efforts being made to enhance social justice .

In Latin America the statement made by former President Johnson was taken as a terrible insult : " Let us act remembering that five dollars invested in birth control are equivalent to a hundred dollars in development " .

Second , it is said that the personal freedom of the poor will be respected , but in practice , when a poor woman depends on public funds and when government agencies favor contraception , sterilization and abortion , the situation itself is coercive .

The experience of family planning organizations which use contraception and sterilization taught us that the poor are frequently pressured , thus offending human rights .

Women have been sterilized against their will . Some husbands found out that their wives had been sterilized or had an DIU only after the procedure had been performed . A publication of population suggested introducing sterilizing substances in the drinking water as a means of birth control . That suggestion was presented by a delegate of Colombia at a population conference in Caracas .

All these approaches to contraception and sterilization paved the way for an abortionist mentality . When man does not respect the origins of life , he does not respect life itself . When mankind does not control its sexual impulses and prefers to resort to contraceptive techniques , morality is corrupted and serious evils ensue .

Our people need to be educated sexually . The phenomenon of " machismo " is a severe threat to our social life . Antinatalist campaigns have increased males' lack of control and , instead of being an educational instrument, have contributed to the immorality of the Latin American people .

We admire the technological conquests of industrialized nations , but we deplore their growing immorality and cultural disorientation . The Population Council claims that " times are changing , and morals are changing " . We know that this change is not always for the best , and we are trying to fight it , since we realize that immorality goes against genuine civilization .

IV. WHAT HONEST SOUTH AMERICANS EXPECT FROM THE HONEST NORTH AMERICAN CITIZENS:

At the end of this report on Latin America , let me tell you what Latin American people expect from you . First of all , it is important to situate the problem of abortion within its true context . We must be aware that South America is not North America and , as a result, people's attitudes towards life are not the same , for

obvious reasons . In our case the socioeconomic situation explains many abortions . If we want to avoid the killing of thousands of innocent children in Latin America we must , therefore , understand the causes of abortion and solve those causes .

In our case , the causes are poverty , ignorance and erroneous sexual behaviour , or what is called "machismo" in Spanish . Our poverty will last forever if wealthy countries refuse to understand that the present economic system is basically unjust , and that the result of the unbalanced development between North and South America is not mainly due to a racial superiority , but principally to injustice . Not only is man unjust to his fellow men , but what is worse still , a nation is unjust to other nations .

The Latin American people are rightfully proud of their nationality . They are shocked when foreign powers impose their conditions tied to financial aid and this is exactly what has happened in the case of population policies . A country is offended in its sovereignty when birth control programs are imposed on behalf of an ideology which is not accepted by its citizens . There is no reason for the morality or education of a U.S. senator or congressman to be imposed on the Latin American people, especially in this particular field of family life and responsible parenthood .

This respect for others' culture and morality needs to be emphasized when what is being offered seems to be the result of a decadent civilization .

We feel that people like you should realize that your money , yours taxes , are been used to foster family and individual immorality in our countries . We expect you to be active and to keep your politicians and jurists from making laws and decisions taht work against our true welfare. Furthermore , we would like to have real friends in the United States who sould be prepared to defend our basic values from irresponsible physicians , confused politicians and lawyers, businessmen or pornographic dealers , and selfish couples.

When we ask for your collaboration , it is not that we are forgetting our own responsibilities . We are aware of our vulnerability . We know that Latin America is a Christian continent only in name . Almost everyone is baptized but the majority has not been reached by the Gospel's message. We know that your technicians and politicians could not impose contraceptive and abortive practices if our governments were firmly convinced of true human values and if they were strong enough to resist the temptatioñ of money . We know that our people , mostly our men , are reluctant to accept rational sexual behaviour ; they procreate irresponsibly and do not genuinely respect human life .

In summary, we know that we must continue working hard to establish a sound family and a just society which respects authentic human values . Today we have not tried to maintain that all our problems result from the evil influence of foreign countries . We do believe that some of our headaches come from the United States and Canada and Europa , and we ask you to help us in such a way that your efforts , plus ours will be strong enough to be effective in our daily struggle against the dehumanization of mankind .

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POPULATION
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Statement by Ambassador Don Mills
Permanent Representative of Jamaica
to the United Nations
19 April 1978

Population

The population issue is closely related to the global dialogue between industrialized and developing countries on international economic matters, referred to as the North-South dialogue. This issue of population has many aspects - global, national and personal.

At the global level it concerns the present condition of the planet earth and its capacity to support a rapidly growing population in the face of resources which are in some respects finite. The question of the preservation of the environment is also closely associated with the condition of the human population.

It concerns in special ways the distribution of population between countries and regions and particularly between the richer and the poorer countries. The future presents a prospect of a large and growing population of the poorer countries, contrasting sharply with the numbers in the richer countries, and in the context of the excessive rate at which the latter countries

consume the available finite resources.

At the national level the concerns are in some respects similar. There are in many countries, grave imbalances in rates of growth, in economic and social condition and in prospects, between the richer minorities and the masses of poor people. Serious problems of health and environment also exist and are closely related to this.

The issue of social and economic justice within nations is closely related to this distribution, as it is in the global scene. Again the point has been made that there is considerable sensitivity about a country's "rights" in regard to its outlook on the size and growth of its population.

Finally, there is a very personal aspect of the population issue - that related to the rights of individuals to determine their own attitudes and behaviour, their own destiny, in regard to matters concerning family size and family life, and the right to the knowledge and understanding which would enable them to exercise these rights.

Population policies must take account of all these factors.

In the context of the particular concerns of this Committee, I will address myself mainly to the global issue of the relationships between industrialized and developing countries.

But I would emphasize that a great many countries have seen the necessity to establish programmes and policies which seek to influence population growth in the national interest, and at the same time to relieve individuals and families, and in particular women, from the crippling burdens imposed on them by reason of lack of realization of their own ability to determine their own fate in this vital aspect of their lives.

My own country, Jamaica, has for many years been taking positive action in this field, and has established programmes out of its own resources, and by way of assistance and co-operation with international and other agencies from outside, notably the United Nations.

Experience across the world over the past 30 years has shown how easy it is to oversimplify the issues related to population, and how difficult it is to find effective measures of influencing individual behaviour or national attitudes or action in this sphere. The growth of population, the movement of people, the attitudes and practices of individuals in this

matter are intimately bound-up with complex cultural social and economic factors - They cannot be separated out and subjected to isolated treatment.

We must never forget, in spite of the great differences between conditions in todays world and those of previous eras, that the countries which are now classified as rich, and developed, in the main went through periods of considerable difficulty when they were what we would now describe as under-developed. They exported population in vast numbers in order to ease the pressures and the suffering stemming from uncontrollable growth and inadequate economic resources.

It was the improvement in the conditions of the masses of people involved which brought the changes in attitudes and in population growth. It is not excessive childbearing and family size that make people poor. It is poverty that accounts for excessive numbers.

The North/South Dialogue

It is becoming generally accepted that the most fundamental issue facing the world today is that concerning the relationship between industrialised and developing countries - the issue of global economic justice.

The international community is preoccupied with many concerns, including the continued critical situation in the Middle East, the liberation of the peoples of Southern Africa, the terrible dangers arising from the massive production of arms and the spread of nuclear devices. But the issue which will haunt the world more and more, which constitutes the most fundamental challenge is the growing imbalance in wealth, in income, in opportunity between the industrialised and the developing countries.

At the end of World War II, the Bretton Woods institutions were established as the centrepiece of the economic system. They were dedicated to the enhancement of the functioning of the market system, and to the promotion of international trading and economic relations in general, with reconstruction of the economies of the Western industrialised nations as their primary concern at the outset.

The United States came to achieve a position of supremacy in terms of economic and military power in the world, and in more recent years a reconstructed Western Europe has become a major force in international economic affairs. The search by these

countries for a common approach to global problems is now a significant element in the economic dialogue.

Finally, the past twenty years have seen the virtual disappearance of the great empires of the Europeans, which reached across the world. Scores of countries which were part of these colonial holdings achieved their independence and have become a new and increasingly significant element in world affairs. These countries have come to realise that in spite of the achievement of political independence, they faced a world organised for the most part, and particularly in respect of economic affairs, very much in the interest of a small group of industrialised countries. They have learned that only by way of structural change in the international economic system will they have the opportunity of playing a full and active part in global economic activity and decision-making, and share equitably in the benefits of such activity.

All of these developments have had considerable implications for the global community. They have resulted in dramatic changes in the international distribution of power and influence - whether military, political or economic. Along with technological advances - not the least in the field of armaments, they are forcing upon the world a gradual realization of the meaning of interdependence - and of the fact that military and economic strength are not now sufficient to insulate any country from the impact of the actions of others.

Much has happened in this area over the past 25 years. The early 1950's saw the beginnings of a real concern about the poverty and lack of development in the Third World. At that time very few developing countries were independent as they were still a part of some colonial holdings of one or other of the North Atlantic countries.

The efforts and ideas which emerged immediately after World War II centred around the need to prevent another outbreak or war, and the need to rebuild the countries of Europe which had been the subject of so much destruction.

It was later that the focus shifted to the Third World. And the interests involved saw aid as the means of alleviating the conditions of poverty in those countries. Those in industrial countries who became involved in these efforts inevitably followed their own notions concerning developing countries as the latter had no means of speaking for themselves in those times.

A number of things have happened over the years since that time. First, the movement toward the sweeping away of the system of colonialism which had kept so many countries in subjugation for so long, reached the point where through the Declaration adopted unanimously by the U.N. in 1960, the entire global community accepted the commitment to facilitate the process of decolonization. With the freeing of the territories concerned, the membership of the U.N. grew from a mere 51 in 1945 to the present figure of 149.

As developing countries joined the U.N. system, they succeeded in gradually shifting the attention of the international community to the questions of underdevelopment and international economic relations.

It became more and more apparent that aid, while being of value, was incapable of making the sort of impact on the situation in developing countries which had been anticipated. And the will to contribute weakened in some countries, with the flow of resources to developing countries lagging behind the agreed targets. In addition, the gap in income between rich and poor countries continued to widen.

The Pearson Commission on International Development appointed by the President of the World Bank in 1968 spoke of the situation at the time as having reached "a point of crisis". They concluded that "if the developed nations wish to preserve their own position in that world, they must play their full part in creating a world order within which all nations, and all men, can live in freedom, dignity and decency ...". This view was based on the very limited results obtained after two decades of effort, mainly concentrating on development assistance or aid, in the field of international economic co-operation.

As developing countries became more aware and more perceptive, and as they built their own groups and associations - such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 - they came to the realization that they were caught in a trap, created in

large part out of historical circumstances, and relating to the manner in which the colonial relationships had expressed itself in economic terms. They realized in short, that they were operating, in such matters as trade, investment and other activities, within an international economic system which was created for and geared to the interests of one category of countries, and that the structure and manner of operation of that system would have to be changed in order to accommodate the interests of all countries.

The proposals relating to the establishment of the New International Economic Order emerged from this new perception, and for almost 4 years these have been the subject of discussions and negotiations inside and outside of the U.N. system.

Developing countries are deeply disappointed at the lack of progress so far achieved in this matter. They have continued to negotiate and to maintain their unity. And they are heartened by the fact that a number of industrialised countries continue to maintain positions of support in regard to the movement toward restructuring of the international economic system.

Since the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, the subject of the New International Economic Order has become more and more the central theme in international discussions. The many conferences and negotiations inside and outside the United Nations system have had some very positive effects. They have resulted in a greater understanding of the issues involved, and of the nature of the international economic system and the relationships surrounding it. A considerable amount of work has been done within the United Nations system, in other international institutions, and in the agencies of governments of many countries in the effort either to throw further light on these issues or to prepare various participants

for the discussions and negotiations which have been taking place.

The central issue in this matter is the call by developing countries for structural change in the international economic system and in the relationships in this area. Their case rests both on the injustice of the existing and past systems - taking into account the present state of affairs in which what is left of the old system no longer serves in the interest even of the industrialised countries - and the fact that a restructured system would serve the interests of all countries in an equitable manner.

Clear evidence is being put forward, more and more, of the fact that the economic system which has brought such great prosperity to the industrialised countries in the last three decades is proving incapable of providing for their assured and continued growth and stability. These fears are being expressed within industrialised countries themselves. The conclusion is being drawn by some that the future prosperity of those countries will depend on the establishment of a balanced and equitable relationship in economic terms with the Third World. This can be regarded as a modulated and partial acceptance of the need for some fundamental changes in the economic system in the interests of developing and developed countries.

The strong support for the New International Economic Order expressed by a number of industrialised countries from the outset continues to be one of the very important developments in

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this situation. This support is based not merely on sentiment, but on a practical and constructive view of the requirements of global economic justice, and of the benefits which all countries would derive from an economic system which provided in a realistic way for the abolition of poverty and the elimination of the inequities which exist between developed and developing countries in economic relations.

But as far as developing countries are concerned, the results of all the discussions and negotiations to date have been very disappointing. Industrialised countries as a group have come to recognise that it is in their interest to make what they regard as greater "concessions" to the developing countries in the face of the pressure from the latter. But on the matter of structural change in the international economic system, which is the very core of the proposal for the NIEO, a number of these countries remain unwilling to move in any constructive manner. The results of such meetings as UNCTAD IV and the Paris Conference on International Economic Co-operation clearly indicate this. The resumed negotiations on the Common Fund in November to early December, 1977, were seen by many as having the greatest significance in this respect. It was the view particularly of developing countries that the outcome of those discussions would represent a clear indication of the willingness or unwillingness of the industrialised countries to accept the need for major structural changes in the interest of

an orderly and just system in the field of commodity trade, which is vital to the development of Third World countries.

In other areas negotiations have produced very limited progress, if any. In spite of the continuing signs of deterioration in the international monetary system, the talks on the question of reform in this area have failed to produce adequate results, certainly from the point of view of developing countries. The question of the crushing burden of indebtedness of developing countries still presents major difficulties for most industrialised countries insofar as the approaches proposed by the developing countries are concerned. But action recently taken by a number of countries by way of a cancellation of official debts of some developing countries has provided some relief.

In the discussions on these issues over the past 3 or 4 years there has emerged a strong interest on the part of some persons and some governments in conditions inside developing countries. Some have argued that global restructuring without internal restructuring in the interest of the disprivileged and the poor, would greatly limit the value of the exercise. This of course is correct. And developing countries must face squarely the task of finding approaches to development which bring real benefits to those of their populations who are in greatest need. This is not at all easy. Also the realization that most of the resources and the effort which must go into the development process must continue to be provided by developing countries themselves

has grown. Those governments in developing countries which fail to or refuse to realise these facts will find themselves under mounting pressure from their citizens.

But some of the ideas and proposals which have emerged in developed countries out of this concern about conditions in developing countries have given rise to serious misgivings.

We have seen some of these ideas coming from countries which are squarely opposed to the notion of restructuring of the international economic system. We cannot accept any substitute for global restructuring. For even if with the help of the rich countries we could raise our levels of living to a significant degree - we in the Third World would remain the Third World - always in a subsidiary position, in which we could not participate fully in international economic activity and benefit on an equitable basis. And the gap between rich and poor countries would continue to widen.

It must be said however that some of the ideas and proposals concerning internal conditions in developing countries come from those in industrialised countries who agree fully with us on the need for global restructuring and join us in the move to achieve this.

What we consider unacceptable is the idea that movement toward global restructuring might be conditional on our taking certain action within our countries - conditional on our good

behaviour so to speak. We hold that the case for restructuring rests on the inequity of the international economic system, the fact that it gives great advantage to some while depriving others.

I think it is true to say that over the past decade we have all come to realise how limited is our understanding of the development process. Most of the cherished formulae which have been applied in developing countries - and applied in some cases with great energy - have failed to solve the basic problem of development. Rapid economic growth and diversification of the economies have been achieved in some instances - but often without solving the problem of providing a meaningful place for masses of the populations. My own country has been one example of this. We are now making efforts to correct this.

The approach to development has changed over the years with the emphasis shifting, from the search for growth per se, the trickle - down process, to rural development, to the direct attack on poverty, and to now basic needs. But as always there has remained the serious danger of oversimplification of the problems and issues. Development is a complex process, involving cultural and social, as well as political factors. Today we realise the need for rethinking our ideas and theories.

The process of restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the U.N. has now begun. One of the purposes of that exercise is to make the U.N. a centre of discussion and exploration

of ideas and concepts, so that it can provide effective guidance in matters of global and national development. This is a time when many industrialised countries are facing the fact that the economic system which has served them so well, and particularly over the past 30 years, is suffering from a serious illness and not merely a temporary indisposition. They are searching for means of returning to the days of continued significant economic growth without the attendant evils such as inflation. It is noteworthy that some persons in those countries see a partnership with developing countries as the only hope for ensuring their own continued prosperity.

It is at such a time that ideas and proposals related to basic human needs are being advanced.

Let me say right away that the eradication of poverty, suffering and ignorance should be the primary aim of any society, rich or poor. This must involve a conscious process, geared to ensuring that all members of a community can have access to amenities, services and resources which are needed to provide them with a tolerable life. The term basic human needs can be applied in this setting.

But it is one thing to accept this, and quite another to manipulate and advance the whole development process. For development involves the generating or acquisition of financial and intellectual and other resources, and the allocation of these in a manner which helps to create for a community a complex and

satisfactory set of conditions, activities and institutions, including those related to contacts with other nations. Development takes place against the background of existing interests, values, notions, skills and expectations. In this setting the introduction of new and far-reaching approaches and the drastic reallocation of resources, present serious operational, political, social and economic problems.

If this were not so there would, I hope, be no poverty and deprivation in rich countries, no pockets of frustration and bitterness growing from it. There would be no need to be frightened in those countries, at the prospect of serious illness because of the high costs of medical care, or to be worried about the education of one's children - again because of the cost.

The process of development in today's circumstances is basically a political one. It calls for comprehension, will, and the organisation of people and communities at the local, regional and national level. It calls for management in places where the market system once reigned supreme. It requires that the public interest be put above commercial interest. It calls for the accumulation of capital. It must result in the generating of the revenues necessary, in particular, for maintaining the provision of those basic services such as health and educational facilities which we all now agree must be the foundations and not the reward of development.

When we hear the call for a direct attack on poverty, or for a programme for meeting basic human needs, we do not often find along with it a real appreciation of the radical nature of such a purpose. Unless the idea of basic human needs is being advanced merely as a glorified and updated welfare scheme, it must involve fundamental changes in the social and economic and also political structures of the country's concerned. For it would then require a redistribution of income, wealth and opportunity. And such changes meet with strong resistance from within a country, and are sometimes attended by varying expressions of concern from outside.

The meeting of basic human needs should then be seen as an important part of a very complex and much wider process of development and social and economic change, designed to remove the indignities of poverty and lack of opportunity, and to build a viable community which more and more satisfies the wide range of requirements of its members.

One danger we face here, is that of projecting the value systems which we all harbour within us, and which involve feelings about people of different countries, cultures and races, into our perceptions of what might be legitimate aspirations or the basic needs of different people.

We must face the fact that we are now at a critical moment. On the one hand the grave nature of the condition of

the international economic system must give cause for very serious concern to all of us. No country has escaped from the effects of the deterioration in global economic activity over the past few years. Developing countries naturally have been particularly affected. The persistence of the problems which plague the system has led to a resurgence of tendencies towards protectionism and to the use of other devices by countries in order to minimize the impact on them of these conditions. In some quarters the situation is regarded as a strong argument against any concrete movement in the direction of meeting the more far-reaching claims and proposals of developing countries. But were we to look at the matter more positively, it is my belief that we would see here both an opportunity and a need to proceed with determination towards constructing an international economic system which would be more viable in the face of such difficulties as are now being experienced, and at the same time, more just.

Footnote:

Some of the above material is taken from the North/South Dialogue: Background and Present Position by Don Mills. From the book entitled: Partners in Tomorrow: Strategies for a New International Order, edited by Anthony J. Dolman and Jan van Ettinger. Copyright (c) 1978 by Foundation Reshaping the International Order. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, E.P. Dutton. All rights reserved.

POPULATION, FOOD AND EMPLOYMENT*

John W. Mellor**

I am pleased to have the opportunity to contribute to your deliberations on the complex topic of population. You have asked me specifically to discuss population growth in relation to the food needs and production potentials of Third World countries. Population growth and food supply interact in a complex manner that can be adequately understood only if placed in the broader context of development processes and strategy. You have also requested that I make recommendations with respect to policy in a form which may assist your committee in the formulation of legislation. For such a view of policy to be useful, it must be dealt with in a manner consistent with the objectives of population policy. Those objectives are so varied and complex and often ill understood that I will also briefly comment on various objectives as they relate to food and population policy.

*Testimony presented to the United States House of Representatives Select Committee of Population, April 19, 1978.

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Relation Between Population, Food, and Development Strategy

Strategies of development which emphasize rapid growth of employment and hence participation in development, and distribution of the benefits of growth to the bulk of the population necessarily bring tremendous increase in the demand for food. To illustrate, in India the lower 20 percent of the income distribution spend 60 percent of additions to their incomes on grain alone and up to 90 percent on food products generally.^{1/} In contrast the top 10 percent of the income distribution spend only 5 percent of increments to income on food. Thus the distribution of income is a particularly powerful determinant of the effective demand for food.

Whenever population growth rates have declined substantially on a nationwide basis, it has been associated with participation of the bulk of the population in increased incomes. Thus the broad based processes of economic growth in the Western industrialized nations, in Japan, in Taiwan, and in South Korea have been accompanied by sharp declines in birth rates and in population growth rates. In contrast, countries experiencing rapid economic growth but with narrow participation in that growth have experienced relatively little decline in birth rates and hence in population growth rates. Thus statistics for Brazil

^{1/} John W. Mellor, The New Economics of Growth: A Strategy for India and the Developing World, Cornell University Press, 1976.

show the current birth rate declining only marginally from 41 per thousand to 38 per thousand in the decades from 1950 to 1970 while it declined from 42 to 30 in South Korea for the same period and from 36 to 26 in Taiwan in only the seven years from 1963 to 1970.^{1/}

The birth rates fell more rapidly in Taiwan and South Korea than Japan and in Japan more rapidly than in Europe and North America. This may well represent the influence of improved technology for birth control in the later period. The evidence thus suggests that countries making the demographic transition in more recent decades do so more rapidly than the earlier candidates.

The evidence from the People's Republic of China suggests further that a major redistribution of income may reduce birth rates substantially even without much growth in overall consumer expenditure, and hence without much increase in per capita food availability. In drawing generalizations, there are three aspects of the record of the People's Republic of China that must be kept in mind, however. First, our knowledge is very limited. It seems clear that birth rates have declined sharply in urban areas as is true of most developing countries, and in the well organized rural areas visited by foreigners. We do not know what has happened in the areas visited infrequently and which may not be as well organized. Second, the redistribution of income in China has been immense, is probably necessary to the results achieved and was achieved in the context of major changes in political ideology and economic and social organization. Third, the slow growth in

^{1/} From James Kocher, Rural Development, Income Distribution and Fertility Decline (New York: The Population Council), Table 4.1; in William Rich, Smaller Families Through Social and Economic Progress, ODC, pp. 68-9.

slow growth in agriculture, and in consumption expenditures, is the result of concentration of productive investment in the heavy industry sector so vital to a wide range of national objectives.

Thus we may conclude that within the context of political systems supported by United States policy in the past, decline in population growth rates of Third World countries requires accelerated economic growth of a type which provides broad participation in growth of the mass of the population in the still dominant rural societies. That requires particular attention to the rural sector so as to include the bulk of the population and for increasing food production to supply the principal consumption good, on which the lower income people want to spend rising real incomes.

Given these powerful broad relationships it is important not to be misled by the occasional evidence of declining birth rates among very poor populations that are not participating in rising real incomes and consumption. First, such evidence is particularly suspect because it is from populations for which data are most likely to be inaccurate. Second such declines appear to be a product of increasing poverty to extraordinary levels of misery, poor health, and incapacity. In such circumstance when incomes improve, birth rates will rise, at least temporarily.

Finally it should be noted that in the demographic transition described, total population increases greatly. The very same processes of the industrial revolution and economic growth that caused the population originating in Europe to rise from one-fifth of the world's total in 1600 to one-third in 1950 will see the late pursuers of development and industrialization raise their population greatly before they, too, stabilize.^{1/} Indeed with

^{1/} Nick Eberstadt in the *Baltimore Sun*, March 19, 1978.

present projections to the year 2025 developing countries will include 82 percent of the world's population compared to the 68 percent of 1960.^{1/} It is interesting that these processes will return the world's population proportions back very close to where they were before the industrial revolution. This last phase, of course, will proceed much more rapidly than the first phase.

Thus the relevant question is probably not whether such growth and change will occur, but when. The sooner countries commence the demographic transition with broad-based development the sooner it will be completed and the smaller will be the final population number. The more importance the rich industrial countries attach to minimizing population growth, the faster, more substantially, and more effectively must they contribute to accelerating the processes of broad-based economic growth.

POPULATION PRESSURES ON FOOD SUPPLIES

Given the tremendous increase in demand for food that must accompany the demographic transition, will it be possible to achieve the necessary increases in food supplies? The answer to that question is usefully divided into three parts.

First, the potential of the tropics and sub-tropics to produce food in the context of well-controlled water supplies and intensive double and triple cropping has hardly been scratched. For example, Indian officials

^{1/} UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1974 UNESCO press, 1975.

document a potential to triple agricultural production.^{1/} That would allow absorption of a doubled population and a 50 percent increase in per capita consumption as well. And, one may note that with a doubled population India would have 10 percent less population per unit area of cultivatable land than does Germany currently, and one-third less than Japan.

The problem of growth of food supplies for the next quarter century does not lie with the potentials but rather with how quickly those potentials can and will be exploited. The requirement of rapid growth in food production is massive investment in physical resources, training of people and development of institutions. That will require literally hundreds of billions of dollars and much careful thought over the next few decades.

Second, IFPRI projections of past production and income growth rates and expected population growth show a food supply gap of 120-145 million tons by 1990. It would require acceleration of production growth rates from the present under 3 percent to 4 percent to close that gap. Rapid pursuit of the demographic transition would bring even faster growth in demand for food. Rarely have large areas exceeded 4 percent growth rates in grain production for substantial periods of time. Thus we can conclude that making the demographic transition will require a major production effort and that at the height of demand pressures, commercial imports, and food aid could be of major importance.

^{1/} Dr. Raj Krishna, member of the Indian Planning Commission, recently stated, "We now have a potential to increase food production three times. If we can increase our irrigated area from 137.5 million to 167 million acres as planned in the next five years, and get the pumps, inputs, and credit out, Indian agriculture is going to make huge strides. Two or three bad monsoons might delay things a bit and make them look bad, but nothing can really affect what's happening," Richard Critchfield in the Christian Science Monitor, March 15, 1978

Third, it is important to note that the pressure on food supplies arises most with the broad-based high employment strategy of growth. If a country for political or other reasons does not want to make a major effort in agriculture or believes such an effort will not succeed, it may choose to grow through emphasis on capital-intensive industry and narrow participation of its population in the benefits of growth. That will delay pursuit of the demographic transition. Foreign capital assistance, food aid and food security can encourage those countries with more broadly participatory strategies.

Population Objectives

The nature and effectiveness of policies pursued by rich and poor countries for reducing population growth depends on the nature and strength of the objectives being pursued through population policy. These objectives are best seen in the context of global concerns, national concerns of the various rich and poor countries and individual concerns.

The need for reducing population growth rates is usually expressed in terms of global concerns with respect to humanitarianism, food supplies, demand on other natural resources and effect on the environment. The case is clear for reduced global population growth on these grounds. It should be noted, however, that few developing countries have anywhere nearly reached the population densities to which people have readily adapted in Japan, Taiwan, Western Europe and the Eastern seaboard of the United States. Thus, the problem is real, but one which allows the few

decades of time for the known, successful approaches to its solution.

Unfortunately, there is considerable potential for conflict between global concerns and national concerns. The rich, industrial countries often appear to attach an immediacy to arresting population growth that is more consistent with an objective of preserving existing power relationships than with the global concerns. The rapid relative growth in the populations of European origin with the industrial revolution was important to the global power and control achieved by those nations. In contemporary times Chairman Mao, in particular, has noted the importance of population size to the power of otherwise poor nations. Either implicit or explicit setting of national power objectives for population policy brings clear conflict between the interests of the currently poor and rich countries. We see continued evidence of such conflict. A concern about population growth without tangible evidence of concern for improved human well-being reinforces that sense of conflict.

The conflict in population policy between the individual objective of families, especially poor families, and the global objective is, of course, the basis for the argument for broad-based economic development. Poor families find the cost of raising children low. It falls most heavily in the years of peak physical strength for the parents when it is most easily borne. Children earn their way at an early age and provide security in later years. The economic case for the poor to have large families is easily made. All that, of course, changes with modernization and development and explains the close relation between broad-based economic growth and decline in fertility.

United States Policy

If the United States wishes to accelerate the decline in world population growth rates in order to forward the global objective of humanitarianism, preservation of the environment and conservation of natural resources, there are four appropriate thrusts.

First, in its potential for immediate impact, a food aid program could be developed on a scale and in a manner which has aggregate impact. To be effective such a program must provide large-scale support of efforts to increase the real incomes of the poor. It must be remembered that two major characteristics of agriculture dissuade policy makers from a broad, rural-based approach to development. Accelerating agricultural growth requires time-consuming building of institutions. Food aid can allow the demographic transition to proceed during the 5 to 15 years needed for those processes. Weather changes induce fluctuations in production (10 to 20 percent) very large relative to the change in trend (1 or 2 percent) from a few years of development effort. Food aid can eliminate these major weather-induced risks. Of course, an effective food aid program must also facilitate growth of domestic agricultural production in developing countries. This requires thoughtful administration. To be effective in these contexts, food aid must be reliable and substantial in size. It is neither at present.

Second, major programs of capital and technical assistance for agricultural development are needed to meet food needs over the longer

run. Such an effort will require large sums invested in the infrastructure of roads, electrification and irrigation as well as technical institutions for research, education, credit and marketing. With respect to both food aid and assistance to agricultural development, an effect cannot be had on the global population problem if the large populous countries are untouched. Further, in the short run, more effect will be had by resource flows to countries with more trained people, the effort concentrating on enlarging the supply of trained people for the latest concerns to the development effort.

Third, a widespread effort of research to improve the technology of birth control is needed. You have already had testimony to indicate that available techniques of birth control are still quite unsatisfactory and yet have assisted more rapid declines in birth rates once the socio-economic environment is appropriate. Further improvement could bring faster declines in the future. The United States contains a high proportion of the world's research resources for such effort. The fact that legislative policy impeded mobilizing those resources in the 1950s undoubtedly is cause for a much larger world population than would otherwise be the case.

Fourth, direct assistance to low income countries for the financial and technical costs of family planning programs can often be of help. However, compared to the costs of development necessary to a desire for small family size, family planning programs are inexpensive and easily paid for by the recipient country. The real test of priority to population is not

shown by the appropriation of tens of millions of dollars to family planning, but by the appropriation of billions of dollars to the appropriate forms of development.

A final point. Because there is time to solve the population problem, and because objectives are diffuse, developing countries are no more likely to pursue that objective at the sacrifice of all other objectives than is the United States. Sanctimonious behavior is not likely to solve problems which require widespread cooperation.



National
Farmers Union

Statement of
Robert G. Lewis
Chief Economist and National Secretary
of the National Farmers Union

Will There Be Enough to Eat?

U.S. House of Representatives
Select Committee on Population

Public Hearing on
Population and Development Assistance

345 Cannon House Office Building
9:30 AM April 19, 1973

I welcome this opportunity to participate with this distinguished panel to present my views of the American farmers' interest in the problems of population, food, energy, and environment.

The topic assigned to this panel is as big as everything. And farmers are right in the middle of the whole thing. We are the custodians of the second-largest element in our land environment -- the cropland and rangelands of the world, second in extent only to the unsettled forested and desert and tundra and ice-covered areas. We employ the croplands and rangelands, together with vast quantities of energy -- mainly solar energy -- to produce all the food that is consumed by almost all the human population -- excepting only that tiny fraction who remain in primitive hunting and gathering societies.

The problems related to this topic are the primary concern these days of the governments of the United States and of all of our allies and trading partners, and all of the developing countries, and presumably also all of the communistic countries. Unfortunately, this complex of problems is usually mistakenly labeled "inflation". This mislabeling leads to misunderstanding of the real problem and the prescription of wrong remedies. Because the problem is really very large and very serious, our human society cannot afford the waste of time and attention that results from trying remedies that are wrong and bound to fail.

Problem Deeper than "Inflation"

The classic description of "inflation" is "high prices caused by too much money chasing scarce goods". There is abundant evidence that this is not what is going on to cause our real trouble, nor even

to cause high prices, for that matter. Wage rates go up even while unemployment rises. Auto manufacturers close plants, lay-off workers, and raise prices all in the same week. It should not be surprising that the remedy indicated by the faulty diagnosis -- to reduce the supply of money and keep the unemployment rate high so as to curb demand for goods and services -- fails to cure the high prices that are commonly supposed to be the problem. And the faulty remedy is even less effective in treating the real problem.

The real problem is to adjust the pressures of our large and growing human population, and of the even-more-swiftly-growing economic demand of the affluent minority of the total population, to the limited space and resources that are present in our environment, and to do it in such a way as to result in the stabilization of population at a total number that will be supportable by the resources available.

That is quite a mouthful, that description of the problem. If my diagnosis is correct, our problem is not at all as simple (even though intractable) as "high prices". Furthermore, not only are high prices not the real problem -- high prices in some or even many cases are part of the necessary solution.

I will elaborate on that upsetting idea later on. At this point I will examine my description of what our problem is, part by part, and suggest what must be done to cope with each of the parts.

First, stabilizing population at a number that will be supportable by the resources available.

There is no telling right now just what that number is. For one thing, we do not know much about the real extent of the useable resources that will become available by the time population growth might be stopped. For another thing, we know very little about the volume and mix of resources that will turn out to be acceptable when the time comes. But I think we can safely assume that human beings must bring their population growth to a stop as soon as feasible, and if at all possible before shortage of resources stops it for us.

Population Stability Question of Will

It is my belief that the primary factor in the slowing and stopping of a population's growth is the will to do it. Further, that the will to limit births is linked directly to the employment of the family breadwinners in jobs that offer the opportunity to enter into the consumption culture and "standard of living" of modern industrial society. Birth control devices facilitate but are not

indispensible to the success of so-motivated couples in limiting their child-bearing.

Increased employment in "modern" jobs, and increased consumption at a "decent" standard of living, therefore, appear to be necessary to motivate couples to limit births so that the human population can be stabilized. These two sides of one coin should balance each other perfectly -- increased production, and increased consumption. However, physical limitations on resources are sure to impose drastic changes in the mix of goods and services that can be produced.

The main general change that is likely to result is an increase in the proportion of services to resources. We will have more personal services available (shoe shine, barbering, mental health counseling, etc.), and smaller quantities per capita of steel, petroleum, paper, meat, and other goods. Possibly we will get "higher quality" goods on which greater expenditures of labor (services) have been made -- such as smaller but better autos, appliances that will last and can be repaired instead of the present "disposable" kind, etc.

The catch is that in this new mix of goods and services we are almost sure to find more and different services than we have any present appetite or use for. And right there is one of the two great problems of human adjustment that confronts us. How can we increase the market demand, or other useage, of the superabundant supply of human services that are available, so that we can generate jobs and earnings sufficient to support the motivation to consume, upon which the will to limit births depends?

Increasing the "market demand" for new kinds and larger volumes of personal services will require prodigious feats of persuasion, by means both profane and divine, from advertising to moral exhortation. But it is not likely soon to be sufficient to absorb the full supply available. This means that "other useage" of the available supply of human services will be needed to take up the gap, if enough jobs are to be created to motivate the desired restriction of births. Thus we will surely need to turn to public works, whereby the community decides collectively that specified volumes of services shall be consumed in both rich and poor countries in such forms as rehabilitated rail roadbeds, sewer and water systems, roads and bridges, parks and playgrounds, reforestation and weed eradication, natural beautification and street cleaning, and so on. The specific "adjustment" we will have to learn to make in order to accomplish this is to accept the tax obligations this will require.

Resource Shares May Get Smaller

The second great problem of human adjustment that confronts us arises from the necessity to share scarce resources with increased numbers of consumers.

The specific dimensions of this challenge are portrayed vividly in an article by Nathan Keyfitz in the *Scientific American* of July 1976. Mr. Keyfitz's analysis reveals that the potential demand for food and other resources greatly exceeds the magnitudes that simple projection of population growth rates suggests. To put it bluntly, we are up against a far bigger job than most of us have guessed.

Keyfitz points out that there are two distinctive kinds of people in this world, who live in two strikingly different styles of existence. Those differences are characterized predominantly by the differing rates at which each consumes resources.

All of us in this room today are among the world's "middle class", which numbers about 600 million and whose consumption of resources can be measured fairly accurately by our average per capita annual income of \$2,000 to \$3,000 per year. One of the most distinctive characteristics of this class of people is that most of its members consume some meat practically every day of every year.

The other great class of human consumers numbers about six times as many as the "middle class" -- about 3½ billion. Their incomes average about \$200 per capita per year. Members of this class consume very little in the way of resources of all kinds. Most of them eat very little meat -- less in a year than most of the members of the middle class eat within a week or two. Many eat no meat at all, year-in and year-out.

Another distinguishing characteristic of the world's middle class of 600 million is that most of its members buy most of their food. They consume well over one thousand pounds of grain per person per year, either directly as cereal food, or indirectly in the forms of milk, eggs, poultry, and red meat.

Members of the huge class numbering 3½ billion buy very little food. They usually consume barely one pound per person per day of grain, mainly directly as cereal food.

Most Births Among Poor

Most of the increase in total world human population is occurring among the huge class of 3½ billion people. Most of the two or

three billion additional human beings who will be added to total world population within a couple of decades will be born to this class and perhaps doomed to remain there, unless present social and economic trends are drastically changed.

But the numbers in the middle class are increasing also. Just a few decades ago, in 1950, this class numbered only around 200 million. The spectacular increase in the numbers of middle class consumers since 1950 represents the swiftest and greatest advance in human welfare that the world has ever seen, and it was sustained over the longest period of uninterrupted economic development and growth, from the end of World War II until the worldwide economic recession which began in the early 1970's.

It is the growth in numbers of this "middle class" that is almost wholly responsible for the enormous increase in sales of food that has occurred during this period.

And most of the increase in total demand for all resources now results from the growth of this "middle class", not from the far greater growth in numbers of the poor.

Population increase among the families of this middle class accounts for only a small part of the increase in its numbers that has occurred. Most of the increase has occurred as a result of people from the vast underclass of the poor getting jobs in the modern economy. Almost any job in the modern economy raises the job-holder and his family members from the underclass into the middle class with its vastly superior levels of welfare. Even the meanest job in the mass production, labor-intensive industries of countries like Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, or Hong Kong, represents a gigantic leap forward in human welfare from the condition of the huge underclass of the poor.

That, in elemental terms, is what "economic development" means: The creation of jobs in the modern economy.

And that is what is required to create the conditions wherein married couples will be motivated to restrict the number of their children.

It is this process of recruiting people from the underclass, whose members buy and consume very little, to the middle class whose members now consume most of the world's wealth, not simple population growth, that is the source of the great pressure that is now being applied against our scarce supplies of resources.

Explosive Potential for Food Demand

The impact of new entrants into the middle class upon demand is most immediate and spectacular in respect to food. Of the very first dollars that the new entrants earn, most is spent for food. And most of their earnings continue to be spent for food until incomes rise substantially above the bottom rungs of the middle class.

The explosive potential of increasing demand for food that results as families make the great leap from poverty into the middle class is illustrated by what happened to imports of food by the countries stretching from Morocco to Afghanistan, across the Mediterranean Basin and southern Asia, immediately after the export price of petroleum was increased by the action of the petroleum exporting states in 1973.

The higher prices of oil shifted less than one-half of one percent of the world's total income from relatively rich industrialized countries to relatively poor countries, many of them located in that region. In the poor oil exporting countries themselves, as well as in their neighboring countries, part of the increased oil revenues were spent for consumption items or invested for the construction of various kinds of capital resources, such as sewer and water systems, schools, roads, office buildings, hotels and apartments, and so on. The result was an increase in employment in construction industries and services, followed by a slower increase in employment in manufacturing.

Some of the farmland that had been devoted to production of grains, much of it for the farming families' own subsistence, was shifted to the production of fresh produce yielding higher returns, to satisfy the suddenly-expanded commercial demand for more and better food. Local production of poultry and eggs also was expanded swiftly, with production of milk and red meat increasing more slowly.

The result is that in a single year, imports of grain into this region increased to thirteen times the preceding five years' average.

"Cheap Food" Policy is Obstacle

This is only a glimpse of the stunning magnitude of the farmers' stake in economic development. When three and a half billion people who now buy little or no food at all, together with two or three billion more of their kind who are sure to join us in another few decades or so -- when -- or if -- all these billions become able to buy enough to eat, they would strain to the utmost all the capacities of all the farmers and of all the farming resources that the world possesses or can develop.

The potential pressure upon food supplies is probably the most acute single element in the problem we face of adjusting our expectations and consumption to the necessity of sharing scarce resources more widely. For one thing, there are comparatively strict

limits on the degree of adjustment each individual can make. For another, the quantity, quality, and price of food is among the most politically sensitive issues in every jurisdiction. Consequently, we will have to rely mainly upon increasing the supply in order to accommodate more consumers who can buy enough to eat.

There are two serious obstacles that block realization of the farmers' aspirations to feed a hungry world. These obstacles thwart also our dreams of a human society freed of misery and deprivation. They obstruct the process by which poor couples can be motivated to limit their child-bearing. And they pose mortal threats to the survival of human civilization.

The first is the habitual dependence of the world's industrialized economy, and particularly that of the United States of America, upon the enormous subsidy in the form of cheap food that is provided at the expense of the farmers of the New World.

The world's agricultural and food economy is poorly understood. It is commonly supposed that the supply of agricultural products should bear some rational relationship to market demand, as is true of most goods and services in an industrial economy. Most enterprises are created by persons who have appraised the prospective market and judged more or less rationally that their product or service can be sold at a remunerative price. But that was not true in the formation of most farm enterprises.

The voyages of Columbus about four centuries ago stimulated an enormous real estate boom lasting for several centuries. The hunters and gatherers of North and South America, New Zealand, Australia and Southern Africa were quickly displaced by huge waves of immigrants, primarily from Europe. Most of them arrived with little or no capital beyond the muscles in their backs and arms, the folk arts and technology of a subsistence farming culture, and a driving impulse to survive and to procreate. They occupied the lands of the hunters, and they farmed it to subsist.

Created "Surplus" Farms

Within a few centuries, by about one hundred years ago, the subsistence settlers in the New World lands had created by the sweat and blood of man, woman, child, horse, and ox, a gigantic stock of agricultural capital having productive capacity far in excess of any conceivable market's capacity to absorb. Such products as tobacco and cotton and a few others were produced for the market. But those of greatest importance to the human food supply -- grains and meat -- became available first as unplanned "surpluses" in excess of the requirements of settlers for subsistence, just as the furs produced by the earlier hunters had become available as "surplus" to the needs of the subsistence hunters. And the world trade in grains and meat, arising from a similar origin, took on characteristics similar to that of the fur trade, with payments to the producers for their surplus far less than any rational judgment of the real cost of production.

As France had exploited the surplus furs of the subsistence hunters, England recognized and exploited the surplus grains and meats of the subsistence farmers. - England's cheap food policy, exemplified by the passage of the Corn Laws in the mid-nineteenth century, soon spread throughout Europe, creating economic distress among European farmers and accelerating their flight to the New World lands.

This nineteenth century cheap food policy was abandoned throughout the industrialized world, along with other exploitative and archaic forms of economic injustice, in the great economic and social reforms that were wrought from the wreckage of the worldwide economic depression of the 1930's.

U.S. Farmers' are Depressed

Only in the United States has there been a regression to the economic abuse of the farmers that prevailed up to the Great Depression. American farmers have been expelled from the "Welfare State".

In the United States, the social justice and equity goals of the New Deal reforms in agriculture were slowly dismantled, and now the Carter Administration has confirmed their repudiation. The prices received by farmers in the United States are the lowest in relation to the prices of other goods and services since the depression of the 1930's.

About three-fourths of the world's total food supply brings higher prices to the farmers who produce it than those now received by farmers in the United States. The only farmers on earth who get prices as low as ours are those who farm in relatively small and poor countries -- Canada, Australia, and Argentina -- which are dependent upon the world trading price that is established at far below the cost of production by the agricultural pricing policies and practices of the United States government.

This cheap food policy of the United States is an injustice, a severe human hardship, and a menace to the economic survival of farmers in the United States and the other main exporting countries.

That is enough to set us farmers against it. But it is a greater menace also, to the greater interest of the greater public.

For the era of chronic world agricultural surplus which has endured for the past century or more has now reached an end.

The swift expansion of the middle class of consumers who buy food has overtaken the over-expansion of the world's food production plant that was achieved a century ago by the subsistence settlers of the New World's land.

During the eight years of this decade, total world consumption of grain has exceeded total world production. In four of those years, production exceeded consumption. But in the other four of those years, consumption exceeded production by a greater margin, and the world's supply of food has declined.

The talk we are hearing these days of a present surplus of grain is a hoax -- intended to mislead the public and the farmers, so as to keep food unrealistically cheap for short-run political purposes.

World Grain Supply Tight

The world's total carry-over of all grain at the beginning of harvest in 1978 is projected by the U.S. Department of Agriculture at 185 million metric tons. That seems like an enormous pile of grain. But it is only around 14% of the total world consumption of grain that is projected for 1978.

And even that does not measure how slight this "surplus" really is. At the very lowest point, during the "world food crisis" of a few years ago, the world's total carry-over of grain never dropped below 130 million tons. That amount, 130 million tons, proved too small to keep the "pipeline" full and when additional grain was needed above that minimum pipeline requirement, prices shot up sharply.

The real "reserve" of grain, therefore is somewhat less than the 55 million tons difference between the carry-over of 1974 and the carry-over of today. A single short world grain crop, comparable to the short crops experienced three times in this decade, would eliminate this reserve and reduce mankind to an empty cupboard. Two successive years of poor crops would create political turbulence and economic dislocations worse than what we experienced earlier in this decade.

The greater interest of the greater public demands that the low cost producers of the United States and other grain exporting countries be paid the incentive prices that they deserve, and need.

This cheap food policy of the United States government, which is unjust to farmers, is a deadly menace to the general welfare. I will describe later how it combines with and reinforces a second obstacle to all our dreams and hopes for development.

Unemployment Remains High

The second obstacle to the farmers mission to feed the hungry is the hard set of the world economy against full employment and jobs for the world's poor. They are the farmers' potential best customers. But unless they can earn money to pay farmers what it costs to raise food, they cannot buy and the farmers cannot produce the food they need.

In country after country, unemployment persists at rates higher than the worst ever experienced in the United States during the depression of the 1930's. When combined with underemployment -- in farming at less-than-subsistence levels of productivity, in scavenging, pre-industrial crafts and services, theiving, begging, and such sorrowful occupations -- the equivalent in terms of unemployment often exceeds 50 percent.

There are some jobs in extractive industries like mining, forestry and so on. Many of the jobs in export agricultural crops pay far less than "real jobs" in modern industries, even within the poor countries.

The only potential source of jobs that would be great enough to absorb even a substantial fraction of the workers now unemployed and underemployed are in manufacturing -- particularly in the low-capital requiring and labor-intensive industries such as textiles, apparel, footwear, light manufacturing and so on, together with the construction and service jobs that would be generated by expanded employment in manufacturing enterprises.

The interest of farmers in the creation of such jobs for such people is obvious. Human workers, when they have jobs, can pay for food and they buy, and they eat. Machines do not.

Rich Countries Bar Imports from Poor

But the highest tariff barriers and other restrictions against trade in the entire world economy are those that are applied against labor-intensive goods. The United States and other industrialized countries raise tariffs against the kinds of manufactured goods that poor and unskilled workers, lacking extensive capital and sophisticated skills, can make and sell in competition with the machines of the industrialized countries. These tariffs are as high as 300 percent of value added by labor -- highest in the world -- and they are compounded with absolute quantitative restrictions on the volumes of goods that may be admitted into the markets of the rich countries.

When unemployment rates remain chronically high in the United States and other industrialized countries, when millions of our own people are unable to find work, when workers believe their jobs are threatened by cheap imported goods, they and their communities will insist upon measures to restrict and bar such trade.

These are concerns that must be respected, and they must be satisfied.

No country can or should sacrifice jobs for its own people to create jobs for other workers in other countries, no matter how needy they may be.

And so the second obstacle raised against the interest and ability of the farmers to feed the hungry is high and persistent unemployment in the USA and in the other rich countries.

The specific obstacles that block the expansion of the world's food production capability are part and parcel of an overall political and economic strategy commonly identified as "anti-inflation". This strategy, by tolerating or even promoting high unemployment instead of creating more jobs, by uncritically resisting price increases even when they are essential to maintain or expand production as for

farm products, is profoundly opposed to the goal of stabilizing world human population by voluntary means. It is a short-sighted strategy that obstructs public understanding of the necessity for the adjustments that must be made in order to share scarce resources more widely. And it exposes the human community to the grave physical and psychological hazard that shortage of resources will put a stop to population growth with famine, disease, and social disintegration.

How to Stretch Scarce Supply

There are two general types of resources: Renewable, like food, water, and trees; and non-renewable, like soil, petroleum, and metals.

Scarcity of renewable resources can be attacked by increasing the rate of renewal. The world's resource base would permit a vast expansion of food production.

Scarcity of non-renewable resources can be attacked only by conservation -- particularly re-use, by rationing the supply more finely, by drawing upon the higher-cost fraction of the supply, or by shifting to use of less satisfactory or higher-cost substitutes.

The one feature that is present in almost all of the possibilities for adjusting our expectations and consumption of scarce resources among more consumers in this: Prices must go up.

Technological advance offers some hope for long-range relief from the prospect of higher prices for some resources. For example, we may learn how to make cheap electricity out of sunshine, perhaps in space. And we may invent new plant or animal genetic manipulations comparable to hybrid corn, so that yields per unit of resource base can be increased and costs per unit of product reduced.

Some Producers Need Higher Prices

But in the short run, and probably for most things more or less permanently, prices of resource-based products will have to go up and up.

Increasing the supply of renewable resources such as food will require the use of less productive and higher-cost land, labor, and management. Unless commodity prices are higher farmers cannot borrow nor afford to invest capital to expand output.

Recycled metals will cost more to use than the cream we have already skimmed off the world's finite supply. The use of lower-grade ores will require higher product prices as incentives to attract the investment of needed capital and the commitment of needed labor and management.

Indeed, the medicine of higher prices is so distasteful that every body politic in the world resists it. This means there is not yet a meaningful public commitment to the goal of stabilizing the

human population by the means of eliminating poverty.

Of course the dosage need not exceed the barest minimum that will suffice. Price increases that would not contribute to increases in supplies of essential goods, or which would result in inequitable enrichment of producers, should and can be resisted effectively. But the proper remedy here is direct action against specific targets by stimulating competition or imposing regulation.

And acceptance of the higher prices that are necessary in the process of readjusting consumption patterns should not necessarily result in a reduced standard of living for most individuals of the "middle class". The living may be comprised of a different mix of goods and services, but it may be a better living than ever -- not worse.

Unified World Economy Essential

But until our national and international political and economic strategy overcomes the obsessive fixation upon high prices as the simple target of governmental policy, the world community will continue to drift toward the creation of two separate worlds.

To one world, we say, "Go feed yourselves!" We goad them toward national "self-sufficiency" in food production, while we shut out the products of their abundant and underemployed workers, condemning their economies to slow growth and persistent poverty.

In the other world of the rich, we build costly machines to do the work that is denied to human hands. We keep the world economy paralyzed in stagnation and decline, lest economic growth generate competition from those now jobless that might raise the price of food and other scarce resources. We deny ourselves the benefits of the poor world's boundless capacity to supply human services. And our economies also decline.

This drift toward two worlds is dangerous, because it cannot work.

The resources of this earth must be developed with the utmost efficiency in order to stretch to meet the needs of our inexorably-growing human population. This can be achieved only by a unified world economy and international trading system, using mankind's abundant labor resources and nature's scarce materials in accordance with the principle of comparative advantage.

This was the goal of American leadership in the decades that followed World War II.

America must again find the courage to re-affirm that goal, and the daring to reassert the leadership which only America can give, and for which a fearful world awaits.

Environmental Quality and Basic Human Needs:Toward a New Synthesis

by

Erik Eckholm

Testimony presented to the Select Committee on Population
U. S. House of Representatives
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Environmental Quality and Basic Human Needs:Toward a New Synthesis

Erik Eckholm

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Introduction

Concern about the highly visible industrial degradation of air and water, more than any other factor, precipitated the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. Before the Stockholm Conference, many people throughout the world thought of environmental quality primarily in terms of the needs to control pollution and protect natural beauty--and as a largely esthetic concern at that. Poor-country spokesmen sometimes attacked what they viewed as efforts by the rich to force irrelevant or unaffordable environmental concerns upon the destitute.

In the few years since the Stockholm Conference, however, perceptions about the meaning of environmental quality have almost universally grown more sophisticated. Awareness has spread that many of the world's most life-endangering environmental threats stem not from industrialization but from unrelieved poverty; that a failure to initiate appropriate forms of development in many of the poorest countries is undermining the productivity of the agricultural systems on which life depends; and that the biological contamination of the water drunk by the poor causes more misery and fatalities than does any other form of pollution.

People everywhere are beginning to understand that recklessly used technologies and polluting industries can do more than spoil beautiful landscapes, that they can also--whether by aiding the spread of parasites or by unleashing carcinogens--shorten the lives of rich and poor alike. The international community is beginning to recognize that along with whales and tigers, unique ecosystems populated by thousands of unrecorded plant and animal species face rapid destruction--irreversible genetic losses that will profoundly alter the course of evolution. The wide acceptance of the global nature and significance of many environmental problems was tangibly manifested in the establishment by the Stockholm Conference of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).

The struggle to preserve environmental quality stands squarely at the center, many now realize, of the overriding challenge of the closing century: meeting the basic needs of all people. Preserving and nurturing the land's productivity is essential if food output is to expand as it must to feed an expanding population, and if the incomes of the billions of people who live directly off the land are to rise above their present often paltry levels. Clean habitats and pure water, like good nutrition, are prerequisites of any improvement in the sorry state of health experienced by the world's poor. Toxic industrial pollutants and hazardous products likewise rob people of good health and sometimes of life itself. In fact, efforts to address many key global concerns of our age--food, energy, population, and health--will necessarily involve addressing "environmental" concerns.

That many environmental threats are worldwide in scope and impact is increasingly apparent. The intuitive notion that polluting the air, rivers, and oceans can have international effects has been amply borne out by scientific findings on the dispersal of certain air-borne and water-borne toxic substances. Some newly perceived threats such as the climatic impact of a rising atmospheric carbon-dioxide level, or the destruction of the ozone layer by assorted pollutants, can be countered effectively only through global cooperation. Similarly, preserving representative ecosystems and as many plant and animal species as possible obviously requires worldwide cooperation.

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The global nature of the environmental predicament takes more subtle forms as well. For example, the deterioration of a food-producing system in one region can, by putting additional pressure on exportable supplies, affect food prices the world over. Similarly, famines in ecologically ravaged areas may have both moral and financial consequences for people elsewhere. Energy policies that seem national in scope can have a variety of international implications. The massive waste of petroleum in North America or the decision taken in the Middle East to increase oil prices, for instance, can indirectly force an African peasant family to cook with firewood cut from local hillsides instead of with the kerosene it formerly used. One nation's attempts to develop nuclear fast-breeder reactors may raise the odds that nuclear terrorism will occur on the far side of the globe. Finally, in an era in which both products and companies move easily from one continent to another, many of the health threats arising from new technologies can be minimized only through cooperative international regulation and monitoring.

Over the long term, efforts to safeguard the global environment do not compete with efforts to raise people's incomes and social opportunities. Economically and socially sound development will also be ecologically sound, or it will be neither sustainable nor socially beneficial over time. At the same time, environmental quality and natural diversity will not be preserved in the absence of socially equitable economic development that provides the world's poor with decent livelihoods. Concern for the environmental ramifications of development policies--in countries at all income levels and of all political hues--is not a luxury. The skill with which we manage and protect the earth's natural systems and resources will help determine the quality of our lives and the timing of our deaths.

2. UNDERMINING THE EARTH'S PRODUCTIVITY

As human numbers and consumer demands increase, the earth's ability to produce food and fiber must not only be protected, but also be continually enhanced. Yet in many regions the reverse is occurring: the productivity of land is being impaired or destroyed by human actions. Sometimes because people try to push a food-producing ecosystem beyond its capacity and sometimes because of sheer mismanagement, the ability of ecosystems to sustain human life is being undercut.^{1/}

Because of the enormous investments made in new irrigation facilities each year and the constantly increased use of chemical fertilizers, as well as the genetic improvement of seeds and the plowing of new lands, world food output has climbed steadily over recent decades despite the erosion of the resource base. However, as fossil fuels--key raw materials for chemical-fertilizer production--become scarce and expensive, and as the economically feasible opportunities for new irrigation and land developments are used up, the preservation of soil quality is naturally receiving considerable attention.

Even when productivity lost because of soil damage is greatly outweighed by productivity gained through new investments, deeper social costs are exacted by soil losses. The aggregate national and global statistics of rising food output conceal the fact that tens of millions of people are losing their livelihoods as their lands deteriorate. Because of falling food output

and incomes, among other reasons, these people often end up abandoning their farms and pastures and migrating to swelling city slums, where they compete with other landless people for jobs and imported food. Nor do aggregate production data reveal the losses that future generations suffer because the production potential of a natural resource is reduced today. A decline in the quality of agricultural soils inevitably manifests itself in heightened food-production costs.

Urban Encroachment onto Arable Land

The clearest loss of productive soils occurs when arable lands are paved over as cities, highways, airports, and other trappings of civilization expand. Once converted to urban uses, farmlands are usually lost for good. And, because towns often grew up originally in prime farming zones, the lands lost to urbanization are frequently of the highest agricultural quality. Conversely, most newly developed farmlands are of marginal quality.

Urban encroachment onto arable lands has been best documented in the industrial countries. The Science Council of Canada, for example, reports that between 1966 and 1971 a million acres, or almost one-tenth of the improved farmland in southern Ontario, was converted to non-agricultural uses. Half the farmland lost to urbanization in Canada comes from the best one-twentieth of Canada's farmlands, and it is being replaced by new farms in regions with poorer soils and less favorable climates.^{2/} In the United States, one million hectares of arable land are lost to urbanization, highways, strip mines, and other uses each year; only about half that much land is added to the agricultural base each year through irrigation and drainage projects, and much of the new farm land is of relatively poor quality. A crop area nearly as large as the state of Nebraska has been converted to non-agricultural uses just since World War II.^{3/}

Urban encroachment onto prime farmlands is by no means a phenomenon unique to developed countries. In the early 1970s, Egypt was losing some 26,000 hectares of precious cropland each year to housing, roads, factories, and military facilities--a total rivaling that of the new croplands claimed at great expense from the desert.^{4/} The Government of India, in a report to the 1976 U. N. Conference on Human Settlements, projected an increase in the amount of land devoted to non-agricultural uses from 16.2 million hectares in 1970 to 26 million hectares at the end of the century.^{5/} A sizable share of the land so converted will likely consist of good farmland. Thus, since private markets and decisions on land use simply do not take society's future resource needs into full account, the need for careful land-use planning and controls in all countries is apparent.

Soil Erosion Trends

Faulty agricultural practices, like urban sprawl, can result in the outright loss of usable lands. Hillside farms can become so eroded that they must be abandoned. Grazing lands and farming areas in arid and semi-arid zones can be reduced to dusty deserts by overgrazing and overcropping. Poor water management can transform fertile irrigated fields into salt-encrusted wastelands.

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Most forms of soil damage, however, do not strike the eye so forcibly. Over huge areas, cropland productivity is declining as wind and water erode the topsoil, or as repeated cropping without renewal dissipates the soil's nutrients. Such lands may never be abandoned, but they produce less over time than they could. Vast rangelands are becoming less able to support livestock as overgrazing causes nutritious perennial grass species to give way to low-value annual herbs or woody shrubs. Crop yields on many irrigated farms the world over are gradually falling as soil salinity or alkalinity rises.

Soil erosion is a constant problem almost everywhere that farming is practiced. When farming techniques are carefully selected and when highly erosion-prone soils are left untilled, soil losses to water or wind can usually be held to a tolerable level. However, the individual farmer often has little short-term economic incentive to protect the land's long-term quality; and, especially in poor countries, many farmers are forced by immediate survival needs to extract what sustenance they can from lands best left in grass or forest.6/

The total costs of much of the soil erosion that has taken place in the developed countries have been masked by the heavy application of energy in the form of chemical fertilizers. As 1975 report by the private Council for Agricultural Science and Technology stated that more than one-third of all U.S. cropland is suffering annual soil losses sufficient to reduce productivity over time. In 1974, artificial fertilizers worth \$1.2 billion would have been required if the nutrients lost through erosion that year had been replaced.7/

All the costs of soil erosion are not incurred on the farm. Soil washed off fields often enters waterways to become sediment that clogs streams, canals, and harbors and that destroys fish habitats and fills up reservoirs. Nutrients and pesticides carried by eroded soils are major pollutants of rivers, lakes, and oceans.

Pushed by population growth, inequitable land distribution, or a lack of non-agricultural jobs in the valleys and plains, farmers in many poor countries are now moving onto mountain slopes where severe erosion is virtually inevitable. At ever faster rates, the slopes of the Himalayas, the Andes, and the East African highlands, as well as of other hilly areas in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are being stripped of trees to extend agriculture that is all too often unsustainable. The most immediate damages caused by farming steep hillsides are suffered by the farmers themselves as their crop yields fall and as landslides become more frequent. Downstream of these untenable operations, however, many more people's lives are disrupted as the incidence and severity of flooding increases and as the water-holding capacity of reservoirs shrinks. Sometimes the effects are international. The extensive clearing of hills in Nepal, for example, is probably intensifying the chronic flooding in northern India. Likewise, soil washed off hillsides in India joins that from within northern Pakistan to help silt up Pakistan's expensive Mangla and Tarbela Reservoirs--both of which may be filled with sediment in little more than 50 years.8/

Arid Lands in Jeopardy

The productivity of arid lands, like that of mountainous zones, is especially vulnerable to human mismanagement. Background documents prepared for the 1977

U. N. Conference on Desertification revealed the breadth and cost of land degradation in drier regions. The term "desertification" has not been precisely defined, but it is usually used to describe ecological changes that reduce the ability of arid and semi-arid lands to support human life. In some cases, the apparent edges of true, climatically created deserts are pulled outward as the vegetation and soil structure of formerly usable adjacent lands are destroyed. More commonly, patches of heavily used rangeland or cropland in semi-arid regions decline in productivity as good forage species disappear and soils lose fertility. In extreme cases, such abused spots can be reduced to useless mini-deserts. By U. N. estimates, about 78 million people live on arid or semi-arid lands that have already been rendered barren or nearly so by human activities.^{9/}

Overgrazing, cropping without renewing soil fertility, cropping with inappropriate technologies, and land denudation by rising numbers of firewood gatherers all contribute significantly to desertification. Land damage is usually greatest during extended droughts; but such droughts are a natural fact of life in arid zones, and it is generally the combination of natural climatic stresses and human misuse of the land that causes severe land destruction. Often underlying these precipitating factors are deeper social failures: failures to transform agricultural technologies as human and livestock populations grow rapidly; failures to align with the needs of society the reproductive behavior and agricultural practices of individuals; and general failures of nations to implement equitable and ecologically sound rural development.^{10/}

With good reason, particular attention has been focused on desertification in Africa. By one estimate, some 650,000 square kilometers of land once suitable for grazing or farming has been lost to the Sahara along its southern edge over the last 50 years.^{11/} In the Sudan, where the process is best documented, the Sahara's southern boundary shifted south by 90 to 100 kilometers between 1958 and 1975.^{12/} The problem in Sudan and elsewhere below the Sahara is actually much greater than even these numbers suggest; in huge areas far away from the desert's edge, crop yields are falling as soils are overused, the carrying capacities of rangelands are shrinking as perennial grasses disappear, and tree cover is disappearing under the onslaught of firewood collectors. Identical problems plague the pastures and rain-fed farmlands to the north of the Sahara, where an estimated 100,000 hectares of land are claimed by the desert each year.^{13/} Portions of southern and eastern Africa also suffer from desertification.

Northwestern India, the world's most densely populated desert area, is likewise experiencing severe land degradation. Pastures have been reduced to only 10 to 15 percent of their original productivity. Declines in crop yields have been registered over the last two decades, and the area blanketed by sand dunes is growing.^{14/} Studies undertaken for the U. N. Conference on Desertification also describe widespread and severe degradation throughout much of the Middle East and in several semi-arid parts of Latin America.^{15/}

Developed countries too have sometimes failed to manage arid-zone agriculture properly, and productivity has suffered accordingly. The U.S. Dust Bowl of the 1930s, like the severe erosion that erupted in the Soviet Union's Virgin

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Lands in the early 1960s, showed the perils of improper cropping in these drought-prone areas--while the subsequent recovery of both regions has shown the possibilities for and benefits of good soil management. Large pasturelands in Australia have been damaged seriously by oversized flocks of sheep. Today in the United States, because of overgrazing on federally controlled rangelands, an area the size of Utah is in "poor" or "bad" condition, according to a recent survey by the Bureau of Land Management.^{16/}

Irrigation multiplies the agricultural output of arid lands and enables large, dense populations to exist in many desert regions. Yet, like rain-fed farming zones, many irrigated zones are experiencing declines in productivity. Usually because of faulty water management--the application of too much water, of too little water, or of water of poor quality, or the failure to provide proper field drainage--soil waterlogging, salinization, and alkalization are taking massive tolls. When the underground water table reaches crop root-zones, or when soil salinity rises, crops are stunted and yields fall; as conditions deteriorate further, fields are abandoned.

The global extent and magnitude of the waterlogging and salinity problems are not widely appreciated. These forms of degradation hold yields below their potential on more than one-third of the earth's irrigated area.^{17/} Moreover, according to recent U.N. estimates, the equivalent of about 125,000 additional hectares of irrigated land is lost each year to waterlogging, salinization and, to a lesser extent, alkalization.^{18/} Hardest hit by these processes are countries in the Middle East and South Asia, but all American and African countries with sizable irrigation systems are subject to the same problems. The rising salinity of the waters of the Colorado River, for example, is damaging crops in the rich farmlands of southern California and of northwestern Mexico.

At the U. N. Conference on Desertification, the nations of the world approved a World Plan of Action designed to combat the degradation of pastures, rain-fed croplands, and irrigated lands in drier regions. According to U.N. estimates, nearly \$16 billion worth of potential agricultural production is lost each year in the world's arid and semi-arid zones because of past and current desertification. Anti-desertification expenditures of some \$400 million annually would, in the view of the Conference Secretariat, yield handsome financial returns and could help halt such land losses by century's end.^{19/}

While the conference initiated several potentially valuable regional schemes, such as the proposed green belts above and below the Sahara, its main provisions can only be implemented by national governments acting with the support and participation of the people whose livelihoods are jeopardized by desertification--and whose actions now cause it. Financial and technical considerations aside, desertification, like many other forms of land deterioration, will not be halted unless the governments of affected countries shift substantial resources into support for broadly based rural development, and unless they sponsor the social and economic reforms needed to make possible new modes of life that do not involve the degradation of natural resources.

Deforesting the Earth

The accelerated deforestation now experienced by many regions is also helping to undermine the productivity of agricultural systems. Denudation of watersheds often promotes soil erosion and landslides. It also increases the frequency of flooding and the degree of siltation of streams, reservoirs, and irrigation systems downstream. The loss of trees in semi-arid regions encourages wind erosion and furthers the creation of desert-like conditions. Since rain falling on bare ground tends to run off rather than soak in, wells and springs sometimes dry up when the surrounding area has been stripped of vegetation.

Apart from such negative ecological consequences, the loss of trees poses significant economic and social problems in its own right. All societies depend on forests for timber and paper. Shortages of either product can cripple economic development efforts. Moreover, for more than one-third of humanity, wood or charcoal is the sole source of fuel for cooking and heating; thus, as obtaining firewood becomes more difficult, the poor are saddled with a heavy economic burden.

As of the early 1970s, according to a recent survey, 22 percent of the earth's land area was covered by closed forests. Another 8 percent of the area was characterized as open woodlands.^{20/} Because data on forest trends in most of Africa, Asia, and Latin America are poor, just how fast the forest area is decreasing is impossible to say. However, both the available forest surveys and the qualitative observations of many scientists indicate that deforestation in many developing countries in particular is proceeding rapidly and has already reached the ecological danger point. The main causes of deforestation are clearing land for agriculture, gathering wood for fuel (which alone accounts for half of all the wood cut in the world each year), and harvesting timber. Existing tree-planting efforts in many countries are inadequate to offset the losses to fuel collectors and timber merchants.

The severe depletion of forests is quite apparent throughout much of the Indian subcontinent, China, the Middle East, North Africa, the drier stretches of sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, and northwestern South America. And, with the significant exception of China, tree cover continues to shrink throughout most of these regions. Today, the humid tropical forests of Central Africa, the Amazon Basin, Central America, and Southeast Asia are also coming under growing pressure. Timber companies are cutting valuable tree species, multinational firms and local entrepreneurs are clearing forests to create cattle ranches, and landless immigrants are moving into the forests to try to eke out a living. Meanwhile, the traditional practice of shifting cultivation continues, and, as the number of people living in this fashion rises while the land available for shifting cultivation shrinks, forests are not given time to regenerate, nor soils time to replenish lost nutrients.^{21/}

Priorities and Prospects

The destruction of food-producing resources deserves far more attention from governments than it has received to date. Failures of social organization,

more than lacks of needed technologies, are responsible for the deterioration of productive biological systems. The trends can be reversed only when governments give such reversals the political priority they deserve, carry out appropriate social reforms, and, in many developing countries, successfully slow the unprecedented increase in human numbers.

Given the tremendous increases in world food requirements that are inevitable over the coming decades, the lack of large new regions to bring under the plow, and the emerging scarcity of fossil fuels, the deterioration of farmlands anywhere must concern people everywhere. The especially severe landscape degradation occurring in many developing countries will intensify the dependence of these countries on outside sources of food, as well as worsen the plights of the poor within their borders. Erosion and reckless urbanization in North America, meanwhile, will reduce the future capacities of the United States and Canada to meet the ever-growing world demand for their food exports.

Safeguarding agricultural soils cannot in itself reduce the extent of under-nutrition in the world. The unequal distribution of food, a direct reflection of the unequal distribution of income within and among nations, is the primary cause of undernutrition. But, at the same time, the continuing loss of productive soils will surely add to the numbers of the undernourished. Falling food output and rising production costs spell higher food prices, and higher food prices mean that more people are unable to afford adequate diets. Frequently, moreover, it is the lands on which the rural poor reside that incur the greatest damages. As the land off which people live deteriorates, their prospects for economic betterment deteriorate as well.

3. ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH

Health is in some sense the ultimate indicator of the extent to which the environment is enhancing or impairing human life. The patterns of disease and death that prevail in all societies are the products of interactions between individuals and their physical and social environments.^{22/} Today, despite impressive advances in medical technologies and despite soaring medical-care expenditures, it is more apparent than ever that significant health improvements require attacks on the environmental sources of disease.

Poverty's Toll

The environment influences the health of both the poor and the rich, but the nature of the effects varies considerably according to income levels. Because they lack access to pure water and safe waste-disposal facilities, and because of their often extreme economic deprivation, the world's poor are ravaged by the infectious diseases and undernutrition that similarly ravaged North Americans and Europeans less than a century ago. Childhood deaths remain tragically commonplace; an estimated 35,000 children under the age of five die every day, in almost all cases of simple infectious diseases, often combined with undernutrition.^{23/} Poor sanitation gives rise to frequent infection, especially among children; poor nutrition gives rise to high mortality from intestinal and respiratory diseases that are regarded as

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merely routine aspects of childhood among the affluent.^{24/} In large measure because so many infants and children die there, average life expectancy at birth in the world's poorer countries ranges between about 40 and 65 years.^{25/}

Judged in terms of the human suffering and death it causes, the poor sanitation faced daily by nearly a third of humanity is by far the world's most critical environmental problem. Good health requires access to water that is not only reasonably germ-free, but also abundant enough so that it can be used to keep the body and the household clean. Safe waste-disposal facilities are essential to the prevention of the contamination of habitats with the dangerous bacteria and parasites transmitted by human excrement.

While the proportion of the world's population living in proximity to safe and plentiful water has risen steadily over the last quarter century, a huge number of people are still deprived of a healthy water supply. As of 1975, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), 62 percent of the residents of the developing countries (excluding China), or 1.2 billion people, did not have reasonable access to safe water supplies. Four-fifths of the rural and one-fourth of the urban population of the developing world lacked an adequate domestic water supply.^{26/}

Safe waste-disposal facilities are even scarcer than safe water supplies. Two-thirds of the developing-country population, or 1.4 billion people, lived without safe latrines or sewage systems in 1975. A fourth of the urban and nearly nine-tenths of the rural residents of the developing countries lacked this health necessity.^{27/} As a result, environmental pollution by untreated human waste exacts a disease and death toll that dwarfs the known toll of industrial pollutants.

Despite the attention drawn by the 1977 United Nations Water Conference to the sorry state of global sanitation, efforts to improve the situation remain pitifully inadequate. Realistically assessing existing political commitments to better sanitation, the World Health Organization in 1976 set modest global water-supply and waste-disposal targets for 1980. WHO has urged the worldwide expenditure of \$35 billion over a five-year period to boost the portion of the developing-country population with adequate water supplies from 38 to 52 percent, and the portion with safe waste facilities from 32 to 45 percent.^{28/} Yet, meeting these limited targets only requires the expenditure of less than one-fortieth the amount that will be spent worldwide on military establishments between 1976 and 1980 and less than one-twelfth of the money consumers will spend on cigarettes during these years.^{29/}

Careless Development

Especially in a context of poor sanitation, carelessly implemented economic development projects sometimes cause or promote the spread of disease. Probably the most dramatic such example is provided by the case of schistosomiasis, a debilitating parasitic disease transmitted from person to person via body wastes and certain types of water-borne snails. Already afflicting more than 200 million people in at least 71 countries, the disease spreads to more people each year as a consequence of tropical irrigation and reservoir development, which provides new habitats for the snail vector. A variety

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of environmental and other control measures that could in many cases slow or prevent the spread of schistosomiasis around newly developed lakes and canals are available. Where human wastes are properly disposed of, the disease cannot spread in any case. Yet governments and developers, eager to construct new irrigation and electric-power capacity and often insensitive to the potential side-effects of their investments, have again and again failed to counter the schistosomiasis threat. Currently, the rising attention paid to the schistosomiasis hazard by many governments and international aid agencies is offset by the sheer rapidity of tropical water-resource development; no end to the disease's spread is in sight.30/

A second striking example of how ecologically careless development activities can promote disease comes from Central America, where pesticides have long been applied extremely heavily to cotton crops. Apart from the unnecessarily high health toll among farm workers that careless pesticide practices there have exacted, general environmental contamination by agricultural pesticides has hastened the evolution of malaria-transmitting mosquitoes that are resistant to DDT and other inexpensive poisons. Formerly successful malaria-control programs in many parts of central America have been severely undermined. In El Salvador, for example, the number of malaria cases jumped from 33,000 in 1973 to 66,000 in 1974--in part because of the insecticide-resistance problem.31/

The Threat of Toxic Substances

While much of the ill health in developed countries today arises from reckless personal behavior--especially overeating, sedentary living, and cigarette smoking--other health hazards have been created by reckless industrial activities. Air pollution spewing out of power plants, factories, and vehicles is contributing to both acute and chronic respiratory diseases in cities the world over--with the health damages usually greatest among low-income groups. Hazardous air pollutants sometimes cross national borders, making their control matters of international concern.32/

Well-publicized toxic-substance disasters such as those in Minamata, Japan, and in Seveso, Italy, are the visible manifestations of an unfolding problem of unknown shape and dimensions. The long-term health effects, exerted individually or in combinations, of the many chemicals, metals, fibers, and other pollutants that exist in minute quantities in our air, water, food, and consumer products have not been determined. Many long-used chemicals have not been adequately tested for possible carcinogenic, mutagenic, or teratogenic qualities; even the new chemicals introduced annually--which perhaps number a thousand--are not all tested thoroughly for health hazards. As a result of inadequate preliminary testing and regulation of potentially toxic substances, factory workers--many of whom are daily exposed to high levels of certain materials--have often unwittingly served as an early-warning system for society. Unusual patterns of disease and death among workers have frequently revealed the hazards of untested substances that are subsequently found to be widely disseminated outside the factories as well.33/

Greatly complicating the task of controlling hazardous substances is the long period that sometimes separates a person's exposure to the substance from the onset of disease. Many carcinogens do not exert their effects until two decades or more after exposure. Thus, at any point the seeds of future cancer epidemics could be unknowingly sown.

International Cooperation and Responsibility

Controlling the threat of toxic substances must necessarily involve close international cooperation. A limited start toward meeting the worldwide challenge has already been made. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes most non-communist developed countries, has sponsored discussions and in some cases made recommendations on national policies concerning particular hazardous substances; it is a logical forum for greater coordination of regulations among its member countries. The World Health Organization plays an important role in analyzing and disseminating information on hazardous materials. The U. N. Environment Program is establishing an International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals, a data bank that could further ease the critical task of sharing information globally, especially in the developing countries. The new U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act (under which the pre-use screening and, where deemed necessary, testing of old and new industrial chemicals can be required) marks a turning point in the U.S. experience with chemicals. Yet, given the complexity and size of the challenge, much remains to be done. The testing job is too big for one country alone; more international coordination of research and regulatory policies is essential.

The global leader both in producing new chemicals and in testing chemicals for health hazards, the United States has much valuable information and experience to share with the rest of the world. At the same time, our country has much to learn from others, such as the Scandinavian countries, which have provided workers with better protection from certain industrial carcinogens than we have, and the many European countries that have been more successful than we have at protecting coal miners from lung diseases.^{34/}

The systematic international sharing of information about newly discovered hazards and regulatory initiatives is especially important because of the ease with which industrial processes and products can cross national boundaries. Less developed countries, their governments intent upon promoting rapid economic growth but lacking the scientific and bureaucratic capacities to regulate industries and products adequately, are especially vulnerable to avoidable tragedies.^{35/} Drugs, foods, cosmetics, pesticides, or other commodities declared dangerous (and in many cases banned) in developed countries are sometimes openly sold or ineffectively controlled in less developed countries. Factory workers, or people living in the vicinity of factories in Africa, Asia, or Latin America, are less likely than their counterparts in Europe or North America to receive adequate health protection. Investigators recently found, for example, that U.S.-owned asbestos-textile plants operating in Mexico were exposing workers to health hazards that would not be tolerated in the United States. In fact, the lack of adequate worker-protection in

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some countries could serve as an economic incentive for companies to set up factories where health standards are less strict and, hence, less expensive to meet.^{36/}

It would probably not be practical for one country or international body to dictate a single occupational health standard to all countries. But presently, no means exist even for keeping track of the international movements of potentially hazardous industries, let alone for monitoring their health practices.^{37/} All too often a lack of information or regulatory capacity, rather than a conscious choice, underlies an unreasonably high health hazard.

The practice, common in the United States and other developed countries, of legally exempting exports from the health regulations and standards that are imposed on domestic products may also be accentuating the toxic-substance problem in less developed countries. Consumer goods, pesticides, and industrial products whose uses are banned or restricted at home are often produced and exported without legal restriction. Likewise, chemical substances intended for export from the United States are exempted from the testing requirements of the Toxic Substances Control Act unless the likelihood of a resulting domestic environmental hazard is established.^{38/}

In theory, and in accordance with traditional notions of national sovereignty, such export exemptions make sense. Each country may set its own standards and regulate imported goods accordingly. Different countries do, of course, have different environmental problems and needs. Thus, for example, DDT may be deemed essential for disease control in one country even though its use in agriculture has been stopped in another country.

In actual practice, however, "national sovereignty" over health standards is not always manifested so rationally. Many poor countries lack both the resources and the laws needed to monitor health-related research findings around the world and then to regulate imports according to local priorities and needs. Innocent citizens may suffer as a result.

Modifications in relevant developed-country laws are desirable in order to help curb the abuses of the prevailing system. To this end, the UNEP Governing Council in 1977 passed a resolution urging all governments to act "to ensure that potentially harmful chemicals, in whatever form or commodity, which are unacceptable for domestic purposes in the exporting country are not permitted to be exported without the knowledge and consent of appropriate authorities in the importing country..."^{39/} In some cases, totally eliminating double standards for domestic and foreign citizens may be in order. It is difficult to conceive of any good reason, for example, for selling to parents in a non-regulating country infant wear treated with a flame retardant found carcinogenic and hence banned in the United States. In other cases, such as that of hazardous pesticides, a more discriminating approach may be necessary. Under such an approach, importing governments would be made fully aware of the known hazards of the product in question and be required to provide consent before the product in question could be shipped. (The U.S. Agency for International Development has, in fact, recently established stricter health and environmental controls on pesticides provided through the foreign aid program. However, private pesticide exports from the United States and other producing countries remain largely unregulated.)^{40/}

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As the recent case of the pesticide leptophos (Phosvel) reveals, self-interest as well as international responsibility demands tighter controls on hazardous exports. Leptophos was never cleared for use in the United States because of uncertainty about its safety. But it was produced in a Texas plant for export--mainly to less developed countries including Egypt, Colombia, Indonesia and others. Even after its neurological threat had been discovered in U.S. laboratories, and even after fatal livestock and human poisonings had occurred in Egypt, aggressive corporate marketing of leptophos continued.^{41/} The health effects that leptophos use may have had on farmworkers and consumers in importing countries will never be known. But in 1976, severe neurological damage to U.S. workers involved in its production was discovered. Only after this domestic tragedy was U.S. leptophos production finally stopped. Perhaps the final irony was the discovery that some vegetables imported into the United States from Mexico were contaminated with residues of the leptophos whose use U.S. authorities had refused to allow at home.^{42/}

4. ENDANGERED SPECIES AND ENDANGERED HABITATS

Once mainly the concern of animal lovers and bird watchers, the disappearance of species now poses a major scientific and social challenge. The magnitude of the foreseeable losses of species and genetic materials is enormous, and the tangible and intangible costs of extinction are huge, if immeasurable. Enormous, too, are the social forces behind the biological depletion of the planet.

Recent findings suggest that the total number of plant and animal species on earth may be as high as ten million--only about 15 percent of which have been identified in scientific literature, let alone been well studied.^{43/} If current trends continue, a good share of the unrecorded majority of species will vanish forever before their existence, much less their biological importance, is known.

Extinction is the ultimate fate of all species. In the late twentieth century, however, because of the accelerated spread of human activities onto ever more habitats, the wide dissemination of toxic chemicals, and the sometimes callous exploitation of wildlife, the pace of the extermination of species has risen sharply.

For example, as Norman Myers has observed, animal species are believed to have died out at a rate of about one per thousand years in the age of the dying of the dinosaurs. But between 1600 and 1950, while human civilization flowered, one animal species or sub-species disappeared per decade. Presently, according to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, an average of one animal species or sub-species is lost each year. Plant species are probably going extinct at a much higher rate, though these losses cannot be estimated. Unknown numbers of unknown plants are dying out, particularly in scientifically uncharted regions in the tropics.^{44/}

Genetic Impoverishment: The Cost to Humanity

The accelerated extermination of species does not pose the obvious, immediate threat to human well-being that trends such as desertification or the spread of environmentally induced diseases do. Yet, for a wide range of reasons, a decline in the diversity of life forms is of grave concern to all people. Since the potential large-scale loss of species is without historical precedent and involves the disruption of ecological systems whose complexity is beyond human grasp, no means exist for quantifying the costs of such a loss. But to be without a price tag is not to be without value; what is irreplaceable is, in some sense, priceless.

Probably the most immediate threat to human welfare posed by the extinction of species and sub-species arises from the shrinkage of the plant gene-pools available to agricultural scientists and farmers. While the global spread of modern agricultural methods and hybrid seeds has brought needed increases in food production, it has in many areas also entailed the substitution of relatively few seed varieties for the rich array of indigenous varieties traditionally planted. At the same time, the spread of cultivation onto unused lands may wipe out the wild varieties of crops that still exist in some regions.

Switching to more productive strains and extending cultivation may often be socially desirable. Improperly implemented, however, such "progress" can involve the extinction of unique and rare crop strains that are closely adapted to the local environment and that are sometimes highly resistant to local pests; the long-term productivity of agriculture may thus be jeopardized. The risks of planting large areas to genetically uniform crops include high vulnerabilities to pests, plant diseases, and weather abnormalities--as the decimation by corn blight of 15 percent of the highly homogenous U.S. corn crop in 1970 made all too clear.^{45/}

The future of plant breeding and thus of agricultural progress is undermined as the diversity of genes on which breeders can draw declines. The maintenance of high-yield agriculture depends not just on major breakthroughs in breeding, but also on the more routine, constant development of new crop strains as pests and diseases, as well as production technologies and goals, evolve over time. Locally adapted domestic or wild strains with properties of huge potential value--strains of crops such as wheat, sorghum, and millet--are disappearing before scientists have time to make use of them.

Fortunately, the preservation of diverse crop strains is one of the more easily manageable aspects of the problem of endangered species. Even if preserving crop strains in their wild or locally cultivated states--clearly a desirable goal--proves for the most part unattainable, large numbers of varied seeds can be stored in international facilities and made available to breeders as the need arises. A global network of seed collection and storage centers is, in fact, being developed by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. Seed collections, however, can never match nature's genetic wealth, and invariably involve seed mortality and cataloging mistakes. Moreover, varieties in a collection do not continue to evolve as they would

within a natural environment. Thus, the long-term effectiveness of seed collections will be greatly enhanced by the conservation of crop strains in their natural habitats wherever possible.^{46/}

Wild plants and animals serve a variety of medical and industrial, as well as agricultural, purposes. As many as half of all the prescriptions filled in the United States each year contain a drug of natural origin. A host of industrial products, including various gums, resins, oils, dyes, and pesticides also come from natural sources and are not easily synthesized.

Some species of proven value, such as certain animals used in laboratory research and whales that are hunted as sources of food and oil, are under acute pressure. But perhaps the greatest industrial, agricultural, and medical costs of species reduction will stem from future opportunities unknowingly lost. Only about 5 percent of the world's plant species have yet been screened for pharmacologically active ingredients. Ninety percent of the food humans eat comes from just 12 crops, but scores of thousands of plants are edible and some will undoubtedly prove useful in meeting human food needs. It is a statistical certainty that socially significant uses will be discovered for many tropical plants as more are studied.^{47/}

No matter how advanced society's technologies may seem, human livelihoods are ultimately grounded in biological processes and humans participate in ecological webs so intricate that the consequences of interference cannot usually be foreseen. Crushed by the march of civilization, one species can take many others with it, and the consequent ecological repercussions and rearrangements may well harm society. The symptoms of an adverse change in the ecosystem, such as the overrunning of crops by pests or the sudden spread of a human disease, may easily be misperceived as matters of chance when in fact they are the direct result of human actions.

No one would claim that all endangered species are essential to the viability of human culture. But, on the other hand, scientists cannot yet say where the critical thresholds lie, at what level of species extermination the web of life will be seriously disrupted. Identifying and protecting those species whose ecological functions are especially important to human welfare are crucial tasks facing both scientists and governments.

To many people, the strongest argument for halting the acceleration of species extinction arises not so much from practical as from philosophical considerations. Some have called for what O. H. Frankel terms an "evolutionary ethic"--a determination to "try to keep evolutionary options open so far as we can" without forcing "undue deprivations on those least able to bear them."^{48/} The alternative to living by such a creed is destroying many of those habitats and species that do not seem immediately useful; humans appoint themselves as the ultimate arbiters of evolution and determine its future course on the basis of short-term considerations.

Habitat Preservation and Social Reform

However compelling the arguments for greater preservation of species, conservation efforts to date have been inadequate. Certainly some progress has been made, particularly in developed countries in temperate zones, where animals and plants identified as imperiled are increasingly apt to receive protection. Globally, an international agreement to halt commerce in endangered species and in products derived from them is, despite poor enforcement, helping to preserve some of the more visible threatened species. But the species-by-species approach that has characterized most past conservation efforts is inadequate in the face of today's challenge. The number of potentially jeopardized species is simply too great for the historic methods of protection to be applied effectively. Moreover, the major threat to species today--the destruction of habitats that often support large numbers of interdependent species--cannot be analyzed or halted using a species-by-species approach.

In addition to protecting individual species of known esthetic, economic, or ecological importance, the overriding need today is to conserve as many varied habitats as possible--to preserve a representative cross-section of the world's species and ecosystems. Since all species everywhere cannot possibly be saved, ensuring the survival of a well-chosen sample of all forms of life is the only feasible recourse at this stage.^{49/}

The need for an ecosystem-preservation approach becomes especially clear if trends in the tropics are inspected. Viewed in terms of the numbers of threatened species, the humid tropical forests of Africa, Asia, and Latin America hold an importance far beyond the share of the land they occupy. Because they receive exceptional amounts of light, warmth, and moisture, the tropical rain forests house an extraordinary variety and number of species. A single volcano in the Philippines, for example, has a greater variety of woody plant species growing on its slopes than grow in all the United States. The Amazon Basin may contain a million plant and animal species, making it the biologically richest region on earth.^{50/}

The multitudes of species inhabiting the tropics are not, of course, distributed uniformly over the landscape. Many individual species exist only in tiny enclaves and as part of fragile local ecosystems. Preserving anything close to all tropical species would require the permanent setting aside of so many spots, covering a combined area so vast, that the prospect is, for all practical purposes, unthinkable. The simple truth is that huge, perhaps inexorable pressures to exploit the remaining virgin territories of the tropics are building.

Although biologically wealthy, the tropical forests lie within countries that are economically poor and whose governments are not inclined to value abstract, long-term ecological goals above immediate economic gains. In most of these countries, moreover, land tenure in presently settled areas is inequitable, and population growth rates are exceptionally high, resulting in the presence of large numbers of land-hungry people desperate to try to carve a living out of the forest. Even affluent people in far-away countries, who demand wood and agricultural products, add to the pressures on tropical

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ecosystems. Multinational companies who offer to turn forests into saleable timber and unused lands into beef-producing pastures are seldom turned away by governments eager to acquire foreign exchange.

Because of the confluence of powerful social forces contributing to the development and disruption of hitherto unexploited tropical lands, many scientists fear that the natural tropical rain-forest will be virtually extinct by century's end.^{51/} Certainly not all the forest lands will be inhabited by people or even be productive; but once disrupted, their original balance of species may be forever lost. Limiting the extent of such losses will require preserving numerous large, well-selected areas in undisturbed states.

Encouragingly, the leaders of a few tropical countries, including Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, Thailand, and Venezuela, have already established sizable natural reserves in their countries. (Leaders in some of the wildlife-rich countries of East Africa, too, have initiated far-sighted conservation policies.) Yet even in these countries, let alone in countries where leaders are less courageous or conservation-minded, permanently protecting large natural areas will be feasible only if the deeper socioeconomic forces that imperil these areas are dispelled. Unless economic and social development become more equitable, unless all are provided with land, jobs, and a decent living, the dispossessed will naturally covet and molest legally protected lands, trees, and animals. And, if rapid population growth in tropical countries is not soon halted, human pressures to exploit virgin territories will overwhelm even the most stalwart conservation efforts. Immediate human survival needs will always take precedence over long-term environmental goals. Clearly, the struggle to save species and ecosystems cannot be divorced from the struggle to achieve a social order in which the basic human needs of all are met.

The social obstacles to the protection of natural reserves become irrelevant if such reserves are never even established. A good start toward the creation of such ecological protectorates has been made under the auspices of UNESCO. As of late 1977, 127 areas had been officially recognized by UNESCO as part its global network of Biosphere Reserves. While an encouraging development, however, the system is far from complete. Even in the United States, in which 28 areas have been officially designated as reserves under the program, the coverage of ecosystems is incomplete and should, many involved scientists feel, be extended to an additional 20 more areas. In general, tropical forest zones are badly underrepresented among the world's parks and reserves.^{52/}

Who Pays the Costs of Protection?

Because so much of the responsibility for preserving the earth's genetic heritage falls to poorer countries, the possibility of distributing the costs of conservation among nations has naturally arisen.^{53/} Those concerned about the depletion of species are, in effect, asking tropical countries to leave untapped the economic potentials of sizable areas and to pass up certain possible development projects--for example, a dam that would destroy a unique habitat but would produce needed power and food. In the United States, the recent halting of construction of a dam that threatened a rare fish species

engendered widespread resentment and political opposition. Can it be surprising, then, if people living at subsistence level in, say, Malaysia or Zaire refuse to forsake the benefits of a new dam or road simply because some obscure plant or animal species may perish? This predicament might be at least partially untangled through global sharing of the costs of habitat protection, by which wealthier nations contribute to conservation-related expenses incurred by poorer countries. If the world's extant species and gene pools are the priceless heritage of all humanity, then people everywhere may need to share the burdens of conservation according to their ability to do so.

5. ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Energy in one form or another is plentiful; the problem is to obtain usable forms of energy, to find sources that are sustainable, and to meet energy needs without undermining environmental quality or human health. Currently, the energy systems of rich and poor countries alike fail for the most part to meet these criteria. Perhaps half of humanity cooks and heats with firewood or dried dung; as presently organized, this pattern is neither physically sustainable nor ecologically benign. Economic life among the wealthier half of humanity is intimately linked to the availability of petroleum and coal, but this pattern is also physically and ecologically unsustainable. Petroleum supplies are limited, and a major rise in coal use worldwide may involve unacceptable environmental risks. Thus both developed and developing countries must make profound economic and social transitions to a new energy order over the next few decades.

The Firewood Crisis

The firewood crisis of the poor has been largely neglected by analysts of world energy problems and even by many governments of countries where the problem is acute.^{54/} Many developing-country governments have devoted considerable resources to procuring fossil fuels for industries and urban elites, and in some cases to developing nuclear power-plants, while giving scant attention to the worsening energy situation faced by the poor majority of their populations.

More than 90 percent of the residents of many less developed countries depend on wood, charcoal, plant residues, or dried dung to meet their basic energy needs. So long as trees are plentiful, this system is workable. But in many areas--particularly South Asia, the Middle East, Central America, north-western South America, and the drier regions of Africa--the growth of the human population has far outpaced that of new trees. As a result, obtaining wood becomes increasingly time-consuming and expensive. The poor must hunt for wood, sometimes spending entire days gathering just enough for one person to carry. Those with enough money pay soaring prices for wood or charcoal brought in on animals or trucks. Charcoal prices in the central Sudanian town of Bara, for example, have tripled in the last decade, while charcoal prices in larger Sudanian cities have multiplied by an even higher factor. Families in some West African cities now spend one-fourth of their

income on fuel wood.^{55/} This growing scarcity of firewood places an especially heavy burden on women, who are frequently saddled with the task of collecting fuel.

The negative social and economic consequences of firewood scarcity are paralleled by negative ecological consequences. The bulk of the world's fuel wood is cut--legally or illegally--either throughout rural countrysides or from designated forest areas. Only rarely is wood cutting matched by the commensurate replanting of trees. Thus, firewood gatherers and charcoal merchants are contributing to the spread of desert-like conditions in semi-arid zones and to rampant soil erosion, silting, and flooding in and below denuded mountain zones. Still more agricultural costs are exacted when wood scarcity becomes so acute that villagers turn to dried dung for fuel, as they have throughout much of the Indian subcontinent and in scattered spots elsewhere. The diversion of precious dung from agricultural soils denies them both the nutrients and the organic matter contained in animal manures.

Solving this energy crisis of the poor, like solving that of the industrial world, requires the expansion of energy supplies, the development of suitable alternative energy sources, and the curtailment of unnecessary energy consumption. Tree-planting programs are needed on a vast scale, and they can bring many ecological benefits as they help meet energy needs. The development and dissemination of alternative fuel sources that are renewable, inexpensive, and small in scale are urgent needs. Solar cookers, and bio-gas plants that produce methane gas and fertilizer from animal and plant wastes, are among the important alternatives that are now being explored. Finally, vast scope exists for energy conservation, even among the poor. In particular, more efficient cooking stoves could reduce wood and charcoal needs markedly.^{56/} One thing is certain: because of the depletion of world petroleum reserves by the affluent; poor countries will not follow the historic energy path of the industrial countries.

While far from identical, the energy problems of the poor and those of the rich are interrelated. The same embargo-caused shortages of petroleum products that in 1974 forced Americans to wait in line for gasoline also forced wheat farmers in India to queue up--in some cases fruitlessly--for fuel to run their irrigation pumps. In fact, by some estimates, the shortage of irrigation fuel in 1974 reduced the Indian wheat harvest by a million tons, enough to feed six million Indians for a year.^{57/} Furthermore, rising kerosene prices the world over have intensified the shortage of firewood. Many families that once cooked with kerosene have been forced by kerosene shortages or price rises to switch back to cooking with wood.^{58/}

The Transition to Renewable Sources

The disruptions and price jumps in the petroleum market of the 1970s are symptoms of a more basic problem: world oil reserves are being depleted, and the downturn in production may be less than two decades away.^{59/} Unfortunately, neither of the two major potential energy sources that have received the greatest attention so far seems likely to be able to fill the projected gaps. Nuclear power, which once struck many as the natural

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successor to fossil fuels for electricity generation, now looks more like a fading dream in the light of various economic, environmental, and security considerations. Coal remains plentiful, but questions about the effects of its greatly expanded use on health and on the climate cast dark shadows on its future role as well.

We are left, then, with an urgent need to develop and deploy a range of renewable and environmentally benign energy sources. Solar energy, whether tapped directly in collectors or photovoltaic cells, or indirectly in the form of biomass (which can, among other uses, be converted into liquid fuel for use in vehicles), must satisfy a growing share of the world's energy needs. Likewise wind, water, and geothermal power can and must be tapped on a large scale. 60/

The world's transition to the use of renewable energy resources must take place in decades, not centuries. Though the eventual depletion of oil supplies has long been predictable, most countries have let valuable years slip by without developing realistic plans for the energy future. Extraordinary efforts must now be put forth to make the inevitable transition as smooth as possible. A failure to prepare adequately for the twilight of the petroleum era could lead to great human misery--to disruptions of food production, to large-scale unemployment, and to a stifling of economic development.

New energy sources must be developed and put into operation while all-out conservation efforts are made in order to stretch out the remaining petroleum supplies as long as possible. Energy conservation is the means by which we can buy time while new sources are developed. Unfortunately, the United States, long the leader in the consumption and waste of petroleum, has not yet led the way toward frugal use of this precious resource.

6. POPULATION, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Nearly all the environmental threats to well-being that are surveyed in this testimony are exacerbated by the unprecedented growth in human numbers that has characterized the late twentieth century. Rapid population growth is seldom the sole cause of environmental stresses, but it is often a major precipitating factor. Particularly in a context of economic stagnation or inequality, it can force farmers onto marginal mountain or desert lands where severe erosion is all but inevitable. It can result in the denudation of the countryside as more and more families seek wood for fuel. Population increases as rapid as those now occurring in most poor countries can overwhelm efforts to build decent housing and sanitary facilities or to increase per capita food supplies.

Population growth in affluent countries, too, causes environmental stresses, though usually different ones than those resulting from population increases among the poor. The rich do not cut down trees themselves, but they put severe pressures on forests all the same as they consume rising amounts of timber products and newsprint. Producing energy to meet the prodigious demands of industrial societies threatens the quality of both land and air; using this energy in work and recreation, affluent consumers foul the environment still more. Those with higher incomes put far greater pressures on non-renewable resources than do the poor.

World Population Trends

In the early 1970s, the United Nations projected that the world's population would rise from its current four billion to six or seven billion by the year 2000, and then perhaps stabilize at between ten and sixteen billion in the year 2150.^{61/} Analysts have debated whether or not the earth's ecological systems have the capacity to support a decent living standard for a population three or more times the size of the current one. But whatever the physical carrying capacity of the earth and the possibilities for technological gains that promise to raise it, the most basic limits to growth may well be social. Most societies will likely be unable to make the awesome and rapid social transformations necessary to absorb the projected population increases and resource stresses without experiencing human disasters.

Recent trends suggest that world population growth may be slowing down more quickly than had been expected when the U. N. projections were made. The global rate of population growth seems to have peaked at close to 2 percent annually sometime near the beginning of this decade, and may since have slowed to below 1.7 percent annually. Dramatic falls in birth rates in Europe, North America, and East Asia provide the major explanation for the global slowdown. On the other hand, progress in slowing population growth in Africa, Latin America, and some parts of Asia has been minimal.^{62/}

A simple extrapolation of current population growth rates in countries now experiencing rapid growth highlights the urgency of rapidly reducing these rates. If its 1975 growth rate were maintained over the next century, Algeria's population would rise from 17 million to 476 million, a 28-fold increase. Under the same circumstances Mexico's population would rise from 60 million to 1.275 billion, and India's from 598 million to 4.330 billion--the latter figure being larger than the current global total. These extrapolations are not projections of what is likely actually to occur; clearly, a variety of influences will prevent them from materializing. The question is not whether population growth in such countries will slow, but how: through falling birth rates or, eventually, through rising death rates among the poor.

Despite the social desirability of slowing population growth and despite the direct importance of family planning to the health of mothers and children, more than half the world's couples do not use any family-planning method. A majority of these couples lack ready access to modern family-planning services.^{63/} Accordingly, fulfilling the goal adopted at the 1974 United Nations Population Conference--that all individuals should have the knowledge and means to plan their family sizes--requires high priority in all countries.

Social Equity and Ecological Sustainability

Providing universal access to family-planning services within a country usually reduces the birth rate, but historical experience also shows that family size is influenced by many other factors as well. Small families do not tend to become the desired norm until basic nutritional and sanitary needs are met, and until the survival odds of children increase. Literacy programs, especially for girls, often serve to instill in the newly literate

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a preference for smaller families, as do rises in personal income. Countering the population threat, then, cannot be divorced from the broader struggle to improve people's overall well-being.^{64/}

Socially equitable and ecologically sustainable development is, in fact, a crucial part of the solution of most of the environmental threats reviewed in this report. In the more developed countries, attempts to safeguard environmental quality have often taken negative forms--stopping some ecologically unsound projects, and forcing those in charge to reassess or redesign others in order to mitigate harmful environmental impacts. Unsound projects in less developed countries, too, need of course to be stopped or altered. But preserving the productivity and habitability of the environment in poorer countries must also entail positive development efforts that afford people opportunities to make a decent living.

Halting the dangerous clearing of mountain slopes, for example, cannot be accomplished simply by banning the upward creep of agriculture. Unless people have access to land or to alternative employment opportunities in the valleys and the plains, the climb by farmers up mountain slopes of paltry agricultural potential is inevitable. Halting overgrazing entails more than legislating reductions in herd sizes; a development process that provides herdsmen with improved technologies and good access to commercial markets is essential if the personal advantages of controlled herds are to be gained. Similarly, natural reserves and endangered species cannot be protected by fiat. If people who live in the vicinity of reserve areas lack the means to earn a livelihood, their movement into "protected" zones is inevitable.

The preservation of environmental quality, then, is not something that can be analyzed or addressed apart from consideration of broader development trends. The success in protecting the forests of one region may depend upon the success of land reform or a rural employment program in another. Building healthy, sanitary habitats for urban slum dwellers may require foregoing national expenditures on automobiles or advanced weapons. Today's leading environmental threats to human well-being cause poverty, but to an even greater extent, they are its consequences. The effort to preserve a safe and productive natural environment must be integrated into the general struggle to reduce poverty and meet basic human needs.

Reexamining the Affluent Society

International considerations of equity will also affect the environmental balance. Currently a small share of the world's people consumes a vastly disproportionate share of the world's resources; it thus accounts for a disproportionate share of certain types of environmental degradation and resource depletion. If global environmental quality is to be preserved as the less fortunate majority of the world's population improves its living standards, the consumption habits of the affluent may have to be curbed. As the effort to improve the welfare of a growing world population places ever greater stresses on resource supplies and on the stability of ecosystems, more attention and pressure will have to be brought to bear on those whose activities and habits account for incongruously high proportions of certain of the stresses.

The industrialized, high-consumption societies must face squarely the need to reexamine their economic patterns and social goals.^{65/} Clearly, many basic attributes of modern industrial states are inimical to the notion of a resource-conserving society. Heretofore, affluent societies have depended upon rising materials consumption and even planned obsolescence to preserve economic growth and widespread employment. Indeed, we presently lack the tools of economic analysis, let alone the economic institutions, needed to chart the path to societies that combine a high quality of life for all with stable and frugal resource consumption and good protection of environmental quality. The philosophical, technological, and economic questions to be faced are profound and difficult. Yet the possible rewards of creating a sustainable, spiritually satisfying mode of life make grappling with such questions well worth the trouble.

7. U. S. INTERESTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Although the United States has led the world in the generation of many industrially related environmental problems, it has also often led the world in recognizing, publicizing, and trying to cope with these and many other environmental threats. On environmental questions, scientists and governments abroad tend to look to the United States as an example and for leadership.^{66/} The United States has, of course, a clear self-interest in preserving a livable global environment; but it also has an unmatched opportunity to contribute to the improvement of living conditions of people everywhere by exercising leadership on environmental issues.

Protecting the Domestic Environment

The most important environmental responsibility of the United States, both in terms of immediate self-interest and long-term global progress, is to build a safe, sustainable domestic environment and mode of life. Although it has passed landmark environmental legislation in the last decade, the United States still has scarcely initiated the social and economic changes that protecting environmental quality requires. We have not yet taken strong measures to save our agricultural soils from erosion, nor to plan land use so that prime farmlands are protected from concrete. Energy conservation remains much more a slogan than a fact of American life. We have scarcely begun to clean our air and waterways of hazardous pollutants; and, in striving to meet rising energy demands we may foul the air still more. We still do not fully understand the extent to which daily life is suffused with hazardous substances; removing toxic chemicals from the environment before rather than after they cause human tragedies remains a largely unfulfilled hope.

Our success, or lack of success, in protecting environmental quality at home carries great international significance. As the world's major grain exporter, the United States has a special social responsibility as well as a huge economic interest in maintaining the productivity of its farmlands. As the world's biggest consumer of non-renewable resources, the United States will affect the future price and availability of such resources to people everywhere. Our international responsibility to stop wasting petroleum is especially apparent. For every gallon of gasoline burned by an oversized automobile today,

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one less gallon will be available to perform far more essential tasks, such as running irrigation pumps, at century's end when the oil wells begin to run dry.

A vigorous U. S. program of environmental protection will automatically produce other less direct international benefits as well. By marshaling our scientific and legislative efforts on behalf of environmental improvement, we create a fund of knowledge and experience of great potential use to other nations. Our efforts to implement the 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act, for example, will provide copious information to other countries that must cope with the same challenges. Where new technologies are needed--as they are in the cases of pollution control and energy production--our technological dynamism and massive research resources will, if devoted to the right ends, produce results of great utility in many countries.

Assessment of U.S. Activities Abroad

The necessity of protecting our domestic environment is widely accepted by the public, and this goal has been embodied in a growing list of laws. However, the U.S. responsibility to insure that our activities and involvements abroad show an equal concern for environmental quality has not yet been so widely accepted by the public or by law-makers. As noted earlier, a number of laws concerning the safety of consumer goods and pesticides and the regulation of toxic substances exempt export products from their provisions. In many cases such exemptions contribute to unnecessary hazards abroad and may even, as the case of Phosvel illustrates, imperil U.S. workers and consumers. The prevailing presumption that potentially hazardous goods can be exported without regulation needs to be replaced by the presumption that universal safety takes first priority; exceptions should be allowed only on a case-by-case basis. Appeals by national or corporate officials to the sanctity of other nations' sovereignty in product regulation should not be used as a smokescreen to cover an abdication of moral responsibility.

Today, as our international economic, political, and cultural involvements broaden, a growing number of governmental agencies--including the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, Commerce, Agriculture, and Defense, as well as agencies such as the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Peace Corps, and the Agency for International Development--make decisions or participate in programs that affect environmental quality abroad. Aid programs, military and civilian construction abroad, government loans or guarantees involving foreign investments or trade, and even support given for foreign research activities can all have significant environmental implications. Significant governmental decisions on domestic questions are already accompanied by the environmental impact studies that the National Environmental Protection Policy Act (NEPA) made mandatory. But, although NEPA's provisions stipulate no such exemption, many federal agencies have been slow to apply its requirements to activities with foreign environmental consequences.

The foreign environmental impacts of U.S. policies need to be assessed not only to satisfy the law, but also to realize the substantial benefits that such assessments can provide.^{67/} Thorough consideration of the ecological

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ramifications of governmental policies is not a frill; it is a sensible exercise of leadership that increases the odds that policy goals will be achieved. Requiring environmental assessments of activities abroad does not infringe upon the sovereignty of other countries. Rather, it helps U.S. decision-makers shape U.S. policies. If another government decides to act in a manner that the U.S. deems environmentally reckless, the United States is certainly not obligated to contribute to the questionable activity. And, in any case, the information gained in the course of preparing environmental assessments is bound to be valuable to the governments of the involved foreign countries.

By the same logic, the U.S. Government needs to do all it can to insure that the multinational institutions to which it donates funds give greater attention to the potential environmental consequences of their activities. A recent UNEP-sponsored study of the practices of nine multilateral development financing agencies, carried out by the International Institute for Environment and Development, revealed that most such agencies are doing little to assess systematically the environmental impacts of their loans and grants. Even in the World Bank, the largest such agency and the clear leader among them in incorporating environmental concerns into policy decisions, acceptance of the need for environmental analysis has not penetrated all departments and the office charged with overseeing environmental assessments is understaffed.^{68/}

Under pressure from nongovernmental environmental groups and the CEQ, the U. S. Agency for International Development (AID) agreed in December of 1975 to prepare environmental assessments before approving development projects expected to have significant environmental effects. As AID Administrator Gilligan has emphasized, significant benefits have already materialized from these procedures. For example, in accordance with the conclusions of the recent reassessment of AID's pesticide program, new policies on the export and use of pesticides have been initiated. By reducing the likelihood that unsafe pesticides will be unknowingly and unnecessarily used abroad, and by emphasizing integrated pest management, the new policy will likely provide better protection of both human health and crops.

Aid for Environmentally Sound Development

Avoiding the negative ecological consequences of development activities is important everywhere but is especially critical in poor countries, where so many people live on the edge of survival and where the human costs of development mistakes can thus be especially high. Yet environmental threats to well-being in poor countries arise not just from ill-advised investments; to an even greater degree, they result from poverty and from the absence of appropriate development. In addition to avoiding negative side-effects as we provide development assistance, we need to contribute positively to development programs that protect and enhance the environment's capacity to support human life.

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Provisions added to the 1977 U.S. aid legislation do, in fact, direct AID to give explicit attention to the fundamental role of environment and natural resources in development. According to the new legislation, "Special efforts shall be made to maintain and where possible restore the land, vegetation, water, wildlife, and other resources upon which depend economic growth and human well-being, especially that of the poor."69/ Moreover, President Carter, in his message to the Congress of May 23, 1977, noted that he has asked the Administrator of AID "to make available to developing countries assistance in environment and natural resources management."

Many traditional aid programs have, of course, addressed important environmental and natural resource problems, even though not under an "environmental" label. By whatever name, efforts to counter soil erosion or rising soil salinity are simply good agricultural practice. The construction of safe water supplies and sanitary facilities has long received AID support, as has the establishment of family-planning programs that indirectly improve the prospects for environmental protection. Many Peace Corps volunteers have contributed to grass-roots village programs of forest, farm, or sanitary improvement. Inasmuch as many of the most severe environmental threats to well-being are consequences of extreme poverty, any aid and trade policies that have helped relieve poverty have improved the environmental outlook (just as aid and trade policies that have worsened the plight of the poor have worsened the environmental picture).

Much scope remains, however, for increasing the effectiveness of our development assistance by incorporating a broad environmental perspective into the planning process. The emphasis on conventional financial criteria in project selection and evaluation has failed to generate adequate support for the long-term protection of natural resources--and hence for sustainable development efforts. The protection and renewal of forests, for example, have received far less support than the ecological and social values of forests would dictate. In the past, little aid has been devoted to meeting rural small-scale energy needs with renewable sources. The preservation of strategic natural areas and species has not traditionally been considered within the purview of development assistance at all.

Poverty's deadly environmental consequences, such as land degradation and poor sanitation, can, like poverty itself, be conquered only if the proper social changes and governmental policies are pursued within the afflicted countries themselves. No matter how enlightened the practices of AID or any other aid agency, they can only have a comparatively marginal effect on social and ecological conditions in foreign lands. At the same time, making what contribution we can to the promotion of foreign development that is at once ecologically sustainable and socially equitable is certainly consistent with our interest in creating a peaceful world free of abject poverty. And, aid efforts that ignore the ecological underpinnings of economic life cannot, in the long run, serve that interest.

Notes

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STATEMENT TO THE
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POPULATION

BY JOHN L. OLSEN

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT

GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY AFFAIRS

SUN COMPANY, INC.

APRIL 19, 1978

We appreciate this opportunity to share with the Committee our views on U.S. relationships with the developing nations.

To place my statement in perspective, I want to make several introductory points.

My company is keenly aware of the fact that we live in an increasingly interdependent world. What affects one nation, affects all. Major economic issues such as inflation, unemployment and energy supply can no longer be dealt with simply as national problems, for they are more and more affected by events and actions in other countries. This growing interdependence has major implications for the future that we are only beginning to understand.

We recognize also the vital need to improve the human condition in the developing nations. But the problems that must be overcome are tremendously difficult and complex. Current world economic trends are intensifying these problems, and the outlook is bleak. Individual private businesses can do little alone to improve the situation. So assistance through the resources of government and government agencies such as the World Bank will be essential.

Accordingly, in this statement I am not speaking as an advocate for particular policies or courses of action. My objective is to outline for your consideration the realities that must be dealt with as the lesser-developed nations seek a larger share of the world's wealth.

I will address four topics:

- . the outlook for the world economy, and its implications for the developing countries
- . an overview of growth considerations in those countries, including energy matters
- . the role of private investment, and
- . the investment climate in the developing nations.

The World Economy and the Developing Nations

The vital key to improving the situation of the developing countries is real economic growth. Robert S. McNamara, president of the World Bank, recently emphasized this fact in these words:

"There is only one way in which poverty in the developing countries can be attacked successfully, and that is by producing more in those nations. In no one of these countries can human needs be satisfied by the simple redistribution of existing income and wealth. In these countries, small is not beautiful. National incomes must rise."

I would add the further point that real growth within these countries can occur only when the world economy, too, is growing.

But the reality is that world economic activity is slowing. Our projections indicate that between now and 1990 a number of forces will increasingly inhibit economic growth. These forces include the high cost of energy, the limited availability and rising costs of natural resources, the costs of protecting the environment, declining opportunities to exploit new technology and changing social values which tend to increase government regulation and taxation and to restrict private economic activity.

Concurrent with this slowing of growth we see a second trend that is running counter to the growth needs of the developing countries. This is a worldwide trend toward protectionism, the inhibition of free trade and control of multinational corporations--a trend motivated by nationalism and the domestic desire to protect employment.

Great progress has been made in removing trade barriers in the years since World War II, with benefit to all nations. But today there are growing indications of a move toward trade restriction as the industrialized nations attempt to deal with the problems of unemployment and inflation in a period of sagging growth. This is an understandable response to economic realities. And the U.S. petroleum industry provides a case in point.

If the proposed crude oil equalization tax becomes law, the U.S. refining industry will experience a severe competitive disadvantage compared with foreign refiners. In this situation, my company would be forced to seek the levying of appropriate fees or tariffs on imported oil products to enable our refineries to compete in the marketplace.

My point is that the inhibiting of international trade in the future could worsen the economic situation of the developing countries.

Pressures for excessive environmental controls are also a factor to be considered. Controls in this country threaten to seriously inhibit both energy development and economic growth in the future. And the efforts of some to export stringent U.S. environmental controls to the developing nations would limit their growth also. In both instances, the ultimate effect would be disadvantageous to the emerging economies of these nations.

The need for balancing environmental and economic goals was recognized at the 1977 UNEP Petroleum Industry and the Environment Meeting in Paris in these words: ". . . the realities of a less than ideal world would require a continuing balance to be struck between the costs and the benefits of incremental pollution abatement for society as a whole . . ."

Against this background, it seems to us that the economic gap between the developed and developing countries will widen. In this period of limited growth, population increases will eat up most of what gains are achieved in the poorer countries, permitting little increase in per capita Gross National Product. But even with limited growth, a lower rate of population increase in the richer countries will enable per capita Gross National Product to rise. At the same time, this slowing of growth in the industrialized nations will weaken the markets for exports of the developing nations. So the immediate future can only intensify differences.

Growth Considerations in the Developing Nations

The developing nations face problems that in today's climate seem almost insurmountable.

A few have sufficient resources in relation to population to grow fairly steadily. But most do not. The ability of these poorer countries to grow is restrained by a number of factors. One is the high rate of population increase, which tends to absorb potential economic gains. Another is a limited amount of arable land, which is usually overworked and which does not supply sufficient food. Another is a lack of goods for export, with exports often dependent upon a single commodity which is in world oversupply. Other factors limiting growth are weak political, economic and social institutions, frequent tribal conflicts and structural restrictions on social and economic reform.

Overcoming these difficulties will require time and both political and economic change. Four particularly significant considerations are these.

First, establishing a society capable of self-sustaining economic growth demands political stability. This is essential to creating a climate in which individuals and enterprises can plan innovations with a reasonable degree of certainty about what will happen in the future.

Second, the transition to a modern society requires industrialization in the fullest sense of the word. This does not mean simply the establishing of manufacturing industries as opposed to agriculture. Rather, it means the organization of production in business enterprises which are characterized by specialization and division of labor. This specialization is based upon the use of technology and of mechanical and electrical power to supplement or replace human effort. And it is motivated by the objective of minimizing cost per unit and maximizing return to the enterprise.

Industrialization in this sense requires far more than investing capital in industrial facilities and the infrastructure--roads, railways,

docks and the generation and transmission of electrical power--required to power them and link them to markets.

It requires development of a skilled, disciplined and motivated labor force. It requires the creation of a professional management group able to combine disciplined teamwork with entrepreneurship. It requires the integration of markets for goods, capital and labor to make possible efficient resource allocation and investment decisions. And perhaps most importantly, it requires institutional and social changes that can radically affect systems of land tenure and income distribution.

Third, many developing countries can do much with their own resources to meet essential needs, given a firm political commitment to doing so. They will be most successful when their efforts recognize the realities of their development situation.

One reality is that jobs must be created in agriculture. The notion that a large proportion of those joining the labor force in coming decades can be productively employed outside agriculture is illusory.

Another reality is that labor intensive technologies--those that result in the most productive use of the entire pool of labor with available capital--should be emphasized. This has several implications for investment in agriculture. It means that investment must be directed toward areas such as irrigation that increase both labor productivity and jobs. And it means that when mechanization essential to increased productivity leads to a loss in jobs, investment in other sectors--including public works--should take up the slack.

Fourth, adjusting to higher oil prices has become a major growth consideration for the developing nations.

Most are heavily dependent on oil as a source of energy. This is true for several reasons. Oil was widely available at low cost in the past. More oil was required as coal reserves were depleted. New industries added to fuel requirements. And a growing population came to rely more and more on kerosine and electricity for heating and lighting.

Oil demand will continue to rise as the economies of the developing nations gradually expand and become more sophisticated. The options for easing the impact of higher oil prices are few and unpromising. They include relying more on other sources of energy, importing fewer nonpetroleum products to make funds available for oil imports, and scaling down development programs. Some assistance will be provided by the OPEC nations. But the realistic conclusion is that the rising cost of oil will limit growth.

The Role of Private Foreign Investment

I want to share with you also some observations relating to private foreign investment in the developing nations.

Foreign companies have a potentially important role to play in the economies of developing countries because of their ability to transport varied resources across national borders. These resources include many of the things I mentioned as essential to economic development-- financial assets, entrepreneurship, management skills, technical knowledge and the organizational skills required to put these resources to effective use.

Foreign aid or technical assistance programs can make the same kinds of resources available, of course. But the deployment of individual experts and technicians is a far cry from private direct investment. The unique contribution of the private company is that it brings together

in one package, capital, modern technology, management skills, innovation and the access to procurement channels and marketing outlets. Further, once private capital is invested it continues in place. Government aid, on the other hand, too often becomes a political football.

Also, direct investment in establishing affiliated companies and branch plants has the additional advantage of bringing the managerial and technological innovations of the parent organization to the host country in a relatively inexpensive way.

At the same time, host countries enjoy the opportunity to tax profits on foreign capital at the direct expense of the government of the country from which the capital comes.

The Climate for Private Investment

Regardless of the value of foreign private investment to developing countries, the fact is that the climate for such investment has been steadily deteriorating. Most developing countries are either barring foreign direct investment entirely or tightly limiting it to designated industrial sectors. And the few countries that are still hospitable to direct investment are ruled by regimes that lack popular constituencies.

In fact, it is fair to say that the depth--and the irrationality--of economic nationalism is nowhere more evident than in the hostility with which many developing countries view private foreign investment. The deepest hostility appears to be reserved for multinational corporations engaged in the extractive businesses, such as mining and petroleum production, and the technically-advanced mass production industries, such as chemicals and oil refining. This is understandable since these industries do little to expand employment. The more important fact,

however, is that they do make the largest contributions to the increased revenues required for accelerating growth. This is true because these are the industries where the mobilization of risk capital for resource exploration and research, advanced production technologies, and efficient management techniques are essential to competitive production.

Nevertheless, the developing nations frequently dictate conditions restricting how these companies may incorporate, invest, repatriate profits, and organize production and distribution. In particular, majority resident participation in the ownership and management of such enterprises is frequently demanded and local production or purchase of components and supplies--where possible--is required.

While the political and cultural motivation for such restrictions is understandable, the effect is frequently to nullify the organizational and operational efficiency on which the company's competitive success is based.

In broader perspective, the restrictive impact of economic nationalism is reflected in other areas such as the current controversy over a law-of-the-sea treaty. My company, among others, is currently investing substantial sums in developing ocean mining technology. And we believe that we could make a substantial contribution in the future to the U.S. and world economies by helping to develop a stable supply of needed metals through ocean mining. But we could not invest risk capital in such development under the conditions of production and price control that are advocated by the developing nations. Such positions discourage investment to the ultimate disadvantage of all.

However, it is not only the developing nations that are contributing to the unfavorable climate for private investment abroad. United States

government policy is a factor also. Specific examples are the proposed elimination of tax deferral in regard to the earnings of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, and recurrent moves to repeal the foreign tax credit provisions. Generally, U.S. companies are required to pay tax in the United States on earnings of their foreign subsidiaries when such earnings are repatriated to them in the form of dividend distributions. Elimination of deferral would place on U.S. companies the burden of paying U.S. taxes on such earnings on a current basis whether or not they were distributed to the U.S. shareholder. In many instances, because of differences in technical tax accounting rules, this would result in destructive double taxation. Elimination of the foreign tax credit would guarantee double taxation, with the result that existing U.S. owned foreign investments would become non-competitive and potential new investment would be foreclosed.

I understand the Congressional desire to assure that all corporations bear a fair share of the tax burden. But these proposals go far beyond fairness, and would in fact have a destructive impact on investment.

All things considered, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the era of private direct investment in the developing nations is drawing to a close:

If so, what role remains for the private company? Clearly, it cannot function as a charitable institution or a foreign aid agency. For survival demands that it provide its shareholders with competitive rates of return on their investments.

Sun Company has responded to this situation by substantially reducing its level of investment overseas.¹ We have done so for two principal reasons. One is the growing trend toward nationalization

¹Sun foreign capital expenditures and intangible development costs (excluding Canada):
 1974 - \$144 million, 1975 - \$116 Million, 1976 - \$57 million, 1977 - \$34 million.

coupled with the possibility of radical political change. And the second is the erosion of profits that resulted from earlier change in the foreign tax credit provisions of U.S. income tax law.

Under present conditions, we see no prospect for improvement in the foreign investment outlook in the lesser-developed countries.

In summary, the developing nations of the world face formidable obstacles--including the population issues you are addressing--to achieving real and sustained growth. Current world economic trends are both intensifying their problems and lessening the ability of others to respond. Opportunities for foreign private investment have been largely foreclosed. The outlook for improvement is bleak. And tensions between the developing and developed nations will rise.

Realism, statesmanship and a clear understanding of the economic issues involved are essential to even beginning to find solutions to these problems. Rhetoric and ritual political pronouncements will not help, and will in fact hinder progress toward those solutions. A shared understanding of our growing interdependence and human interaction between representatives of the developed and developing nations are essential.

TESTIMONY OF LEE M. TALBOT
ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN FOR INTERNATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
BEFORE THE
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POPULATION

April 19, 1978

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you the critically important subject of population and development assistance. I have been asked to address the impact of global population growth on the environment and the implications for international cooperation. This is a subject which has been of strong concern to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) since its establishment in 1970. CEQ has been strongly involved in international environmental activities and has given much attention to the population issue. The CEQ Chairman, for example, served as the Deputy Head of the U.S. Delegation to the World Population Conference in Bucharest. CEQ prepared a paper entitled "The Food-People Problem: Can the Land's Capacity to Produce Food be Sustained?" which was presented to the U.N. Conferences on Water and Desertification in 1977, and which I should like to insert in the record as part of my testimony. Further, global population and environment are key components of a study which CEQ, with the State Department, is currently conducting for the President. In his Environmental Message of last spring, the President directed us to conduct a study into probable changes of the world's population, resources and environment through

the end of this century. This study is now nearly complete and it is anticipated that it will go to the President around the end of May. I am sure that when it is available, the study and its results will be of great interest to your Committee.

This testimony also derives from my own personal experience. I am an ecologist and I have worked on environmental issues in something over 90 nations. I also have a professional involvement specifically with population matters. Population, of course, is basic to many of our global environmental problems. Consequently, it was a key factor in many of the nations where I have worked. I served on the Board of Trustees of the Population Reference Bureau, and my last trip through Asia, about two years ago, was to view population programs in a number of South and Southeast Asian nations.

In this testimony I will develop two themes. The first is the impact of population growth on the global environment; the second is the implications of this impact for international development.

Impact of Population Growth on the Global Environment

Forests

Deforestation is a global environmental problem of increasing severity, and is largely caused by population growth through its effect on shifting cultivation, opening of "new lands" for cultivation, demands for firewood and construction materials. Shifting cultivation is the major primitive form of agriculture

throughout the tropical and semitropical parts of the world. A farmer will cut and burn a small area of forest which over the years has built up a store of nutrients at the surface of what is otherwise relatively infertile land. The burning releases further nutrients via the ashes. The farmer can then cultivate for two or occasionally more years until the fragile store of nutrients is exhausted. He then moves on to open another field allowing the forest to take over the one just abandoned, and the forest has time to reestablish itself and its nutrients before the farmer returns to open it again. With a low population relative to the available land, this system works extremely well. Where the population density gets too great, however, people must return to the same areas before the forest has had an opportunity to recover and reestablish the nutrient supply. When this happens, there are fewer nutrients, the crops are poor, and the yield shorter lived, and the farmer must move again more rapidly leading to a cycle of more rapid moves for less crop productivity, ultimately resulting in loss of the forest as well as gross reduction in the value of the area from the standpoint of human welfare. Population pressure also forces the shifting cultivation up the hillsides to unsuitable areas that are too steep and fragile. Once the forest is cut in these areas, erosion is rapid and again the effect is loss of the forest, the soils, and the productivity of the area.

Population pressure also results in the opening of forests in an attempt to develop new lands for the increasing population. Such developments in the Amazon Basin have received worldwide attention, but this is a process going on wherever forest lands remain in developing countries. Unfortunately, most tropical forest soils are poor or unsuitable for agriculture. As a consequence, the forest is lost but the intended agricultural land is rarely obtained.

Demand for firewood is causing deforestation over more of the globe than even shifting cultivation. In an effort to obtain fuel for cooking and warmth, an increasing population first reduces the forest, then individual trees, and ultimately even woody brush and grass. In recent years, I have traveled over large areas in Africa and Asia which are now totally denuded by the search for firewood, but which were areas of extensive forest and woodland at the time of my first visits in the 1950's. The firewood crisis is acute and widespread throughout much of the world. In places such as parts of India where no firewood remains, the people often use dried animal dung for fuel for cooking. While the dung does serve as a fuel, its use diverts needed fertilizer from the degraded fields, further aggravating the soil depletion.

Commercial logging is another factor exacerbated by population growth. Developing countries need foreign income to provide for food and other services for their expanding

populations. Where their timber resources offer a source of such income, there is strong pressure to exploit them quickly, and the result is generally timber mining, not renewable forestry. There is significant cash income to certain segments of the society for a short time, but a long-term loss of the forest and degradation of the lands involved. This is the case, for example in Kalimantan, and Sumatra where American, Japanese and Philippine lumber companies generally are mining the logs and leaving what is, in essence, a wet desert behind them.

These factors in combination are so rapidly reducing what is left of the tropical forests and other woodlands of the world that if present trends continue, relatively few tropical forests may be left standing by the end of this century, and a large percentage of what is now forest worldwide will be gone by that time. The impact of this is severalfold. There is a loss of biotic resources. The tropical forests are amazingly rich in flora and fauna. Some of the plants they contain, like quinine or the rubber tree, may prove to be of inestimable value to human welfare. But at the present rate, most of them will be gone before many of them have even been described much less explored for their potential values.

The loss of the forests usually means loss of the watershed value of the areas. Thus, when rain falls, instead of being soaked up by forest vegetation and released year long

in stream and spring flow below, there is now a tin roof effect. During the rains the water rushes off immediately, eroding the soil and creating floods below. During the dry season there is no release of stored waters, and the lands are dry and parched. Loss of the forests also usually results in loss of soil through erosion and degradation of the soils that remain. It also changes local climate, and as described below, may affect global climate.

Rangelands

A second major area of environmental impact from population growth is the range or grazing lands of the world. Grazing lands cover much of the earth's surface which is too dry or for other reasons is unsuitable for agriculture. Particularly in the world's arid land, these areas support a pastoral population, often nomadic or seminomadic people who rely on livestock for their subsistence and livelihood. Ecologically, these are vulnerable areas with quite restricted carrying capacities in terms of livestock, which in turn translates into carrying capacity in terms of humans. As the population, and consequently the livestock, exceed these capacities, the land is overgrazed, the vegetation lost and the soil lost or degraded, reducing or even eliminating their value for human use.

These are lands of periodic droughts. With a low enough population the effect of the droughts is relatively moderate.

However, where increased population has pushed the numbers of livestock to and beyond carrying capacity during good years, the effect of a normal drought can be catastrophic. This was the case in the Sahelian zone in 1972.

Agriculture

A third major area of the environmental impact of population increase is on agricultural land. Increasing population inevitably puts greater pressure on agricultural land. This often translates into increased use of pesticides, fertilizers, and equipment. Pesticides, fertilizers, and mechanical agriculture are energy intensive and hence vulnerable to the inevitable increases in energy prices. Fertilizers and pesticides create environmental problems of their own. In addition to the widely publicized impacts of pesticides and the effect of fertilizer nutrients in waterways, there is the growing concern about the long-term climatic impact of nitrogen. Even under North American agriculture, much recent concern has been expressed that the high levels of erosion under our present system cannot be sustained too far in the future.

Worldwide, the increasing pressure on the land is leading to increased losses of agricultural land due to erosion and to various problems associated with irrigation, particularly salinization, alkalization, and waterlogging. At the United Nations Conference on Desertification, it was estimated that one-third of the world's present croplands may have been lost

to these factors by the year 2000. Superimposed on the physical loss of land is the additional loss of productivity of agricultural lands wherever the watersheds on which they rely have been denuded, resulting in floods, siltation of irrigation systems, and loss of needed water much of the year.

Climate

Climate may be another area of major environmental impact from population growth. The population-induced changes in climate may include: increased atmospheric CO₂ from burning of forests and rangelands; depletion of the ozone layer through fluorocarbons and possibly through the use of nitrogenous fertilizers; possible changes in major climatic patterns and precipitation due to the clearance of forest and other vegetation from vast areas in the mid latitudes; changes in local climates because of major land use changes, i.e., through deforestation or the creation of additional deserts. Climate variability during the past eight years has shown that the world's agriculture and human wellbeing, in general, is closely tied to the stable climate of the past 50 years or so. Any change, a cooling or warming trend or increased variability, would have a major deleterious impact on agriculture, human wellbeing and a variety of environmental factors.

Urban Areas

Another set of environmental impacts are associated with the population increase in the urban areas. Attendant problems

of solid waste, air, and water pollution are, of course, well known. The physical expansion of urban areas, along with the pollution and other factors associated with them, further impacts the ecological stability of the globe and its potential carrying capacity for humans.

The foregoing discussion has largely focused on the effects of an increasing rural population, largely in the developing world. The impacts derived basically from the need for food, fuel, and building materials and the direct result is the increasing removal of the vegetation cover -- grasslands, shrubs, and forests -- of the earth with resultant erosion by wind and water, soil degradation, and the biological impoverishment or degradation of the remaining lands. In effect, the ecological degradation is reducing the ability of the earth to provide food and fiber; the increasing human population is decreasing the numbers of people the earth can support.

There is an additional set of environmental impacts associated with energy production and industrialization. These involve the global carbon, phosphorus and nitrogen cycles, other chemicals, an assorted related factors of pollution and land use change. While the rate of expansion of these factors is driven to a degree by increases in population, I have not emphasized them in this testimony, preferring to focus on the areas where the most direct impact of increasing numbers of people on the environment occurs. This direct impact is of

critical importance, yet it is the area which has received remarkably little attention to date.

In discussion of food potential I have not discussed marine productivity. In spite of constantly increasing fishing effort by the nations of the world, and increasing technological capabilities applied to this effort, global fishery production appears to be leveling off. This is probably largely due to overfishing, and partly due to pollution and other habitat change, particularly in the estuarian and other inshore areas which are critical to most marine species at some time during their life cycles. In any event, it appears unlikely that increases in marine fishery production will contribute much to the increasing food needs of a growing population.

Implications for International Development

With an immense amount of international technical assistance and agricultural developments within the developed nations, the world's food production has increased impressively over the past two decades. However, with the concurrent population increase, the result has been that the food supply on a per capita basis has remained roughly the same, and "the same" is not very adequate for the population of much of the world. Looking ahead, it is clear that even more heroic efforts are going to be required simply to stay even, i.e., to provide enough food to assure the same amount on a per capita basis to

a rapidly growing population. The environmental factors noted above, however, raise very serious questions about the long-term food producing capability of the earth. If indeed we do lose a third of existing croplands by the end of the century and if many more areas have reduced productivity because of loss of watersheds and subsequent flooding and drought problems, it is unlikely that total productivity can be greatly increased by the end of this century even with further massive development efforts and best of climatic and other conditions.

Also in large part due to international technical assistance, the GNP of most nations has increased significantly over the past couple of decades. But when the increasing population is taken into account, the increases in per capita GNP have been substantially cancelled out. I would also note that GNP is a rather inadequate indicator of the welfare of the human population as a whole. In many cases the increments are concentrated in one segment of the population, but they are not felt by most of the people. While continued increases in GNP are anticipated in most parts of the world, with an increasing population the per capita impact for many will likely be minimal.

I see two major consequences of these factors. The first is that no matter how great a commitment is made to international development assistance, it cannot succeed in producing balanced development unless population growth is checked. The

second is that no matter how great the effort made on population and other development assistance, it ultimately cannot succeed unless a major and effective effort is made to check and reverse the ecological degradation of our life support system. Let us analyze these two points:

One demographic theory holds that it is not possible to achieve an effective population control program in a country unless the standard of living has increased significantly. From the foregoing discussion it should be clear that even if that theory were true -- and I do not believe it -- it is not going to be possible significantly to increase the standard of living of much of the world's population unless population growth is checked. It is a vicious cycle. If we choose to wait for an increase in the standard of living before we address the population problem, we shall never address the population problem since because of it, we cannot increase the standard of living. While this is obviously not true in all countries, it is abundantly true in much of the world.

My own observations in many countries, among them India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines, have convinced me that an effective population program can be mounted even in the absence of an increase in standard of living. What is required is governmental commitment, a truly effective motivational and educational program and easy accessibility of information, assistance, and materials. This argues that an

international development assistance program must have a population component as a major and urgent objective. Health care and food assistance in the absence of population control maintain the status quo now but aggravate the inevitable problems in the near future.

Assistance with food, medicines, and allied facilities serve an immediate humanitarian objective and in the short run help the basic human needs. But in the absence of a parallel population program they actually reduce the potential for meeting those needs tomorrow.

The other major need is to focus on restoring the biological basis for human life. The environmental impacts of the population growth discussed earlier all had the effect of reducing the viability of this planet from a human point of view. The loss of forests and other vegetation cover, loss and degradation of the soils, biotic impoverishment, alteration of the water cycles, and possible impact on the climate all constitute ecological degradation and reduce the capacity of the world to support people. In the past it has been possible to mask or compensate for losses in one area by technological increases in another. However, the losses are at present so great and the magnitude of the projected ones so awesome that we clearly cannot provide a further effective technological quick fixes.

In the past much technical assistance has had the effect of exacerbating these problems. Rangeland and livestock programs

in Africa, for example, have often resulted in significantly reduced long-term carrying capacity rather than the reverse. The Sahelian is a prime example of that phenomenon. Forest development programs throughout the tropics for the most part are reducing rather than enhancing the forest resources. Agricultural projects frequently have led to salinization, alkalization, waterlogging, or other losses. Tse Tse fly control projects in Africa generally led to the degradation and loss of productivity of the areas involved.

The examples are legend. Ecological prospective has not characterized most international development activities, and this, of course, is one of the reasons why environmental assessments should be a routine part of any international activities. But for the future, it will not be enough simply to avoid further degradation caused by individual development projects. Meeting basic human needs will require stopping the on-going biological degradation which otherwise inevitably will cancel out other development gains. Accordingly, another central and urgent objective of international development assistance must be reversing the present trend of biological degradation.

In conclusion, if international development assistance is to be truly effective, it will require a significant shift in emphasis. Any such development assistance program must include an effective and urgent population program, and it

must include an effective component to reverse the on-going biological degradation which reduces the carrying capacity of the world for people.

For the Record

THE FOOD-PEOPLE PROBLEM:
CAN THE LAND'S CAPACITY TO PRODUCE
FOOD BE SUSTAINED?

Presented to the 1977 United Nations
Conferences on Water and Desertification

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by

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INTRODUCTION

Emergence of a New Global Problem

The world is facing a new problem--one that is pervasive, enormously complex, and frightening in its potential consequences. It is, in fact, a composite of many age-old, locally significant problems which have been expanding and feeding on each other until they have emerged on the world scene, fused into a single interlocking challenge of global proportions: In most countries of the world, rich and poor alike, the drive to provide enough food for more and more people is reducing the land's agricultural potential.

As will be shown in this paper, improper farming practices--including overly intensive cultivation, too heavy a reliance on marginally productive semi-arid lands, and inadequate conservation measures--are increasing the erosion and depleting the nutrients of topsoils. The result is a reduction in the fertility of the land lowering its capacity for food production. In many parts of the world, hillsides are being deforested to make way for more farms and to provide fuel for cooking food. The rains no longer soak into the ground but run off in the form of uncontrollable torrents which tear away the soil under cultivation, flood the lower-lying croplands, and clog reservoirs and irrigation canals with silt. Left behind are barren, abandoned slopes.

Such environmental degradations are barely noticed as they begin to occur. Over the years, however, they become manifest as the impacts accumulate. Historically, such problems have usually been overlooked as attention focused instead on near-term crop yields, on production versus demand, and on carryover reserves. They were also ignored because, on a global basis, increases in agricultural production have outpaced population growth, though not by very much (Table 1).

The accomplishments of modern technology have helped to conceal the subtle reductions taking place in the productive capacity of the land. The improvements of the "Green Revolution" have had such an effect. Quite understandably, emphasis has been directed toward perfecting and applying this technology, including the need to provide the critical fertilizer, pesticide, and water inputs. Since 1974, the International Fertilizer Supply Scheme of the Food and Agriculture Organization has provided 46 developing countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia with fertilizers and pesticides worth more than \$133 million.^{1/}

Such assistance has clearly helped to increase total food production--sometimes quite dramatically. However, producing more food per capita than was produced a decade ago has not always been possible in all regions of the world (Table II). In 1965, just prior to the Green Revolution, the then Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization, R.B. Sen, warned the FAO conference that food and agriculture are "no longer growing faster than population growth The efforts, often heroic, of the developing countries combined with aid in all forms channeled through numerous multilateral and bilateral sources have not so far proved sufficient to reverse this dangerous trend."^{2/}

In parts of the developing world this trend has since been forestalled, if not reversed, chiefly by the Green Revolution. However, the problem still persists. As noted by the new FAO Director-General, Edward Saouma, at the 70th session of the FAO council in Rome: "In Africa south of the Sahara, increase in food production per head has fallen well behind population growth."^{3/}

According to Norman Borlaug, Nobel Peace Prize winner, the Green Revolution at best is merely buying time to solve the population growth problem. Although many dimensions of food production need attention, the most critical are population growth and spreading affluence, for each is growing apace and each is increasing the demand for food.

The tremendous losses of soil fertility which are reducing the capacity of land to produce food are not revealed by food production statistics or in cost-of-farming figures. However, one thing is certain: The losses will exact their toll in full measure unless an effort of global proportions reverses the degradation of the soil and the water--for most arable land throughout the world is already in production. That which is not in use cannot be used without first making enormous capital investments which are not readily available. Hence, most of the food that will be needed must be produced by more efficient farming of lands already in use. Thus better conservation of these lands is essential before it is too late.

Purpose of This Report

This paper was prepared to call the attention of world leaders and their advisors convening at the United Nations Conferences on Water and Desertification to the interrelated environmental degradations that are undercutting the inherent capacity of the world to produce food. The situation

poses serious consequences for individuals, societies, and governments. Leaders and citizens of all countries must become aware of the pervasiveness and significance of the environmental degradation that is occurring and lay plans for corrective action.

Sources of Information

The situation described in this paper is based on the results of a survey conducted in 1976 through U.S. posts overseas and upon corroborating reports in the current literature.

The survey assessed local environmental problems that appear related to the pressures caused by population growth. The responses combine with the current literature to portray an emerging global problem which, if not solved, threatens the future well-being and perhaps even the existence of millions of people in the decades ahead. Specific types of environmental problems come to light over and over again. The fact that these are common to many countries takes on unusual significance. It is for this reason that the United States is directing attention to the general pattern of these environmental difficulties.

The survey responses were not prompted by a list of problems. Respondents were asked to report their perceptions of the more obvious or urgent issues. The survey was not intended to be comprehensive or to delineate technical details, strategies, and options for avoiding degradation. Consequently, serious as the problem seems, it may actually be understated. A more detailed analysis thus becomes imperative.

The credibility of the survey results is enhanced by the corroboration that it finds in the current literature. Unfortunately, there has often been a tendency to dismiss single examples cited in the literature as unique, or the exception intended to titillate the reader. However, one ought not thus disregard Erik P. Eckholm's more comprehensive analysis, Losing Ground, prepared for the Worldwatch Institute with the support and cooperation of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).^{4/} Nor ought one ignore the steady flow of items in World Environment Report, published biweekly by the Center for International Environment Information established by the UN Association of the USA with support of UNEP.^{5/} The survey theme is consistent with these assessments.

DEGRADATION OF PRODUCTIVE LANDSSurvey Results

The 1976 survey conducted in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Near East shows that the urgent need to produce more food has led to widespread overcropping,* overgrazing, deforestation, water problems, etc.

Of 69 countries considered, 43 have problems of overcropping or overgrazing, or both (Table III). By region, these problems are occurring in 21 out of 34 countries in Africa, 9 out of 13 in Asia, 8 out of 16 in Latin America, and in 5 out of 6 countries in the Near East nations which were considered. Table IV shows the breakdown of specific problems noted. The resulting degradation, principally erosion from both rains and winds, is becoming serious.

Table V compares by regions the combined population of countries noted in the survey as having overgrazing/overcropping problems with the total population of all countries considered within each region and with the total population of the regions (excluding the People's Republic of China and Japan). Sixty-nine countries were surveyed in the four regions indicated. These have a combined population of just over 1.8 billion or 90 percent of the total population of the four regions. The countries which have overgrazing/overcropping problems have a combined population of nearly 1.4 billion, or just under 75 percent of the 1.8 billion considered. Quite possibly, some countries not considered in these analyses are also beset with environmental degradation due to overcropping and overgrazing.

The survey shows that overcropping and overgrazing generally occur as a result of intensified efforts to increase the food supply. Sometimes, however, overgrazing results from an expanding population clinging to traditional customs. This includes accumulating wealth in the form of livestock not needed for food, rather than maintaining

* In this paper "overcropping" refers to tilling practices which result in heavy loss of soil by erosion or in exhaustion of soil nutrients. It usually results from failure to practice conservation and from efforts to produce more food than is practical in terms of inputs used. Examples are farming marginal lands, inadequate terracing, double cropping without sufficient water, and the exhaustion of lands through failure to rotate crops or to let lands lie fallow for periods of time.

smaller herds of higher quality for food only and accumulating additional wealth in other forms. Further, population pressures which result in grazing or cultivation of marginal and sub-marginal lands are an increasingly significant factor. Of course, using marginal land can be beneficial if use is wisely planned and managed.

In many countries potential new farmland is already in critically short supply, so what is in use becomes overused.

According to the survey, important consequences of overcropping and overgrazing are outright loss of soil by erosion (28 countries) and depletion of nutrients in the remaining soil (12 countries).

But farmers and hungry people do not suffer reversals without a struggle. Some try farming new marginal lands, which, however, cannot withstand heavy use for long. As a result, the environmental degradation is compounded. For example, a shift to hillside farming undertaken without adequate terracing or other erosion controls is reported to be causing serious erosion of the soil and loss of water in eight countries.

Farmers who can afford it sometimes apply fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides. If erosion has already become a problem on croplands so treated, these agents are less effective than they are on good crop lands. If erosion occurs soon after application of these agents, their transfer to other lands and waters sometimes has harmful impacts. The fertilizers and soil nutrients which accumulate in lakes cause eutrophication; the insecticides and herbicides tend to destroy much of the aquatic life in streams and lakes.

If water is available, irrigation is often attempted to increase food production. Because this practice requires far more precision than traditional dry-land farming, in many instances it has failed. For example, if drainage is poor and water abundant, the soil becomes too water-logged for the crops. If evaporation is high, the soil soon becomes too saline for crops, unless salts are flushed away. In some areas where irrigation water is being pumped from wells, the aquifers are being depleted, and the water table is dropping to much lower levels, making water supplies inadequate. In erosion-prone areas where reservoirs and canals are used for irrigation, they are being clogged with silt. Very serious difficulties were noted in eight of the more arid countries attempting to increase food production by

expanding irrigation. Yet these and other countries have little chance of increasing food supplies without irrigation.

Related problems associated with the heavy and sometimes irreversible loss of forests were reported to be hampering food production in 24 developing countries (Table III). Deforestation takes place for a number of reasons, most of which relate one way or another to the food system. According to the survey, many countries have water problems that may be attributed in large part to deforestation: 16 have periodic water shortages, and in some of these serious droughts also occur; 10 countries have experienced a significant increase in flooding, and several of these were included above as experiencing water shortages and droughts.

The principal cause of deforestation is the outright conversion of forest land to cropland and grazing fields. The age-old practice of "slash and burn"* agriculture is of particular concern. The denuded land suffers from heavy erosion, especially where slash and burn areas are in hilly regions. Over the years this practice has caused extensive deforestation.

Deforestation is also caused by the steady trimming and cutting of trees to provide firewood and charcoal for cooking. In some areas the fires are also needed to keep people warm. Efforts to replant trees often come to naught as the saplings fall victim to the ceaseless search for more firewood and to foraging by goats. After the trees become scarce, animal dung is collected, dried, and used as cooking fuel. This deprives farms and pastures of an essential fertilizer and so further reduces the capacity to produce food.

* In this practice trees in a small area are girdled and later are felled and burned. The land is then farmed for a few years until the nutrients from the ashes are depleted, when people move on and repeat the process, allowing the used areas to become reforested. If the forest recovery period is 20 years or more, the reforested areas may again be subjected to the slash and burn procedure. But in many areas the shifting cultivator population has increased greatly, reducing the time cycle. Consequently, the forest does not have sufficient time to recover. Hence, when the land is subjected to slash and burn farming, the ashes contain fewer nutrients, and the cultivators have to move on much sooner. Thus the cycle is accelerated, and the forests eventually disappear.

Commercial lumbering operations were also cited as a cause, at times, of permanent deforestation. Whether the lumber is used domestically or is exported, the ecological effect is the same. The expanding population, seeking land on which to live, often moves into the cleared areas made accessible by the lumbering roads. The settlers then prevent forest regrowth by their subsistence farming practices. They also gradually destroy the remaining surrounding woodlands.

In these various ways the world's forests are disappearing rapidly. Regardless of the cause of deforestation, effects on the environment and on the capacity of the land to produce food are becoming more and more serious. The rain runs off quickly before aquifers can be fully recharged. During subsequent dry spells, water shortages may occur in many distant areas of the watershed. Agriculture which depends on such water resources suffers accordingly. The runoff from the deforested land, which is almost always hilly, causes serious erosion and eventually leaves barren, gutted, useless hillsides. The silt carried off in the process clogs waterways, lakes, reservoirs, irrigation canals, and harbors. Without the forests to hold the water and release it slowly, heavy rains flood the lowlands, wiping out crops and causing other serious damage. In addition, during dry seasons the streams and watering holes dry up because the forests, with their springs and reserves of moisture, are no more. In the process wildlife also disappears.

Additional Evidence

The following examples of losses of farmland productivity and destruction of water resources in many countries are taken from the recent literature. They verify the global dimensions of the problem described by the survey.

In a recent article, David Pimentel and others discuss land degradation and its effects on food and energy. In reviewing the serious erosion that has taken place and still is occurring in the United States (for example, see the next section), they compare it with the world situation:

"Worldwide, environmental degradation of land is worse than in the United States because of population pressure for highways and housing, and especially because of soil erosion. The soil erosion problem in the developing countries

of the world is estimated to be nearly twice as severe as it is in the United States. The erosion problem will intensify as the demand for food increases. Already, more marginal land with steep slopes is being pressed into crop use, forests are rapidly being removed for fuel, and deserts continue to advance, partly because of overgrazing." 6/

In Losing Ground, Eckholm cites many examples, several of which are summarized below to illustrate the geographical scope and severity of the problems:

- In the Soviet Union's development of Virgin Lands, about 100 million acres was farmed without allowing sufficient periods for lands to lie fallow and recover moisture. Wind erosion mounted dramatically, especially during periods of drought. Between 1956 and 1963, yields dropped from 2.7 to 1.6 tons of grain per acre, as half the land was severely damaged. Conservation practices were finally undertaken in 1965 to correct the situation. 7/
- The history of deforestation, reviewed for many areas of the world, shows that the world's original forested areas have by now been reduced by one-third to one-half, chiefly because of the need to clear land for farms and for firewood. In 1963, the time of the last global survey, only 29 percent of lands was classified as forested. 8/
- In Nepal and Java large sections of hillsides have thus been deforested, with the tragic result that parts of these lands have been severely eroded and are now useless. This problem is also appearing in the Andes Mountains of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia and in the highlands of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. 9/
- The loss of forests in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, and the Sahel region has accentuated droughts or floods, resulting in major crop failures in these countries. 10/
- Floods intensified by hillside clearing have been occurring in India, Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Tanzania, and many other countries. 11/
- Huge semi-arid zones of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where lands are only lightly wooded, are being stripped of trees, chiefly by fuel gatherers. These areas are

being degraded to desert-like conditions through over-grazing, burning, and improper farming practices. Many such lands could recover if the constant pressure of overuse were removed. But while it persists, erosion, which in the extreme leads to dune formations, is making the degradation permanent.^{12/}

- ° Irrigated lands have also been degraded in various ways. Nearly every country in the Middle East is plagued by waterlogging and salinity, each of which is very damaging to agriculture. Salt has accumulated on the surface of the ground in Iraq, Pakistan, and India as irrigation waters evaporated. Extensive and expensive corrective action has been taken in an effort to hold the process in check. Irrigation in both Iraq and Pakistan is also plagued by accelerated siltation which clogs canals. In Pakistan accelerated siltation is also filling in expensive new reservoirs, greatly reducing their useful life.^{13/}

According to the August 1976 "Environmental Issues: A Report to the International Council of Scientific Unions by the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment" (the SCOPE report),

"[1]t is estimated that every year several hundred thousand hectares of irrigated land fall out of cultivation as a result of salinisation. FAO data suggest that no less than one-half of the irrigated area of the world is subject to salinisation and is experiencing reduction in crop production as a consequence. In the Eastern Mediterranean region the percentage of salt-affected or waterlogged soils amounts to about 50 percent of the total irrigated area in Iraq, 23 percent in Pakistan, 50 percent in Syria, 30 percent in Egypt, 15 percent in Iran, and about 80 percent in Punjabi sections in Pakistan."^{14/}

The editors of the World Environment Report cited numerous examples of land and water resource degradation which may be summarized as follows:

- ° Northern Haiti, once able to export food, spices, sugar, coffee, and tobacco, has seen its production diminish steadily because of population growth and degradation of the ecosystem. Now "virtually stripped of its forest cover," plagued by drought and erosion, Haiti relies on imports of basic

foods for its inhabitants. Haitians are also being urged to use less charcoal made from scarce timber because forest cover has been slashed 50 percent in the last 4 years alone and because experts predict that Haiti will be treeless within 15 years if this practice continues.^{15/}

- ° In one African country, farmers are no longer required to terrace their land and may even cultivate along river banks. Consequently, there has been widespread destruction of water catchments, such as forests, and serious erosion. Reservoirs are filling with silt at a far higher rate than had been expected when they were built. Electrical generating capacity has been so reduced that the government-owned hydroelectric plant has had to resort to withholding delivery of electricity in many urban households for 4-hour periods on 4 days each week. These problems have been enlarged by systematic cutting of forests to make charcoal for export.^{16/}
- ° The West Asia office of the UN Environment Programme has given top priority to the ecology of arid and semi-arid lands, for rapid population growth is destroying the beautiful 10 percent of this region that is not already desert or semi-desert.^{17/}

Experience of the United States

The United States has also experienced disastrous farmland degradation. The most serious episode occurred in the 1930's when the Great Plains, encompassing some 250 million acres of fertile land in the central part of the country, became a dry dust bowl. Winds stripped off tremendous amounts of topsoil and deposited it at great distances east of the area affected. This situation is vividly described in Erik P. Eckholm's Losing Ground. Eckholm's account of the disaster may be summarized as follows:

Despite periodic appearances of danger signs, rich soil, limited in rainfall and subject to occasional high winds, was used intensively in relatively wet years, resulting in severe overcropping and overgrazing during a subsequent period of dry years. In the early 1930's crops failed and cattle consumed the sparse growth of grass. Soils dessicated by drought ceased to support plant life. Lands plowed under for planting grain were lashed by strong winds. Lighter particles of soil were

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blown in the air, while heavier particles rolled with the wind, forming snow-like drifts of sandy soil that buried fields and machinery. Cattle died, and farm families moved away. Clouds of dust caused hours of eerie total darkness at midday, and left a litter of dead birds and rabbits in their wake. "Dust pneumonia" and other respiratory ailments increased markedly. Some dust even blew across the country and out over the Atlantic, leaving fine deposits in its path.

This experience catalyzed an ecological revolution in the United States. In 1935, the Soil Conservation Service was formed as part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Farmers followed recommended conservation practices: returning poor lands to pasture, allowing other lands to lie fallow to regain moisture while under protection of crop stubble and plant residues, alternating bands of grain crops with bands of grass, terracing fields, plowing along land contours, limiting sizes of herds, and planting trees as windbreaks between fields. The devastation was halted and much of the semi-arid land was returned to farming.

Despite this tragic experience, today the response of many U.S. farmers to currently high demands for more wheat is to farm these lands more intensely, thus flirting with the danger of a return to dust bowl conditions.^{18/}

Some of the observations of David Pimentel and others regarding problems of land degradation affecting food resources in the United States are summarized as follows:

According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, about 64 percent of the nation's cropland needs better treatment to safeguard against soil erosion, with 179 million acres subjected to serious erosion from water and 55 million acres from wind. Whereas under normal agricultural conditions in the United States it takes about 100 years to form 1 inch of topsoil, present practices cause topsoil to be lost at the rate of about 1 inch in 10-11 years, and in some areas at even higher rates. In the Great Plains region, current all-out efforts that have been made to increase production appear to have increased soil erosion levels significantly over levels which prevailed during the past two decades.

Since the days of the pioneer settlers, the potential for producing food has been lost on about 200 million acres. In addition, erosion has removed about one-third of the topsoil on cropland remaining in use, reducing its production potential 10 to 15 percent. Serious as erosion losses are in reducing the ultimate capacity for food production, farming resources are being eliminated by the irreversible conversion of farmland into nonfarm uses. Each year more than 2.5 million acres of arable cropland is lost in the United States to highways, urbanization, and other nonfarm uses.^{19/}

Of course, it is usually argued that a decrease in productivity due to loss of topsoil can be overcome by addition of fertilizers and trace minerals. However, these must be added each year to compensate for the loss of topsoil. Such a course depends upon having adequate energy supplies, including gas or petroleum for producing nitrogen fertilizer. As reported by Pimentel,

to offset the past soil erosion that has occurred in the United States, fertilizers and other energy inputs would require an equivalent of 50 million barrels of oil annually (4 percent of U.S. oil imports during 1970). The rising cost of energy, fertilizers, and other resources needed has become a strong deterrent to maximizing agricultural output.^{20/}

This drives home the foolhardiness of farming practices which allow serious erosion to take place.

Because of an unfavorable crop-fertilizer price ratio, use of fertilizers in the U.S. was 11 percent lower in 1975 than in 1974. Although output in 1975 was 3 percent higher than in 1974 (a year of poor weather), it was 1 percent below that of 1973. Had more fertilizer been used, 1975 would no doubt have been a record year. Crop production in 1976 did finally reach a record high.

Little rain falls in the western regions of the United States, and despite large reservoirs, water there is in short supply. As agriculture developed in this area it came to rely heavily upon irrigation. Presently 37 million acres are irrigated, accounting for about 90 percent of all irrigated lands in the U.S. This irrigation now accounts for 80 percent of all withdrawals from the western water resources.^{21/} With so much water being used for irrigation, that portion which is returned to the rivers after use has caused the

Colorado River, as it enters Mexico, to become too salty for further use on crops. This was not foreseen as irrigation was being developed throughout the area. Consequently, the United States government is having to install equipment to desalinate the river so that its waters can be used again for irrigation in Mexico. For such reasons and also because economic yields from irrigation are lower than from industry and mining, it appears that the proportion of water allotted to agriculture in the western region may eventually decline.

It is obvious that substantially increasing U.S. food production without losing topsoil faster than it can be formed and with effective conservation of water resources will be far more expensive than present farming practices are. Current dry conditions in the Great Plains region have also raised concerns that dust bowl conditions might recur if maximum production is sought.

EFFORTS TO ARREST AND REVERSE LOSSES

Not all reports are bad. There is clearly a growing awareness that conservation on croplands must be practiced, that forests must be protected and restored, and that vital capacity to produce food must be maintained.

In the summer of 1976, the U.S. Department of Agriculture adopted an official policy to encourage the preservation of the country's best farm, grazing, and forests lands.^{22/} Shortly thereafter, the President's Council on Environmental Quality advised federal agencies to include in their environmental impact statements an analysis of the effects of their proposed actions on prime and unique farmlands. These efforts are to be made

"to assure that such farmlands are not irreversibly converted to other uses unless other national interests override the importance of preservation or otherwise outweigh the environmental benefits derived from their protection. These benefits stem from the capacity of such farmlands to produce relatively more food with less erosion and with lower demands for fertilizer, energy, and other resources. In addition, the preservation of farmland in general provides the benefits of open space, protection of scenery, wildlife habitat and, in some cases, recreation opportunities and controls on urban sprawl."^{23/}

Innovative technologies for reducing erosion are being developed and applied, thereby providing new tools to protect the croplands that are used. The promising new techniques of no tillage and minimum tillage farming, for example, will help to eliminate runoff of rainwater and prevent the associated heavy losses of topsoil, fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides. It will also help reduce evaporation of soil moisture so essential to crops raised in areas that have moderate rainfall. Glover B. Triplett, Jr., and David M. Van Doren, Jr., state that

"within a few years much of the cropland in the U.S. will be planted without a moldboard plow. In most conditions planting without tillage (but with herbicides) can save labor, energy, water and soil A survey . . . by the Soil Conservation Service [U.S. Department of Agriculture] indicated that in the U.S. in 1976 some 7.3 million acres were planted without tillage and that on 52.5 million additional acres tillage was reduced from the conventional level. In an assessment . . . published in 1975 the Department of Agriculture predicted that by the year 2010 more than 90 percent of the acreage of crops will be grown with reduced-tillage systems and that on more than half of the acreage some form of no-tillage farming will be the practice."24/

According to World Environment Report, the Global Environmental Monitoring System being designed by the UN Environment Program to appraise conditions of the biosphere will begin a monitoring program for Benin, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Togo because of concern over

"degradation and depletion of soils by erosion, salination, waterlogging; of forests by excessive exploitation, shifting cultivation and fires; and of rangeland by overgrazing, fire and other factors."25/

Satellite systems will contribute to these appraisals. As monitoring of these phenomena is perfected, it will be extended to cover the entire tropical belt of the world.

Few countries are at present adequately protecting their remaining forests or promoting significant reforestation projects. However, the fact that such measures are practical has been demonstrated in varying degrees in China, the Soviet Union, northern Europe, and North America, according to Eckholm, in Losing Ground.26/

The World Environment Report has cited a number of specific reforestation activities which may be summarized as follows:

- Large-scale efforts to reforest areas that have been denuded by destructive agricultural practices are underway in the southwest Mexican state of Chiapas where nomadic slash and burn methods of farming have destroyed 25 percent of the jungle. Half of the land will be restored as forests and half devoted to a mix of more permanent agricultural operations.27/
- Pakistan has also entered into a reforestation program involving 90,000 acres of hilly tracts in the Hazara district. Renovation will also be carried out on an additional 40,000 acres through control of grazing, reseeding of pastures, planting of forage and shade trees, establishment of a network of ponds, dams, channels, and streams for irrigation and drinking water, conservation of soil, and development of forest and fruit tree nurseries.28/
- India plans a massive program to plant date trees to arrest the spread of the Rajasthan desert.29/
- The World Wildlife Fund announced an international campaign to save the world's forests because forests are being leveled at the rate of 11 million hectares per year. The main cause of deforestation is the intensive expansion of agriculture in Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America.30/
- Sri Lanka conducted an unprecedented massive tree planting program backed at the highest political levels. An estimated 7 million trees were planted in a month's time.31/

Although there are many commendable programs being initiated, a great deal more must be done. Arresting the widespread degradation of land and water resources in the face of projections of more people to be fed, clothed, and sheltered is a challenge which will require the attention and committed action of the entire world community.

THE ROLE OF PEOPLE IN THE PROBLEM

People need food. It is indispensable. Whenever it runs short, people exert greater efforts to grow more food in any way possible. In trying to produce enough food, they too often employ farming practices that over time degrade the land and water resources upon which future food production must depend. There are at least three forces that compel ever greater food production:

- ° population growth resulting from medical and health advances which have increased survival without decreasing fertility
- ° need to improve calorie-deficient diets that are also nutritionally substandard
- ° desire for a higher quality of life, including a diet improved by addition of more meats, etc.

Population growth has a built-in momentum. Children grow up, have their own children before their parents die, and the cycle is repeated, causing population to increase rapidly if fertility levels are high. Because of past high levels of fertility and declining mortality, even if world fertility were to be reduced immediately to replacement levels (about 2.5 children per family worldwide),^{32/} population growth would not stop before the end of the next century. With most countries still far from attaining replacement fertility, growth will no doubt occur for much more than a century. Population will more than double before it is possible to stop further growth, assuming death rates do not rise. If efforts to reduce fertility are delayed, the ultimate population growth will be even larger.

The drive to improve calorie-deficient diets that are also nutritionally substandard is very widespread. Calorie intake usually is lowest where the population is the largest. According to figures presented at the UN World Food Conference,^{33/} Asia has the lowest average per capita daily intake of dietary energy--2,160 kilocalories. Africa ranks next with 2,250 kilocalories, followed by Latin America with 2,530 kilocalories. By contrast, the average figure for the developed regions is much higher. For example, the same tabulation lists 3,320 kilocalories per capita for North America, 3,150 for Europe, 3,280 for the USSR, and 3,270 for Oceania. However, those figures, high as they are, do not reflect the grains consumed in producing much of the meat, poultry, and dairy products included in the diet.

The degradation of food-producing lands has become especially widespread in the last 15 years, when the world population was expanding from 3 to 4 billion people. It appears that each increment in population further accelerates the degradation process. If that is so, what will happen as the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth billions are added to the world population? Such a population growth is considered unavoidable. It may very well be exceeded considerably during the lifetime of our children. All these additional people will need food.

CONCLUSIONS

The world is being confronted with a serious threat of mankind's own making--the loss of topsoil necessary for producing food and the associated abuse of essential water resources. This threat is chiefly a result of mankind's struggle to produce the food needed for survival. The threat is becoming more serious as more food is needed for more people. Population expansion accentuates the failure to raise crop yields sufficiently on good lands which are capable of producing more. To the extent that good lands can produce more, marginal lands would not have to be exploited to produce food. In some areas land reform may be necessary to help solve this problem. In forestry, too, better use of modern techniques can increase productivity to meet the needs of people for firewood and lumber, thereby reducing demands made on marginal timberlands.

Remedial action is needed now to halt the losses. Corrective efforts must be sustained over a long period of time to rebuild soils and forests. Experiences in many countries indicate that it is possible to implement preventive and corrective measures through wise planning and sound management. The Water and Desertification Conferences are timely fora in which decisionmakers can deal with these problems.

It is very important to obtain a better understanding of the global extent of the problems described. Hence international cooperation in monitoring the world's resources for producing food merits high priority. The Global Environmental Monitoring System of UNEP can fill an indispensable role in this regard. Its implementation and application to these purposes should be accelerated.

To develop the necessary awareness of the problems and to develop and apply the management principles and tools needed to avoid the problems that have been described will require the dedicated support of leaders in every country. Planners and policy makers will also require the support of specialists in food production, conservation, ecology, sociology, and demography to help design programs best suited to each country's special needs.

Food production, land and water quality, population growth, and the overall quality of human existence are inextricably related. Thus efforts to stop environmental degradation, to conserve food, to develop better food-producing technologies, and to limit population growth must all be intensified and must all be successful. If they are not, despite heroic efforts to prevent food shortages, they will force a grim ceiling on population growth and force the quality of life for millions back to much lower levels. In one sense, all countries are part of one world suffering from one common problem--many people attempting to produce enough food for all but failing in the process to protect adequately the resource base upon which food production will depend over time.

Table I

Growth in World Population
and Agricultural Production
(1961-65=100)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Agricultural Production</u>
1962	98	98
1963	100	100
1964	102	104
1965	104	104
1966	106	108
1967	108	112
1968	110	115
1969	112	116
1970	114	119
1971	116	123
1972	118	122
1973	121	129
1974	123	130
1975	125	133

Source: Data for 1964-75 from United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Production Yearbook, Vol. 29, 1975, Tables 5, 8; for 1962-63, from Vol. 27, 1973, Tables 4, 8.

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Table II

Index of Per Capita Food Production
(1961-65=100)

Region	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
West Asia ^{1/}	101	106	96	100	106
Africa ^{2/}	100	99	91	97	95
Indian Area ^{3/}	105	97	104	96	104
Far East ^{4/}	98	98	100	100	102
Latin America ^{5/}	-	-	103	105	105

1/ Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey.

2/ Algeria, Angola, Benin (Dahomey), Burundi, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rhodesia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Rep. of South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia.

3/ Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.

4/ Burma, Indonesia, Japan, Cambodia, Rep. of Korea, West Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, South Vietnam.

5/ Mexico, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, The Agricultural Situation in the Far East and Oceania, The Agricultural Situation in the Western Hemisphere, and The Agricultural Situation in Africa and West Asia, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report Nos. 121, 122, 125 (1976).

Table III

Basic Causes of Environmental Degradations
That Reduce Capacity To Produce Food

<u>Region</u>	<u>Number of Countries Considered</u>	<u>Number of Countries Reporting Overcropping Overgrazing</u>	<u>Reporting Loss of Forests</u>
Africa	34	21	9
Asia	13	9	7
Latin America	16	8	7
Near East	6	5	1
Totals	69	43	24

Source: Based on 1976 survey through U.S. posts.

Table IV

Serious Manifestations of Environmental Degradation Related
to Food Production Reported in 69 Countries

<u>Type of Environmental Degradation</u>	<u>Number of Countries Afflicted</u>
Soil Erosion	28
Depletion of Nutrients in Soil	12
Lands Abandoned	5
Hillside Farming (without terracing)	8
Water Shortage	16
Flooding	10
Irrigation Difficulties	8

Source: Based on 1976 survey through U.S. posts.

Table V

Mid-1976 Combined Population of Countries Surveyed for
Overcropping/Overgrazing Problems

Region	Regional Total		Total in Survey		Total Reporting Problem	
	Millions	As Percent of Regional Total	As Number in Millions	As Percent of Regional Total	As Number in Millions	As Percent of Total Survey
Africa	413		321	78	254	80
Asia ^{1/}	1,218		1,132	93	907	80
Latin America ^{2/}	305		289	95	106	37
Near East	121		93	77	86	93
Totals	2,057		1,835	90	1,353	74

^{1/} Excludes Mainland China and Japan.

^{2/} Excludes Caribbean Islands.

Source: Population figures are based on 1976 World Population Data Sheet of the Population Reference Bureau, Inc., 1337 Connecticut Ave., Washington, D.C. 20036.

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Statement by

PATSY T. MINK
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS

before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POPULATION
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

relating to
THE EFFECTS OF POPULATION GROWTH
ON THE WORLD'S ENVIRONMENT

on
April 19, 1978

Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to be called upon to participate in this important series of hearings. Population and world environment issues both fall within my sphere of responsibility as head of the Department of State's Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

I do not need to tell this Committee that understanding the population-environment relationship is crucial to an effective foreign policy. That more people mean more pollution and greater strain on environmental systems is obvious. What is really frightening is that, as a direct result of the desperate efforts of rapidly growing, impoverished populations to increase food production, collect firewood for fuel, and otherwise survive, the availability of these and other basic requirements of life is increasingly cut off through the degradation of the

environment which supplies them.

Two United Nations Conferences held last year--one on Water and the other on Desertification--dramatized the stresses that population growth and concomitantly increased demand are placing on the earth's water resources and agricultural lands. Overuse and misuse of the water, the soil and forestry resources are already severely curtailing food production in many parts of the globe. A recent analysis by the Worldwatch Institute concluded that the world's population is at the verge of overburdening the resources necessary to sustain life, and that signs of stress on the world's principal biological systems--forests, fisheries, grasslands, and croplands--indicate that in many places these systems have already reached the breaking point.

The scale, depth and implications of the deprivation to which runaway population increases and growing environmental degradation have contributed in large measure is difficult to grasp:

- close to 1 billion people around the globe are suffering from hunger and malnutrition with some 450 million on the brink of starvation...
- between 10 and 40 percent of the infants and children in the developing world are unable to survive beyond the age of five...

- some 10 million deaths each year are attributed to the absence of safe drinking water and basic sanitation. It is estimated that over 1 billion people in rural areas do not have adequate supplies of safe water and that the rate at which it is being provided fails to keep pace with population growth...
- twice as many hectares of land now under cultivation will be lost to soil degradation and urban sprawl during the fourth quarter of this century as will be added.

It is unfortunately true that we inhabitants of developed industrialized countries have been the worst offenders in terms of environmental disruption and overall pollution. However, the developed nations are now attempting to reduce the environmental damage for which they are responsible through recently initiated, and as yet inadequate, national and international conservation and anti-pollution controls as well as indirectly through falling birth rates.

Our immediate task is, logically enough, to draw on the environmental mistakes we and other developed nations have made in the course of our own development--and urge and assist others not to repeat them. As part of this

effort, President Carter specifically called in his 1977 Environmental Message for measures to ensure the environmental soundness of overseas development projects being considered for U.S. support, and for an increase in U.S. assistance to developing countries for environmental and natural resources management purposes. Subsequently, the Agency for International Development adopted new procedures to integrate environmental considerations into all its activities, and has received a new Congressional mandate to expand its resources management and environmental planning programs. But we can't force our ethic on others, and so it is imperative that we continue working to gain full acceptance of and adherence by other nations to these concepts. This is especially true of countries in the developing world, where high population growth rates and maldistribution of population have led to depredations which may in some cases have already become irreversible.

In terms of geographic extent, the most widespread environmental depredations have occurred in the countryside rather than the cities of developing countries. Vast rural areas of Africa, South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America have been crippled, in attempts to feed and otherwise care for ever-growing numbers of people, through such activities as slash-and-burn agriculture, overcropping and overgrazing, and consequent wind and water erosion.

The most evident and most destructive form of rural depredation is probably deforestation, which is carried out principally to obtain firewood for fuel and additional land for grazing and cultivation. The scale on which it has already occurred is staggering: most of the Middle East, North Africa, Continental Asia, Central America, and the Andean region of South America is now treeless. It has been estimated that, by the year 2000, some 30 percent of the already depleted forests of the world will have disappeared.

The consequences of deforestation are numerous and very grave. As the forest cover disappears, the structure of the soil is degraded, with soil nutrients lost and erosion becoming widespread. Most important, the water supply for surrounding land is impaired, particularly if the deforestation has occurred on high ground. Watersheds are destroyed and flooding occurs downstream, as does a buildup of flood-carried silt which clogs irrigation and hydroelectric systems. One long-range result is the changing of local patterns of flora and fauna. Another is the necessity for local residents to resort to the use

of animal dung for fuel, thus robbing agriculture of a traditional source of fertilizer.

The widespread destructive potential of deforestation is hard to exaggerate. Haiti, whose devastated hillsides may never be restorable even under optimal conditions--that is, with zero population growth and maximum socio-economic development--is but one example of the fruits of the deforestation process brought about by population pressures.

Desertification, whose destructive effects are often on a par with those of deforestation, is also frequently linked with attempts to increase food production to feed burgeoning populations. In the process of desertification, range and pasture lands are overgrazed or converted to crop uses for which they are not suited. Particularly if the land involved is steeply sloping or tends to be arid or semi-arid, such misuse will destroy the ability of the soil to support either crops or vegetation for grazing, and is likely to produce either a massive washing away of the soil or the creation of Dust Bowl-type conditions. Salinization, waterlogging, and alkalinization can stem from the irrigation of arid land where irrigation canal seepage occurs--as it has in Pakistan, Argentina, and other developing countries.

A classic example of the desertification process is Nepal, which loses huge quantities of earth to its neighbors each year as a result of the failure of hill agriculture attempted on marginal land. Indonesia has suffered the same problem; because of unscientific planting on upland slopes, large areas have been exposed to erosion, and arable land is being lost much faster than reclamation programs can restore it. As a result, millions of tons of Indonesian food production are lost annually, and the declines in soil fertility, rural and urban flooding, silting up of irrigation canals and reservoirs, and loss of vital water reserves and hydroelectric potential have caused untold economic damage. A third example of the depredations of desertification is the drought-stricken Sahelian region of Africa.

Negative effects also occur when overgrazing or agriculture, following the pressures of population growth, extends into areas which are neither steeply sloped nor particularly arid but still marginal. Expansion into previously uncultivated marginal land of this nature may lead to short-term increases in production. However, it also leads to deteriorating soil fertility and loss of soil and humus from wind and water erosion.

Similarly, environmental conditions can be upset and food production decreased by the intensification of agricultural effort in areas which have been in use

regularly. Burning, overgrazing and failure to allow the land to lie fallow for adequate periods often result--as they have in Ghana, for example--in a decrease in vegetative cover, which in turn leads to decreased soil moisture, reduced organic material in the soil and accompanying erosion, accelerated runoff of water, reduced groundwater availability, a lowered water table and diminution of perennial stream flow.

In short, I cannot overemphasize the adverse effect that excessive population growth has on the very systems which support life. The agricultural practices instituted by farmers to feed themselves and their fellows diminish the carrying capacity of the land for both humans and animals and bring malnutrition and starvation closer instead of pushing them back.

Among the problems caused in the rural areas of developing countries by high rates of population growth is the continual subdivision of family plots among surviving children. This aggravates the rural under-employment problem, leading to large-scale migration to urban areas. There, overcrowding contributes to problems of environmental degradation which every day take their toll in human misery and death. The reality of such extensive maldistribution of population is, for many developing countries, a cause of concern equal to population growth itself.

Among the numerous environmental impacts of urban conditions, the following are particularly grave in developing countries:

- The loss of potentially productive land through its conversion to residential, commercial or industrial use.
- The drawing off of excessive amounts of ground water, leading to its subterranean replacement by brackish or saline water and--in some extreme cases such as that of Mexico City--leading to the subsidence of the soil itself as its water content is removed.
- The pollution of the air, land and particularly water by garbage and by industrial and human wastes. Despite efforts to extend sewer systems and provide potable water, water-transmitted disease is a growing curse. One of the most tragic results is the high rate of child mortality (which is characteristic of rural areas as well). In many developing countries this is closely linked to fecally related diseases such as intestinal parasites and infectious diarrheal ailments.

-- The pollution of the air by the burning of mineral fuels. In Taipei, at least 70 percent of total air pollution is caused by vehicle emissions, and thus is more closely related to population factors than to industrial ones.

The picture I have drawn with regard to population, environment and their interrelationship is a bleak one, and the situation promises to get worse before it can get better--if indeed it does. And what is our Government doing in the face of the problem?

U.S. environment policy is, in its simplest form, devoted to collective efforts to protect the physical environment from further degradation, by curbing pollution, guarding against irreversible resource depletion, and halting the reckless despoilation of land, forests, water and atmosphere. In the foreign affairs context, we lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment.

The objective of our dealings with developing nations relative to environment matters is to assist them to achieve their economic growth objectives while at the same time providing safeguards against environmental degradation. This requires a strong commitment to pursue sound environmental planning, impact analysis and a search for viable

alternatives within our development assistance activities as implemented by the Agency for International Development, the Export-Import Bank, private voluntary organizations, and multilateral channels such as the World Bank.

In order for this policy to be successfully implemented, it is necessary for it to be designed and carried out as one of the cornerstones of overall U.S. foreign policy, rather than as a unique, albeit important, appendage. Put another way, it is vital that an environmental awareness and ethic be integrated into all facets of U.S. foreign policy.

Even more important, if environmentally-sound development is to occur, if global population growth is to be curtailed, and if the quality of human existence is to be uplifted--then it is vital that the United States itself lead by example. This means demonstrating leadership and success in addressing our own domestic problems of air and water pollution, land degradation and urban decay--and, in particular, by reconciling environmental and economic goals. To lead the way domestically in this manner would provide the most irrefutable proof of the falsity of developing country suspicions that environmental concern is merely an element of a strategy by the "have" nations to retard their rise to a competitive economic status.

U.S. policy on population matters, which is anchored in the World Population Plan of Action and defined in NSC documents, remains based on concern for the health, well-being and economic status of all people and on respect for the rights and responsibilities of each government to determine its population policies and programs, consistent with human rights. Objectives of this policy are to help developing countries and their people recognize the need for bringing population growth in line with their development goals, to assist them in formulating and implementing actions to restrain population growth, and to help them gradually assume the necessary action responsibility themselves. Accordingly, the United States supports voluntary programs designed to make family planning information and services fully available to all elements of the societies of developing countries.

Under this policy guidance, U.S. financing of population programs, whether bilateral, multilateral or through private organizations, has reached or exceeded \$100 million annually since FY 1971, and has totaled \$1 billion through FY 1977. The level for FY 1978 is about \$160 million, which represents about 58 percent of the total donor resources going into population activities in the developing countries. I am sure my distinguished colleagues in the Agency for International Development will provide additional information regarding the U.S. program of population assistance.

Mr. Chairman, you have been kind enough to ask for my recommendations regarding policy in this field. My most basic response to your request is to point out that, despite all the progress achieved over the past decade in the population field, there is still an urgent need for a broader and more concerted effort by donors and receiving nations alike to deal with the population problem. Thus, the United States should continue its leading role in providing assistance to developing countries in their attempts to establish and implement effective family planning programs.

I would also commend to the Committee the conclusions reached by the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy in its recently released second annual report. Probably the most important conclusion of the Ad Hoc Group is that the leaders of developing countries themselves must be clearly, firmly and actively committed to promoting broadly based national population programs if these programs are to succeed. Unfortunately, it may be politically more difficult for developing world leaders to take a firm position on population growth than to ask the United States for additional aid in producing or importing food and other essential supplies, for in their countries rampant disease, hunger and malnutrition are really the "environmental" priorities. Therefore it is

important that, in discussions with such leaders, our own leadership in the Legislative as well as the Executive Branch use every opportunity to urge and encourage their active support for population programs down to the community and village level, where the actual decisions about such matters as family size are made.

To these recommendations I would like to add a final one which may appear less familiar. On the basis of one United Nations projection, about 1.1 billion people--that is, about half of the increase in world population expected to occur between 1975 and the year 2000--will be added to the cities of the developing world, contributing further to the urban environmental degradation already mentioned here in brief. Ninety-five of 114 countries recently surveyed by the U.N. indicated that massive population maldistribution is already an issue requiring attention. I therefore suggest that the Committee may wish to consider this particular aspect of the world population problem along with the question of population growth itself, in making its own recommendations.

It is a matter of great satisfaction to me personally and to all of my colleagues in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs that this Select Committee is investigating the impact of population growth on economic development, on food and resources, on unemployment and underemployment, on human

habitat, on health, and on conditions of life for men, women, and children today and for generations to come. I am especially glad to have had this opportunity to discuss population and environment and the potentially disastrous manner in which they interact. The global nature of the threat requires us to move, and to move quickly, in concert with other nations and with international organizations and private voluntary organizations to deal with these issues in a united and effective way.

Hearing Before the House Committee on Population
Statement by Maxwell D. Taylor, General US Army (ret)

April 19, 1978

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We are accustomed to appraise the effects of excessive population growth in terms of interest to the demographer, sociologist, economist, nutritionist or the representative of some kindred discipline. It is rare to attempt to evaluate the composite effect on broad areas of general concern such as national security and foreign policy. This is the aspect of population growth to which I shall address my remarks today.

Population growth is both a seminal cause and an environmental process which, by increasing human demand for the essentials and amenities of life, imposes mounting requirements on ecological, economic and political systems beyond their capacity to satisfy. Efforts to provide the food, energy, goods and services required hasten the depletion of natural resources and eventually oblige nations to seek new sources of raw materials at home and abroad.

In industrial countries, the consequences of population growth tend to generate inflation, retard economic growth, aggravate unemployment, expand welfare rolls, and contribute to an increase in imports. The impact on devel-

oping countries is likely to be far more severe, particularly for those whose population will double in 20-30 years. These will suffer from endemic poverty, confirmed backwardness, and continuous denial of opportunity to progress toward industrialization. Many will experience natural disasters in the form of famine, flood and drought arising from the overworking of crop and grazing lands, the overcutting of forests, and the inability to restore them to their pristine state. If their situation becomes desperate and survival is at stake, people will seek refuge in migration in hope of finding greener fields and a better life, beyond neighboring frontiers.

Under such circumstances, governments are faced with impossible tasks and, when they fail to perform, become culpable scapegoats in the eyes of their people. Loss of authority by the leadership creates political unrest leading to disorder, violence and frequent changes in government detrimental to national and regional tranquility. Troubles will arise among nations generated by frictions and conflicts over such matters as markets, fishing rights, fresh water sources, and illegal immigration. Overcrowded nations may seek relief by territorial expansion at the expense of less densely populated neighbors. The latter, anticipating such aggression, will be inclined to seek allies among the great powers and may even attempt to obtain nuclear weapons to improve their defenses. Wars arising from such causes may invite Soviet

intérvencion as was the case in the recent conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, a development which could lead to a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

To perceive more clearly the bearing of population growth on international relationships, it may be useful to examine a few specific consequences on the U.S. as an exemplar of the industrial countries of the West.

With a birthrate of 15 per thousand in a world with an average of 28 per thousand, we Americans are inclined to be complacent over the ability to control our own population problem. We tend to forget however that, although our birthrate is low, it still represents a gain of about 40,000,000 by the end of the century to which we must assume the added presence of an annual contingent of some 400,000 legal immigrants and a much larger illegal annual increment presently estimated at about a million a year. Thus, unless we find ways to restrain illegal immigration, our overall problem is to make provision for a population which may approach about 300,000,000 by the end of the century.

An added factor affecting the scope of our task is the inordinately high per capita consumption rate which has become a national habit which immigrants are quick to acquire. Hence, in terms of impact on world resources, the anticipated increase in American population by the year 2000 would approximate in consumption an increase of nearly a billion in the developing world. Thus viewed,

our population growth problem is far from insignificant.

One of the most sensitive effects of our population growth is the contribution made to a growing scarcity of domestic oil and minerals, to the rise in prices of food and manufactured goods and to the deficit balance in our foreign trade account resulting from our mounting dependence on imports. The latter, though a relatively recent phenomenon, is destined to exercise a major influence on both our national security and our international relations, particularly with many countries of the Third World. Already we are importing over half of our oil consumption, and we are still without an energy policy offering the prospect of diminishing our vassallage to OPEC. At the same time, we are obtaining abroad over half of our consumption of basic minerals such as bauxite, chromium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, tin and zinc, and by the end of the century we shall have added five or six more items to the list. Even if we do our utmost to exploit additional domestic sources, we must henceforth look in increasing measure to countries of the Third World for scarce materials essential to sustained economic productivity. We can never again boast of an economically self-sufficient Fortress America.

This increased reliance on exports makes our economy extremely vulnerable to foreign hostile actions. Henceforth its productivity -- and thereby many important aspects of our security and well being -- will be exposed

to the whims, bias and domestic conditions of a score of producer countries. The most important of these are clustered in four widely separated regions -- the Western Hemisphere, the Middle East, Africa and the Southwest Pacific. Many of these nations are already suffering severely from the effects of a population growth rate which, by doubling in the next few decades will have predictably disastrous consequences. With little industrialization and limited food resources, they must buy manufactures at inflated prices from the industrial nations and import much of their food from the limited number of countries with surplus food to sell.

Under such conditions, American importers of raw materials are likely to find producer nations hard bargainers anxious to squeeze the last penny from their products and, inspired by OPEC successes, ready to resort to the cartel weapon. An added problem will be the trend in many have-not countries to latent or active anti-Americanism, particularly prevalent in parts of Latin America and Africa. While their animosity is directed primarily at the United States, it is broad enough to encompass most of the industrial world. There is already widespread Third World dissatisfaction with the unequal distribution of wealth and a growing demand for compensation from the well-to-do nations for past and present wrongs. This is a resentment which the Soviet Union and fellow troublemakers will be happy to aggravate as a promising means for undermining the capitalist world.

Obviously it will be in the American interest to establish close political and economic ties with producer countries having exports which we shall need in this coming era of scarcities. In forming these ties, our diplomats will face many obstacles in overcoming Third World prejudices -- many justified by our past indifference to the needs of emerging nations. Even if they are successful in their trade negotiations, the subsequent flow of imports from overseas will always be vulnerable to interruptions from many sources. In time of war involving the USSR, the expanding Soviet navy, particularly its large fleet of submarines, would endanger our maritime supply lines and would probably render access impossible or very costly to Midcast oil and to many African markets. In peace pirates and privateers, possibly acting as proxies for covert troublemakers, could prey upon shipping both for the political effect and for the booty obtained. We should remember that, in this period of scarcities, a tanker of oil would exceed in worth the cargoes of gold carried in the Spanish galleons which in Elizabethan times Sir Francis Drake and his comrades delighted to plunder.

This elaboration of difficulties which may arise from our dependence on imports is to underscore the future vulnerability of our economy and the effect of this vulnerability on its output of goods, services, profits and jobs. Under such conditions, it is a valid question whether we can count on continuing economic growth sufficient to meet the demands of the growing population and, at the

same time, provide the exports necessary to support our foreign policy and pay for our imports. Our currently disquieting trade deficit indicates we are not capable of doing so today.

Population growth in foreign countries may produce other effects adverse to our interests. The chaotic internal conditions to be anticipated in heavily overpopulated countries can interfere seriously with our trade with them and their neighbors. Soviet subversive activities in regions of our economic interest may also deprive us of access to vital markets. Racial violence in southern Africa may force us to break off commercial relations with Rhodesia and South Africa, in which case we shall be forced to buy most of our chromium from the Soviet Union. The widening population differential between Israel and the Arab states may be a factor in a renewal of hostilities accompanied by another Arab oil embargo against the friends of Israel.

A conflict arising between populous Brazil and its smaller neighbors could hamper our access to hemispheric markets. The prolonged natalist policy of Mexico only recently moderated is largely responsible for the wave of illegal immigration whereby our southern neighbor exports its unemployment to our Southwest. We are handicapped in taking appropriate action to restrain this overflow by the importance of our trade with Mexico

which soon will include substantial quantities of badly needed oil and natural gas. At some point, perhaps about the year 2020 when the population of Mexico is expected to exceed that of the U.S., we may have occasion to fear an irredentist invasion from Mexico to regain the territory lost to the Yanquis in 1848.

Recognition of the importance of friendly relations with Latin America in a period of dependence on foreign markets has been a strong reason for supporting the Panama Canal Treaties. Our failure to ratify them at this late date would lead to a wave of violent anti-Americanism causing a serious deterioration in hemispheric relations and the loss of important markets.

The most serious international development arising from population growth would be an offensive coalition of have-not countries supported by the Soviet Union to enforce a redistribution of wealth from the affluent to the disadvantaged nations of the world. While this threat appears remote at the moment, it is far from implausible. It would offer an attractive possibility for the Soviets to use their military power to intimidate the decadent, guilt-ridden West into making retribution to the poor nations as a preliminary to world-wide socialization under Communist auspices.

In closing, I would hope that we might agree on at least three points which flow from the preceding discussion. The first is that the dangers arising from population growth and the scarcities to which it contributes are so imminent

that they should arouse in us a sense of urgency comparable to that which has animated our citizens in the past in responding to foreign dangers to our national security. Social, political or economic threats, such as those discussed, are more subtle and less easily identified than those represented by hostile armies or air fleets armed with atomic weapons poised to attack across national frontiers. Yet the consequences of population growth bear so importantly upon world peace and tranquility that we must act promptly to forestall them by all available means.

A related point is the universal nature of the population threat -- no nation has the monopoly and no nation alone can cope with its consequences. No single state, however far-sighted in controlling its own population problem, can escape the consequences of the irresponsibility of others who ignore their problems or delay in dealing with them. World leaders who believe that nuclear war is the greatest threat to the future of the human race should in logic unite in efforts to control in time the population bomb and try to mitigate an equally mortal threat to world peace.

My final point is that we Americans must be organized to concentrate all available resources against this threat, if we are to do our full part in an international effort. Over the years, with the benefit of the National Security Act of 1947 which established the National Security Council, we have been reasonably well organized to mobilize military

forces in defense of those aspects of national security to which military means are applicable. That is far from the case with regard to our non-military resources, particularly those represented by our vast productive economy. Among the latter are to be found most of the tools we shall need in dealing with population and food problems but they are widely scattered through many departments and agencies of government with no one in charge short of the President.

My own recommendation for solving this organizational defect would be to expand and replace the National Security Council by a National Policy Council to serve as an inter-departmental agency to advise the President on all important policy matters, foreign and domestic, to formulate the necessary plans and programs for presidential approval and to supervise subsequent implementation. In the coming era we shall have many problems too complex for the improvisations of the past -- problems like foreign trade, food, energy and immigration which, exceeding the capacity of "czars" suddenly appointed in time of crisis and staffs assembled overnight, will require the undivided attention of career professionals constantly on the job. I hope that our present justified concern over population growth will lead to a broad survey of our organizational readiness to mass our total resources in dealing with the critical problems arising from its consequences.

The Effective Population in International Politics

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The Effective Population in International Politics

INTRODUCTION

This paper will outline some of the major connections that can be established between population trends and national power and security. Admittedly some of the links are tenuous due to the necessity of tracing them through a maze of intermediate variables. Certainly a full picture of the many connections would show them to be exceedingly complex and only imperfectly understood. Nevertheless, it seems important to investigate, even in an initial fashion, some of the ways in which demographic shifts affect the power and security of the nation, for the results of such an investigation are instructive in giving policy makers some perspective about what can be changed and what cannot.

It should be made clear at the outset that when national power and security are referred to here, the reference is not primarily to military preparedness. "Power" is here defined as the ability of the nation to manipulate its international environment, particularly its ability to influence the behavior of other nations and to withstand unwelcome influence on their part. "Security" is here defined as the safety of the nation from armed attack, internal subversion, or damage to its vital international interests. Military preparedness is but one of many factors affecting a nation's power and security and does not, in itself, guarantee any predictable result.

Consider, for example, the association between military preparedness and the long-run power and security of the major combatants in World War II. The ultimate in military preparations did not save Germany and Japan from defeat at the hands of the woefully unprepared United States and Britain. The French, according to some calculations, were more prepared than the Russians, but France fell and the Soviet Union did not. The Italians were terribly unprepared militarily, and were disastrously defeated. Nor has military preparedness provided either the Egyptians or the South Vietnamese with security. The picture at best is muddled; a causal link between preparedness and power and security is still to be made.

Power, it is generally agreed, is that facet of every human relationship that enables the parties involved to influence or control each other's behavior. Joint behav-

ior, essential in any relationship, would not be possible but for the mutual influence that the parties exercise over one another. Among nations, this influence is exercised through a wide range of means, of which military force is only one. The methods of exercising power can be broadly categorized as persuasion, reward, punishment, and force; and in the daily course of international relations, the overwhelming number of pressures applied by nations to one another are exercised by methods other than military force. Similarly, the determinants of national power include many variables other than the size of a nation's military forces and the degree of their preparedness.

When it comes to considering the determinants of national power, an additional difficulty must be faced. The conception of national power is notoriously defective in lacking an objective, independent measurement. Used as a dependent variable, this creates immense difficulties, for there is no way of measuring it independently from its determinants. Thus, we customarily assess a nation's power by its population size, its economic might, or even the size of its military forces, all of which, of course, are partial determinants of power but do not constitute power, itself. To measure directly the "quantity" of influence that one nation in a complex system exercises over all the others is theoretically possible, but has never been done. Direct indications of the relative power of nations are given when one defeats another in a war. (But this holds only if they fight without allies, and even then other factors may tip the balance. Surely no one would claim that the United States is less powerful than North Vietnam despite the fact that the United States cannot seem to win the war between them.) War, however, is not the usual state of affairs among nations; and we more generally estimate their relative power by falling back upon an impressionistic weighting of the probabilities that one nation will predominate in a conflict of interest with others. In consequence, the relative importance of the various determinants of national power is customarily judged by their correlation with this impressionistic power ranking. The methodological deficiencies are clear but seem unavoidable at this stage of the study of international

relations. Certainly the deficiencies are not removed by failing to mention them.

Caveats aside, the three variables generally considered the most important of the many determinants of national power are population size, level of economic productivity, and level of political mobilization. Our concern here is primarily with the demographic determinants of power and with their interrelationship with economic productivity and political mobilization.

The rationale for considering population size a major determinant of national power is fairly clear. After all, it is people who fight and work and consume and carry within themselves the national culture and ideology; and it is these activities that are the sources of the capacity of one nation to influence the behavior of other nations. At times, however, people may do none of these things; in such cases, they add nothing to a nation's power. These divergent possibilities are summed up in the following passage:

Population is, indeed, a nation's greatest resource, though like other resources it may be squandered or misused. What greater asset can a nation have than a multitude of able-bodied citizens, ready to stoke its furnaces, work its mines, run its machinery, harvest its crops, build its cities, raise its children, produce its art, and provide the vast array of goods and services that make a nation prosperous and content? On the other hand, what greater liability can a nation have than a mass of surplus people, living in hunger and poverty, scratching at tiny plots of land whose produce will not feed them all, swarming into cities where there are no more jobs, living in huts or dying in the street, sitting in apathy or smouldering with discontent, and even begetting more children to share their misery? The relationship between numbers and wealth and power is not simple, but surely it is significant.¹

Total population size sets limits to a nation's power; but they are broad limits, and within them considerable variation is possible. The variations are shaped by the way demographic, economic, and political variables are intertwined; and it is these variations that influence the relative power of nations.

THE EFFECTIVE POPULATION

For purposes of national power, a nation is no larger than the portion of its population that makes a contribution to the furthering of national goals. We call these people "the effective population."² If effective populations, rather than total populations, are consid-

ered, some startling results are obtained. Consider, for example, a list of the most populous nations in the world: those with total populations above 50 million. More than two-thirds of the people on the earth live in these 13 nations. Eight of them are giants, two of them what might be called super-giants. Yet if only the effective population is counted (by procedures to be explained later), some of these nations shrivel up unbelievably. China, for example, shrinks to less than 1/10 her total size, while Indonesia has an effective population smaller than the number of people living in greater New York City. (See Tables 1 and 2.)

The tremendous gap between total population size and effective population size becomes significant when we consider that it is changes in the effective population that are most likely to bring future increments of power. Total population size sets limits to how large the effective population can become, but the nation with a low percentage of effective population contains an immense reservoir of untapped power compared to a nation like the United States that is already using its population relatively effectively.

Of course, one must consider not only the size of the effective population but also the level of their skills and the ability of the political and economic system to aggregate individual contributions into a common pool of national capabilities to be used in furthering national goals. These factors in turn are interrelated in intricate and subtle ways. For example, the level of individual skills is very much a function of the system, which not only facilitates or hinders the training of individuals but also affects their willingness and their commitment to national goals.

In summary, to assess the contribution that a nation's population makes to its power, we must ask four different questions: (1) How many people does a nation have? (2) How many of them now make, and in the future could make, a contribution to the achievement of national goals? (3) How motivated, skilled, and productive are they? (4) How successfully can their individual contributions be pooled in the joint pursuit of common national goals? Let us address ourselves to each of these questions in turn.

SIZE OF TOTAL POPULATION

Few attributes of nations vary more than population size. Political entities vary in size from China with its 740,000,000 people, down to Pitcairn Island with a population of 75.³ The "typical" nation has a population under 10 million and does not possess much international power. The vast majority of political units (168 out of 219) fall into this category, which includes such independent nations as Ghana, Haiti, Israel, Jordan,

Table 1.—Nations with Largest Total Populations

Nation	Population in millions ^a
China	740
India	537
USSR	241
United States	203
Indonesia ^b	117
Pakistan	112
Japan	102
Brazil	91
Nigeria	65
West Germany ^c	61
United Kingdom	56
Italy	53
France	50

^aMidyear, 1969.^bIncluding West Irian.^cIncluding West Berlin.Source: United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1970*, Table 18.

Cambodia, Albania, and Ireland, and all of the world's remaining colonial territories.

The major world powers all have populations of at least 50 million. A population of this size appears to be at least a prerequisite of great power status, though not a guarantee. (See Table 1.) The two great super-powers (and their most troublesome rivals: China and Japan) have populations of over 100 million.

Total population size alone provides at least a partial explanation of the diminishing importance of the West European powers that dominated the world in the 19th Century. They simply do not possess the demographic resources to compete with nations four times their size once these nations become economically developed and politically mobilized.

On the basis of their size, the United States and the Soviet Union appear assured of continued leadership for some time to come, but face clear future threats from China (increasingly recognized), India (generally overlooked), and a United Europe if true political unity is ever achieved.⁴

SIZE OF EFFECTIVE POPULATION

Total population size is interesting in that it sets limits to the size of the effective population and provides an indication of future possibilities; but for an understanding of the relative power of nations at the present time and in the near future, the size of the effective population is more significant.

The majority of the people in any nation do not make any significant contribution to the nation's power, either through economic production, political participation, tax payment, or military service. In the United States, for example, 58 million Americans are under the age of 15. They will make no contribution to the achievement of national goals until they work, fight, or vote—activities which some of them will not pursue until they are into their twenties. In the meantime their activities and their welfare are of the greatest national interest. Indeed, matters concerning them provide the focus of many of the nation's most controversial political issues: racial integration in the schools, the draft, drug addiction, crime. It is legitimate to view this large group as valuable in themselves, and it is reasonable to regard the immense expenditures of resources and energy on their behalf as investments in the nation's future; but, for the duration of their juvenile dependency, they consume but do not produce, they question but do not make decisions, they disrupt but do not unify. At best, they prepare. In short, they are not part of the nation's effective population. Neither are most of the 20 million Americans aged 65 and over, though some continue to be economically and politically active.

Table 2.—Nations with Largest Effective Populations

Nation	Effective population (number of employed non-agricultural workers in millions) ^a	Percentage of total population in effective population
China ^b	62.1	10
United States	60.5	33
USSR	58.0	27
India ^c	38.0	9
Japan	31.1	33
West Germany	22.8	42
United Kingdom	22.2	42
France	14.7	32
Italy	14.0	28
Indonesia ^c	8.6	9

^a1961. Except for China, India, and Indonesia, all figures are computed from International Labour Office, *Year Book of Labour Statistics, 1970* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1970), Table 3.^b1959. Data computed from Chi-Ming Hou, "Manpower, Employment and Unemployment," in *Economic Trends in Communist China*, Alexander Eckstein et al., eds. (Chicago: Aldine, 1958).^cFigures include unemployed so are slightly inflated and not strictly comparable. Computed from United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1964*, Table 9.

Even within the 15-65 age group there are many who make no effective contribution to the achievement of national goals: the physically ill, the mentally deranged, the criminal, the disaffected, or simply the unemployed. In terms of political participation, it is worth noting that out of 118 million Americans of voting age, only 73 million actually voted in the last presidential election.⁵ The number who join political parties or campaign actively is much smaller.

When it comes to taxes, virtually all adult Americans contribute something to the Federal Government through income taxes and excise taxes, but the contribution is often small. In 1967, only 34 million Americans paid Federal income taxes of more than \$500.⁶

The contribution made through economic production is perhaps the hardest to assess. Most adults "work"; that is, they produce some economic goods or service. The subsistence farmer who grows his own vegetables produces economic goods, but they are immediately consumed within his own family. We can make a distinction between workers who take care of themselves and their dependents and those who are involved in economic networks that enable them to make economic contributions to others outside the household and beyond the village, contributions that can be used to achieve national goals. The peasant in a subsistence economy does make a contribution to others. We would classify him not as a dependent but as a "noneffective." And for our purposes, we would probably be justified in classifying most housewives in the same manner. On the other hand, the farmer in commercial agriculture and the woman in paid employment are both part of the effective population.

We are dealing here with a continuum of contribution. The contribution to national power is obvious in the case of those who help produce military goods or those who produce commodities that are exchanged in international trade. It is clear for those who produce raw materials or foodstuffs for the rest of the nation. It is visible for most of those who produce the goods and services that make up the Gross National Product; and it is perceptible for the housewife who provides economic services for her husband who in turn provides economic services for the rest of us. It has just about vanished for the man who provides only for himself, though he may pay taxes, or for the dependent student, though he may suddenly be drafted.

For purposes of international comparison we must arbitrarily decide who is in the effective population and who is not; but in reality, the problem is complicated not only because the level of contribution varies, but also because some people contribute in one area and some in another. In some cases, the contribution is

intermittent; in others, it is continuous. Moreover, specific individuals drop in and out of the effective population. Sick people get well again; peasants are drafted and then return to the fields; students become politically active; workers become unemployed.

The indicator used here for the effective population is crude and obscures these fine distinctions. It is the number of employed nonagricultural workers. It has the merit of excluding the dependent groups: children, the aged, the infirm, the unemployed. For the developing nations, it also separates out in a rough way the modern sector from the traditional sector of the economy. Also, and this is essential, economic data of this nature are available for a relatively large number of countries.

However, there are also marked liabilities in using such a measure of effective population. In the first place, it discriminates only economic effectiveness and omits other information in which we may be very much interested, such as the number of politically active people and how well they are organized. When we measure the effective population of China, for example, it totals the economically effective, but gives no clue as to the contributions to power made through the political system. This is a grievous defect.

Even in economic terms, the measure is inexact, for it excludes people who, on strong theoretical grounds, should be counted as effective. It is clearly incorrect to exclude from the ranks of the effective population, people who work in agriculture in developed countries. In the most highly developed countries, agricultural workers not only make a contribution to the national economy, but, indeed, are among the most efficient workers in the nation. In the United States, for example, gains in agricultural productivity have been so high that a tiny fraction of the working population has become capable not only of taking care of the needs of the nation but of producing surpluses for export to millions of nonnationals as well. Throughout the developed nations, a major feature of social and economic modernity has been the small fraction of the labor force who work the land. The distortion resulting from excluding modern farmers from the effective population is minimized by the fact that the numbers involved are relatively small; but it is still a distortion.

The indicator used (number of employed nonagricultural workers) also excludes the military, for in most cases, the figures available on occupational breakdowns are for the civilian labor force. This, too, is a group that certainly ought to be included as contributors to the realization of national goals. Not only do military forces contribute to national defense, but in countries such as China, they also provide a considerable amount of labor for such tasks as road-building and construction. The

idea of an effective population is valid, but the indicator is faulty.

In spite of its shortcomings, the yardstick we have chosen gives some striking results when used for international comparison of effective populations. (See Table 2.) China still heads the list; but, like the other nondeveloped nations, she has shrunk to a fraction of her total size, so small a fraction that her effective population is scarcely larger than that of the United States despite the much larger total population base from which she starts. The United States, using her population more effectively, has a larger effective population than the Soviet Union, although her total population is smaller. The United Kingdom, though having a high percentage of effective population, is nevertheless seventh in world ranking, for her total population is simply not large enough to provide her with sufficient base.

It is instructive to consider the percentage of the total population that is included in the effective population for the major nations, for it shows how heavy a load those who make a contribution must carry. As one would expect, it is in the least developed countries that the percentage is smallest; and it is there that one individual must push the wheel for many when it comes to producing national power. In the most developed nations, one person out of every three or four is a member of the effective population. In the least developed countries, the ratio falls to one of 10 or 11. (See Table 2.)

It is also worth noting that when one ranks nations by the size of their effective populations, the result is much closer to a ranking by power than was the case when they were ranked by total population size. In other words, population size is an important determinant of national power; but its influence is much more clearly seen when only effective population is considered.

LEVEL OF SKILLS AND ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY

It is obviously not sufficient to assess the relative power of a nation by saying that it has a larger or smaller effective population than does some other state. We must probe further into the relative utility of these individuals as resource donors to the nation. In particular, we must examine their economic productivity, which in turn reflects both the level of their skills and the capital goods at their disposal. The very formulation of effective population as people working in the modern sector of economy ties the concept of effective population to productivity. But even within the "modern" sector, it is possible to have vast differences in economic

productivity. Two nations with roughly equivalent effective populations (for example, the United States and China) may, nevertheless, possess widely differing amounts of power thanks to the superior economic productivity of one.

The importance of economic productivity as a source of power is relatively obvious. A productive economy will provide goods that other nations want and a market that other nations seek. It will provide the potential for a mighty military machine, and it will provide its people with a level of wealth that will make them envied and emulated by others. American power has certainly been based in large part upon her wealth, as was the previous power of the European nations that were the first to industrialize.

It would be highly desirable to have an index that would measure the combined effect of size of effective population and level of economic productivity for various nations. No tailor-made index of this kind exists, but the Gross National Product (GNP) is tolerably close to what we want. And, not incidentally, it has proved to be the best generally available measure of national power. GNP reflects both the size of the effective population (including, in this instance, agricultural workers whose produce is exchanged in the market) and its level of productivity. In addition, it reflects, if only indirectly, the capacity of the economic system to aggregate the output of individuals and groups. Table 3 lists the 10 nations with the largest GNPs and shows the relation between their rank in GNP, their rank in Table 3.—Power as Indicated by GNP, Total Population, Effective Population

Nation	GNP (billions) ^a	Rank in total population ^b	Rank in effective population ^c	Rank in GNP
United States . . .	\$866	4	2	1
Soviet Union . . .	413	3	3	2
Japan	142	7	5	3
West Germany . . .	133	10	6	4
France	127	13	8	5
United Kingdom . .	103	11	7	6
China	90	1	1	7
Italy	75	12	9	8
Canada	66	26	13	9
India	43	2	4	10

^a1968 Gross National Product; United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures, 1970*, Table 2.

^bMidyear 1968. United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1968*, Table 4.

^c1959-1961. For sources, see Table 2.

effective population, and their rank in total population. An examination of these rankings shows clearly that nations registering significantly higher in GNP than they do in total population or in effective population have made up the difference through high economic productivity (for example, Canada and most of the Western European nations). Nations ranking lower in GNP than in total population or in effective population (such as China and India) are low in economic productivity and owe their present power in large part to their size.

AGGREGATION OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The fourth question to which we must address ourselves in assessing the contribution that population makes to national power is: How effective is the system in aggregating the efforts of the individuals who make up the effective population? We have touched upon the question in mentioning that high economic productivity suggests successful organization and pooling of individual efforts and resources, for it is the system that makes the individual worker productive. But the reference is solely to the capacity of the economic system to aggregate economic resources, not to the capacity of the political system to mobilize, organize, and direct individual activities toward political ends. The two capacities differ, and one does not always accompany the other.

In the past, it has been widely assumed that economic development and political development proceeded hand in hand. Thus a failure to measure political mobilization directly was not thought overly damaging, for it could be assumed that, if a nation possessed a high level of economic productivity, it also possessed a high level of political mobilization. The statement is probably true as far as it goes.

The error lay in assuming that low levels of economic productivity and political mobilization were likewise associated. In recent years, we have witnessed repeated examples of nations that experienced a high degree of political mobilization and a corresponding increase in effective population and national power, far in advance of substantial economic modernization. Consider, for example, the wide range of political mobilization exhibited by a group of nondeveloped countries when electoral participation is used as a measure of political mobilization. (See Table 4.)

Granted that voting behavior is a somewhat spotty indicator of political mobilization, it is nevertheless interesting to find it varies so greatly in a group of nondeveloped nations. It does not vary this much among the more developed nations. Other indicators support the impression that we are witnessing a new pattern of development, in which political mobilization precedes

Table 4.—Political Mobilization and Economic Development

Selected nondeveloped countries	Economic development as measured by per capita GNP	Percentage voting among people of voting age
Guatemala	189	27.5
Albania	175	94.6
Nicaragua	160	92.7
South Korea	144	31.3
Egypt	142	0.0
Indonesia	131	92.0
Liberia	100	82.9
Bolivia	99	51.4
Nigeria	78	40.4
India	73	52.6

Source: Bruce Russett et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 84-87 and 155-157.

economic modernization, rather than following it as it did in the case of the United States and the Western European nations.

In such cases, the usual social and economic indicators will not detect the facts of political life; and the increases in effective population and national power that such nations experience are likely to be overlooked. Many of the major miscalculations in international politics in recent years and many of the subsequent unexpected outcomes of military confrontations have been, at base, failures to take into account the increase in power that can be generated simply by developing a political network that mobilizes a peasant population.

China and the Viet Cong are cases in point. China in 1949 was in a state of collapse, exhausted by civil war, her armies disintegrated, a new Communist government just assuming control. A short two years later, Chinese armies entered Korea and fought the greatest power on earth to a military draw. What had changed? Neither population size nor economic productivity had altered significantly. Climate, resources, and area were all the same. What had changed was the political system. For the first time, China, had a political party and a government bureaucracy that could mobilize a large fraction of the population to contribute to the war against the United States. Or consider the case of the Viet Cong. Here again the military adversary of the United States is economically backward, with low productivity and a traditional social life. In addition, the population is relatively small, and the military forces badly armed; and yet they defy defeat. The only

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conceivable answer is that the strength of the Viet Cong lies in its political organization, which has succeeded in recruiting a very large proportion of Vietnamese peasants into its effective population. The United States has been slow to recognize the power potential of a politically mobilized effective population in an otherwise backward nation, slow indeed when the consequences have twice been written in American blood.

There is another classic case of the increase in power that accrues to a nation when it uses its political institutions to mobilize new citizens into the effective population. The case is over 180 years old, but it is generally overlooked. We refer to the case of France during the Revolution and the ensuing Napoleonic years, when a sudden burst of power drove France to the mastery of Europe. France was, at the time (and had been for years), the most populous nation in Europe except for Russia. She was also relatively rich and well-organized economically. But there seems little question that the French Revolution generated new levels of political mobilization, including the first mass citizen army in history. France's greatly increased effective population seems certain to have played a major role in her sudden acquisition of power.

SOME LIMITATIONS

In writing of the ways in which population size, economic productivity, and political mobilization contribute to a nation's power, we have perhaps left the impression that (1) national power increases in a linear manner, and (2) a nation can continue to increase its power indefinitely if it continues to enlarge its effective population, raise its productivity, and improve its political mobilization. But this is not the case. There are limits to the increments in power that can be obtained, some of them stemming from the nature of power itself, and some of them stemming from the differential rate and timing of modernization in the various nations of the world.

National power is not a characteristic of the nation but of the relationships among nations. It is the relative ability of nations to influence each other in conflicts of interest that concerns us; and here, one nation's gain is another's loss. The power of the United States is not determined solely by its own capacities and skills; it is affected by changes in other nations as well.

The first nations to industrialize gained power rapidly because they left behind their preindustrial rivals. Those next to industrialize gained power relative to those they left behind and also gained on those ahead, who in turn experienced a drop in their relative power. Now, new nations are industrializing and gaining in power on the present leaders despite the latter's con-

tinued economic modernization. The power gains that a nation achieves through economic modernization do not continue at the same rate after an initial period even if economic development continues at a fast pace. The nation simply grows richer but does not become proportionately more powerful. No one knows exactly where the inflection point on the power curve lies, but there seems little doubt that the power curve flattens out after rising steeply during the early stages of industrialization.

A similar pattern exists as far as political mobilization is concerned. There are obvious gains in power when a nation first expands its political network to incorporate as active participants a sizable proportion of the national population. The nation whose government can channel its economy, raise and dispose of large tax revenues, count on the informed support of its citizenry, and enlist large armed forces if necessary, will gain rapidly in power over nations that have not yet taken such steps. And it will gain power in catching up with other countries that preceded it. But again the gains are limited by the similar actions of other nations.

One author has written elsewhere of this "power transition":

The result has been that first one nation and then another has experienced a sudden spurt in power. It is like a race in which one runner after another goes into a brief sprint.⁷

Perhaps a race that is also a multidirectional tug of war would be a better simile.

There are additional limitations that apply specifically to the capacity of a nation to utilize and to increase its effective population above a certain point. The "nation" is a metaphor for the sum of the individual citizens and groups that compose it. Nations neither make decisions nor take actions. In most nations, one specific group, the government, has been assigned the major responsibility for acting in the name of the nation; but the government's success in converting its intentions into actions is dependent upon its ability to mobilize and to utilize various elements of the effective population and the resources that they control.

Government in any system can be considered simply one powerful group among other powerful groups. To the extent that it is *primus inter pares*, it owes its position to the fact that it controls resources and can exercise power over a broader spectrum than other groups. The effective population is also organized into groups that control resources (including their own skills), have extensive networks of relationships, and pursue goals, but usually within a fairly narrowly defined range.

In order to achieve its goals, the government must often seek support from other groups within the effective population. It does this, not by mobilizing the entire effective population, but rather by forming coalitions with particular groups whose support will be most valuable. To gain this support, the government must be prepared to make concessions, grant favors, or yield resources. Thus, there are costs in mobilizing the effective population.

The most useful coalition partners are, of course, those that control the most resources; and it is precisely these groups that are likely to have the largest number of relationships with others, the greatest complexity of ongoing activities, and the largest number of goals. They are also the groups that require the most resources to carry on their existing programs and to achieve new goals. In order to alter their behavior to distract them from their present activities, it may be necessary to reward them heavily. As a general rule, it can be said that the greater the potential utility of a coalition partner, the higher the cost that must be borne to win his support. Furthermore, if a group is politically developed, it is likely to have a strong interest in the nature of the government's objectives. If its goals are compatible with those of the government, it is probably efficient to pay even a high price for its support; but if, as is often the case, the group intends in the long run to pursue goals which differ from the government's, then many resources will have to be dissipated in assuring its continued loyalty and support.

It is also possible for the government to obtain support from groups outside the effective population. In doing so, it increases the size of the effective population (that is, it includes them among those who make a contribution to the realization of national goals), though the level of their effectiveness may remain low. The less skilled and organized the group, the less costly it will be to obtain it as a coalition partner. The problem with such partners is that they are not very useful, for they command few resources beyond their own persons. Perhaps the most frequent use made of noneffectives is as soldiers or, occasionally, as mobs to intimidate effective groups. An appearance of mobilizing mass support is often made by governments. But it often turns out that only a small number of leaders have been mobilized and that they do not in fact control and cannot commit the behavior of their "followers," for the latter have never been tied into any network that would make them members of the effective population.

Viewing the effective population as a resource might make it appear that the larger it is, the better, and that the nation that succeeded in incorporating virtually all of its adult population into the effective population

would command maximum power; but it is by no means clear that this is the case. It appears equally probable that there is some optimum level beyond which the effective population becomes dysfunctionally large.

Members of the effective population do not stand by in idle isolation waiting for the government to call for their contribution. They organize themselves into groups and networks and form coalitions of their own in pursuit of their various interests. Their divergent groups compete for scarce resources and fight one another when their goals conflict. Some of these groups become so large and so powerful that they compete with, oppose, and occasionally even dominate the national government.

If the effective population is "too large," the government may find that it commands few resources of its own and that its flexibility in making and changing coalitions is thereby decreased. It may also find that its efforts to form successful coalitions are inhibited by internal bickering and factionalism. On the other hand, when the largest and most powerful groups within a highly effective population are unified, it becomes extremely costly for the government to redirect their activities, so costly that the government may find that it has surrendered more in payoffs to its partners than their assistance was worth. Under these circumstances, the government will find itself in a position of weakness, where it has decreased its ability to achieve its goals.

SHIFTING POWER PATTERNS

We have said that the power of nations is determined in important measure by the size and effectiveness of their effective populations and that a given nation will experience an increase in its power if it increases its effective population through population growth, economic modernization, or political mobilization. We have also seen that there are limits to the growth in power that can be achieved through any of these means: that population growth beyond a certain rate cannot be absorbed into productive labor, but becomes a growth in the dependent population rather than an increase in the effective population; that economic modernization and higher economic productivity beyond a certain point become ways of making the nation richer without producing a commensurate increase in power; and that political mobilization beyond a certain point produces groups and coalitions that the government has difficulty harnessing for the achievement of national goals. In each case, it is not clear whether there is an optimum point of increase beyond which the nation's power actually diminishes or whether there is simply a diminishing return in the power gained. But, in either case, the power increments

gained eventually taper off. Finally, the nations of the world have not all gone through this power transition together, but have experienced their greatest gains in power at different times, each gaining in turn at the expense of the others.

Up to this point, we have simply stated these propositions as theoretical generalizations. However, a brief look at the history of world politics in modern times reveals that this is precisely what has happened. The power stratification of the international community at any one time, the shifts in that stratification over time, and the resulting conflicts are clearly traceable to differential changes in effective population.

Let us begin with a consideration of international stratification. It is customary today to divide the world into strata as developed, developing, and less developed nations. (The last term is pejorative, and is constantly changed to avoid offense. It has progressed from "backward" to "underdeveloped" to "undeveloped" to "less developed" or even "developing," though this last term seems better applied to a middle strata.) These are not simply descriptions of economic development, though they are often phrased as such, but refer also to political and social structures. In addition, they characterize, to some extent, a power status, for ever since the Industrial Revolution the world has been dominated by the developed nations.

As a group, the developed nations have all enjoyed marked advantages over the presently less developed nations, both in their present position and in the case with which they achieved it:

1. They were the first to industrialize and had the advantage of increasing their effective populations rapidly while the rest of the world "stood still" (or developed much less rapidly).

2. With the notable exception of Japan, they began their industrialization at a point where they already had a higher level of economic productivity and a lower rate of population increase than the less developed nations have today, thus facilitating the absorption of new millions into the effective population.

3. Population growth and economic growth were rapid as development proceeded, and these nations passed from nonindustrial to industrial status. (France was an interesting exception in regard to population growth.)

4. Rapid growth was sustained for a considerable period of time. Simon Kuznets has described the resulting gap between the developed and the less developed strata:

In general, over the last century to century and a half per capita product grew much more

rapidly in the presently developed countries; and since they, with the single exception of Japan, entered on modern growth with per capita product already well above that of the less developed countries today, these international differences must have widened. And the rapidity with which they widened was largely a function of the unusually high growth rates in the developed countries.

But, until very recent decades, population also tended to grow more rapidly in the developed countries (except for France) than in the less developed. This meant that both per capita and total product grew at much higher rates in the developed countries—and relative economic magnitudes shifted in favor of that group.⁸

This gap in economic efficiency and in power between the developed and the less developed strata made it possible for the developed nations to conquer and to dominate the less developed countries, first through colonial rule and more recently through subtler forms of economic and political domination. The result has been to impede still further the development of these nations, for their overlords and "senior partners" have shaped their economies to serve their own ends and have used their power to encourage rulers who will not disturb the status quo.

Thus, the presently underdeveloped areas (and they are, indeed, underdeveloped) face many handicaps as they undertake to modernize, increase their effective populations, and go through their own power transition. They start late, from an economically poorer position, under the political domination of others. They differ from their European predecessors in that many of them have undergone considerable political modernization and effected considerable political mobilization even in advance of economic modernization. This would appear to offer an advantage, but it has also brought problems in that it has helped to place these nations in a demographically poor position to increase their effective populations.

This last point requires some explanation. Fertility and mortality respond to different environmental stimuli. Fertility patterns are influenced by widely shared social values and are implemented by repeated individual choices. Changes in social values are not easily brought about by governmental action; and the high fertility characteristic of most peasant societies does not drop sharply (at least, this has been the historical experience up to now) until economic modernization and urbanization, with their accompanying life styles, are well advanced.

Mortality, on the other hand, is more likely to change in response to structural changes within the society. When governments establish sanitary facilities, institute health programs, or reorganize food distribution, the effects upon mortality are immediate. Political modernization, then, may have an immediate, visible effect upon mortality; but it is unlikely to have as direct an effect upon fertility.

It is demographically significant, therefore, which pattern of modernization a nation pursues. In Western Europe and the United States, economic and social modernization had been sustained for a considerable period before political modernization and accompanying governmental programs brought a significant reduction in mortality. Thus, fertility and mortality rates dropped together, with a gap between them large enough to assure substantial population growth, but not so large that the growth could not be absorbed into the effective population.

The presently developing world is pursuing a different course. Relatively high levels of political modernization are producing governmental programs that reduce mortality while the peasant economy and social system remain relatively intact. The result is low mortality combined with high fertility, producing the contemporary population explosion. Such rapid population growth, coming in advance of economic modernization, disturbs the delicate balance of economic and demographic factors that is required to produce a larger effective population.

The current stratification of the international community into levels of economic development and the resulting domination by the most developed nations are directly related to differential mobilization of the effective population. So, too, are the shifts of power within the top group of nations.

Kuznets has described the varying rates of development within the group of the most developed nations:

... The interesting aspect is that the same rapid shifts in economic magnitude, caused by wide differences in the growth rates of per capita product, population, and total product, are found *within* the group of developed countries. Despite the fairly high rates of growth of per capita product over long periods in all developed countries, usually well above 10 per cent per decade, and despite the impressive rates of population growth in most of these countries, these rates and those for total product differed widely among the countries themselves. Consequently, over the long periods, there were drastic shifts in relative economic magnitude.⁹

In other words, these nations all developed by increasing their economic productivity and their population size (and their political mobilization as well). All increased their effective populations, but they did not do so *at the same rate or at the same time*. Using per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as an indicator, Figure 1 shows the changes that have occurred in economic productivity in a number of nations over the years.¹⁰ Figure 2 shows changes in total output (total Gross Product). GDP, like GNP, gives a rough indication of the combined effect of size of effective population and level of economic productivity. It also approximates an indicator of relative national power.

Figure 1 shows the distinct stratification of developed versus nondeveloped nations in terms of economic productivity. Figure 2 shows that they are also stratified in power, though India's extremely large population lifts her into the upper group. (The logarithmic scale distorts the magnitude of differences but is necessary if such a range of differences is to be encompassed in a single graph.)

The graphs also show how nations pass each other due to their varying rates of development, and how even rapidly rising economic productivity is not sufficient to guarantee a nation world leadership if it is forced to compete with larger nations that are also modernizing. Recent history is encapsulated as Britain passes France and both are passed by the United States and the Soviet Union. Germany's challenge to Britain and France is also suggested.


PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

The political consequences of these shifts in power are highly significant. More than any other factor, they explain the underlying reasons for world conflict.

At any given period, the most powerful nation heads an international order that includes some of the powers of secondary importance and also some minor nations and dependencies. In recent history, the dominant nation has always been a large industrial nation whose economic and political modernization have provided it with the largest highly effective population. As additional large nations industrialize, the old leader is challenged, for the distribution of wealth and privilege is no longer coincident with the distribution of power. If change cannot be effected peaceably, the challenger may turn to military conflict to achieve its goals. It may seek to dominate the existing world order (as in the German threat that culminated in World War I) or it may seek to establish a rival international order (as in the case of the Soviet challenge today).

If the distribution of power among nations

Figure 1—Changes in Economic Productivity (Per Capita Gross Domestic Product)




Note: Source of data prior to 1870 differs from that after 1870. See Reference 10.

remained the same for centuries, the powerful would eventually shape the world to their liking and there would be perpetual peace (though not perhaps justice). It is when power shifts that the peace is broken, for the power passes to the dissatisfied who will use force, if necessary, to change the status quo.¹¹

The danger of war is greatest, not at the moment when one great nation catches up with another in power,

but rather in the years just before that point is reached. Perceptions and misperceptions play an important role here, for it is at this period that each side is most likely to miscalculate the power of the other. A challenger that has risen rapidly may easily become infatuated with its own new strength and overestimate its ability to defeat its rivals. Nazi Germany made such an error, and so did Imperial Japan. A dominant nation, used to the privileges of power, may fail to make any accommodation to the needs of a new rival and may either minimize the

Figure 2—Changes in Total Economic Output



Note: Source of data prior to 1870 differs from that after 1870. See Reference 10.

threat or overreact when a new challenger begins to assert itself. The United States has exhibited both attitudes in regard to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

Miscalculation is commonplace where a nation has gained in power through internal developments rather than external aggression. Underestimation of a nation's

power is particularly likely when the basis for increased power lies in the political mobilization of new effective population, for which we have no measure, rather than in increased economic wealth, which the modern world calculates so closely.

There is perhaps no way that a dominant nation can guarantee its preponderance indefinitely in the face of

larger modernizing challengers, but an accurate understanding of the mainsprings of power will maximize its power and security.

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POPULATION PROCESSES
AND IMPROVING
THE QUALITY OF HUMAN LIFE

Testimony of George Zeidenstein, President of the Population
Council, before the Select Committee on Population
House of Representatives 20 April 1978

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Select Committee:

My name is George Zeidenstein and I work as President of the Population Council, an independent, nonprofit, research, training, and technical assistance organization that is international in the composition of its Board of Trustees and its staff, as well as in the nature and deployment of its activities. The Council was established in 1952 at the initiative of John D. Rockefeller 3rd and seeks to contribute to knowledge and the capacity for improving human welfare through its research and services in the broad field of population.

Since 1965, I have devoted my working life to development efforts in poorer countries; during about eight of those dozen or so years, I was resident in Asia - first as Director of the Peace Corps in Nepal and later as Representative of the Ford Foundation in Bangladesh. In those positions, my concerns covered the wide spectrum of development activities, including population activities.

The intensity and complexity of my experiences in those situations of paradoxically mixed poverty and beauty taught me that tendencies to oversimplify frequently characterize even the most dedicated efforts to be helpful to others. We want to see and describe problems clearly and succinctly and to attack them unequivocally and effectively. But some problems are too complex for that approach. We need to be particularly aware of and cautious about tendencies to oversimplify when we focus on population issues because here we touch upon the most intimate and private aspects of people's behavior toward one another and upon their most vital strategies for family and community survival.

For example, global population numbers and projections of what they are likely to be at future times express an important element of reality. Yet there is a danger that in focusing on global numbers and defining a global population problem we may divert attention from the importance of improving the quality of life of people already here. In fact, these are the very people whose decisions about family size and child spacing are the major determinants of future population growth. And those decisions are affected by the quality of their lives.

Similarly, even those of us who are firmly convinced that population growth rates in many countries are too high for sustained balancing of resources and people need to perceive those situations from local vantages. At the same time and even more importantly, we need to assist in strengthening the local human and institutional capacities to identify and deal with population problems. In this way we can help to provide strengthened bases for collaboration and cooperation rather than be seen as dictating to others what we think is best for them or, worse yet, what we want them to do because it is best for us.

We should associate ourselves only with programs that keep the well being of people affected by them at the center of attention. That is, we should not be prepared to trade the well-being of today's people for presumed benefits to be enjoyed by generations in a future world about which our predictions are bound to be imperfect.

For example, heavily target-oriented projects for providing contraceptives can become projects for imposing contraceptives. When this happens violations of fundamental human rights can be made to appear legitimate and can even become institutionalized. Again, pegging development assistance levels to degrees of success in reducing population growth rates can mean withholding assistance from the very people who need it most. Application of such triage concepts against the citizens of countries with population growth rates thought to be excessive would be shameful.

Although there is more than one definition for the phrase "quality of human life," adherents of most definitions would agree, I think, that an acceptable quality of human life means more than mere survival. In addition

to food and shelter, people require the wherewithal to lead lives of dignity and purpose within the contexts of their own societies and cultures; this seems always and in all places to include decent opportunities for health, physical security, education, and socially valued productivity.

There are important connections between population processes and improving the quality of human life. In fact, population issues and quality of life issues are interdependent. They interact with each other and they affect each other both causally and consequentially. Regarding fertility, as the quality of life enjoyed by people rises, their desire to limit family size frequently rises, too. On the other hand, rapid population growth can aggravate and intensify many of the kinds of social and economic problems that make it difficult for poor people to experience improvements in their general welfare.

But, if one is to avoid over-simplification, it must be recognized that rapid population growth is not the sole or even the main cause of the widespread poverty in many places. In fact, for the rural poor in large parts of the world, high fertility makes good economic and social sense for several reasons. For example, in many poor countries, where the household is the center of economic activity and unpaid family labor may be critical, a surviving child can be expected to produce more than he or she consumes; motherhood remains the main source of status for women whose other contributions to the family and the community tend to be undervalued; and grown sons are the principal providers of social security for parents in old age.

Thus, as we think about population and improving the quality of human life, we see that the two are definitely related in important causal and

consequential ways, but we cannot simply and comfortably conclude that high fertility is the cause of low quality of human life or that fertility reduction insures its improvement. Indeed, if a country lacks demonstrated commitment to improvement of the living conditions of its poor, we should be uncomfortable about family planning posters and slogans that it issues attempting to convince people they will be better off with a two-child family than with some larger one.

If those of us whose principal development focus is population are to concern ourselves with improvement of the quality of human life - and I believe that that should be the central objective of all development work - then we have to see high fertility as one of several threads in the complex tapestry of people's lives. Seen this way, high fertility is a problem mainly in relation to other important threads of the life-fabric: for example, to patterns of disposition and consumption of resources; to inequities in the distribution of capital, income, and social and economic opportunities; and to inadequate realization of the full potentials of women and men. Therefore, at the same time that we concern ourselves with reduction of excessively high or rapid population growth we must also concern ourselves with the other developmental and structural problems that block substantial improvement in the quality of human life for the great mass of the world's poor.

What does this perspective mean for US policies? Does it mean that investments by the National Institutes of Health in biomedical research on human reproductive systems and in new contraceptive technology should be reduced or that the family planning programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development should be curtailed or given lower priority? Not at

all. Definitely not. The funds allocated for these activities are vital and there is a pressing need to increase them in order that people everywhere - the poor as well as the rich, the rural as well as the urban - become able to implement their desires about child spacing and limitation of family size with safe, effective, and convenient contraceptive means. To achieve this goal, a variety of new contraceptives are needed; widely available, nonclinic-based delivery systems must be emphasized; information about contraceptives that is accurate and understandable needs to be provided to prospective users.

Major challenges with regard to contraceptive development cannot be met with the limited fundamental knowledge so far available. For example, the chances for development of safe, effective, convenient contraceptives for men will remain slender until a great deal more is known about the physiology of the male reproductive system. Advancement of this important frontier of knowledge requires that even larger amounts of funding than before be made available for basic biomedical research.

With regard to service delivery, it is only in recent years that community-based delivery systems have begun in a few countries to extend contraceptive services to the countryside and to the urban poor. Most rural and urban poor people in the world are not yet adequately served by existing family planning programs. More resources are needed both to extend the use of already available practical knowledge and to develop still more through applied research before we can satisfy people's needs for readily available contraceptives and related information.

Very little has been done thus far and much more needs to be done to assist countries in strengthening their own capacities to evaluate the safety and health effects of fertility regulation programs and, where necessary, to modify contraceptives in order to suit local needs. In particular, physicians and social scientists in the poor countries need to be assisted in developing statistical, epidemiological, and pharmacological skills.

But in addition to continued and increased investments in resolving these concerns, all of which are essentially on the supply side of the fertility regulation equation, we in the population sector of development work need to increase our attention and to draw the attention of our colleagues in the other development sectors to the demand side - that is, to those development undertakings that help to improve the quality of human life for poor people and, at the same time, to increase their demands for smaller families and the contraceptive services with which to achieve those ends.

We know that activities which tend to make nations richer but to increase gaps between their rich and their poor do not serve well either the purpose of improving the lot of the poor or of increasing their desires for smaller or better spaced families. We have still to learn how to do more effectively the kinds of development work that do tend to improve the quality of human life for poor people. In particular, we need to pay greater attention to implementation of development projects at grass roots levels and to evaluation of the demographic impacts of those projects.

In this way, relatively small investments in basic and applied research charged against population budgets can have potentially immense influence on the ways in which vastly larger development budgets - for example in agriculture and rural development - are spent.

The point is that development programs in sectors other than population have a tremendous impact on population processes and if those programs are adequately informed and designed with population considerations in mind, population objectives as well as the primary sectoral ones can be included. Steps in this direction were mandated for the first time in § 104(d) of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977, an immensely forward-looking, positive, and potentially important piece of legislation.

I am not suggesting that we who are in the field of population activities should undertake general development assistance. Rather I am suggesting that all development programs in addition to their primary or intended impacts have substantial secondary impacts on population processes; that attention should be given to designing those programs in ways that increase their beneficial and decrease their detrimental impacts on population processes; and that we whose work is population should encourage, support, and conduct the necessary basic and applied research to inform those in a broad range of other development programs how best to include population concerns in the design and evaluation of their work.

We do not have all the answers to these questions yet. The state of scientific knowledge about population and development relationships is imprecise. But more is known about the directions of these relationships than is yet being fully utilized in the design of development projects. Development inputs that are helpful both toward improved quality of human life and toward smaller family size desires are those that provide opportunities for education, particularly for girls and women; improvements in health, especially of rural poor people; increased employment; and better income distribution.

There is a growing body of experience with appropriately scaled development projects that are succeeding in changing the life contexts of the individuals they seek to serve and changing them in ways that tend to make the small family more socially and economically desirable. We need to identify and analyze such programs and to disseminate their experience more broadly in the development community.

Additionally there are a growing number of practical economic-demographic models that permit prediction and measurement of population effects of various kinds of development inputs. Further work with such models is needed and, again, their implications need to be made widely known across the development community.

To advance applied research, we in the population field need to encourage, support, and even undertake small-scale projects in other development sectors where these projects seem to offer promising insights into population and development relationships. Here again, our objective should be to inform the other sectors of the development community and promote their broader application of the findings.

One of the most important areas for selectively increased development assistance - and one in which experience bears out the contention that this is an area with which we in population should rightly concern ourselves - is that of improving the social and economic status of women and recognizing and strengthening their productive roles in their societies. This element of needed development activities is of major importance both for improving the quality of human life and for reducing excessive fertility.

It is now clear that in the more than twenty years of major development undertakings in various fields, women have been badly neglected. Although women have always been active participants in the economically and socially productive activities of their families and communities, recent efforts toward modernization have tended to exclude them. When there was something important to be provided by governments and their foreign development financiers, it was provided only to men. New knowledge, better inputs, more credit are only some of the elements of modernization that men received and women were denied.

Everywhere, among the poor, women are the poorest of the poor. Their exclusion from modernizing efforts in the last twenty years in the poorer countries has aggravated their relative poverty. In many places, the principal if not the only available source of status (which equates with economic security) for women is motherhood. So long as a woman is producing sons, her status is reasonably high and her life secure. When she stops, the uncertainties of her life increase. Because women are half of the productive population and because they are all of the reproductive population, development efforts in the future need to be consciously designed to tap their productive potentials and serve their needs.

Here again, the question arises, "How shall we do it?" And again, the response is that although the available knowledge is not as complete as we would prefer, there is much more known than is being used in the design and implementation of policies, programs, and projects. Let me give an example.

The Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) of Bangladesh has established a network of women's cooperatives based on agriculture. A central

element of the project has been the recognition - evolved over many years by those closest to the original women's program of the Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development at Comilla - that women are motivated by rational self-interest. (Their husbands were readily acknowledged long ago to be so without any requirement of sophisticated research to prove it.) Because they are women in a society in which men have the overt power, Bangladeshi women have had to devise their own special ways to look out for themselves. Thus, changing their behavior requires attention to their special needs as well as those that they share with their husbands. Accordingly, in the IRDP project, it is recognized that, just as their husbands do, the women need economic resources - including credit - and opportunities to enjoy improved profits before they are likely to be motivated to change behavior that has worked for them in the past. But, in addition, and equally important, it is also recognized that the status that Bangladeshi women achieve from seclusion is itself a valuable asset for them and occupies a valid position in the overall equation of their self-interests. Therefore, the IRDP women's cooperatives provide credit and opportunities for profit along with useful training and improved health and family planning services - but they do so in ways that allow women to participate without violating the rules of purdah.

As the project continues, the rules of purdah may themselves change, as part of a dynamic process whereby women begin to transform social and self-concepts in response to tangible new possibilities. It is this transformation - the expansion and broadening of women's roles and status, the provision of alternatives to high fertility - that leads to situations in which small families are socially and economically desirable and in which demand for

contraception will grow. In fact, the demand for contraception among the women participating in the IRDP project is substantially higher than the demand in surrounding areas.

Only as the quality of life of the individual is altered will the demand for children be altered. A primary role for those of us in the field of population assistance is to encourage activities that will insure that people everywhere will be able to implement their desires about child spacing and family size with safe, effective, and convenient means for family planning. But at the same time, I believe we should be deeply concerned and intensively engaged in identifying and promoting those development projects and programs that improve quality of life and at the same time increase the demand for family size limitation.

Increasingly, our development work needs to be done collaboratively with governments and local institutions in the poorer countries. United States efforts that are perceived as dictation to other countries or groups within those countries cannot be fully effective. Accordingly, a tremendous need remains for US development assistance to be focused on enabling poorer countries to strengthen their own capacities on both the social and the biomedical side for population-related research, training, and delivery of services. In particular, there is need to support and encourage local constituencies that favor attention to population issues and that favor population programs and population-relevant development programs. These constituencies can be achieved only by local people who have become committed to understanding and resolving population matters - they can be an important product of capacity-building activities.

I have had occasion to review some of the issues mentioned here this morning in greater detail in two publications that I would like to offer for the record of these proceedings. The first is entitled "Strategic Issues in Population" and was published in Population and Development Review, and the second is entitled "Including Women in Development Efforts" and is forthcoming in World Development.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my views.

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REVIEW

George Zeidenstein

Strategic Issues in Population

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Strategic Issues in Population

Within the broad context of development, population has generally been seen as a sectoral concern, with family planning as its primary component and with its own objectives, agencies, programs, and funding requirements. This approach is valid in situations in which there are large or growing pools of demand for birth planning or latent demand that can readily be stimulated by education and exhortation. In this context, current issues are fairly concrete. Although they are frequently difficult, it is relatively easy to hold them in programmatic focus.

The hard core of the population problem lies elsewhere, however—precisely in those situations in which requisite degrees of demand do not exist and cannot be generated by skillful application of red-triangle posters and puppet shows. Here the issues are a good deal less concrete and perhaps more fundamental. It is more difficult to keep them in programmatic focus. The mechanisms for identifying and resolving the issues appear to lie in a broader approach to population policy development. Such an approach involves identifying and altering the intervening variables that affect individual fertility behavior. In the first section of this paper, I attempt to raise issues surrounding this approach, particularly as it responds to some of the problems of the sectoral approach in situations in which demand for fertility regulation services is at a low level or even absent.

Although the developing countries in which demand for fertility regulation services is sufficient for large-scale family planning programs to be effective are in the minority, their numbers are increasing, and the demand for assistance in initiating such programs is likely to continue to grow. Thus, in the second section I raise current issues in the sectoral approach to family planning programs.

The final section describes some of the issues confronting the international

community in offering assistance to developing countries in creating and implementing population policies and programs.

Policy Development

Population policy is still usually organized sectorally by governments (typically under the command of the ministry of health and family planning). However, development policies in general—and especially certain key facets like education, rural development, employment, urban-rural wage differentials, and income distribution—have a strong influence on the kinds of behavioral changes required to affect population variables. Even though the relevant relationships cannot be readily quantified, a systematic scanning of socioeconomic policies from the point of view of their anticipated demographic effects would be a potentially important contribution to the policymaking process.

Improving National Policymaking Processes The prevailing line of thinking that seeks to identify development-population linkages and then searches for specific programs or program components to manipulate each linkage has not proven adequately fruitful. Inevitably, that approach seems to involve conceptualizing the policy agenda as a long list of specialized levers competing for the attention of centralized policymaking bodies. As a rule, organizing effective programs capable of manipulating more than a few of these levers is beyond the financial and organizational capacities of concerned governments. After all, not only is there a diverse array of population action programs for policymakers to consider, but population itself is just one of the many development issues they have to tackle.

Thus, priorities have to be established, but the complexity of the problems to be solved seems to prevent isolated lines of attack from working well. Failure of a particular programmatic action becomes an argument to try another lever and, in turn, to explain lack of success in the new endeavor by the absence of simultaneous effort on related fronts. Program is piled upon program. The process seems both wasteful and bureaucratically bloated. Yet simultaneously, it is certifiable as underfinanced, starved for skills and resources, and inadequate for the task at hand.

One response to the steady accretion of specialized action programs is the current search for integration by the creation of multipurpose programs with numerous specialized subcomponents. However, in multipurpose programs, gains in balance tend to be negated by organizational complexity and a resulting inefficiency. Administrators of, say, integrated rural development programs resist the introduction of population components because they are reluctant to further stretch an already overloaded administrative structure.

To have an impact on population, development (including population “components”) has to be integrated, indeed, organically integrated. But the complexity that centralized integrated programs involve seems to present an insurmountable obstacle. How is this dilemma to be resolved? How can this complexity be broken down to manageable pieces without sacrificing organic integration? One answer may be the movement toward smaller territorial units rather than

functionally specialized vertical components. Perhaps a key strategic task is to strengthen areal capacities, or, if none exist, create them, to handle developmental tasks and find the optimal distribution of functions among the various levels. In other words, it may be that a key issue for the late 1970s and into the 1980s is structural reform: a shift of attention and emphasis from the results of particular development programs to the search for better structures for going about the business of development.

Sectoral allocations of public investment, specific design and content of major development projects, and, more generally, the style of development policy are likely to be affected if the anticipated demographic impact is adequately considered in deliberations of policymakers. Examples of institutional mechanisms that might influence decisions are (a) appointment of high-level population units as suggested in the World Population Plan of Action (paragraph 95); (b) consideration of population impacts in advance of major allocation and program decisions; and (c) periodic preparation of country-level comprehensive analyses assessing demographic-developmental relationships and evaluating alternative development policies in their light ("status reports"). Concerning (b), most often identification of the anticipated population impact would introduce only a supplementary consideration into benefit-cost analyses. However, the cumulative effect of such consideration on the overall direction of social and economic policy would be important.

Going Beyond Population Policy as a Sector Activity The natural tendency of the international community to favor policy action promising relatively speedy, tangible, and direct payoffs and to favor actions calling for infusions of technology and other resources requiring foreign exchange has made family planning programs occupy center stage in the arena of internationally sponsored population policies. In contrast to other approaches, family planning programs can be carried out as reasonably well-defined sector activities, with their own sizable cadres, software, and high and intermediate technology. (An issue not discussed here is whether alternative ways of organizing such a sector activity have been considered. The striking similarities among the corresponding governmental programs in a large number of diverse developing countries—almost invariably highly centralized pyramids—suggests a negative answer.)

By now, limitations of such a single-sector approach are appearing, particularly in countries where population problems are most severe. As a result, there is a salutary search for additional policy approaches. However, there may still be too strong a sectoral inclination within the international community. The objects of the search seem still to be programs that are "fundable," "tangible," and "population-labeled." Even the current interest in "integrated" approaches seems to imply development programs that contain or carry ("piggy-back," as it were) identifiable birth planning subcomponents. More organic alternatives need to be identified or created.

Bucharest's message, correct although neither well spelled out nor yet adequately digested, is that fertility behavior is a reflection of the socioeconomic structure and its pattern of change. Hence, fertility behavior is not likely to be amenable to manipulation by a set of compartmentalized projects. The strategic focus of attention should be development itself, and, accordingly, a second key

issue on the population policy agenda is to understand how overall development strategy and the small-grain structure of development policy affect population changes, and then to apply that understanding in development policymaking.

Far from deflating the importance of population considerations in guiding the development process, this view might elevate them to a place of influence that they do not now have. That influence would not need to be measured mainly by the size of "population" items in budgets, nor would it depend on relabeling parts of relevant programs as their "population components." For example, inclusion of women as visible and active participants in a rural development project, an improved social security scheme for the aged, development of a network of rural savings institutions, promotion of a functional literacy project for urban adult women, or a public works project need not be labeled as "population components" even if the arguments for their adoption and styling have been materially influenced by consideration of their expected demographic effects.

Varieties of Policy Intervention To successfully modify aggregate demographic processes in a socially desired direction, public policy must affect their behavioral roots in the family and its individual members. The two ultimate targets—complementary rather than alternative—of policy intervention are (a) individual preferences affecting demographic choices and (b) the objective factors, and their perception by individuals, that condition and constrain those choices. This proposition is briefly elaborated here with examples regarding fertility. However, it is equally applicable to all facets of demographic behavior, including mortality, nuptiality, and migration.

Changes in both (a) and (b) tending on balance to reduce fertility are spontaneously engendered in the process of socioeconomic development; however, conscious policy choices can reinforce change so as to speed up the decline of fertility. To do so, policy interventions must generate one or more of the following impacts as perceived and experienced by the individual women and men who make the choices:

- Change individual norms regarding childbearing and sexual behavior. Policy intervention examples: education, exhortation, propaganda, to establish new values and standards on age at marriage, sexual behavior outside marriage, parental obligations, and norms concerning the quality of children's upbringing, and to change aspirations about lifestyles or present new models of behavior that increase expectations of material consumption or accumulation of physical or human capital.
- Increase direct costs (in the broadest social sense) of children payable by parents. Policy intervention examples: change the ways in which education is financed, manipulate tax laws.
- Increase indirect costs of children. Policy intervention examples: increase women's opportunities in gainful employment particularly when it is strongly competitive with childbearing and child rearing, manipulate tax laws.
- Increase relative costs of children. Policy intervention examples: manipulate access to and prices of competing goods by increasing exposure to

and decreasing relative costs of consumption goods, producers' goods, and financial savings.

- Increase opportunities for upward social mobility for oneself or one's children or felt need to resist erosion of one's social status when these are positively related to limiting fertility. Policy intervention example: redistributive measures that compress differences between adjoining social strata in the income-distribution pyramid.
- Decrease productive contribution of children to the household economy. Policy intervention examples: compulsory schooling, child labor regulation, increased parental access to alternatives for old-age security.
- Reduce frequency of infant and child deaths, that is, reduce the number of births needed to reach a desired number of surviving children. Policy intervention example: support programs to improve child health and speed up reduction of infant and child mortality.
- Reduce costs of practicing birth planning. Policy intervention examples: assure easier, more dignified access and use, greater safety and convenience and effectiveness, lower price, of birth planning services and information.

This list is not exhaustive and the examples are merely suggestive. In contemplating the problem of specific policy design in any given situation, one immediately encounters the problem of inadequacy of the knowledge base on which policy design can draw. In many instances of key causal relationships, even their direction is not known; more typically, their quantitative strength can only be guessed. Accordingly, the payoffs to improvements in knowledge are potentially very high. Thus, there is a strong case for policy-oriented social science research in this field. This research needs to focus not only on the "rational person" approach underlying the above examples; it needs to concern itself as well with impacts of political considerations and with cultural and other social norms that affect demographic behavior.

The family planning approach covers essentially the last item on the list above and, to a smaller extent, through its communications components, the first item. What is common to the first seven items on the list is closeness to other development issues—that is, they involve changes in the patterns of development. Questions of proof of fertility impact need not arise any more in these cases than in the case of reducing the cost of practicing birth planning. The historical record of Europe and Japan and the contemporary experience of several more rapidly developing countries of the developing world provide evidence of the fertility impact of changes in the variables listed.

Birth Planning Services and Information

In the preceding section I presented a respectful view of the limitations of the single-sector, top-down approach, which supplies birth planning services and information in centralized programs. I questioned the assumption of that ap-

proach—that enough demand exists at the household level; and I questioned the feasibility of organizing and maintaining centralized mechanisms for delivering service of sufficiently high quality on a sustained basis in areas of greatest need. The first problem calls for demand creation: mechanisms to discover, explicate, and assert the collective interest in lowering fertility, and to translate this into individual behavior; the second calls for a solution to the major flaw of the centralized supply system—it is energized from above rather than from below, where the demand is supposed to be. Both problems focus attention on the weakness of intermediate-level social organization and, therefore, on the critical strategic need to remedy that weakness. But there is a continuing and significant role for single-sector programs in addition to the approaches recommended in the preceding section, and the following observations are based on this conviction.

The rapid social change taking place in many developing countries is creating demand for fertility regulation along the classical lines: by providing positive and negative incentives for lower fertility at the household level. Demand is not as soft as pessimists claim. In any case, its growth represents a rising tide. Furthermore, birth planning programs themselves contribute to speeding the tide. Similarly, obvious weaknesses of the supply programs organized thus far to meet demand are not beyond the reach of conventional prescriptions. Greater attention by governments, better financing, better training of cadres, and sheer persistence, among other things, can make a big difference.

Several analysts credit the widespread appearance of fertility declines, as measured on the national level, to existing family planning programs. Also, despite Bucharest, national appeals for more outside assistance for launching new family planning programs, or expanding and sustaining existing ones, have not slackened. In fact, much demand for such assistance remains unmet. Thus the strategy of the international community with respect to support of delivery of services and related communications systems should be to hold the course firmly but improve and extend performance.

The central issues that need to be resolved can be grouped in the areas of objectives, means, and evaluation.

Broadening Program Objectives Presumably all will agree that arresting excessive population growth remains an objective. What is “excessive” requires serious consideration in various regional, national, and subnational contexts. Beyond this general objective, other, more specific objectives should be priority issues for the international community.

Improved service should be an objective in itself. Arguably, more than enhanced demographic impact could be achieved. If the availability and use of birth planning services and information can in itself be a change agent, the quality of service—the dignity and ease with which it can be obtained and used—could be an important variable. Similarly, reaching rural people and the urban poor should be special objectives for the years ahead. The major delivery efforts of the past seem not to have reached either group in significant numbers in more than a small number of countries. And, finally, direct and current improvement of human welfare should be seen as an objective of programs and projects for the delivery of birth planning services and information.

Improving Program Means Greater flexibility and experimentation with different delivery systems are needed. The ideal is that the widest varieties of technologies be available to the widest groups of potential users. Integration, decentralization, involvement of women as actors, and use of commercial sectors may be important leads to follow and develop. And, while the demand creation role of information, education, and communication has not proven to be strong, their long-term contribution to changing attitudes and behavior has not been fully explored. We need to know more about China's experience in order to improve our own programmatic means. More attention should also be given to similarities and differences at regional, national, and subnational levels, their implications in program terms, and the extent to which decentralization is necessary, appropriate, and possible.

Sterilization and abortion services need to be available along with the other birth planning services. Recent activities in India have increased political sensitivity about sterilization immensely; likewise, abortion is an inherently sensitive subject and is legally restricted or prohibited in many countries. Nevertheless, with careful attention to local circumstances, the international community could play an important role in assisting governments and other local institutions to ensure that effective, safe, and dignified means are available to as many citizens as possible for voluntary sterilization and voluntary induced abortion (where legal).

Abortion is common throughout the world, whether legal or not. Where it is illegal, poor women who avail themselves of inadequately skilled abortion practitioners are often maimed or killed. Good birth planning services and information are one positive response to this problem. There are others—especially through provision of training and facilities for treating incomplete abortions and offering birth planning services (IUDs, perhaps) to women receiving service.

Rural people are not likely to be well served if sterilization and abortion services are restricted to a formal health infrastructure that does not extend very far into the rural areas. In countries with inadequate rural health infrastructures, it may be possible to train midwives or other paramedics to perform safe and effective abortions using available simple techniques. Additionally, simplification of safe and effective sterilization and abortion techniques may be an important focus for future biomedical research.

Evaluating Achievement The overwhelming emphasis of evaluation has been on demographic impact, and techniques for evaluating the demographic impact of family planning and other birth regulation programs have become highly sophisticated. This emphasis has led to the neglect in some instances of other forms of evaluation that would provide useful insights and has often imposed excessively heavy collection chores on delivery systems and on the persons who should benefit from these systems.

Evaluation should seek to include measurement of opportunity costs. Some observers say, for example, that international emphasis on government programs may have foreclosed the growth of other systems that perhaps would have been more effective and long lasting. Similarly, the possible modernizing impact of birth regulation programs should be evaluated, since there are indications they may contribute to development in a broad sense. From the program management

point of view, evaluation of the quality of service experienced by clients and identification of weaknesses in and means to improve program operations would provide valuable information for decision-making.

The data production load borne by many delivery programs may have an important negative impact on the willingness of people to use the service. This load and the corresponding demands on the client could be lightened significantly if evaluators would avoid using the day-to-day program activities as a data source for nonaction-oriented data collection. The latter is more appropriately relegated to sample surveys.

ICARP (the International Committee on Applied Research in Population) and ICOMP (the International Committee on the Management of Population Programs) are useful examples of networks of professionals from different countries with different experiences but broadly shared objectives, the former conducting evaluation from a social demographic point of view and the latter from a management point of view. These networks should be strengthened and expanded and should coordinate their activities. Both kinds of research are needed, and neither alone is sufficient.

Perhaps additional networks need to be established not only in the delivery field but in the fields of social scientific policy research and contraceptive development as well. It might be a challenge for the international community to take the initiative to devise and fund initially the establishment of additional networks as international mechanisms for evaluation and exchange of information.

Complementarity of the Two Approaches

It would be incorrect to see the policy implications of the preceding sections as representing polar opposites or alternatives. Many specific national situations call for remedial action both through broad policy development and through sectoral provision of birth planning services.

In areas in which sectoral family planning programs are currently under way or planned, there are a number of steps "beyond family planning" that are worthy of serious programmatic consideration now and that lead logically into the more organic integration of population with other development efforts suggested in the first section.

Breastfeeding Prolonged lactation has substantial demographic and health effects in extending the time between births. It has a further beneficial health effect for children where adequate facilities for bottle feeding or adequate nutritional supplements are not available. In addition, breastfeeding enhances immunogenic capacities in babies. But the practice and duration of breastfeeding in developing countries tend to decrease with modernization. Effects of the shift from breastfeeding to bottle feeding are dramatic in many poor countries not only in a demographic sense but also in the poorer health of infants.

Programs could be undertaken to counteract pressures, propaganda, and other factors that encourage women to shift from nursing to bottle feeding—especially in situations in which contraception is not available or acceptable and

in which extended nursing is desirable for the health of the infant. Such programs could also involve education of medical and paramedical personnel, as well as education of women themselves, about benefits of breastfeeding. Various factors would need to be taken into consideration if such projects are to be supported. These include the potential conflict between breastfeeding and wider roles outside the home for women and better understanding of the optimum duration of nursing from the health point of view for mother and infant and from the demographic point of view. Such programs would be logical complements to already-existing family planning programs.

Changing the Roles and Status of Women The hypothesis is that as women are afforded increased opportunities to participate in economic activities outside the home, their self-esteem and their value in nonmothering roles as perceived by other family members will increase, and they will enjoy greater degrees of participation in decision-making about their own lives and the well-being of their families.

Although the demographic impact of projects to improve the roles and status of women might be indirect, the assumption is that it would be substantial in the long run, through a rise in age at marriage, reduction in the number of children desired, and increase in the spacing of births. Projects could be especially tailored to benefit poorer segments of society, both rural and urban. They could involve formation or strengthening of networks of women's organizations providing a basic infrastructure for bringing birth planning information and means to the attention of participating women.

Community-Oriented Strategies Community-orientation implies greater attention in overall development strategy to such goals as reducing poverty rather than increasing aggregate wealth, increasing food consumption rather than increasing aggregate food production, improving health conditions rather than creating more medical infrastructure. In addition, community-oriented strategies seek to expand the areas in which individuals have control over the choices that affect their lives. Community-oriented approaches imply shifts in management responsibility and accountability away from centralized agencies toward more local ones. The hypothesis is that community-oriented development would create demand for birth planning, in addition to its other benefits. In the context of community-oriented development, a formal family planning program could become organically integrated with other development projects within the community.

Given the range of approaches outlined with respect to policy development and birth planning programs, how does one select which approaches to use when and where? The most effective way to examine the agenda may be to start with a recognition of the greatly divergent national situations that underlie population and development issues and the diversity of responses called for. Korea is unlike Bangladesh; Iran is different from Egypt. Propositions that are valid for Brazil make less sense for the Dominican Republic. A broad categorization of poorer countries, reflecting the combined influence of such factors as developmental stage, resource endowments, international trade prospects, population

size, and cultural-political factors, could be an essential first step toward defining priorities and differentiating between the kinds of contributions the international community could usefully make in each situation.

Participation of the International Community

The international community has made significant contributions to the various dimensions of national population policies and birth planning programs. The potential for the international community to assist individual countries in these areas continues to be great. At the same time, the very nature of the relationship between the international community and individual countries is changing. Different perceptions of population problems at global, national, and individual levels, cultural and developmental diversity, perceptions of women's roles, and North/South differences are some of the issues that need to be clarified and resolved if the international community is to make its maximum contribution to country efforts to implement policies and programs.

The Global Population Problem versus National Population Problems A substantial share of the international flow of resources supporting population programs seems traceable to global concerns, which seem to manifest supranational interests in modifying national demographic processes. Yet most of the deleterious as well as the positive effects of demographic behavior are contained within national boundaries. The main, often the only, motive force for governmental action is perceived direct national interest. And even perceived national interest is sometimes clouded by what is seen as outsiders' intrusion into the domain of national decision making, for motives that are suspect.

A balance must be struck between stress on global concerns with population processes and stress on the sovereignty of national states and the diversity of national population problems. The international community can play a useful role in monitoring the global situation, informing individual countries of possible global impacts of their local problems, and conveying information to them about the global situation that may relate to national issues. At the same time, the only feasible arena for action on population issues is at the level of the national state or within the national state. At this level, the primary role of the international community should be to assist individual states in developing and implementing their own policy and program initiatives.

These issues are complicated further by questions about the degree of responsibility that the international system claims or is willing to assume and sustain for conditions in the constituent states. International responsibility would suggest a right, even a duty, to be involved in matters that affect international contributions to problem-solving. Conversely, international involvement with national population policies, if the recipients of the advice cooperate, entails assumption by the advisors of a degree of responsibility for the well-being of the population affected—an obligation that is not well recognized or defined but nevertheless seems implicit.

A much greater degree of consciousness and clarity within the international community concerning the rationale for and philosophy of their actions might help clear the air and, by the same token, might lead to sounder policies.

The National Interest versus Individual Interests The issues just outlined at the international level are echoed within each nation. Governments perceive a national population problem and seek to solve it, often by appealing to the national interest. However, national interest is rarely sufficient to motivate individual behavior; the art of population policy is to find ways to harness individual motivation to serve social goals.

In the past the international community may have introduced or reinforced a disproportionate stress on aggregate formulations of the population problem and a corresponding disinclination to analyze population issues from the point of view of the individual or relatively homogeneous subgroups within the national population. This bias may have contributed to misjudgments about the potential effectiveness of certain types of governmental population policy actions and may have resulted in failures to explore more adequately ways in which individual motivation could be affected. To the extent that it is responsible for this bias, the international community should try to use its influence on national policy-making processes to rectify the bias. However, international participation in national policymaking processes should be limited primarily to promotion of a better understanding of alternative choices that are available (capacity development and deployment).

Cultural and Developmental Diversity There may also be an excessive tendency in the international community to see population problems and their potential remedies as only minimally culture-specific. The great diversity of economic and social conditions reflected in social structures, resource endowments, sizes of countries, and their trading potentials, for example, has often been largely overlooked in analyses focusing on the similarity of certain overall demographic characteristics, such as levels of fertility, trends in population growth and mortality, or the status and dynamics of age distribution.

Similarly, suggested policy prescriptions are too often insufficiently sensitive to cultural differences that affect, among other things, the relative valuation of economic gains and noneconomic values such as conformity to social norms. This may have generated unrealistic notions about feasible and desirable future patterns of development and demographic change.

Conversely, international stress on certain human rights and values as universal may retard national action that could result in attractive policy trade-offs when measured by local standards. By the same token, if such national action nevertheless materializes, the international community may find itself in a quandary about its responsibility. The issue here is to find proper balances between universally applicable norms and the play that must be given to social and cultural pluralism within the international system.

Role of Women in Policy and Program Development Very few women participate in the councils where population and other development policies are made. Nor are there substantial numbers of women high in the agencies where

population programs are formulated or implemented. This is equally true in the international community and in national organizations. Because women are the principal "targets" or "objects" or "beneficiaries" of most family planning programs and other birth regulation undertakings, the virtual absence of women as actors in the policymaking process and at senior levels of the program formulation and implementation may affect these processes adversely.

At the same time, it appears that few women are both available for the work and adequately qualified. The international community should make a concerted effort to help increase the pool of interested and capable women. In the past, interest on the part of the international community in increasing the numbers of, say, agricultural economists has made an important difference.

North and South Population as an interest of the international community has become imbedded in North/South and new economic order debates. This may be related to poor-country perceptions that the main interests of the wealthy international community are limited to short-term demographic change in the poor countries and rapid, cost-effective distribution of contraceptives rather than to improvement of the welfare of individuals. If such a perception is, in fact, correct, the international community needs to respond to it, both by broadening the scope of its interest in population, and by making that scope clearly known.

Closing Comments

In this review I have attempted to group the current issues in two broad areas: population policy development and related cultural, social, and political and behavioral factors, which have received increasing attention in the 1970s and appear to suggest significant new leads for the 1980s as well; and design, operation, management, and evaluation of birth planning delivery systems and information, the dominant approach of the 1960s, and an approach for which demand seems to be escalating rather than diminishing in this decade. The first of these areas is new, largely untested, and it is in this area that the scope for new theoretical work, new programs, and sharing of new approaches is greatest. In the second area, the challenge is more to reassess past efforts and past and present directions to ensure that efforts do not become so institutionalized that they fail to move in new directions more responsive to needs.

The international community can make substantial contributions in both these areas, but in order to do so, it must be continuously responsive to the needs of the countries it assists. Thus, in the third section of this paper, I have tried to identify some of the political, ideological, and sociological issues that affect relationships between the international community and the individual countries receiving assistance. Open recognition of these issues and mutually satisfactory resolutions of them in particular situations are crucial to success in the two areas of strategic intervention described here.

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Note

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Including Women
in Development Efforts

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INCLUDING WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

Based on my experience during more than a dozen years devoted to development activities in poor countries, it is my conviction that development undertakings cannot succeed unless the contributions, potentials, and needs of women who will be affected by them are understood and addressed at every stage of planning and implementation. I include but do not limit myself in this statement to those development undertakings with specific population objectives.

In making the statement, I am measuring success and failure against the objective that development programs and projects should bring about sustained improvement in the well-being of affected individuals and societies and should bestow benefits on *all* of them.¹ I am aware that women are no more an undifferentiated group sharing all interests than men are. Just as there are differing class and other social and economic interests among men, so, too, with women. Nevertheless, it is my view that in every development situation there are, indeed, identifiable contributions, potentials, and needs of women that can be adequately understood, addressed, and integrated into development undertakings. A rich literature concerning women and development, which has expanded substantially during the past five years or so, supports this view.² Yet, the literature remains very little known among development specialists. Why?

Why is it that so little substantive attention has been paid to women in development? Why have few serious efforts been made to strengthen women's productive activities and broaden their opportunities to realize their full potentials? Why is it that the relevant literature is so neglected and the process of learning about women's roles so mysti-

fied? Finally, why is it that women's concerns are generally seen by planners and programmers as welfare rather than development matters or as narrow sideline elements of development rather than one of the central perspectives for the whole development process?

In my opinion, the answer to these questions is that political, attitudinal, and conceptual blocks have been erected by hierarchies prejudiced by male-defined standards and modes and by male-oriented conceptual frameworks.³ Consider, for example, the complaint that knowledge about women is too scanty to allow sufficient analysis to support policy formulation and programmatic action. One hears this repeatedly and often from decision makers expressing the desire to include women in their development undertakings, "if only there were more knowledge available so that this could be done." But, clearly, there is already more relevant knowledge available than is being used in the process of policy formulation or program planning and implementation. Moreover, development planners and programmers are well accustomed in most countries to operating on imperfect knowledge in other areas, and development specialists everywhere make important decisions and commitments daily on equally unsatisfying knowledge bases. What is known about women is ignored or undervalued but, at the same time, lack of attention to women in development programs is attributed to paucity of information about them. Yet, on other subjects decision makers eagerly seek out and willingly act upon knowledge that is no less imperfect. This is a troublesome paradox that implies powerful prejudice.

The negative consequences of omitting women from development activities are dramatic. The Commission on the Status of Women of India examined the cumulative effect on women and girls of 70 years (1901-71) of development and found high rates of displacement from the paid labor force, increasing migration (two to three times the

rate for males) attributable in part to destitution, and, most striking, increasing mortality of females as compared to males, resulting in a declining sex ratio.⁴

Unfortunately, India is not an isolated example. Development activities around the world are omitting women as productive participants, and the consequences are disheartening.

The time has come for policy formulation and programmatic action based on a strong conviction that the participation of women is essential to the success of development efforts. There is enough already known about women's roles, and there are enough fairly obvious ways to find out more, that ignorance is no longer an acceptable excuse for inaction. Nor is it an acceptable justification for continued application of research standards that require higher degrees of proof in this area than are generally required in others.

Development *can* address the contributions, potentials, and needs of both women and men, once it is realized unequivocally that women's behavior influences a country's development as much as men's does, that women behave in response to their own realities—which must be acknowledged and directly addressed in development activities—and that positive action is possible and overdue.

Let me turn now to some specific areas in which programmatic action could be taken without further deliberation. Examples could be drawn from a wide spectrum of development sectors, but perhaps the clearest ones are to be found in the areas of food production, nutrition, health, and contraception. In each of these areas women play an essential role; in each, development efforts in the past have largely overlooked women's roles and their needs and have failed to recognize their potentials; yet in each area substantial accumulated experience points the way to useful programmatic action.

Food Production

Most women in the Third World are rural and poor.⁵ They are directly and immediately involved in food production. On average, they work 10-15 hours each day.⁶ Although there are important regional differences, these women participate in virtually every phase of food production: ground preparation, planting and transplanting, cultivating and weeding, harvesting, preserving and processing, storing, transporting, and marketing. Women also manage poultry and other livestock; process fish and fruits; produce most domestic goods; and provide most of the services essential to the effective working of the family production unit.

Thus, the contributions of women to national economies are not only important but also highly visible to anyone concerned with understanding how traditional, rural families survive. Nevertheless, women's work and their economic and social productivity have remained largely uncounted in national tabulations, which frequently borrow inappropriate concepts of work, employment, and productivity from highly industrialized countries. Furthermore, during the past 20 years, major development efforts around the world have almost completely ignored women's part in food production and provision. Evidently, people believed women's roles in subsistence agriculture were an artifact of "underdevelopment" instead of recognizing them for what they are: a key source of successful development—improved yields and better nutrition.

During the earliest years, the community development years, the food production effort was to increase yields by improving local practices within the existing technologies. Even though women were comprehensively involved in using and transmitting the very local practices sought to be improved, when the new technologies were introduced, they were delivered only to men. Later, when it was realized that new technologies could not be used

effectively without added resources, the additional resources were handed over to men only, limiting the opportunities for women to increase their production and move toward modernization.⁷

It would be inexplicable to *continue* ignoring women's food production roles in the planning and implementation of programs and projects intended to increase the output of food.

The priorities for programmatic action are not obscure. What has been learned about increasing men's productivity will be useful for women as well. Women's work in food production and handling can be assisted by new seeds, fertilizers, labor-saving technologies, training, and credit facilities. Improved methods for food harvesting, preservation, and storage, and poultry and live-stock management—which are the near-exclusive domain of women in many parts of the world—must no longer be neglected or imparted only to men, if overall food production is to be increased and nutrition levels are to be improved.

In many cases programmatic action involves simply extending to women opportunities already provided to men in development programs. Evidence from Kenya, Peru, and India suggests that women will seek out and use agricultural innovations and credit—even where special efforts have not been made to reach women.⁸

Programmatic action must be tailored to the needs of women in specific contexts. This has been the underlying premise of the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) of Bangladesh, which has established a network of women's cooperatives based on agriculture.⁹ A central element of the project has been the recognition—evolved over many years by those closest to the original women's program of the Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development at Comilla—that women are motivated by rational self-interest. (Their husbands

were readily acknowledged long ago to be so without any requirement of sophisticated research to prove it.) Because they are women in a society in which men have the overt power, Bangladeshi women have had to devise their own special ways to look out for themselves. Thus, changing their behavior requires attention to their *special* needs as well as those that they share with their husbands. Accordingly, in the IRDP project, it is recognized that, just as their husbands do, the women need economic resources—including credit—and opportunities to enjoy improved profits before they are likely to be motivated to change behavior that has worked for them in the past. But, in addition, and equally important, it is also recognized that the status that Bangladeshi women achieve from seclusion is *itself* a valuable asset for them and occupies a valid position in the overall equation of their self-interests. Therefore, the IRDP women's cooperatives provide credit and opportunities for profit along with useful training and improved health and family planning services—but they do so in ways that allow women to participate without violating the rules of *purdah*.

As the project continues, the rules of *purdah* may themselves change, as part of a dynamic process whereby women begin to transform social- and self-concepts in response to *tangible* new possibilities.¹⁰ The IRDP project was designed as a dynamic process. The staff of the project believed from the start that rural women *already* constitute a significant network of development resources which can extend from the community to the government and serve within the community as an agency of positive change—so long as the women's real self-interests are learned and addressed.

Programs must be flexible enough to change as more is learned about women's needs during program implementation. For example, a project in Upper Volta began with the objective of increasing attendance of girls in local schools.¹¹ It was soon

realized that providing more teachers would not necessarily address the problem and that the poor attendance was largely caused by an even greater problem: the heavy workloads of women—and girls—in the area. The project sought ways to reduce women's workloads. The introduction of grinding mills into the village led to collective decision making about management of the mills, increased income for the village women, and higher productivity. The women themselves began to define new directions.

Programs can begin *before* all is known or understood: A project can be a powerful engine for generating the knowledge required for its own development. As the Upper Volta example illustrated and as a quote from those involved in assessing the Bangladesh project sums it up:

Since a project is a process of initiating and monitoring change, it cannot have a totally fixed programme that can be set in place in the beginning with predictable results. There are too many unknowns that cannot be discovered until women and their families respond to the introduction of new resources. Then the potential for change that existed as a latent force in what might have seemed from the outside as a static or "conservative" situation becomes revealed.¹²

Additional examples could only reinforce the points made here: Rural women in traditional societies are vitally involved in food production. It is not particularly mysterious or difficult to include attention to women's contributions, potentials, and needs in designing and implementing food production programs and projects. Moreover, it is counterproductive to fail to do so.

Nutrition

Poor, rural women prepare virtually all the food their families consume. Traditionally, nutrition programs and projects seem to have focused on teaching women what foods to eat and how best to prepare them; yet, often such strategies have failed to consider the realities of the women's situations. Even after women have learned which foods are best, they may not have enough control over resources for food production to decide what food-stuffs the family needs to cultivate. Often more nutritious ways of preparing foods are far more time-consuming than traditional methods; yet projects have failed to consider whether the women have the additional time needed for such preparation or whether this time would be spent at the expense of time needed to produce food. Nor has the possible resistance of the family, and particularly the husband, to innovations in diet been taken into account. (In poor, traditional societies the consequences of a husband's displeasure can be severe.)

Projects are needed to determine why women prepare the foods they do in the ways they do and whether they can make use of new information within the realities of their lives. In most parts of the world the daily diet is relatively balanced and would be adequate if there were more of it.¹³ Thus, nutrition programs must be integrally related to programs designed to increase the access that women have to resources for food production and the control that they have over the yields of their labor.¹⁴

Many poor women complain that they usually feel weak and frequently are sick. Yet the emphasis of many nutrition programs has been on women as nurturers of others: food preparers, bearers of children, sources of human milk. Programs must also recognize that women need nutritious foods when they are *not* pregnant or nursing.

Recently, nutrition and other health-related programs have been increasingly concerned with the trend away from breastfeeding in many areas of the developing world in which equipment for hygienic bottle-feeding and contraceptives to protect the mother from early subsequent pregnancy are not readily available. It is especially important to consider women's self-interests when examining changes in patterns of breastfeeding and designing programs to promote breastfeeding. Women's work roles and breastfeeding are not always compatible. In rural areas, changes in agricultural practices may push the land farmed by women so far away that carrying a nursing child to the fields is very difficult. The opportunity to work for pay during harvest periods may motivate a woman to migrate temporarily and make prolonged breastfeeding impossible. Poor women in the cities frequently work in some capacity—such as domestic service, industry, or street-selling—in which breastfeeding is discouraged or difficult. In the same urban environment, they receive commercial messages and inducements to use powdered milk.

The Protein Advisory Group of the United Nations has recently undertaken a study of women's roles in food production, food handling, and nutrition. One of their conclusions is that society must make an overall greater effort to be responsive to women's needs while breastfeeding if it is to stem the trend away from breastfeeding. Their comment:

Other [policy] options, especially those that allow breastfeeding, deserve consideration. They include creches at the work place where mothers could nurse their babies, communal day-care centers (where alternative feeding could be carried out under hygienic conditions), part-time working hours for women and communal transport from the work place to the home for nursing. In rural areas, the need for special arrangements for women working far from home may be greater than has been believed, especially on account of seasonal variations in their work schedule.¹⁵

Health

Women treat their own health problems and those of their family members with home remedies, or with the help of some local practitioner or respected older woman if things look serious, or by going outside their family or community circle to some "professional." Their responses to illness in the family are integrally related to the other elements of their situations.

The professional they would seek when all else failed might be, but certainly would not *necessarily* be, a practitioner of allopathic medicine. Yet, most projects to deliver health services to poor people rely almost entirely on allopathic medicine—and most of it is delivered at centers that are more or less distant from large proportions of the people they are supposed to serve.

Increasing the numbers of physicians and hospital beds and the quantities and sophistication of modern curative facilities is unlikely to be central to improving the overall health of poor, rural people. Women are likely to want to use the health services that fit best into the overall patterns of their lives—unless it is fairly clear that some less convenient option is *much* more likely to succeed. If the known local remedy or help within the community is likely to work, why go outside to some unknown professional? Doing so is often frightening and difficult. Distance alone means economic and social costs. All too frequently, for women these costs include disrespectful and undignified treatment from strangers.

What benefits in seeking professional health care outside the community offset these rather clear costs? Unfortunately, the benefits are not at all certain. Thus far, it has not been shown that health care available at the modern centers that health care programs and projects have provided produces a markedly higher cure rate than local, traditional forms of care.

Programs are needed to educate and train the mem-

bers of the traditional health care network that poor, rural women are most likely to rely on. Well-trained local health workers—responsible to the community rather than to some distant government and supplied with basic modern medicines to supplement the local resources—are more likely to prove effective in serving women and their families.

Programs to train rural midwives provide many examples of successful integration of “modern medical techniques” into women’s traditional health care system. Thus, in the rural province of Bohol in the Philippines, the maternal-child health and family planning program identifies and trains traditional birth attendants (*hilots*) in antiseptic delivery techniques. Over 75 percent of the identified *hilots* have been trained, and this has led to substantial improvements in maternal and particularly infant survival, including a striking decline in tetanus among newborns.¹⁶

Programs are also needed to encourage women to be active in the health management of their families and themselves, conducting self-diagnosis and treatment and self-referral to supportive backup services. In Indonesia, for example, a health care program employs mothers as “basic health workers” backed up by family planning field workers.¹⁷ This program trains women to carry out specific tasks in the areas of child nutrition, maternal health, and treatment and prevention of common diseases. The design and content of the training was based on an understanding of the time and resources available to women, and the procedures were built as much as possible on traditional medicine and local concepts of health. For example, in Java, a raw egg mixed with honey is widely believed to cure many illnesses, and this already accepted and useful practice has been promoted both as a nutritional and curative measure.

At the same time, efforts should be made to understand and reduce the costs that women incur in using outside health facilities and to increase the benefits such facilities can provide.

Contraception

Women are the principal consumers of the services that contraceptive programs are supposed to deliver. Yet women's priorities as they perceive them are generally not addressed in the design and implementation of such undertakings.¹⁸ Often women have been viewed narrowly and objectified as targets of, rather than participants in, programs meant to benefit them.

Excessive emphasis at the point of service delivery on demographic targets, numbers of "acceptors" required to achieve them, and levels of "motivation" required to yield the acceptors—rather than on quality of service—is unlikely to promote real caring and attention to individuals. Although the ultimate objective of such target-setting is presumably a social good, the actual operating focus that generally flows from it seems to come to rest far afield of the well-being of the people directly affected. Their levels of satisfaction become a remote aspect of the work—even a forgotten one.

Because childbearing imposes large health risks on mothers, and the health risks to newborn and young children are also high, contraceptive materials, services, and information should be a required part of every primary health care system. This does not mean that health care systems should be the only, or even the main, channels for delivering contraception. Nor does it mean that contraception can be considered exclusively, or even primarily, a health service. On the contrary, contraception should be made available in every possible way consistent with safety and effectiveness. And the justifications for it should include the rights of women to control their bodies and, when appropriate, social judgments on the desirability of controlling fertility as a means of reducing rates of population growth for the overall good of the particular society.

To be safe and effective (that is, to address the central concerns of users), contraceptive means and

services must be accompanied by information that helps people understand how the available contraceptives will work. Women need not only to have contraceptives made readily and discreetly available to them but also to know what to expect from the contraceptive they choose and what to do if something unexpected and alarming happens. The counterproductive consequences of instances in which it was decided to tell less than was known, or to simplify what was told to a level of near meaninglessness—presumably because users were illiterate—range from widespread fear when unanticipated side effects become manifest to serious complications when significant side effects go untreated because women have not been informed to associate them with the method used and to seek treatment accordingly.

Projects are needed in which the key providers of services are respected members of the community itself, whose responsibility is to the individual members of the community rather than the government and to whom women can turn with confidence and security both for service delivery and for supportive follow-up.

Contraceptive delivery programs, like programs in food production, nutrition, and health, need to use a community-orientation strategy.¹⁹ Community orientation in overall development strategy means greater attention to such goals as reducing poverty rather than increasing aggregate wealth, increasing food consumption rather than increasing aggregate production, improving health conditions rather than creating more medical infrastructure. It implies shifts in management responsibility and accountability away from centralized agencies toward more local ones that are deeply committed to and responsive to the community members.

Conclusion

My thesis in this paper is that development activities cannot achieve their full potential if women's interests continue to be neglected. Programs directed to women—programs to deliver nutrition, health, or contraception services—rarely take into account the complexity of women's roles as child-bearers and rearers, food producers and processors, and household managers, and the possibility these roles can conflict with as well as supplement each other.²⁰ Too often the timing and quality of services and the nature and amounts of information have been inappropriate. Too seldom have women's competing priorities been understood and addressed. Programs directed at food production have in most instances completely ignored the vital role women play in this area.

In all four categories, development efforts could be increased if visions were broadened to include the breadth and complexity of women's roles, and if planners could seek to understand what is acceptable and accessible within "women's cultures"—those world views that are distinct from those of men and that are particularly intense with regard to the nurturing of families. Examples have been given to show that it is possible and not unusually difficult to design and implement development activities that include attention to women's productivity and social roles.

I am convinced that development activities cannot have much value for *any* of us if they do not have a positive value for women.

Notes

1. This is consistent with the principles stated in *Report of the World Conference of the International Women's Year, Mexico City, 19 June-2 July 1975* CESI.E29 (New York: United Nations, 1976).

2. Among recent bibliographic sources are Mayra Buvinic, *Women and World Development: An Annotated Bibliography* (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1976); and May Rihani and Jody Joy, *Development as if Women Matter: A Third-World Focus: An Annotated Bibliography* (Washington, D.C.: Secretariat for Women in Development of the New Trans-Century Foundation, forthcoming 1978).

3. See Gerda Lerner, *The Female Experience: An American Documentary*, American Heritage Series, no. 90 (Indianapolis, In.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1977); and Hanna Papanek, "Development planning for women," *Signs* 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1977): 14-21.

4. *Status of Women in India: A Synopsis of the Report of the National Committee on the Status of Women (1901-1971)* (New Delhi: Indian Council of Social Science Research, 1975).

5. In Africa, about 80 percent of women fall into this category; in Asia, 75 percent; and in Latin America, 45 percent. See Nadia Youssef, "Social structure and the female labor force," *Demography* 8, no. 4 (November 1971): 427-440. For slightly different figures on urban/rural distribution, see Kingsley Davis, "Asia's cities: Problems and options," *Population and Development Review* 1, no. 1 (September 1975): 71-86.

6. For time-use studies that include rural women, see Mead T. Cain, "The economic activities of children in a village in Bangladesh," *Population and Development Review* 3, no. 3 (September 1977): 201-227; *The Data Base for Discussion of the Interrelationship between the Integration of Women in Development, Their Situation and Population Factors in Africa* ECA CN 14/SW/37 (Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 1974); and Moni Nag, Benjamin White, and Robert C. Peet, "An anthropological approach to the study of economic value of children in Java and Nepal," *Population Council, Center for Policy Studies Working Paper*, no. 11 (1977).

7. This is a central theme of Ester Boserup's classic study, *Women's Role in Economic Development* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970).

8. For descriptions of how women secure resources even where special attempts have not been made to reach women, see Kathleen A. Staudt, "Women farmers and inequities in agricultural services," *Rural Africana*, no. 29 (Winter 1975-76): 81-94; and Carmen Diana Deere, "The agricultural division of labor by sex: Myths, facts and contradictions in the Northern Peruvian Sierra," paper presented to the panel on "Women: The New Marginals in the Development Process," at the Joint meeting of the Latin American Studies Association and the African Studies Association, Houston, 2-5 November 1977.

9. Taheranessa Abdullah and Sondra A. Zeidenstein, *Village Women of Bangladesh: Prospects for Change* (forthcoming 1978).

10. S. P. F. Senaratne, "Micro studies, employment and the strategies of development," unpublished (1975).

11. *United Nations Development Program in the Republic of Upper Volta. Report Given at African Regional Conference. Prepared for Nouakchott, 27 September-2 October 1977*, mimeo; and personal correspondence and discussion with Brenda McSweeney and Scholastique Kompare, who are evaluating the project (report forthcoming 1978).

12. Abdullah and Zeidenstein, cited in note 9.

13. Robert H. Cassen, "Population and development: A survey," *World Development* 4, nos. 10-11 (October-November 1976): 785-830.

14. Ingrid Palmer, "Food and the new agricultural technology," UNRISD Report No. 72.9 (1972); and Clio Presvelou, "The World Food Programme and women's involvement in development" (Rome: World Food Program, 1975), mimeo.

15. Wenche Barth Eide et al., *A Report on: Women in Food Production, Food Handling and Nutrition with Special Emphasis on Africa. Final Report of the Protein Calorie Advisory Group of the United Nations System* (June 1977), Vol. 13, mimeo.

16. Unpublished reports submitted to the Population Council by the Bohol Province Maternal-Child Health/Family Planning Project, Department of Health, Republic of the Philippines.

17. For a fuller description of this program, see Janeliot Rohde and Robert S. Northrup, "New type of basic health services world-wide and the implications for the education of other health care professionals," paper presented at the Bellagio Consultation, May 1977, mimeo.

18. For a fuller discussion of women as a constituency in family planning and the complexity of policy issues, see Judith Bruce, "Setting the system to work for women: A review of the UNFPA guidelines," *Populi* 4, no. 1 (March 1977): 36-42; Bruce, "Women's organizations: A resource for family planning and development," *Family Planning Perspectives* 8, no. 6 (November-December 1976): 291-297; Adrienne Germain, "Status and roles of women as factors in fertility behavior: A policy analysis," *Studies in Family Planning* 6, no. 7 (July 1975): 192-200; Germain, "Women at Mexico City: Beyond family planning acceptors," *Family Planning Perspectives* 7, no. 5 (September-October 1975): 235-238; and Fatima Mernissi, "Obstacles to family planning practice in urban Morocco," *Studies in Family Planning* 6, no. 12 (December 1975): 418-425.

19. For a discussion of family planning in an urban and a rural community context, see Susan Scrimshaw, "Lo de nosotros: Pudor and family planning clinics in a Latin American city" (New York: Columbia University, International Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction, January 1973); and Mely G. Tan, "The social and cultural context of family planning in Indonesia" (Jakarta: National Institute of Economic and Social Research [LEKNAS], n.d.), mimeo.

20. Elizabeth King-Quizon, "Time-allocated home products in rural Laguna households," paper presented at Symposium in Household Economics, Manila, May 1977 (to be published in *Philippine Journal of Economics*, forthcoming); and Robert Evenson, "Time allocation in rural Philippine household," paper presented at the meeting of the American Economic Association, New York City, December 1977 (to be published in *American Journal of Household Economics*, forthcoming 1978).

Statement of James P. Grant*
 President, Overseas Development Council
 Before the
 House Select Committee on Population
 April 20, 1978

POPULATION STABILIZATION, THE PQLI, AND MEETING BASIC NEEDS BY YEAR 2000

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate this opportunity to testify on the important subject of the interaction of population and the quality of human life. This Committee is to be commended for spotlighting the potential contribution of development assistance to progress on this important issue. Actions by the United States through its assistance and other programs affecting the progress of developing countries can contribute importantly to determining whether the world's population, now above four billion, stabilizes in the next century at approximately eleven billion as indicated by present trend lines or at a substantially lower level. The human and societal stakes are huge. Assuring the coexistence of anything like eleven billion people--at far higher individual consumption levels world-wide than those of today--would require staggering changes in the world's political, economic and social institutions.

Any development assistance strategy, therefore, that fails to accord a central place to population is seriously deficient. Family planning programs have a vital role to play in slowing population growth; they deserve greater support from most national governments and from the United States Government than they get today.

Very importantly, and this is the point on which I wish to dwell today, development strategies that effectively improve the quality of life of the poor majority also have a vital and probably indispensable role in achieving population stabilization in most countries. As George Zeidenstein, President of the Population Council, said in July, 1977, at the Bellagio III Population Conference:

Fertility behavior is a reflection of the socioeconomic structure and its pattern of changes...The strategic focus of attention should be development itself, and...how overall development strategy and the small-grain structure of development policy affect population changes."

The views expressed in this testimony are those of the witness, and do not necessarily represent those of the Overseas Development Council, or others of its Directors, officers, or staff.

Fertility Reduction - The Contribution of Quality of Life Improvement

There is striking recent evidence that in an increasing number of poor countries birth rates have dropped sharply despite relatively low per capita income and despite the relative newness of family planning programs. More than a dozen low-income countries and regions (with highly diverse cultural, economic, and political backgrounds) have sharply decreased their-crude birth rates--by 27 to 55 per cent in the two decades since 1955--to levels of 30 and below per thousand population. These countries (or regions), which include South Korea, Kerala (India), Costa Rica, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore (and probably China as well), all have implemented unusually effective policies to improve the lot of the poor majority that have encouraged couples to desire smaller families; all of them have likewise resorted to policy measures designed to provide parents with the means to implement that desire. The common factor in these countries is that the majority of the population has shared in the economic and social benefits of significant national progress to a far greater degree than in most poor countries--or in most Western countries during their comparable periods of development. The existing evidence argues that appropriate policies for making health, education, and jobs more broadly available to lower income groups in poor countries contribute significantly toward the motivation for smaller families that is the prerequisite of a major reduction in birth rates. Combining policies that give special attention to improving the well-being of the poor majority of the population with large-scale, well-executed family planning programs should make it possible to stabilize population in developing countries much faster than reliance on either approach alone.

If the developing countries are to escape the threat posed by rapid population growth within an acceptable time frame, more families must acquire the motivation to limit births, not only be provided with improved means to

do so. Development planners--and this Congress--need to give far more attention than heretofore to the effect of alternative development strategies on birth rates. This means that the population crisis must be confronted in the broader context of the development crisis--with more emphasis on the possible ways of treating the basic "disease" of poverty and thereby creating the needed motivation for smaller families.^{1/}

Unfortunately, even though the relative proportions of the world's population that lives in abject poverty and is undernourished are declining, the absolute numbers are higher today than 25 years ago. And on current trend lines the number will be considerably higher by the end of this century. As can be seen from the chart below, the great majority of the approximately one billion currently living in absolute poverty reside in the low-income countries--commonly referred to as the Fourth World; countries whose starting levels of development are so low that, even with maximum conceivable progress, their per capita incomes by the year 2000 in real terms will only approximate the levels prevailing for the United States in 1776.

Table 1,

	Population (millions)				Per Capita Income (in constant 1975 U.S. \$)				Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI)		
	1975	Absolute	Under-	2000	1965	1975	1985	2000	1950s		
	Total	Poor	nourished	Total					(approx)	1970s	2000
Low Income Countries (LIC: \$300-per capita)	1,300	700-800	400-640	2,250- 2,100	130	150	160- 180	180- 230/330	24	39	56-78
Middle Income Countries (MIC: \$300+ p.c.)	800	150-200	80-120	1,350- 1,050	630	950	1,130- 1,350	1,510- 2,400	54	63	73-82
High Income Countries (HIC: \$2,000+ p.c.)	700	35-70	20-35	850	4,200	5,500	6,700- 8,100	9,000- 14,600	92	96	97-98

^{1/}William Rich, Smaller Families Through Social and Economic Progress, Monograph No. 7 (Washington D. C. Overseas Development Council, 1973); see Robert S. McNamara, "Accelerating Population Stabilization Through Social and Economic Progress," Development Paper No. 24 (Washington D. C., Overseas Development Council, 1977).

Fortunately, we are learning from the development experience of such diverse countries and regions as China, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, Kerala (India), and Costa Rica that overcoming the worst aspects of absolute poverty is not necessarily dependent upon achieving high per capita income. These countries have demonstrated that, with the right basic needs-oriented strategies, it is possible to achieve the levels of life expectancy, literacy, infant mortality and birth rates achieved by the United States in the 1920s and 1930s while having per capita incomes below the levels of the United States in 1776.

It is these facts—and this exciting prospect—which have led to the evolution during the past several years of the concept of seeking to overcome the worst aspects of absolute poverty by the year 2000, a concept which received the endorsement this week of the House International Relations Committee as follows:

Section 102, Development Assistance Policy (c) The Congress, recognizing the desirability of overcoming the worst aspects of absolute poverty by the end of this century by, among other measures, substantially lowering infant mortality and birth rates, and increasing life expectancy, food production, literacy, and employment, encourages the President to explore with other countries, through all appropriate channels, the feasibility of a worldwide cooperative effort to overcome the worst aspects of absolute poverty and to assure self-reliant growth in the developing countries by the year 2000. (H.R. 12222)

Effective support of this goal is indispensable if world population is to stabilize at any level significantly below the level of eleven billion that now appears likely on present trend lines.

Meeting Basic Needs by the Year 2000 - The Concept

Like most great ideas, the concept of overcoming at least the worst aspects of poverty within a relatively short time is being nourished from many sources. One such source was effectively identified by the late Senator Hubert H. Humphrey in 1973 when, in support of the New Directions legislation introduced that year by the House, he spoke of: "...the veritable intellectual revolt among scholars of development who are turning against the long-held

view that growth alone is the answer that will trickle benefits to the poorest majority..." His comments paralleled thinking emerging in many developing countries, the World Bank, key United Nations agencies and many scholars in many countries.^{2/}

Another source of support for this concept is the association that is made between basic needs and the new emphasis on human rights. Basic (physical) needs and human (political and social) rights are increasingly being seen as parallel and interconnected. President Carter on his Inauguration Day spoke of the "basic rights" of every human being to be free not only of political repression but also of poverty, hunger and disease.

The addition to the concept of seeking to address basic human needs problems in a quantifiable way within a given timeframe emerged with major force in the summer and fall of 1976.^{3/} It first came to widespread public attention with the issuance of Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One World Problem, the Report of the ILO Director General prepared for the June 1976 World Employment Conference.^{4/} This report not only presented the most thorough discussion to date of basic needs and how these might be more effectively addressed through international cooperation, but also made the far-reaching proposal that steps be taken to achieve satisfaction of the most basic needs within a given timeframe--by the year 2000. The end-of-the-century timeframe proposal proved too innovative to be accepted at the World Employment Conference; however, in the intervening months, the proposal has received a growing number of endorsements from around the world.

^{2/}See Redistribution with Growth, Chenery, et.al., Oxford 1974; Growth from Below, James P. Grant, Overseas Development Council, 1973; Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries (Adelman and C. T. Morris), Stanford, 1973.

^{3/}For an earlier presentation, see "The Changing World Order and the World's Poorest Billion: A Fresh Approach," by James P. Grant; paper presented to the 25th Pugwash Conference, Madras, India, January, 1976.

^{4/}Report of the Director General of the International Labour Office: Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem, International Labour Organization, Geneva, 1976.

By the end of 1976, both World Bank President McNamara and the Reshaping the International Order (RIO) report coordinated by Nobel Prize winner Jan Tinbergen, based on work begun long before, had come to the same conclusion. McNamara gave explicit endorsement to the idea that goals be set for overcoming the worst aspects of absolute poverty in a given timeframe in his address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank on October 4, 1976. He called for "a basic understanding" and a kind of "global compact" that would have as a major objective "the meeting of the basic human needs of the absolute poor in both the poor and middle income countries within a reasonable period of time, say by the end of this century." Later in the same month, the Tinbergen-led group of 22 international experts issued the RIO Report that called for a "global compact on poverty" between rich and poor nations, with the goal of overcoming the worst aspects of absolute poverty within countries by the year 2000.

Physical Quality of Life Index

As the concept of overcoming the worst aspects of absolute poverty within a given timeframe (for example, by the year 2000) gains support in both numbers and intensity, it is becoming increasingly evident that some readily usable measures of progress in meeting basic needs are required.

While the rate of increase of per capita gross national product (GNP) indicates general overall economic performance, it does not tell us much about what happens to the human needs of individuals at different levels within societies. Thus, the Overseas Development Council has been led to introduce a new Physical Quality of Life Index, designed to supplement GNP by providing a more specific measure of what happens to people. As described in the Annex to my testimony, the PQLI is based on an equally weighted composites of infant mortality, literacy, and expectancy of life at age one, each rated

on an index of 1 to 100 with 100 being the best. Figures for these indicators, available for societies at almost all stages of development, are consolidated into a single index that can serve to indicate non-economic human progress. Among the PQLI's many advantages is its ability to reflect distributional characteristics within countries, for countries cannot achieve high national averages of literacy, life expectancy, and infant mortality unless majorities of their populations are receiving the benefits of progress in these areas. The PQLI and the per capita GNP figures for all countries are given in the Annex.

There is, to be sure, a general relationship between a country's per capita GNP and its PQLI rating. But there are also enough divergences to indicate clearly that a high per capita GNP does not ensure a high PQLI level; and, conversely, that a high PQLI rating can be achieved at a relatively low per capita GNP level. Sri Lanka, for example, has an annual per capita GNP of below \$150 and a PQLI rating of 83, above the 80 PQLI score of Venezuela with a per capita annual income of nearly \$1,200. (Other illustrations are to be found in the annex.)

A country's birth rate, we find, is much more closely associated with its PQLI rating than it is with per capita GNP. Differences in PQLI scores, for example, can by themselves explain about two-thirds the differences in birth rates among countries with annual per capita incomes below \$2,000 annually; differences in per capita GNP can by themselves explain only 40-45 per cent of the differences in birth rates. This stronger relationship between the PQLI and the birth rate holds true for each region of the developing world, and also for the developed and developing countries when taken together.

Triple Targeting to Achieve the Year 2000 Goal

The year 2000 goal now under consideration in a number of forums for overcoming the worst aspects of absolute poverty offers a convenient time-frame for identifying goals, formulating strategies, and determining the specific

instruments of implementation that could contribute greatly toward earlier population stabilization than now appears likely. The skeletal outlines--and goals--of such a cooperative effort are now becoming visible and available for analysis and discussion. In this connection, the RIO report suggests that such a common goal for all countries might consist of the achievement of the following targets by the year 2000: life expectancy of 65 years or more (compared with 48 years at present in the low-income countries); a literacy rate of at least 75 per cent (compared with the present 33 per cent); an infant mortality rate of 50 or less per thousand births (or less than two fifths of the current average); and a birth rate of 25 or less per thousand (compared with the current 40 per thousand in the low-income countries).^{5/} In addition, it has been proposed that all countries, including those above the "floor" described above, seek to reduce by at least half the disparities between the current levels of these social indicators in their countries and those levels prevailing in the most advanced countries today.

It is also very clear that the process of implementing a basic needs strategy should make the fullest possible use of presently underutilized human and physical resources in the developing countries. This not only would lead to increased employment (which in turn would provide the income with which basic needs can be acquired) but also would generate the resources for a self-sustaining approach to meeting basic needs. To assure a self-reliant approach to providing basic needs we believe it necessary, by the year 2000, to, as proposed in the Declaration of Amsterdam:

- (1) double food production in developing countries (through means that capitalize on presently underutilized human as well as physical resources of those countries);

^{5/}These recommended goals have now received several endorsements, including further international endorsement in the Declaration of Amsterdam, the statement of the participants from five continents attending the Amsterdam Symposium on February 23-26, 1978

- (2) double per capita income in each country; and
- (3) at least halve the present disparities between the life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy and birth rates now prevailing in each country of the world and the levels achieved in the most advanced countries.

The additional costs of such a cooperative effort would be substantial, but certainly not unattainable for developing countries that are both a) determined to advance a strategy to address basic needs and achieve economic growth and b) reliably assured of sustained outside support. Studies indicate that additional outside development assistance of \$12-\$20 billion annually to the end of the century--with perhaps one-third to two-fifths from the United States--should suffice to achieve this goal in the participating countries. This expenditure might well turn out to be an investment with a return ultimately comparable to that of the Marshall Plan. By the 1980s, lower inflation rates and many millions of jobs in the industrial democracies will be dependent on the success of the developed and developing countries in reaching solution to common problems.^{6/} In an eloquent paraphrase of the late Senator Humphrey at the memorial tribute in Minneapolis, President Carter asserted that "Foreign aid is an investment in our future."

The human stakes involved in the success of such an effort are, of course, huge. If the developing world were by 1995-2000 to succeed in, say halving the disparity between its present life expectancy and the best now prevailing in the developed world, the result, which would yield an average annual 3½ per cent gap reduction over the twenty-year period as a whole, would reduce by 4.6 million annually the number of developing country deaths now projected by the United Nations as likely for the end of the century. If, as recommended in the RIO report 65 years was taken as the "floor" for all developing countries, its achievement would save an additional five million lives annually by 1995-2000, or a total of approximately ten million lives annually.

^{6/}See John W. Sewell, "Can the Rich Prosper without Progress by the Poor?," (Washington, D. C., Overseas Development Council, 1978).

Table 2.

Average Annual Number of Deaths in Less Developed Regions Under Varying Assumptions of Mortality 1975-2000 1/

Mortality Assumption	Average annual number of deaths (in thousands)				
	<u>1975-80</u>	<u>1980-85</u>	<u>1985-90</u>	<u>1990-95</u>	<u>1995-2000</u>
I. Presently Projected Trend <u>2/</u> (Life Expectancy at Birth[LE]=)	40,658 (LE=53.4)	41,595	42,187	42,662	43,094 (LE=60.7)
II. Reduction of gap <u>2/</u> in LE by half by 1995-2000 (3 1/2% annual average)	40,658 (LE=53.4)	40,353	39,714	39,001	38,306 (LE=63.35)
III. LE reaches 65 years by 1995-2000 for less-developed regions as a whole	40,658 (LE=53.4)	39,645	38,282	36,839	35,394 (LE=65.0)
IV. LE in each country reaches 65 years	39,370	38,033	36,539	34,899	33,177
V. Deaths Avoided (I-II)		1,242	2,473	3,661	4,788
VI. Deaths Avoided (I-III)		1,950	3,905	5,823	7,700
VII. Deaths Avoided (II-III)		708	1,432	2,162	2,912
VIII. Deaths Avoided (I-IV)		2,231	4,695	7,122	9,599

1/ All projections are based on United Nations 1973 medium fertility assumptions.

2/ United Nations mortality assumptions are currently under revision, with upward revision in the 1973 medium projections anticipated. Thus, the 1973 high mortality assumption is used as an approximation of the forthcoming 1978 United Nations medium mortality assumption.

3/ Gap calculated by taking a high value of life expectancy at birth as 73.3 years, the 1970-75 Swedish level, compared with a life expectancy and birth of 53.4 years for the less developed regions in 1975-80.

In summary, there is a clear and pressing need for cooperative efforts by the developed and developing--essentially Fourth World--countries to bring about a reduction in needless deaths, toward or if possible even below the levels suggested in the Tinbergen RIO report for the year 2000--a saving of some 10 million lives annually. The reduction in births can be expected to be even greater. (If all developing countries today had the death and birth rates prevailing in Sri Lanka in 1975, there would be some 13 million fewer deaths and more than 30 million fewer births in the world today.)

Conclusion

There has upon occasion been a "family planning-development debate" about the importance of one relative to the other. The debate is misplaced. Recent cases illustrate, rather, the basic complementarity between equity-oriented development and family planning.^{7/} As they indicate, there is a natural alignment of concerns between equity-oriented developers and family planners that deserves greater emphasis. Development efforts that effectively help the poor also increase interest in fertility limitation, raise clinic attendance and contraceptive acceptance, and thereby increase family planning program effectiveness. By the same token, family planning work also serves the ends of the equity-planners, for increases in contraceptive use are obviously important for long-term improvements in the lives of the poor; and family planning services are centrally important to translate the increased concern for fertility limitation brought by development into actual contraceptive use as quickly as possible.

Continued efforts to establish conclusively the dominance of one approach over the other are thus pointless. The cause of fertility reduction

^{7/}For a further elaboration of this point, see Davidson R. Gwatkin, "Toward an Integrated Population and Development Strategy," in M. E. Khan, ed., The Relationship between Socio-Economic Development and Population Control (forthcoming).

(not to mention the cause of ameliorating the human condition, to which fertility reduction is meant to contribute) can be far better served by drawing together these two complementary approaches.

Lowered fertility, of course, is not the principal objective of a basic human needs oriented development strategy. The central justification for such a strategy is to be found in basic equity considerations, in the more effective improvement in human life which a basic needs strategy is capable of bringing. But the evidence just cited clearly suggests that a more egalitarian development approach can, in addition to bringing obvious direct benefits to the poor, also prepare the way for a significantly more rapid rate of fertility decline than can a development pattern providing a disproportionate amount of benefits to elites.

The potential fertility impact of a development strategy oriented to the fulfillment of basic human needs thus provides yet one more powerful justification for support to it, as an important complement to family planning efforts.

I thus urge, Mr. Chairman, that you not feel that your population mandate need restrict your vision. As I have tried to indicate, general development patterns are as central to eventual fertility reduction as are family planning programs. The scope and magnitude of America's overall aid program is thus clearly central to the effectiveness of its contribution to fertility reduction.

The 1973 U. S. Foreign Assistance Act stipulation that an increasing amount of U. S. bilateral assistance go to the aid of the poor majority provides the appropriate programmatic focus for this purpose. But we are seeing that programmatic focus is not enough: It must be supported by adequate funding

and an effective administrative structure to enable the United States to participate effectively in a cooperative effort to overcome the worst aspects of absolute poverty by the end of this century. It is toward the achievement of these two essential objectives, particularly the latter, that the new Humphrey bill and the legislation now emanating from the House International Relations Committee (H.R. 12222) is directed. I thus hope that you and your colleagues will take an active interest in this and other legislation relevant to a strengthening of the American development assistance program--not simply from the point of view of ensuring that a population sector is adequately and specifically incorporated, important as that objective is, but also with the much more important aim of working toward the strongest possible overall American contribution to the improvement of basic human needs in the developing countries. Overcoming the worst aspects of absolute poverty by the year 2000 will contribute importantly to limiting the population explosion and to advancing, possibly by decades, the date when population stabilization can be achieved.

Needless to say, my colleagues and I stand prepared to provide any assistance toward the development of more specific recommendations that you might consider helpful.

ANNEX: A PHYSICAL QUALITY OF LIFE INDEX (PQLI)*

In recent years, international development agencies and economic planners in many countries have become increasingly concerned with the task of meeting the "basic human needs" of the very poorest groups of people. As development strategies have shifted their emphasis toward addressing these minimum human needs, there has been a growing recognition of the need to devise an indicator that more effectively measures the degree of progress along these lines than is possible with GNP indicators. The U. S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 (and its subsequent amendments)--which mandated that an increasing amount of U. S. bilateral assistance be directed toward the improvement of the lot of the poor majority in developing countries--requires that appropriate criteria be established to assess the progress of countries in meeting this objective. Also in 1973, the Secretary General of the United Nations, in the first overall review and appraisal of progress in Development Decade II, recognized the need for a supplement to per capita GNP as a unit for measuring progress in addressing human needs problems. And in 1976, the report Reshaping the International Order, prepared under the guidance of Professor Jan Tinbergen for the Club of Rome, called for the development of a quality of life index to be used in conjunction with the per capita GNP indicator.

The traditional measure of national economic progress--the gross national product (GNP) and its component elements--cannot very satisfactorily measure the extent to which the human needs of individuals are being met, nor should it be expected to do so. There is no automatic policy relationship between any particular level or rate of growth of GNP and improvement in such indicators as life expectancy, death rates, infant mortality, literacy, etc. A nation's economic product at any particular level may be allocated in a variety of ways, both among areas of activities and among social groups; or national policies may emphasize the growth of military power and of sectors of the economy that do not contribute in any obvious way to improving the health and physical well-being of that country's people. Nor does the growth of average per capita GNP or personal disposable income necessarily improve the well-being of large portions of a country's population since that income may flow to social groups in very unequal proportions. The very poorest groups of the society may not benefit much, if at all, from rising incomes and some may even suffer declines in real income. Moreover, even if rising incomes are shared with the poorest groups, there is no guarantee that these increases in income will be spent in ways that improve physical well-being. For example, in some societies in which rising income has led to a decline in breast feeding and an increase in the use of breast-milk substitutes, higher infant mortality rates have resulted.

Thus the need for new measures of development progress arises from the facts that:

- (1) GNP and per capita GNP say nothing about the distribution of income.

*The PQLI was developed at the Overseas Development Council under the direction of Morris David Morris, and further refinement and analysis of it continues, as part of a larger project, under the direction of James E. Grant.

- (2) the conceptual problems inherent in measuring income distribution in any society are compounded in the case of the developing countries, with their largely rural and non-monetary economies; and
- (3) money measures do not in themselves indicate anything about the levels of physical well-being of individuals--which is what national and international development planners are seeking to achieve.

Most of the efforts to develop measures of human progress have used a variety of separate indicators such as per capita income, calorie intake, life expectancy, literacy, etc.--all of which improve or deteriorate at varying rates. Use of these disaggregated indicators makes it difficult for national policymakers or administrators of development assistance to determine the combined effectiveness of separate programs addressing different social conditions.

What is needed is not a variety of indicators but some composite measure that will summarize the different rates of improvement (or deterioration) in various categories and that will make it possible to estimate the extent to which the basic human needs of all people have or have not been equitably met. The few attempts at devising such a composite measure that have been made have tended to suffer from one or more of three defects:

- (1) too close tying of the composite measure to the per capita GNP measure;
- (2) use of components (e.g., urbanization, number of telephones per 1,000 people, number of homes with piped water) that assume that the poor countries must inevitably develop along lines followed by developed countries. This assumption, however, fails to take into consideration the long-run implications of the emerging labor-intensive strategy that is being supported by the U. S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and the International Labour Office;
- (3) the setting of targets that may be excessively ethnocentric (as in the case of nutritional standards).

For the past two years, the Overseas Development Council has been exploring the implications of alternative development strategies. One of the concerns in this effort has been to measure how effectively various development strategies distribute the most basic benefits of development progress to all parts of society. Out of this study has come a "Physical Quality of Life Index" (PQLI) that promises to serve as a useful measure of a country's general progress toward more equitably meeting basic human requirements for the majority of its population.

The PQLI does not attempt to measure the many other social and psychological characteristics suggested by the term "quality of life"--justice, political freedom, or a sense of participation. It is based on the assumption that the

needs and desires of individuals initially and at the most basic level are for longer life expectancy, reduced illness, and greater opportunity. The index does not measure the amount or the type of effort put into achieving these goals, but the extent to which they are being met--that is, it measures results. It acknowledges that improvements in meeting these minimum needs can be achieved in a variety of ways--by better nutrition, improved medical care, better income distribution, increased levels of education, and increased employment.

Developed countries--as a result of improvements made over long periods of time--are today generally able to provide reasonable levels of these basic features of human existence to most of their people. But the poor countries cannot provide better diets, sanitation, medical care, education, etc., all at one time. Moreover, it should not be important that they provide a specific kind of medical organization, a particular type of sanitary facility, or a specific pattern of nutrition, for these are not in themselves ends. They are means and must be chosen to suit the resources and cultures of the individual countries. What is important is that, whatever the type of techniques and policies chosen, greater opportunities are made available to those who have the least of these. Thus policymakers are free to apply any mix of policies that will bring about the desired ends. Different policymakers in different countries will choose differently.

While involving many complex issues, the method eventually adopted for constructing the PQLI is very simple. After examining a large array of potential indicators, the ODC selected three--infant mortality, life expectancy at age one, and literacy--that appeared to adequately represent the wider range of conditions that a "minimum human needs" program seeks to improve. The PQLI consolidates these three indicators into a simple, composite index.

Life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy figures are each rated on a scale of 1 to 100, within which individual countries are ranked according to their performance. Since literacy is itself a percentage and can vary at most between 1 and 100 per cent, and since in the post World War II period countries have ranged from less than 5 per cent to virtually 100 per cent literacy, a one to one correspondence was established between literacy rates and the literacy component of the PQLI. For the index of life expectancy at age one, the age 77, two years above the most favorable figure achieved to date by any country (75 years in Sweden), was valued at 100 and the most unfavorably performance in 1950 (38 years in Guinea Bissau) was valued at 1. Similarly, for infant mortality, 7 per thousand, one below the best performance to date (8 per thousand in Sweden), was rated 100 and the poorest performance in 1950 (229 per thousand in Gabon) was rated 1. A composite index was calculated by averaging the three components of the index, giving equal weight to each one.

Use of the worst performance in 1950 as the lower limit of the index rather than the current worst performance permits comparison over the whole period after 1950 without the inconvenience of occasionally producing a negative PQLI rating.

Although estimates are controversial, use of the expected best performance in year 2000 of life expectancy at age one and infant mortality allows for a modest further improvement over current best performances.

Because the three component indicators of PQLI are indexed on a scale of 1 to 100, keeping both upper and lower limits stable, progress is assessed against a fixed rather than changing target, and whatever gains (or losses) countries make will always show up as increases (or decreases) in PQLI.

Improving physical well-being is complex, but because the three indicators measure different aspects of development, and yet together provide information about how the benefits of development are distributed, the PQLI (in combining them into one index) provides important information on success in improving well-being and reducing the worst aspects of poverty not captured by GNP alone or by any of the social indicators alone.

Sweden, with a PQLI of 98, has the highest rating, Guinea-Bissau, with 11, has the lowest, and the composite PQLI rating for all countries appears in the world map attached.

The data below show a comparison of performance as measured by GNP and performance as measured by the PQLI for income groups as well as for selected countries.

Table 1: The Development Attained by Selected Countries

	Average Per Capita GNP	PQLI ^{a/} Achievement	Life Expectancy at Birth	Infant Mortality	Literacy	Birth Rate
	(\$, 1974)		(years)	(per 1,000)	(%)	(per 100)
Low-Income Countries	152	39	48	134	33	40
India	140	41	50	139	34	35
Kerala, India	110	68	61	58	60	27
Sri Lanka	130	82	68	45	81	28
Afghanistan	110	18	40	182	8	43
Lower Middle-Income Countries	338	58	61	70	34	30
Malaysia	680	62	63	75	41	39
Korea, Rep. of	480	82	65	47	83	29
Cuba	640	85	70	29	78	25
Upper Middle-Income Countries	1,091	68	61	82	63	36
Iran	1,250	39	51	139	23	45
Algeria	710	41	53	142	26	49
Tunisia (ROC)	850	86	69	26	83	23
High-Income Countries	4,361	93	71	21	97	17
Kuwait	11,770	75	69	44	55	45
United States	6,670	94	71	16	99	15
Netherlands	5,250	96	74	11	90	14

^{a/} Calculated on the basis of the listed indicators and rounded.

The table shows that when the development progress of countries is viewed in terms of life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy, rather than in terms of income, the picture that emerges is different from the usual. While levels of per capita GNP and physical well-being generally show a close

correlation, the examples suggest that at any level of income, countries can produce different levels of basic needs benefits. Rich countries do not always do the best and poor do not always do the worst. The low- and lower-middle income examples such as Sri Lanka, the Indian state of Kerala and the Rep. of Korea (who all have PQLI performances well above the average of countries with incomes between \$700 and \$2000) are particularly intriguing because they suggest that with a right mix of development strategies, it might be possible to improve the elemental conditions of life in other poor countries much more rapidly than historical experience (or statistical correlation between income and PQLI) might otherwise suggest. That is, low income and the worst consequences of poverty need not go hand-in-hand.

Conversely, a rapid rise in per capita GNP is not in itself a guarantee of significant improvements in basic quality of life levels as the examples of Gabon, Iran and Kuwait readily verify.

Thus, by implication, there seems to be more and less efficient ways of organizing and allocating resources to achieve basic needs objectives; and the fact that the PQLI standing of a country does not necessarily correlate with per capita GNP is intended to stimulate analysis of those circumstances and policies which apparently can produce significant improvements in the provision of minimum human needs very cheaply.

The data below show quality of life changes over the last two decades for a number of countries, and proves the PQLI to be a fairly sensitive measure of change over time.

Table 2: PQLI of Selected Countries

PQLI of Selected Countries

	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>Disparity Reduction Rate 1950-70*</u>	<u>Per Capita GNP Growth Rate 1960-1975</u>
Algeria	34	36	41	.56%	1.8%
India	14	30	40	1.7%	1.3%
Egypt	32	42	—	1.2%	1.5%
Brazil	53	63	66	1.6%	4.3%
Sri Lanka	45(1946)	65	75	3.6%	2.0%
Taiwan	55(1948)	63	77	5.2%	6.0%
Poland	54(1935)	75	87	5.5%	4.0%
United States	84(1940)	89	91	2.3%	2.5%
France	83(1945)	87	93	5.7%	4.2%
Norway	95	96	97	2.5%	3.6%

*Progress can be measured in terms of the rate at which the gap in social conditions in the most advanced and in the developing countries is being narrowed. The rate at which a disparity is being narrowed (or widened) between the level prevailing in a given country and that prevailing in the most advanced countries can be computed in terms of a single indicator such as life expectancy, or, as here, in terms of a more comprehensive measure of multiple social conditions such as the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI). A one year increase in India's current life expectancy of 50 years to 51 years would reduce by 4 per cent the 25 year disparity between India's present life expectancy and the 75 year life expectancy of such advanced countries as Sweden.

A major advantage of the PQLI is not only that it measures the current level of achievement for nations, but can also distinguish the distribution of benefits by various subnational breakdowns such as male/female, urban/rural, ethnic/racial and districts or states at any point and over time. Historical experience is one of the few laboratories available to the social scientist and policymaker. Although the data quality and availability is uneven from indicator to indicator, from country to country, and over time, the usefulness of the PQLI in its basic version as well as in its various disaggregated forms--male/female, etc., clearly is much strengthened when a historical dimension can be provided.

A great many of the development programs that are explicitly directed to satisfying basic human needs will have to focus on women; and much of any alternative development strategy by definition will need to incorporate an explicit role for women. Therefore, there is good reason to seek a measure that lends itself to recording the impact of policy specifically on women. While much more collection of data, research and analysis is necessary before solid conclusions can be drawn, it appears that the PQLI can effectively do this.^{a/}

Table 3: MALE/FEMALE PQLI DIFFERENTIALS

<u>Country</u>	<u>Male PQLI</u>	<u>Female PQLI</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Burma	62	49	-13
India	46	35	-11
Egypt	45	38	- 7
Turkey	59	52	- 7
Indonesia	51	47	- 4
Sri Lanka	82	78	- 4
Malaysia	69	65	- 4
Kuwait	76	74	- 2
Bulgaria	89	90	1
Mexico	70	73	3
Philippines	71	74	4
Brazil	64	68	4
United States	90	97	7

^{a/}For more details and analysis on this subject, see Morris D. Morris, Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index, Monograph No. 11 (Washington, D. C.: Overseas Development Council, forthcoming)

Similarly, the intra-country use of the PQLI reveals in the data below some interesting regional as well as racial contrasts within the U. S.^{b/}

Table 4:


	<u>1900</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>% Reduction*</u>
All US Population	61	82	89	93	2.5%
White Population	63	85	91	94	2.5%
Other Races	27	69	79	85	2.3%
Selected States					
Mississippi	—	80	84	89	1.8%
New Mexico	—	71	85	92	3.2%
Texas	—	80	85	92	3.5%
Wisconsin	—	88	91	95	2.4%
Minnesota	—	89	93	95	1.8%
District of Col.	—	85	86	88	.6%

* Gap reduction rates for "All US", "White", and "Other Races" are calculated from 1900. The rates for the Selected States are from 1950. Gap reduction rates are calculated on the unrounded numbers given in the Annex table.

Improving Physical Well Being Is Complex

Targeting change toward attaining improvement in social indicators raises the broad issue of what inputs are required to achieve desired results. The complexity of advancing physical well being--particularly of extending life expectancy and reducing infant mortality--is evidenced in the chart below, which suggests that the two principal requirements are improvement in nutritional status (see right hand column) and improved environmental circumstances and health services (see left hand column). This, of course, raises the further question of what variables affect these two requirements and what the relative weights of the variables are under a variety of circumstances.

^{b/}For data and further analysis of subnational PQLI for the U.S. as well as Sri Lanka, India and Taiwan, see Morris D. Morris, *ibid.*



A determining factor in the amount of nutrition any individual gets is whether he or she has sufficient resources to obtain what food may be available. For even if there is plenty of food, as in India in the mid-1970s, those in the poorest third of the population may not be able to get it. The availability of medical services is similarly restricted. Thus in most countries the need for jobs assumes great importance. In Taiwan, which has 70-80 workers per 100 acres of cultivated land, modern agriculture obviously is supporting more people on the land than in northern Mexico, which employs 3-4 workers per 100 acres. Taiwan--like China and South Korea--undertook land reform and other programs which created the jobs that provide the incomes with which families can buy nutrition and health services.

In Sri Lanka, the villagers did not initially have the kind of power needed to bring about land reform. But they were politically able to tax the relatively rich modern sector, which was based on the foreign dominated plantation crops, and then to make widely available for twenty-five years medical interventions and such nutritional interventions as two pounds of free grain per week. After long term emphasis on primary education that dated back to the early part of this century and more than a decade of widespread health services and food subsidies, a vigorous citizenry was able to force land reform and other measures to redistribute productive assets. This is an example of a "virtuous circle." A somewhat similar process has been going on in Kerala, which is one of the lowest income states in India. Kerala now has a 61-year life expectancy which is comparable to that of Brazil--and contrasts with India's overall life expectancy of 50.

Much more social science research is required before there will be even a basic consensus about the principal variables, and about their relative weights, that have made possible rapid progress in improving social conditions in such countries and regions as China, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Kerala. The need for this understanding is urgent. If all developing countries had the death rates of 10 per 1000 and birth rates of 30 per 1000 that these countries attained while their per capita incomes were under \$300, about 11 million fewer people would be dying--and there would be about 20 million fewer births--each year.

PQLI Targets

Another use for the PQLI is as a targeting mechanism or programming tool. International donors, including the U. S. Government, often use GNP levels as triggers for specific types of assistance. For example, countries whose per capita GNP is under \$200 may be eligible for a broad range of concessionary assistance, while countries with per capita incomes above \$200 may be more eligible for assistance on more commercial terms. But such a simple definition often leads to inappropriate assistance policies. The PQLI can be used in conjunction with GNP to create a more sophisticated trigger for action.

Looking at indicators of social conditions as well as at per capita income suggest that there is a dual challenge: 1) that of ensuring that progress in meeting basic needs at least parallels progress in improving per capita GNP; and 2) that of accelerating progress in meeting basic needs to the point that by year 2000 all countries will have met the "minimum floor" proposed by the Tinbergen/RIO Study--that is, a life expectancy at birth of 65 years (or approximately 67 years at age 1), an infant mortality of 50 per 1000 live births, and a literacy rate of 75 per cent. Achieving these individual levels of progress would result in an overall PQLI rating of 77 by year 2000.

Just as targets have been set for doubling food production and per capita GNPs by year 2000, one could also set a more nation-specific target for PQLI (beyond the "minimum floor") which would halve the gap or disparity which exists between each country's PQLI and the best expected PQLI by year 2000 of 100. A 3 1/2 annual rate of reduction in the gap would insure that all countries halved their respective PQLI gaps by year 2000, and would also mean reducing by one-half the gap that currently exists between each nation's life expectancy at age 1, infant mortality and literacy and the best that can be expected in these three indicators by year 2000.

The table below shows for a selected group of countries what can be expected in terms of PQLI for year 2000 by meeting both "minimum floor" and "halving" targets; and reflects the usefulness of PQLI as a targeting mechanism especially when viewed in light of the total number of infant deaths that could be avoided, the additional literate people in the world, and the number of years that could be added to people's lives.

Table 5:

Countries	Current PQLI	Current Gap	Year 2000 Gap ^{1/}	Year 2000 PQLI ^{1/}	Year 2000 RIO PQLI	Rate of reduction needed ^{2/}
MALI	14	86	43.0	57.0	77	6.6%
ZAIRE	28	72	36.0	64.0	77	5.7
BANGLADESH	35	65	32.5	67.5	77	5.2
INDIA	43	57	28.5	71.5	77	4.5
GUATEMALA	51	49	24.5	75.5	77	3.8
BRAZIL	68	32	16.0	84.0	77	1.7
PHILIPPINES	71	29	14.5	85.5	77	1.2
MEXICO	73	27	13.5	86.5	77	0.8
KORE ^{3/} , REP. OF	82	18	9.0	91.0	77	3/
JAMAICA	84	16	8.0	92.0	77	3/
U.S.	94	6	3.0	97.0	77	3/
SWEDEN	98	2	1.0	99.0	77	3/

^{1/}At 3.5% annual rate of reduction between 1980 and year 2000.


^{2/}To attain the RIO target in year 2000 of a 77 PQLI.

^{3/}These countries have already achieved the RIO target.

The PQLI seems to be fairly free of the major difficulties that in one way or another afflict most other measures of human progress. Because it is not weighted at all by the level of GNP, it avoids all problems of monetary measurement. It avoids ethnocentric biases about as much as is possible. While it does assume that almost all people everywhere would choose improvements in life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy, the PQLI does not specify how these improvements ought to be achieved. Moreover, it avoids dependence on absolute technical standards (such as a fixed calorie requirement) about which there is no genuine agreement.

The PQLI has a number of advantages. It uses three indicators which apparently do reflect distributional characteristics within countries, for countries cannot achieve high national averages of literacy, life expectancy, and infant mortality unless majorities of their populations are receiving the benefits of progress in each of these areas. It also recognizes that there can be very complex tradeoffs among the inputs that would yield equivalent quality of life results; thus it enables the setting of targets that permit considerable flexibility without suffering from the GNP insensitivity to equity considerations. Moreover, the PQLI automatically narrows the range of data required to measure the extent to which a country is meeting basic needs objectives; it can help planners decide what specific improvements in types and quality of data collection are immediately necessary.

Additional work on the development of the PQLI is needed in further refining it and in determining its limitations as well as where and how it can most usefully be employed. But in the meantime, the simplicity of the measure permits it to be easily understood by both lay people and policymakers interested in measuring the progress being made in meeting the most basic needs in particular countries and regions and groups within countries. This is a case in which use of "the good"--the PQLI--should not be precluded because of continuing pursuit of "the best." The PQLI--even in its present form--already serves as a useful measurement of progress in the address of basic human needs.



A POLI AND PER CAPITA GNP MAP OF THE WORLD

▣ - Per capita GNP

▲ - POLI

STATEMENT OF
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BEFORE
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POPULATION

April 20, 1978

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the impact of development programs on fertility in the third world, with particular attention to women's roles and status. This subject is of special interest to the Agency for International Development. Last year the Agency initiated and the Congress enacted legislation (Section 104d of the Foreign Assistance Act) requiring that A.I.D. consider ways of using appropriate development policies and programs to build motivation for smaller families. My colleague, Mr. Shakow, will testify on A.I.D.'s early efforts to implement this legislation. I shall focus on what we know now about the ways in which development may encourage or discourage low fertility. Let me say at the outset, however, that this is a new field, what evidence we do have is preliminary, and we need to do much more to improve our understanding of the fertility impact of development.

My testimony today is drawn from A.I.D.'s Population Analysis Paper which expresses the Agency's current policy related to population. It contains a brief summary of what we believe A.I.D. has discovered about development's influence on fertility. The paper does not refer to analysis produced over the last year or so, but that analysis generally confirms our views. I shall be happy to respond to any questions from the committee.

THE PROBLEM

Population growth rates reflect the size of individual families.

Couples need not affirmatively decide to have a child, but they must affirmatively decide to practice family planning, whether they just want to postpone pregnancy or whether they want to end their childbearing. Consciously or unconsciously they weigh the pros and cons, as they see them, of a child against the pros and cons, as they see them, of available means of family planning. Their attitudes toward family planning depend on the type (hopefully reflecting both cultural acceptability and bio-medical concerns), cost, and accessibility of the family planning services available and on the extent to which they accurately understand those services. Their views on the desirability of a child are more complex, and depend largely on their social, cultural, political, economic, and medical milieu.

Thus, the number of children parents actually have includes:

- (1) the minimum desired number of children that parents would want even if the best possible family planning services were available;
- (2) any more "insurance" births they may want to insure survival of the desired minimum;
- (3) any extra births they don't consciously seek, but which result from miscalculations, laissez-faire attitudes, casual assessments of long run costs and benefits, etc.

Minimum desired family size depends on all the economic, social, cultural, and personal influences on the family. It does not depend directly on the availability of family planning services, though it is likely that the successful use of services available now may well influence future attitudes and expectations on appropriate and acceptable family size. Attitudes on minimum desired family size can also be directly influenced by information and education programs specifically designed to influence them. And development policies in any number of seemingly unrelated areas can change minimum desired family size by changing the economic, social, cultural, and personal circumstances of the family in such a way as to make smaller families a more attractive option.

Insurance births can be reduced by improving child health -- by providing better health services, better nutrition, and even better family planning services (since wider spacing of pregnancies greatly improves child health where mothers and children are ill and poorly fed).

Extra births, which may be numerous, can be greatly reduced or even eliminated by providing acceptable, affordable, and accessible family planning services and appropriate information.

The basic question of this particular paper is how to achieve the most voluntary reduction in family size and fertility with limited resources, bearing in mind that both LDC and AID objectives are of course much broader than this, as discussed

above. But many LDC's receiving U.S. aid have low target birth rates; for argument's sake, we take their ultimate demographic objective to be a stable population.

Providing better family planning services -- effective, safe, affordable, and accessible -- seems the simplest way to tip parental decisions in favor of family planning. In the few countries that have such services on a wide scale, birth rates are falling -- not to stable population levels yet, but far below their recent high levels. The cost-effectiveness of such services depends on whether they are used efficiently, on how many children the users have, on how many fertile-age couples are users, and so on. So far, really good services -- i.e. safe, effective, affordable, and accessible -- do seem to be used extensively and by people who otherwise probably would have had several more children. Thus good services probably represent the cheapest approach to reducing birth rates so far. And a good many more people in LDC's stand ready to use good services. It is only sensible to provide them with such services, which need not be costly, as a start. That much is clear. Thus AID has devoted most Title X assistance, totaling about one billion dollars over the past decade, largely to improving and extending family planning services (including information), and plans to continue to do so.

But family planning services and information alone will probably not suffice to reduce birth rates to near stable-population levels. Essentially, this would require an average

family size of only slightly more than two children. Making family planning as easy as possible can certainly eliminate unwanted pregnancies and help reduce "insurance births" as wider spacing of pregnancies improves child health. And through their influence on social expectations over time, services may encourage people to want fewer children as a minimum. But services alone may not much reduce the minimum number of children parents want. That may be no problem if most parents would be content with two children. But if many parents want three, four, five, or more children even when good services are available, then it will be essential to combine services with development policies and programs that also encourage smaller families.

No one really knows what the situation is in fact. In the few places (including some poor, rural areas primarily in Asia) where good services are really available, indications are that around a third of the couples, mostly with 3-4 children, may use them. This suggests that extending good services further can indeed reduce family size sharply, and certainly good services should be provided as rapidly as possible. But historical evidence also suggests reductions in average family size sufficient for population stability can be achieved faster when family planning services and information are combined with appropriate development policies and programs. For as parents become more determined to have smaller families, they naturally become more willing to use the services available, however imperfect those may still be.

In recent years, AID has devoted some population funds and other

AID resources to exploring the links between fertility and development policies and programs so that all AID assistance programs -- or those of other donors or LDCs -- can be designed as appropriate with a view to their possible impact on fertility. We expect to expand such efforts in the future.

Developing a strategy for population-related assistance thus requires determining what sorts of family planning services and information appeal most (and what they cost), what development policies and programs encourage smaller families most (and what they cost), and how these may best be combined.

One major conclusion is that we are woefully short of hard information on which to judge services, information, or policies -- because services and information are not widely enough available to permit measuring their ultimate impact accurately, because measuring anything is difficult in many LDC's, and because sorting out the tangled influences on fertility -- services, information, and all the other changes development brings -- is difficult even with sophisticated statistical analytic techniques. That sort of analysis certainly cannot get far with the data now available. Major attention needs to go into developing and refining the necessary data and techniques. Only thus can we sort out just which approaches are likely to reduce birth rates fastest and at lowest cost and what the trade-offs and complementarities among such approaches may be. Among other things the Agency should build more such analysis into its annual program review process.

Even at present, however, some reading of the comparative effectiveness of various services, information and education programs, and development policies and programs can be made. As you have requested, I shall now focus on the comparative fertility impact of different development policies and programs.

DEVELOPMENT/POPULATION POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

It is a common observation that family size falls as modernization proceeds; in the more advanced countries, family size began to fall even before good family planning services were widely available. As parents become more determined to have smaller families, they will be more willing to use available family planning services despite their imperfections. And when education, health, or other non-family planning budgets can also be brought bear on fertility, the family planning budget will be that much more effective. Thus it is important to ask what about the development process most influences parents to seek smaller families, and how smaller families may be encouraged.

Answering this question requires unraveling a paradox: for a nation as a whole, when population grows significantly faster than supplies of other productive resources, the eventual result must be low labor productivity, hence low living standards, unless technical change continually intervenes to save the day; yet in populous countries many poor parents (particularly in rural areas) still insist it is in their interests to have three or more children. Why? The answers are complex, but some useful insights are emerging.

Odd as it may seem, even for the extremely poor -- the landless rural laborer or very small-scale farmer -- the pittance each additional child earns probably exceeds the additional cost of supporting that child, for parents provide little more than minimal extra food. Crucial to this analysis is the parents' belief, probably well-founded, that their children cannot break out of their current poverty to anything qualitatively different that substantial education, land acquisition, better health, and other means to a really better life are simply not realistic possibilities. The additional cost of another child is kept low in good part because of this ceiling on parental expectations. For such parents, the only road to whatever modest improvements they can achieve lies in increasing family income through the contribution of several children. Moreover, since such parents must usually rely on their children for old-age support (there being no institutional form of social security), they need an ample supply of children, particularly sons. With high child mortality, they may well "over-insure" to prevent disaster. These high family-size preferences get codified into social customs; most women get their satisfaction and status from having large families. Aspects of this description may be debatable in different countries, but the gist of it emerges again and again from analysis of poor rural areas.

All this suggests parents may opt for far fewer children -- say just two -- only when they have a quantum improvement in living standards that encourages them to prefer fewer children of higher quality (in terms of health, education, earning power, etc.) to many hungry, illiterate ones who can earn but little. The key is to make the fewer-

but-better option be real--and seem real--to poorer parents.

There is ample reason to believe that massive rural development with major production increases directly benefiting the poor, accompanied by education, health, nutrition, and family planning services and supported by active community organizations, encourages declines in fertility, especially as women are encouraged to move beyond their traditional roles. A few LDC's, especially those enjoying sustained and substantial GNP growth, can afford this route and show encouraging progress. But what about the others? They must be far more selective, finding the pressure points of the development process that most encourage lower fertility and focusing on those. Of course, the better-off LDCs working to lower fertility will also find the job that much less costly if they too focus on these pressure points.

What are these pressure points? They seem to fall in five major areas. One is public leadership, laws and administrative regulations, which can encourage smaller families at very little cost. High-level statements favoring small families and opinion-leaders' visible support for family planning can help. Other apparently effective measures include raising the minimum legal age of marriage, relaxing restrictions on abortion, easing prescription requirements

on contraceptive pills, and permitting paramedics to provide a broad range of family planning services. Other possibilities include restricting child labor, passing right-to-work laws for women, providing opportunities for working mothers to breastfeed, and restricting subdivision of agricultural land, though these all entail obvious problems.

Another key pressure point seems to be the status of women.

Female education, even if pursued for only four to six years, seems to encourage significantly lower fertility. The more extended the education, the fewer children the woman is likely to prefer. But exactly how or why female education encourages lower fertility is not entirely clear, and should be explored further. Preferences for smaller families seem to result from work activities outside the home, from middle-class family aspirations shared with an educated husband, and -- apparently particularly important for women with only a few years' education -- from an introduction, however fleeting, to the notion that women need not live today, even in poor countries, quite as they always have. Where education affects fertility primarily by equipping women to work outside the home, the availability of jobs as well as education becomes important; but aside from employment opportunities, education alone seems to encourage lower fertility in many areas. Where budget limitations prevent attaining even a few years' education, this approach to reducing fertility may be limited.

Female employment, particularly in jobs incompatible with continual child-bearing, is also strongly tied to fertility declines. We do not know what the fertility impact would be if poor women were given access to more-than-menial jobs, but sketchy evidence suggests that they might indeed opt for fewer but healthier and better education children as their expectations and opportunities for themselves and their children rise. In countries suffering substantial and chronic male unemployment and underemployment, of course, it may be argued that more good job opportunities for women must be put off for another day. It is particularly important, therefore, that care be taken with employment opportunities for women, that jobs do not simply continue the exploitation of women which is all too common particularly among the poor and that children are cared for, especially among the poor.

Also promising are any measures like women's associations for health, handicrafts, etc. that help replace the fatalism of the traditional woman with a sense that one can improve one's own life at least to a degree.

A third pressure point involves changing the economic cost and benefits of children to encourage smaller families through the deliberate use of rewards (incentives) to parents who limit fertility or penalties (disincentives) on parents

who do not. In considering incentives it should be remembered that social and economic conditions inevitably influence parental views on family size - or on health, savings, employment, etc. Incentives are but one way of deliberately adjusting economic conditions to encourage smaller families; the alternative to deliberate action is, of course, laissez-faire with all that implies for haphazard influences on individuals. Incentives do, of course, leave parents who truly want many children able to choose large families. It bears emphasizing that when population pressure on resources is extreme enough so that labor productivity is very low, then averting a birth can save resources; an incentive can be designed to give part of this saving to those who made it possible--the couple practicing family planning. In other words, when demographic pressure exacerbates resource scarcities so that some rationing of some goods outside the market is virtually inevitable, then one reasonable basis (or practical basis) for that rationing is to favor those who help ease demographic pressure. When parents rely on children for old-age support in the absence of social security, providing extra resources as an incentive or reward for family planning can compensate for what additional children might have provided to their

parents, and so fill a real economic need of parents at little or no real cost to society. (In the shorter run, of course, there may be budgetary problems in managing incentives.)

A fourth pressure point is child health, as discussed above. As more children survive, completed family size will supposedly fall. To the extent this argument is valid, it militates in favor of integrating health and family planning services or at least seeing that both are provided in a coordinated way.

The fifth and perhaps most important over-arching pressure point is broad rural development. Cross-country studies suggest countries with more egalitarian income distribution have lower fertility, but no one is quite sure why. Studies of poor countries over time (as income distribution changes) are lacking. In these countries appears that income growth alone need not lead to lower fertility at any time soon, at least if the increases are modest and bring income to no more than low-to-moderate levels; it all depends on how the income growth comes about. As we said at the start of this section, massive rural development involving sustained increases in agricultural production (particularly food), infrastructure, health services, and education, supported by active community-based organizations, can encourage lower fertility if it involves and benefits the majority who are poor and if

it encourages new options for women. But because of budget limitations, relatively few LDCs can afford such widespread and massive rural development; most must take a more selective approach to reducing fertility and stimulating development, focusing on those aspects of rural development that promise both increased output and smaller families in order to raise individual living standards as much as possible given available budgets. Generally the aspects of rural development that most encourage lower fertility are the same as in development as a whole--the aspects we have just discussed in points one through four. Thus the wheel comes full circle.

Given its Congressional mandate, which of the fertility-reducing policies and programs should AID encourage particularly through its programs?

AID's Congressional mandate includes among its several objectives the voluntary reduction of fertility through both provision of services and policies to strengthen motivation for family planning; reducing fertility can be crucial to efforts to improve per capita living standards, which is the ultimate objective of our mandate and indeed of most LDCs. Thus the question is whether working to lower fertility through changes in development policies and programs will seriously compromise

other mandate objectives or violate mandate restrictions in the attempt to improve per capita living standards for the poor, particularly in rural areas.

Basically, the policy changes needed to lower fertility are the same ones needed to reach other mandate objectives. While some qualification is necessary, generally the more AID assistance serves to improve the well-being of the poor (especially women) and involve them in development processes-- whether through rural development, improved food production and more equitable distribution, widespread and practical education, broad and effective health programs, programs that combat malnutrition, measures that help foster reasonable trust in political and economic institutions, or programs that generally encourage and equip people better to take charge of their own lives-- then the more AID's assistance also serves to contain fertility.

Thus the basic recommendation here is for more coordinated programming, not only to reduce fertility where that is desired but also to take other steps toward the ultimate goal of improving the life of the poor. The principal focus of AID's efforts will be on rural areas, both because most poor

people are in rural areas and because improving conditions in rural areas will make it that much easier to combat urban problems (most of which are exacerbated by migration from rural areas of people who find too little there to persuade them to stay).

In most AID developing program categories, like education, agriculture, etc., of course, not all programs can serve equally well both their own primary purposes and the secondary purpose of reducing fertility. So far AID has stressed maximum fulfillment of primary purposes. But without jeopardizing the primary purpose of a given program, we may be able to gain a secondary but significant impact on fertility through reasonable and feasible changes in program design and implementation. It should be borne in mind, however, that careful assessment of all the benefits and costs of alternative programs should govern AID funding decisions. While fertility benefits may be important, they must be considered alongside other benefits and within the context of resource availabilities, management capacity, etc. Specific steps A.I.D. takes to implement Section 104d will be discussed by Mr. Shakow.

The Compatibility of the World Population Plan of
Action with Human Rights

by

Luke T. Lee

Testimony presented to the Select Committee on Population
U.S. House of Representatives
April 20, 1978

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Statement by

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before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POPULATION
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

relating to
COMPATIBILITY OF THE WORLD POPULATION
PLAN OF ACTION WITH HUMAN RIGHTS

on

April 20, 1978

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I wish to express my appreciation for the opportunity to appear before this important Committee to discuss the World Population Plan of Action (WPPA) and Human Rights. I consider these two subjects the cornerstones of any population program: the Plan of Action, because it was a product of the first official intergovernmental conference devoted to population and was adopted by consensus of 135 Governments representing all shades of ideologies, geographic regions, and political and economic systems; and Human Rights, because it is the basis for all population programs. Family planning should not be viewed as an end itself, but should be considered as merely a means to help fulfill the rights to education, health, employment opportunities, food and nutrition, etc. - in short, to safeguard and maximize the wellbeing of all individuals.

May I set forth my thoughts on the compatibility of the WPPA with human rights more systematically as follows:

I. Introduction

The relevancy of human rights to the WPPA adopted by the World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974 is spelled out in paragraph 97 of the Plan:

This Plan of Action recognizes the responsibility of each Government to decide on its own policies and devise its own programmes of action for dealing with the problems of population and economic and social progress...However, national policies should be formulated and implemented without violating, and with due promotion of, universally accepted standards of human rights.¹

This overriding concern for human rights is reinforced in a resolution adopted by the same Conference stating that, while "it is the right of each nation to determine its own population policy in the unrestricted exercise of its sovereignty,"² such policy must accord "absolute respect" for human rights.³

It is therefore fitting for the Select Committee on Population to review the Plan of Action itself in the light of human rights principles. Such a review would also serve to carry out the "high priority" set by the Plan "to clarify, systematize and more effectively implement these human rights."⁴

II. Definition of Human Rights

In giving high priority to research in the formulation, evaluation and implementation of population policies, the Plan of Action prescribes the standard of "full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in international instruments of the United Nations."⁵ The Plan of Action thus makes no distinction between rights which are the subjects of ratified treaties and those which are not. This distinction had traditionally been crucial in determining the binding legal effect of a right: namely, the right is legally binding if it is specified in a ratified treaty, and then only upon states parties to the treaty; but where the right is dealt with in such instruments as declarations, proclamations, or unratified covenants, it is considered only morally, but not legally, binding.⁶ The blurring of such a distinction by the Plan of Action is to be welcomed because, by emphasizing the formal or procedural aspects of human rights treaties, the traditional approach confuses the instruments stipulating human rights with the substantive human rights themselves. It should be recognized that the binding force of human rights is based not solely on treaties, but also on natural law,⁷ customary international law⁸ and general principles of law.⁹ Each of these has made its contribution to the development of human rights and is

binding upon states even in the absence of a treaty. For human rights, by definition, are "rights which attach to all human beings equally, whatever their nationality."¹⁰ Their legal validity cannot be rooted solely in a document signed and ratified by states.

What categories of basic human rights are affected by population policies and programs? Probably all, but the following fourteen are more directly relevant. They are specified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in a series of subsequent instruments or declarations:

1. The right to adequate education and information on family planning.¹¹
2. The right of access to the means of practicing family planning.¹²
3. The right to the equality of men and women.¹³
4. The right of children, whether born in or out of wedlock, to equal status under the law and to adequate support from natural parents.¹⁴
5. The right to work.¹⁵
6. The right to an adequate social security system, including health and old-age insurance.¹⁶
7. The right to freedom from hunger.¹⁷
8. The right to an adequate standard of living.¹⁸
9. The right to freedom from environmental pollution.¹⁹
10. The right to freedom of movement.²⁰
11. The right of privacy.²¹

12. The right to freedom of conscience.²²
13. The right to freedom of religion.²³
14. The right to social, economic and legal reforms necessary to ensure the above rights.²⁴

Fulfillment of each of the above rights requires in turn the fulfillment of certain preconditions. The first right, for example, presupposes universal literacy and compulsory education, thus necessitating a revision of education law toward that end as well as permitting or even requiring sex or family planning instruction in schools. This in turn has implications for school construction, teachers' training, library and recreation facilities, etc., which in turn affect other rights through reallocation of resources, priorities, etc.

Existing laws on obscenity need to be changed if they forbid the publication, broadcasting, televising, advertisement or mailing of family planning material. Regulations of publicly owned mass communication media should be re-examined with a view to determining their obligation to disseminate family planning information.

Recent emphasis on integrating population into the process of socio-economic development--a pervasive theme in the World Population Plan of Action--accentuates the human rights approach. Thus, the First Committee of the World Population Conference, charged with examining problems

related to population change and socio-economic development, recalled the International Development Strategy of the United Nations Second Development Decade which stated:

The ultimate objective of development is to bring about sustained improvement in the well-being of the individual and bestow benefits on all.²⁵

The Report of the United Nations Symposium on Population and Development similarly underscored:

Socio-economic development was a powerful force in improving the qualitative characteristics of human beings, both physiological and intellectual, which conversely made a significant contribution to socio-economic development.²⁶

A review of the fourteen population-related human rights listed above shows unmistakably their identification with socio-economic development. Of these rights, six are social in nature, five economic, and three a mixture of both.

Development policies and plans, irrespective of political ideologies, are in essence primarily concerned with inducing change that can accelerate an upward shift in social and economic growth and hence, in the welfare of peoples. Any excessive increase or decrease of population may adversely affect political stability and welfare since economic conditions cannot be marshalled to follow suit immediately; hence the importance of population as a

variable in development planning, basically affecting both the productive and consumer components.

The United Nations Secretariat shares this view:

A better understanding of the mutual and complex relationships between population and development is recognized as fundamental for the identification of crucial problem areas, directing the orientation of development policies and the adoption of the demographic objectives and measures

A better understanding of population problems and their relationship to development requires an explicit recognition of the complex and interrelated nature of the development process in which population is an integral and crucial factor.²⁷

The Secretariat views population "as one dimension in the complex and intricate system of interacting variables which integrate the development process."^{27a}

Disagreements between the rich and the poor nations at Bucharest in 1974 may in any case reflect the conviction that population problems are inherently development problems that should not be tackled independently and in isolation. But, in addition, population planning programs must be formulated and executed with full regard to the necessity of safeguarding basic human rights and human dignity.

For it should be recognized that the manipulation of such population variables as fertility and migration for development purposes can create areas of potential conflict with accepted human rights.

III. The World Population Plan of Action and Human Rights

The Plan of Action contains two types of recommendations: those expressed in the categorical form and those not so expressed. Recommendations of the first type are principally those calling for the reduction of morbidity and mortality;²⁸ provision of the knowledge and means of practicing family planning;²⁹ elimination of colonialism, neo-colonialism and racial discrimination;³⁰ improvement of health and nutrition;³¹ equality of men and women;³² integration of women in the development process;³³ promotion of social justice and development;³⁴ elimination of child labor and abuse;³⁵ equalization for the status of children born in and out of wedlock;³⁶ establishment of social security and old age benefits;³⁷ promotion of educational opportunities;³⁸ establishment of a minimum age of marriage;³⁹ collection, analysis and utilization of statistical data;⁴⁰ and the undertaking of various research activities related to population.⁴¹ All of these are designed to further the goals of human rights and are themselves compatible with human rights, in particular, the fourteen rights listed above. They clearly enhance some aspects of human rights without at the same time detracting from the others.

Belonging to the second type of recommendations are, for example, those pertaining to internal⁴² and international⁴³ migration, where the right to the freedom of movement must be balanced against the desirability for rural development and family stability, on the one hand, and the perils of

excessive urbanization, contamination of the environment, "brain drain", loss of cultural identity, etc., on the other.

Of particular importance is the Plan of Action's objective that "All couples and individuals have a basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children."⁴⁴

The question may be raised as to whether the language of the Plan of Action would allow couples and individuals to have as many children as they want. How can a decision reached "freely" be reconciled with a decision reached "responsibly"? Are there ingrained "conflicts" among human rights, just as there are conflicts of law? But unlike conflicts of law which arise because of decentralized law-making in the modern State system, can there really be conflicts among human rights if such rights are universally valid? Would admission of such conflicts in fact negate the existence and universality of human rights?

IV. Conflicts between Human Rights

To seek a systematic answer to this question, the ensuing discussion will be divided into four parts: "Conflicts between Individual and Collective Human Rights," "Conflicts between Present and Future Human Rights," "Conflicts between Different Human Rights," and "Conflicts in the Interpretation of a Human Right."

A. Conflicts between individual and collective human rights
The relationship between individual and collective human

rights may be better expressed in terms of "right" and "duty" - two sides of the same coin. As such, they complement, rather than conflict with, each other. The individual right to free speech, for example, must be exercised responsibly and take into account the collective right whether in time of peace (for example, libel, defamation, nuisance, obscenity) or during war or emergency (for example, treason, sedition, censorship). Certainly, the shouting of "Fire!" in a crowded theatre could not be condoned on grounds of free speech. The question of when exactly the individual right gives way to the collective is always difficult to answer - even in the case of freedom of speech notwithstanding its century-old development and refinement. However, it is equally clear that inability to define with exactitude the relationship between the two rights does not negate their existence.

As applied to questions involving reproduction, attempts to delineate the boundaries between the individual and collective rights face even greater difficulty. For until recently, the individual and collective rights coincided in the direction of pro-natalism: it was in the interest of both the individual and the society at large that population should multiply. So, no conflict arose. However, the advent of modern medicines which greatly reduced mortality rates, coupled with the reality of a finite earth with its finite resources being exploited by an ever-increasing population, inevitably led to a re-examination or reversal of the pro-natalist policy. The need for a quick transition from centuries-old pro-natalism to anti-natalism is bound to produce uneven results, and the task of reconciling the

individual and collective rights is taxing the skills of even the most ingenious. As Schubnell observes: "Events in the macrosphere of population have to be explained by decisions made in the microsphere of the family and the individual, [but that] as yet no theory exists which could explain this and which is supported by individual and group psychology." ⁴⁵

And yet the right to family planning cannot ignore the dichotomy between individual and collective rights. Both the Tehran Proclamation of Human Rights and the WPPA explicitly provide that family planning must be made not only freely but also responsibly. Involved in a responsible parenthood is the balancing of the individual with the collective right - i.e., from the right of children to that of the society at large. ⁴⁶ It would be better, then, to speak of such balancing as harmonization of rights rather than as conflict of rights. Recognition of this fact would facilitate the elaboration of rights and duties, thus strengthening the human rights for all.

B. Conflicts between present and future human rights

Might the present exercise of human rights, such as the right to privacy, conflict with the future exercise of such a right?

Such a conflict may be approached by analogizing the future rights with the collective rights since the former may be subsumed under the latter. Accordingly, future rights are but duties of the present. Again, it becomes a matter of balancing or harmonizing the rights and duties, rather than a matter of conflict as such.

The individual right to privacy, for example, if carried to extremes, could mean a total lack of restraints on individual fertility choice, resulting in a proliferation of children, which in turn infringes upon the future and collective right to privacy. As noted in a recent Harvard Law Review issue: "Population expansion contributes to environmental degradation, which in turn endangers values of individual integrity and freedom from outside intrusion."⁴⁷ But precisely where the individual right ought to give way to the collective right, justifying governmental restraints, is always difficult to decide. The same Harvard note suggests:

the need to find the point at which couples' exercise of privacy and free choice in child bearing so impairs a broad set of citizens' interests in privacy and other aspects of life and in meaningful free expression that direct regulations may be justified....[This] provides yet another balance to be struck as society attempts to find out how and at what point, if any, a regulationist policy might be justified.⁴⁸

In this regard, Daniel Callahan had this to say:

While the rights of the living should take precedence over the rights of unborn generations, the living have an obligation to refrain from actions that would endanger future generations' enjoyment of the same rights that the living now enjoy. This means, for instance, that the present generation should not exhaust non-renewable resources, irrevocably pollute the environment, or procreate to such an extent that future generations will be left with an unmanageably large number of people. All of these obligations imply a restriction of freedom.⁴⁹

C. Conflicts between different human rights

Recent judicial decisions concerning abortion may well provide an illustration of how conflicts between human rights may develop. It may be noted that the United States Supreme Court declared in 1973 a Texas law restricting abortion

only to save the mother's life as unconstitutional for violating the right of privacy.⁵⁰ The Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, overruled a law allowing abortion on request during the first three months of pregnancy as unconstitutional for violating the right to life.⁵¹ The courts of the two countries thus arrived at opposite conclusions on the issue of abortion by invoking different human rights as grounds for their decisions.

But is there really a conflict here between the right to privacy and the right to life, assuming that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights serves as the basis for both the rights? The answer to these questions must be sought from the text of the Declaration itself, as well as the travaux préparatoires. Since the right to privacy is admittedly that of the woman and the right to life is that of the foetus, is the right of the foetus a subject covered by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

It may be noted that the "Preamble" to the Declaration refers to "human" rights as belonging explicitly to "human beings," "people," "individual," "men" and "women." Nowhere does it imply that the rights belong also to fetuses. This is made even clearer by Article 1 which begins with: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights..." All substantive rights which follow clearly pertain to these human beings already born. Article 25(2) reinforces this, by conferring rights to children already born. An examination of the travaux préparatoires of both the Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reveals

that amendments designed to protect the right to life "from the moment of conception" were submitted to both of the instruments, but were both defeated.⁵² It follows that, to the extent that the Federal Republic of Germany court should wish to extend equal human rights to unborn fetuses, that would be its prerogative and lie within the domestic jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany, hence not brooking interference by other States. But that would be a decision falling beyond the human rights with which the Declaration is concerned. Thus viewed, there is actually no conflict between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany courts in terms of human rights as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, since these rights were not involved in the Federal Republic of Germany decision.

D. Conflicts in the interpretation of a human right

Could there be conflicts in the interpretation of a particular human right? Just as differences of interpretation do exist in contracts and treaties, so there are bound to be differences of interpretation with respect to a particular human right. Both types of differences, however, are susceptible to resolution through the application of normal rules of interpretation.

Space allows again but one example to illustrate the nature of a conflict arising from the interpretation of a particular human right.

Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

- (1) Everyone has the right to education....Elementary education shall be compulsory....
- (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms....
- (3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Does the "right to education" include "compulsory sex education," even in the face of parental objection? This was the issue confronting two Federal Republic of Germany courts, which reached different conclusions in their decisions.

It may be noted that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany provides: "The entire educational system shall be under the supervision of the Government."⁵³ However, Article 6(2) provides: "The care and upbringing of children are the natural rights of the parents and a duty primarily incumbent on them. The national community shall watch over the performance of this duty."

The court of Berlin interpreted these provisions as being consistent with compulsory sex education in schools regardless of parental objections, stating:

Supplying biological facts on the differences between the sexes in the first four grades belongs to the exclusive domain of the school. The discussions, in the higher grades, on the topics of partnership and marriage from ethical, social, psychological, hygienic and economic points of view have...their crucial point located in the domain of the school. The teaching in both topical areas is therefore admissible without the parents' consent.⁵⁴

On the other hand, the court of Hamburg tempered the Government's right to require sex education in school with the need to take into account the parental attitudes. The court stated:

Since the Constitution in Article 7, para. 1, places school education under the control of the State, it thus limits pro tanto the right of parents. Logically, to decide on the form [Gestaltung] of school education in relation to the right of parents is, in principle, a matter for the State. The State thus has.... an independent mandate to supply education. This constitutional reservation in favour of State teaching and State education cannot, however, be viewed as independent of the right provided to parents by Article 6, para. 2, of the Constitution. The State must rather take the parental right into account whenever it carries out its constitutional mandate. Special restraint has to be shown by the State wherever beliefs are transmitted which may give rise to ideological attitudes and attitudes to life.... Because the issue of how parents want the education of their children to be shaped in the field of personal beliefs affects the freedom of religion and of conscience (Art. 4 Const.), the State must strictly respect their right, as education in this area is one of the essential aspects of the parental right to educate.⁵⁵

Using the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as terms of reference, the answer to the question posed would hinge on the content of the sex education to be introduced in schools: Is it "directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" as required by Article 26(2) of the Declaration? If yes, the rule of interpretation which elevates the specific over the general would negate the parents' "prior right to choose the kind of education" for their children. Otherwise, the "prior right" would apply.

E. Summary

The foregoing discussion shows that the so-called conflicts among human rights are more apparent than real. While the last two types of conflicts may be resolved by resort to the usual rules of interpretation, the first two involve a

balancing or harmonizing of human rights, rather than a conflict. Such balancing, however, would require massive educational and research efforts: educational, to inculcate the idea that every right automatically entails a duty into the mind of every individual; research, because little systematic study has as yet been undertaken on the nature and scope of the rights and duties involved in each of the human rights.

Too often, only the cries for rights are heard, but no reference is made to the duties. This is true for individuals as well as States. Might it not be time to give equal emphasis to duties?

V. National Action

In light of the compatibility of the WPPA with human rights, it remains to inquire about the implications for national action. From the viewpoint of recommendations for national action, human rights may be classified in terms of the nature of governmental obligations imposed by such rights, of which there are three categories: (a) those requiring public resources to enable the individual to exercise human rights relating to such matters as health services, education, food and nutrition, public housing, social security and adequate standard of living; (b) those allowing the individual to exercise the right of free choice, such as religion, movement, privacy and access to the knowledge and means of practicing family planning; and (c) those regulating the individual's legal status, such as the equality of the

sexes, nationality, equal birth status (removing discrimination against "illegitimacy"), adoption, labor (children and women), marriage (including the setting of the minimum age) and divorce.

It is obvious that, in so far as the financial implications are concerned, the last two types of government obligations can be discharged practically free of charge, while the first, which is bound up with problems of development as a whole, requires additional resources or reallocation - a particularly difficult task if resources are already strained.

The relative economy with which the last two types of governmental obligations can be fulfilled does not suggest, however, that either of these is less important than the first or, because of such ease, that they have already been implemented. The removal of sex discrimination, for example, ranks among the most important of human rights, but actual legal reforms have been slow and far between. And yet legal reforms are often the essential first steps toward the strengthening and implementation of human rights. The Plan of Action specifically accords "high priority" to the "review and analysis of national and international

laws which bear directly or indirectly on population factors."⁵⁶ More than thirty countries have already established Law and Population Projects, funded mostly by the UNFPA with the cooperation of the Law and Population Programme of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, to undertake the law compilation, review and reform activities in the field of population.⁵⁷ It is hoped that eventually all countries will participate in such activities. For it would make no sense for Governments to request international assistance or cooperation only to have the intended results nullified by obsolete or conflicting laws.

The above classification of governmental obligations may serve the purpose of drawing the attention of Governments to the need to set realistic priorities in their population programs in light of their resources as well as to take action immediately without resorting to an "all of nothing" formula -- which often results in "nothing" rather than "all."

For even the human rights instruments, though prescribing the minimum standards of the well-being of each individual, are realistic enough to allow a certain flexibility for implementation. Thus, Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights limits the right to social security to that which is "in accordance with the organization and resources of each State..." Article 2(3) of the

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights allows developing countries to "determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the ... Covenant to non-nationals." And with regard to the right to freedom from hunger, Article 11(b) obligates States "to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need," but also "taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries."

The above recommendations for national action should be taken as representing only the minimum obligations for Governments under the human rights principles. Governments are, of course, free to undertake additional programs to further the goals of human rights, such as incentives and disincentives in a form which best suits the conditions of their countries.⁵⁸

Recommendations for national action would be incomplete without reference to the potential role of local governments in population matters. Too often, population policies and programs are perceived as matters of concern only to the national government or private organizations. While this is true historically, there is no valid reason for continuing to exclude local governments from taking initiatives in population matters. On the contrary, as the governmental unit most intimately involved in the daily life of the people, the local government is in a far better position than the

central government to feel their pulse, sense their needs, and prescribe appropriate remedies or affirmative actions.

That local governments can indeed fulfill this role is evidenced by the successful experimentation of the Model City Project established in 1972 in Cagayan de Oro in Mindanao, the Philippines.⁵⁹ Among the important components of this project is the requirement that all those who intend to marry should attend a seminar on responsible parenthood. In a letter addressed to President Ferdinand E. Marcos, dated 27 September 1973, the Chairman of the Legal Committee of the project requested that a presidential decree be issued to amend the new civil code so that no marriage licence would be issued to couples unless they could present a certificate of attendance in such a seminar.⁶⁰ Such a decree was subsequently issued on 20 July 1976.⁶¹ A letter of instruction was issued on the same day by the president directing all governors, mayors and barangay (village) heads to "integrate population and family planning in ... overall socio-economic development plans."⁶² Another letter of instruction authorized governors and mayors to "gradually and progressively assume the responsibility of funding the costs of all population and family planning related activities and projects" falling within their respective jurisdictions."⁶³ In fact, even prior to the issuing of the decree and letters of instruction, the Commission on Population of the Philippines had already adopted the "Total Integrated Development Approach" under which "planning was done at the field and regional level and

consolidated to make the national program plan." The new approach of "making the barangay units the focus of the program" is in effect "handing over the population problem to those who can best solve it -- the people." This approach was tried out in July 1975 in seven pilot provinces before its adoption for the whole country.⁶⁴

But above all, no population or family planning program can ever succeed without the strong personal commitment of top government leaders. Their commitment to strengthening the economic and social rights of all of their people is a prerequisite to the successful implementation of the Plan of Action.

VI. International Action

With respect to recommendations for international actions, while the World Population Plan of Action merely "urged" the developed countries and the United Nations system to increase their assistance to developing countries in the population field,⁶⁵ from the human rights viewpoint there is a duty on the part of the United Nations and its members to render effective assistance and cooperation. For the language of the United Nations Charter is unequivocal: Article 55 provides that the United Nations "shall promote ...universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all ...;" Article 56 pledges all members "to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Thus, the recommendation for international

action is a simple one: to implement Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter in good faith.

More specifically, international organizations have a role to play in formulating international standards, undertaking and co-ordinating research, bringing to the attention of governments and the general public the human rights implications of population questions as well as possible approaches to the solution of problems, etc.

Assistance to Governments might include co-operation in the collection and analysis of human rights data necessary for the preparation of realistic and acceptable population programs. This could well involve selection of criteria for assigning priorities between different human rights in the elaboration of population policy, choice of measures in the pursuance of such policies, which guarantee maximum respect for human rights perceived by the communities in question, or definition of norms for safeguarding basic freedoms in the application of strategies to modify demographic trends.

Finally, international cooperation and assistance should respond to national needs and requests in the areas outlined in the World Population Plan of Action, while observing the cardinal principle that donors not impose their views or policies upon the recipient countries.

It may be relevant to cite a report of the Review Committee of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities submitted to the Secretary-General in October 1972. The report, though confining its recommendations to the UNFPA, contains certain guidelines which may be equally applicable to all international action:

A. To promote awareness, both in developed and in developing countries, of the social, economic and environmental implications of national and international population problems; of the human rights aspects of family planning; and of possible strategies to deal with them.

B. To extend systematic and sustained assistance to countries at their request in dealing with their population problems; such assistance to be afforded in forms and by means best suited to meet the individual country's needs;

. . .

D. To build up, on an international basis, the knowledge and the capacity to respond to national, regional, interregional and global needs in the population and family planning fields; to promote coordination in planning and programming, and to cooperate with all concerned.⁶⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. Approved by the Conference on 30 August 1974 without a vote. Text of the Plan in Department of State Bulletin, vol. LXXI, No. 1840 (September 30, 1974), pp. 440-453.
2. U.N., Report of the United Nations World Population Conference, 1974 (Bucharest, 19-30 August 1974), p. 44.
3. Ibid.
4. Paragraph 78(g).
5. Paragraph 78.
6. H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law 144-45 (1952); H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights 397-417 (1950); Schwelb, "The Influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on International and National Law," American Society of International Law Proceedings 217 (1959); P. Drost, Human Rights As Legal Rights 32 (1951).
7. Whether in their manifestation as "inherit rights," "fundamental freedoms," or "natural justice," human rights are synonymous with the law of nature. Except for those extreme positivists who would deny in toto the existence of natural law, the latter is deemed to underlie both domestic legislation and international agreements, finding expression in such basic instruments as the United Nations Charter and national constitutions. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. I-X, especially the Due Process clauses. See also the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, which contains the renowned passage:

[We] hold these truths to be self-evident -

That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. (Emphasis added.)

Yet, even for these positivists, to the extent that human rights-natural law has already been incorporated into these basic laws, it is already binding upon states regardless, or even in spite, of a treaty. On the relationship between natural law and general principles of law, see note 9 infra.

8. The validity of international custom as the second source of international law in the criteria of the International Court of Justice is stipulated in I.C.J. Stat. art. 38, para. 1(b). Thus, those human rights based on international custom continue to be binding upon states, notwithstanding the latter's failure to ratify or adhere to human rights treaties. For a discussion of the binding force of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights on the basis of codification of pre-existing binding customary norms, see Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 76 (separate opinion of Vice President Ammoun). For a discussion on the acceleration of the custom-generating process through General Assembly resolutions, see South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, [1966] I.C.J. 6, 291-92 (dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka).

9. For the inclusion of general principles of law as the third source of international law in the criteria of the International Court of Justice, see I.C.J. Stat. art 38, para. 1(c). For a discussion of the concept of human rights as a general principle of law, see South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, supra note 8, at 298. Judge Tanaka wrote:

As an interpretation of Article 38, paragraph 1(c), we consider that the concept of human rights and of their protection is included in the general principles mentioned in that Article. Such an interpretation would necessarily be open to the criticism of falling into the error of natural law dogma. But it is undeniable that in Article 38, paragraph 1(c), some natural law elements are inherent. It extends the concept of the source of international law beyond the limit of legal positivism according to which, the States being bound only by their own will, international law is nothing but the law of the consent and auto-limitation of the State. But this viewpoint, we believe, was clearly overruled by Article 38, paragraph 1(c), by the fact that this provision does not require the consent of States as a condition of the recognition of the general principles. States which do not recognize this principle or even deny its validity are nevertheless subject to its rule. From this kind of source international law could have the foundation of its validity extended beyond the will of States, that is to say, into the sphere of natural law and assume an aspect of its supra-national and supra-positive character.

10. Waldock, "Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Significance of the European Convention," 11 International & Comp. L.Q. 3 (Supp. 1965). This paper was delivered at the European Convention on Human Rights.
11. Tehran Proclamation on Human Rights, Resolution XVIII, 1968.
12. United Nations Declaration on Social Progress and Development, Article 22(b).
13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 3; and Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Articles 1, 4, 6, 9 and 10.
14. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Principles 1, 4, 6, 9 and 10.
15. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 6.
16. Ibid., Article 9.
17. Ibid., Article 11(2).
18. Ibid., Article 11(1).
19. Ibid., Article 12(2)(b).
20. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 12
21. Ibid., Article 17.
22. Ibid., Article 18(1).
23. Ibid., Articles 18 and 26.
24. This right flows logically from the fact that human rights are ipso facto legal rights, entailing legal obligations on the part of governments to undertake the necessary reforms to conform with such rights.

25. General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV), paragraph 7; Report of the First Committee, supra note 2, p. 76.
26. Report of the Symposium on Population and Development, paragraph 79; text in United Nations, The Population Debate: Dimensions and Perspectives: Papers of the World Population Conference, Vol. II. p. 686, Bucharest, 1974; New York, 1975.
27. United Nations Secretariat, "Population and Development," ibid., Vol. I, p. 415.
- 27a. Ibid., p. 416
28. Paragraphs 20-26, 32.
29. Paragraphs 14(f), 29(b)
30. Paragraph 14(b).
31. Paragraphs 24(d), 25, 26, 29(e) and (f).
32. Paragraphs 14(h), 42.
33. Paragraph 32(b).
34. Paragraph 32(c).
35. Paragraph 32(e).
36. Paragraph 40.
37. Paragraph 32(e).
38. Paragraph 33.
39. Paragraph 32(f).
40. Paragraphs 72-77.
41. Paragraphs 78-80.
42. Paragraphs 44-50.
43. Paragraphs 51-62.
44. Paragraph 14(f).

45. See H. Schubnell, Law and Fertility: Procreation, Contraception, Birth, 31 (Wiesbaden: Federal Institute for Population Research, 1974).
46. Paragraph 14(f).
47. "Legal Analysis and Population Control: The Problem of Coercion," Harvard Law Review, vol. 84, 1971, p. 1910.
48. Id. at 1911.
49. D. Callahan, "Ethics and Population Limitation," in Reining and Tinker (eds.), Population: Dynamics, Ethics and Policy, p. 8, Washington, D.C., American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1975.
50. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. Judgement of First Panel of Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 25 February 1975, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht, vol. 35, p. 1.
52. United Nations Secretariat, "United Nations Standards Concerning the Relationship Between Human Rights and Various Population Questions," in United Nations, supra note 26, p. 355.
53. Article 7(1).
54. Oberverwaltungsgericht, Berlin, Decision of 7 December 1972, VB 37/71.
55. Oberverwaltungsgericht, Hamburg, decision of 1 January 1973, Bf. III, 5/72.
56. Paragraph 78(h).

57. For a description of the objectives, functions and findings of these projects, see UNFPA, Law and Population (Population Profiles #2, 1976).
58. See paragraph 34 of the WPPA.
59. For a description of the Model City Project, see Reuben B. Canoy, "The Local Government as a Direct Participant in Population Activities," in UNFPA, The Symposium on Law and Population: Proceedings, Background Papers and Recommendations (1975), pp. 177-206.
60. Id. at 200.
61. Presidential Decree No. 965, a decree requiring applicants for marriage licences to receive instructions on family planning and responsible parenthood.
62. Letter of Instruction No. 436, 20 July 1976.
63. Letter of Instruction No. 435, 20 July 1976.
64. Commission on Population, Annual Report, 1974-1975, p. 53-5, Manila, National Media Production Center, 1976.
65. Paragraph 104.
66. See Report to the Secretary General of the United Nations from the Review Committee of the UNFPA (Chairman: Ernst Michanek; New York, October 1972), paragraph 42.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS RE-EXAMINED

by

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In his inaugural address, President Carter characterized as "absolute" the United States "commitment to human rights."¹ Indeed, the term "human rights" was repeated three times in an address otherwise noted for its brevity. Immediately thereafter, the Department of State criticized Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union for harassing their dissidents as in violation of the 1975 Helsinki Agreement and "accepted international standards of human rights."² In his talk with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin,³ and again at his first press conference as President,⁴ Mr. Carter reiterated the United States right to speak out strongly and forcefully whenever and wherever human rights are threatened.

At his news conference on 23 February 1977, Mr. Carter went a step further by stating that the U.S. has "a responsibility and a legal right to express our disapproval of violations of human rights."^{4b}

But is not the treatment or mistreatment of nationals an internal affair of a state? Is not the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference admittedly not legally binding?⁵ By insisting on its right to be concerned with infringements of human rights wherever they occur, is not the United States upholding human rights as a higher law, transcending conflicting national laws? What are the legal bases for such a position.

The purpose of this paper is to seek answers to these questions by re-examining the legal status of human rights.

It should be noted that the status of human rights has traditionally been linked to the types of instruments into which they are incorporated. Thus, the answer to the question whether human rights are legally or only morally binding upon states usually hinges upon the fulfillment or nonfulfillment of the various requirements under the law of treaties. As is often the case, where human rights are dealt with in such instruments as declarations, proclamations,⁷ or unratified covenants,⁸ they are considered morally, but not legally binding. Only duly ratified conventions⁹ are given legally binding effect, and then only on the countries which have ratified them. This treaty-oriented approach to human rights has been subscribed to by many jurists.¹⁰

For traditional international law, preoccupied at it was with relations between sovereign states,¹¹ had relegated the individual human being to the status of "in the offensive, but widely current, terminology of the experts, a mere object of international law."¹² In fact, his status was even less than that of an object because "the fundamental claim of human personality to equality, liberty, and freedom against the arbitrary will of the State, remains outside the orbit of international law, save for the precarious and controversial principle of humanitarian intervention."¹³ In view of their different objectives, therefore, international law and human rights were treated as two distinct entities; lofty though the human rights ideals were, without translation into positive law, they belonged to the realm of morality, lacking internationally binding legal force. Of course, municipal law could provide for the protection of human rights, but in this case the state could freely prohibit exercise of the rights or restrict their scope. On the other hand, this freedom of states would be limited if they were under an international obligation to recognize and guarantee human rights, and herein lies the importance of determining whether today international law has developed in this direction.

It is submitted by this author that human rights, to the extent that they have met the conditions prescribed below, are ipso facto legally binding upon states, regardless of the existence of a duly ratified treaty, for human rights, by definition, are "rights which attach to all human beings equally, whatever their nationality."¹⁴ As such, the legal validity of their application cannot be rooted solely in a mere piece of paper signed and ratified by states.

By emphasizing the formal or procedural aspects of human rights treaties, the traditional approach seems to confuse the instruments stipulating human rights with the substantive human rights themselves. Rather, the analysis of the binding force of human rights must be approached also from their non-treaty sources: natural law, customary international law and general principles of law as recognized by civilized nations. Each of these sources has contributed to the development of human rights. Together with treaty law, these non-treaty sources of human rights will be discussed in the ensuing space.

I. Treaty Law

It is submitted that the United Nations Charter has now provided the vital link between traditional international law and human rights by incorporating human rights into treaty law. This is done primarily through Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. Article 55 obligates the United Nations to "promote... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." Of critical importance, however, is Article 56:

All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

As Professor Quincy Wright has pointed out,¹⁵ the word "pledge" would clearly seem to indicate that an obligation of international law has been accepted. This view is reinforced by the statement of the International Court of Justice

in the case of Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolutions 276 (1970):

(T)o enforce distinctions, exclusions, restrictions, and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter. 16

Thus, all members of the United Nations have shouldered a legal responsibility to take the necessary action to promote universal observance of human rights; this is so even if the promotion of such rights is in conflict with obligations assumed under other international agreements, past or future, since Article 103 of the Charter provides:

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

However, the United Nations Charter does not spell out all of the contents of human rights and it, therefore, remains for subsequent instruments, principally the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to fill in the gaps. Unfortunately, though, the ink on the Declaration had hardly dried before claims were made that it had no binding effect in law. What is the validity of these claims? While it is conceded that a declaration, by itself, lacks the binding legal force, what of a declaration integrally tied to a 'treaty like the United Nations Charter?

If one accepts the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 as the authoritative restatement of modern treaty law, there are several articles relevant to this inquiry. In the first place, the Convention differs from the traditional positivists' view by emphasizing that the consent of a state to be

bound by a treaty does not need to be expressed solely by ratification; consent may also be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, acceptance, approval or accession, as well as "by any other means if so agreed."¹⁸

More importantly, section 3 of Article 31 on the Interpretation of Treaties provides:

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
 - (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
 - (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
 - (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
 - (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
 - (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties

As indicated earlier, since the Charter does not stipulate the entire contents of human rights, recourse must be had to subsequent agreements or instruments among members of the United Nations to define human rights "in

connection with the conclusion of the treaty," in other words, in connexion with the conclusion of the Charter. Clear evidence of such a "connexion" would, of course, lie in the words actually used in subsequent instruments, and it is significant that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted unanimously by the members of the United Nations in 1948 and subsequently through its repeated recitation,¹⁹ contains the following paragraphs in its Preamble:

....

WHEREAS the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights,

WHEREAS Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms...

NOW, THEREFORE,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

PROCLAIMS this Universal Declaration of Human Rights....

By using the words of Article 56 of the Charter and clearly establishing its "connexion with the conclusion of" the Charter, the language of the Universal Declaration provides the legal basis for considering its definition of human rights as the "authoritative interpretation of the Charter of the highest order."²⁰

This analysis can also be supported by recourse

... to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31.²¹

An examination of the "travaux préparatoires" of the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, 1945, reveals that Committee 1/1, which was given the task of drafting the Preamble, Purposes and Principles of the Charter, received with sympathy the idea that the Charter should incorporate a bill of rights.²² However, because the details had not been worked out earlier, the Committee could not, within the limited conference time, include a comprehensive bill of rights in the Charter and decide that:

The present Conference, if only for lack of time, could not proceed to realize such a draft in an international contract. The Organization, once formed, could better proceed to consider the suggestion and to deal effectively with it through a special commission or by some other method. The Committee recommends that the General Assembly consider the proposal and give it effect. 23

Echoing the sentiment of the Conference, the President of the United States underlined the necessity for following the Charter with an elaborated bill of rights when he said that:

Under this document (the Charter) we have good reason to expect an international bill of rights, acceptable to all the nations involved. That bill of rights will be as much a part of international life as our Bill of Rights is to our Constitution. 24

The intention, therefore, was to entrust the task of preparing an international bill of rights, which was to form part of an elaborate the Charter, to the Economic and Social Council - the first Council set up under the Charter - whose terms of reference include the preparation of draft bills on human rights.²⁵ On 16 February 1946, at its first session, the Economic and Social Council established a Commission on Human Rights to submit proposals, recommendations and reports to the Council regarding an "international bill of rights."²⁶ Pursuant to this mandate, a draft declaration was prepared,

and this was adopted in 1948 by the General Assembly as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.²⁷ Once Again, the conclusion from the viewpoint of the Vienna Convention principles on supplementary means of interpretation points to the legal integration of the Declaration into the Charter.²⁸

It may be noted that almost all of the human rights declarations or instruments contain references to their "connexion with the conclusion of" the United Nations Charter either directly, as in the case of the Universal Declaration, or indirectly (in other words, through the Universal Declaration) as in the Proclamation of Teheran²⁹ and the UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation.³⁰ In the absence of any direct conflicts amongst these instruments, the same argument can be made for the proposition that they are of binding force upon the signatory powers.³¹

The binding force of human rights declarations and instruments is, thus, strongly implied by analysis of the Law of Treaties; there are, however, other grounds, too, for considering human rights as legally binding upon states even in the absence of a treaty. A brief discussion of these grounds now follows.

II. Natural Law

"Whenever there is an appeal to such (human) rights, to 'the dignity and worth of human person', there is an appeal to natural law and vice versa."³² Human rights have their foundation in the law of nature. Indeed, some jurists go so far as to say that human rights are inherent in human beings and exist whether or not they are expressed in positive law; for example, Judge Tanaka, in his dissenting opinion in the South West Africa

Cases in the International Court of Justice, said:

The existence of human rights does not depend on the will of a State; neither internally on its law or any other legislative measure, nor internationally on treaty or custom, in which the express or tacit will or a State constitutes the essential element. A State or States are not capable of creating human rights by law or by convention; they can only confirm their existence and give them protection. The role of the State is no more than declaratory. 33

Again, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the International Court of Justice characterized "inherent right" as follows:

In order to exercise it, no special legal process has to be gone through, nor have any special legal acts to be performed. Its existence can be declared ... but does not need to be constituted. Furthermore, the right does not depend on its being exercised. 34

Although the notion of the natural or inherent rights of man dates from antiquity, it was the Constitution of Virginia of 1776, the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen which marked the first constitutional instruments in modern times to proclaim such rights as part of the fundamental law of the state and their protection as its "raison d'etre."³⁵ However, for over a century thereafter, a period which coincided with the rise of industrialization and colonialism, the doctrine of natural law and its human rights components receded into the background. In its place, positivism, with its focus on written law, both national and international, emerged dominant; the setting was a world of complex economic relations requiring detailed regulation and, in addition, the dominant powers sought to uphold "unequal treaties" brought about by "gunboat diplomacy," which natural law might have condemned. In such a situation, why stress the rights of man, containing as they do the seeds of self-reawakening?

Might is not be more useful to stress the letter and technicality of the law, right or wrong, just or unjust? This was the age of "pacta sunt servanda" and John Austin's teaching of law as the command of a sovereign to persons subject to him.³⁶

Although the League of Nations was often credited with the revival of natural law, it was in reality the United Nations which marked its rebirth. The League of Nations actually remained very much tied to positive international law, stressing "scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations" in the Preamble of the Covenant and distinguishing, not between just and unjust wars, but between the legal and the illegal resort to war.³⁷ Article 16 provided sanctions against a member which resorted to war in violation of these legal obligations. Only in the areas of self-determination, the mandates system, protection of minorities and labor conditions did the League exhibit a modicum of natural law tendencies.

By contrast, the Preamble of the United Nations Charter expresses the resolve of the

peoples of the United Nations...to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.

In every session of the General Assembly, human rights issues loom large in speeches and debates, and resolution after resolution reaffirms commitment to human rights principles.³⁸

However, it is significant to note that, while the 18th-century revolutionaries were content to achieve the civil and political rights of man, their 20th-century counterparts consider such rights illusory unless accompanied by economic, cultural and social rights. As Prime Minister Atlee said in his opening statement at the first General Assembly in London:

The Charter of the United Nations does not deal only with Governments and States or with politics and war, but with the simple elemental needs of human beings whatever their race, their colour or their creed. In the Charter we reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights. We see the freedom of the individual in the State as an essential complement to the freedom of the State in the world community of nations. We stress, too, that social justice and the best possible standard of life for all are essential factors in promoting and maintaining the peace of the world. 39

Such a change of emphasis recalls the statement of Stammler that there is only a "natural law with a changing content," all content being contingent and derived from experience.⁴⁰ In other words, while the category of "right law" or "just law" may claim universal validity, no particular precept can claim that quality. As Professor Quincy Wright put it:

It need not be assumed that either Universal values or Universal relations are immutable, as was usually assumed by the Natural law school of jurists. Human nature may evolve, as may the analysis of human relations. In proportion as certain values and relations are universally accepted, the probability of their change in time is reduced, but radical changes in the conditions of human and social existence may induce changes. 41

Professor Leo Gross perhaps summed it up best when he said:

All normative systems, be they derived from a divine source or from nature or from reason, or whether they be, like positive law, enacted by authority, are mediated by prophets and men. Priests transmit divine or revealed law, and laymen derive precepts from reason or nature, and men, be they kings or legislative assemblies, proclaim or enact positive law. Between the original source and the formulated precepts man always plays a mediating role.⁴²

Thus, the contents of natural law have shifted their ground: from the divine or "eternal law of God" to the secular law derived from reason; from the accent on civil and political rights to the accent on socio-economic rights; and from

preoccupation with the rights of states to the rights of man. In other words, natural law has become more "humanized."

Given this change of emphasis, what role does natural law play today? What is its relevance to the legal status of human rights? Perhaps partly because of its ability to change in the light of circumstances, natural law has been able to serve two practical purposes: it is, firstly, a "source" and, secondly, a "censor" of positive law. With respect to the former, natural law has served as a model basis for legislation; in its role as censor, natural law, as a superior legal order, "strikes down: conflicting positive laws."⁴³ By partaking of the natural law quality,⁴⁴ human rights also share in these attributes vis-a-vis positive law. The codification of human rights principles into treaty form and the enactment of legislation and even constitutional provisions incorporating human rights principles are direct evidences of the working of the "source" function.

As for human rights performing the "censorial" function, striking down conflicting positive law, cases abound in which courts and authorities in many countries have ruled invalid statutes or treaties which conflict with human rights. Thus, the right of privacy was invoked by the United States Supreme Court to declare unconstitutional a Connecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives,⁴⁵ a Massachusetts law denying unmarried minors access to contraceptives,⁴⁶ a Texas law prohibiting all abortion except to save the life of the woman,⁴⁷ and a Missouri law requiring spousal consent or, in the case of unmarried minors, parental consent as a prerequisite to abortion.⁴⁸

In 1971, the Italian Constitutional Court struck down an anti-contraceptive law enacted during the Fascist era.⁴⁹ Though the Court did not

specify the ground for its decision, the human rights factor which so dominated the brief of the defendants, Dr. Luigi de Marchi, must be deemed relevant. It may be noted that Italy's compliance with human rights is required not only by Article 15 of the Peace Treaty,⁵⁰ but also by Article 10 (1) of the Italian Constitution which provided:

The Italian legal system conforms to the generally recognized principles of international law.

In a political asylum case, the Court of Appeals in Milan based its decision on the conclusion that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is "an integral part of the Italian legal system."⁵¹ The decision foreshadowed the Government's policy in yet another asylum case that has even greater significance because it involved a conflict between the Declaration and a multilateral treaty. The details of the case are these:

Forty-eight hours after the military junta in Greece announced the foiling of a plot organized by three retired admirals, Commander Pappas and part of the 270-member crew of a Greek anti-torpedo naval vessel, "Velos," at Fiumicino, 30 km. west of Rome, sought political asylum from the Italian authorities on 25 May 1973. The vessel had been in the Mediterranean with American, British, Italian and Turkish ships participating in NATO manoeuvres.

The 19 June 1951 status-of-force convention between states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 7, #5) obligates member states to lend mutual assistance in arresting delinquent members of military forces of a NATO power and returning them to their state of origin.

In view of the request by the Greek military Government for the return of these seamen, the question arose as to the comparative binding force of the convention and the Universal Declaration, Article 14 (1) of which states:

"Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." It is interesting to note that the Italian authorities decided that the Declaration prevailed over the Convention and so granted the asylum. On 29 May, the Commander and his crew were accorded the status of refugees pursuant to the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951.

Thus, the Italian Government has been consistent in upholding human rights as superior to both domestic law (the de Marchi case) and treaties.

The "censorial" function may be exercised not only by states in both their domestic and foreign spheres of activities, but also by international organizations. Thus, the assimilation of the legal status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into that of the United Nations Charter itself underlies the rationale for resolution 3207 (XXIX) adopted by the General Assembly on 30 September 1974 on the subject of the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa. The resolution

Calls upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa in the light of the constant violation by South Africa of the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁵²

Even if one were to consider General Assembly resolutions as having no binding legal force, it would be difficult to ignore the decisions of the Security Council directing member states to desist from activities deemed incompatible with human rights. Resolution 5761 of 9 June 1964, for example, calls upon the Government of South Africa:

(a) To renounce the execution of the persons sentenced to death for acts resulting from their opposition to the policy of apartheid;

(b) To and forthwith the trial in progress, instituted within the framework of the arbitrary laws of apartheid; 53

The Security Council resolution was adopted notwithstanding South Africa's contention that the matter of apartheid lies within its domestic jurisdiction, thus precluding the United Nations from interference,⁵⁴ as well as the fact that the trial is question was at the time still under judicial review.⁵⁵

III. Customary International Law

The recent trend of codifying customary rules of international law into conventional international law⁵⁶ is reflected in recent attempts at casting human rights declarations into treaty form.⁵⁷ Since the applicability of international custom as a source of international law as listed in the Statute of the International Court of Justice⁵⁸ remains undiminished in the absence of binding treaties, those human rights which have become international custom may arguably continue to be binding upon states, notwithstanding the latter's failure to sign, ratify or accede to the new treaties.^{58a}

The idea of custom-based human rights assumes greater significance, too, in the light of the increasingly active involvement of the United Nations in the field of human rights.⁵⁹ That the United Nations has clear authority to discuss and make recommendations on human rights matters is specifically provided for in Articles 10, 13, 55 and 62 of the Charter. While it is not contended that individual General Assembly resolutions have a legally binding force for members of the United Nations, repeated and near-unanimous resolutions or declarations may achieve such an effect through accelerating the custom-generating process. Judge Tanaka describes well the working of such a process:

According to traditional international law, a general practice is the result of the repetition of individual acts of States constituting consensus in regard to a certain content of a rule of law. Such repetition of acts is an historical process extending over a long period of time.... The appearance of organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, with their agencies and affiliated institutions, replacing an important part of the traditional individualistic method of international negotiation by the method of 'parliamentary diplomacy'...is bound to influence the mode of generation of customary international law. A State, instead of pronouncing its view to a few States directly concerned, has the opportunity, through the medium of an organization, to declare its position to all members of the organization and to know immediately their reaction on the same matter. In former days, practice, repetition and opinio juris sive necessitatis, which are the ingredients of customary law, might be combined together in a very long and slow process extending over centuries. In the contemporary age of highly developed techniques of communication and information, the formation of a custom through the medium of international organization is greatly facilitated and accelerated; the establishment of such a custom would require no more than one generation or even far less than that. This is one of the examples of the transformation of law inevitably produced by change in the social substratum. 60

As Fitzmaurice put it: "Older days, slower ways: the great increase in and speeding up of communications, and other interactions, has changed this."⁶¹

Rosalyn Higgins reached the same conclusion by another route:

So far as custom is concerned, politically motivated state practice in non-institutionalised bilateral and multilateral diplomacy is accepted as evidence. There is no logical reason why it should not also be within the framework of international organization. 62

The question of whether all resolutions need be followed by repeated state practice in order to qualify as "customary law" is negatively answered by Professor Bin Cheng. Writing on United Nations resolutions on outer space he said: "There need...be no usage at all in the sense of repeated practice, provided that the opinio juris of the States concerned can be clearly established."⁶³ Similarly, Ian Brownlie, in discussing the elements of international custom as sources of the law, said:

A long (and much less, an immemorial) practice is not necessary, and rules relating to airspace and the continental shelf have emerged from fairly quick maturing of practice. The International Court does not emphasise the time element as such in its practice. 64

All of these prompted Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice to conclude:

It is a mistake to think customary law is necessarily 'old' law, or that it must take a long time to come into being. It is capable of springing up quite quickly if a sufficiently wide and spontaneous consensus of opinion manifests itself in favour of the view that a given matter is governed by rules that must be considered to be rules of law. Prominent examples of this process in very recent times are to be found, for instance, in the fields of maritime, air and space law, and of war crimes and crimes against peace and humanity....65

The question of when a United Nations General Assembly resolution is transformed into a legally binding prescription hinges upon the intent of the resolution, the extent of the consensus supporting it, and the repeated endorsements it receives both in and out of the United Nations. Once completed, the metamorphosis would endow the General Assembly resolution with customary law obligations for member states which would be as binding as if incorporated in a ratified treaty.⁶⁶ As Mr. Constantin A. Stavropoulos, the former United Nations Legal Counsel, said:

The effect of a resolution may vary from case to case and even from State to State, but it seems undue conservatism to suggest that Assembly resolutions have not, in fact, become one of the principal means whereby international law is now moulded, especially in (such instances as)...the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, where the resolution has enjoyed the support of virtually all States Members, both at the time of its adoption and subsequently. 67

Courts in non-Western countries seem very ready to regard declaratory statements as evidence of customary international law, and therefore endowed with binding legal force, and this holds vast potential for the strengthening

of human rights. The Shimoda Case⁶⁸ illustrates this point. An action was brought by five Japanese in May 1965 against their Government to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the closing days of World War II. The District Court of Tokyo declared that the United States had violated international law by dropping the bombs, but concluded that the claimants lacked legal basis for recovering damages from the Japanese Government. Of particular interest, however, was the route which the court took to reach its decision with regard to the United States' violation of international law; the court relied heavily on a number of declarations, as well as on widely ratified multilateral treaties, to ascertain the international law of war, but without attaching any distinction to the legal effects of the two types of instrument. Thus, although it conceded that the "Draft Rules of Air Warfare cannot be called positive law, since they have not yet become effective as a treaty." it went on to state that "international jurists regard the Draft Rules as authoritative," and therefore imbued with the quality of customary international law. This was so despite nonconformity with the standards prescribed by the Draft Rules in wars waged since their formulation in 1923. Also deemed relevant by the court was the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases," to which atomic bombs are analogized.⁶⁹ The court was apparently unconcerned with the fact that neither Japan nor the United States had ratified that Protocol.

The willingness of this court, in a developed and relatively Westernized country, to construe binding international custom from non-binding instruments has obvious and very important implications for human rights declarations, especially in the non-Western world.

IV. General Principles of Law

"General principles of law," the third source of international law upon which the International Court of Justice may draw, may be classified into the following broad categories:

- (1) Principles of approach to and interpretation of legal relationships of all kinds;
- (2) Minimum standards of procedural fairness;
- (3) Substantive principles of law sufficiently widely and firmly recognized in the leading legal systems of the world to be regarded as international legal principles.⁷⁰

For present purposes, only categories (1) and (3) are relevant.

It is submitted that there are essentially three ways in which these general principles of law are relevant in ascertaining the legal status of human rights.

First, as Lauterpacht has pointed out, the 19th century saw the incorporation of the fundamental rights of man into the law of nearly all European states, thus elevating recognition of these rights to "a general principle of the constitutional law of civilized states."⁷¹

Second, human rights may be "inferred," by means of generally applicable legal principles. Commenting on Oppenheim's statement that the International Court may "apply the general principles of municipal jurisprudence, in particular of private law,"⁷² Brownlie said:

What has happened is that international tribunals have employed elements of legal reasoning and private law analogies in order to make the law of nations a viable system.⁷³

Thus, certain rights may be inferred from the acknowledged existence of other rights by legal reasoning. For example, in several countries, there has recently been inferred from the right of privacy a right to use,⁷⁴ or import⁷⁵ contraceptives, and even to have abortion on request during the first trimester of pregnancy.⁷⁶ Such inferred rights may in time ripen into express rights through the United Nations custom-generating process.⁷⁷

Third, the principle of estoppel, albeit a matter of jurisprudential controversy, is important for human rights. Estoppel has long been accepted as a general principle of law, in the sense of being a principle common to all systems of law. Thus, Lauterpacht characterized the estoppel principle as "recognized by all systems of private law, not only with regard to estoppel by record...but also, under different names, with regard to estoppel by conduct and by deed." He could not see why the principle, having been invoked in pleadings or made the basis of several important arbitration awards, "should be disregarded in the relations between States."⁷⁸

Underlying the doctrine of estoppel is the requirement that a State ought to be consistent in its attitude to a given factual or legal situation in the interest of predictability and stability in relations between states. In essence, it means that "a State cannot blow hot and cold - allegans contraria non audiendus est."⁷⁹ Nor should a State "be allowed to avail itself of the advantages of the treaty when it suits it to do so and repudiate it when its performance becomes onerous. It is of little consequence whether that rule is based on what in English law is known as the principle of estoppel or the more generally conceived requirement of good faith."⁸⁰

Publicists are not in agreement about whether a vote for a General Assembly resolution constitutes and estoppel for the state which cast that vote. At one extreme are the comments of Dr. Schwarzenberger on the analysis by the International Court of the resolution of the General Assembly on Genocide,⁸¹ suggesting that, since the resolution was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly, "its contents may be considered to have become binding on all the members of the United Nations by way of estoppel."⁸² Similarly, in insisting that a country's vote on or adherence to a human rights instrument must be taken as reflecting its official opinion with all the implications that go with it, Professor John Humphrey, former Director of the United Nations Human Rights Division, asked:

How, indeed, could that opinion be more officially or more formally reflected? There is, it will be noted, an element of estoppel in the creation of customary law. How can a State be heard to say on one occasion that the law is such-and-such and later deny that this is the case? ⁸⁴

And the other extreme is the viewpoint of MacGibbon, who stresses that, while a resolution may become binding by consent, which then estops the consenting state from challenging it, "Where consent is given and subject to the overriding consideration that recommendations are not binding, no estoppel can be created."⁸⁴ (Emphasis supplied)

Holding the middle view is Bleicher who states that "There should be no obstacle to a 'change of heart' by a state which finds advantage in altering its view of the law, unless there was initially some reason for others to believe that the asserting party intended to constrain itself by its words." He explains further:

This is not to say that votes in the General Assembly cannot be relied upon because they are "politically" motivated. A state which, for whatever reason, openly supported a resolution in which it did not believe, should not be permitted to use that fact as a defense to an obligation built upon its public expression of support for the resolution, any more than a party to a treaty can avoid that obligation by demonstrating an ulterior motive for adherence. 'True' motive on the part of the state voting for a resolution is not the missing element here, but reasonable basis for relying upon the public expression embodied in that vote. 85

In the face of these conflicting views, it is submitted that while a single vote on a resolution may not constitute an estoppel, repeated and near-unanimous votes reciting or reaffirming that vote undoubtedly bring the doctrine of estoppel into effect. Since human rights resolutions have been repeatedly affirmed both in and out of the General Assembly, a strong argument may be made that states are estopped from disregarding their obligations in this matter.

One final aspect of "general principles of law" to stress in this context is that, unlike treaties or international customary law whose legal validity hinges upon the express or implied consent of states, the validity of "general principles" does not depend on the consent of any particular state. In the words of Judge Tanaka:

States which do not recognize this principle or even deny its validity are nevertheless subject to its rule. From this kind of source international law could have the foundation of its validity extended beyond the will of States, that is to say, into the sphere of natural law and assume an aspect of its supra-national and supra-positive character. 86

Conclusions

The legal status of human rights may be approached from any or all of the four viewpoints - treaty law, natural law, customary international law and general principles of law. It can be concluded that each of these, standing alone, presents a strong argument in favor of the legal validity of human rights. Taken together, they represent an incontestable case for a legal basis for human rights.

The near three-fold expansion of the United Nations membership from the original 51 in 1945 to the present 145 has brought with it many changes in the rules governing international relationships. Not the least of these is the increased emphasis on human rights as the standard for state conduct, both internationally and domestically. This is to be welcomed, for in the words of Moskowitz:

There can be no doubt as to the validity of the principle of human rights as the one point of concurrence where the best interests of the individual, the community, the state and the world converge. 87

Having won their independence based on the human rights principles of equality and self-determination, forcing these deeper legal convictions to override contrary written laws--be they the "unequal treaties" or basic laws of the "mother states"--the newly emergent nations are apt to place less reliance upon the Western-originated or imposed law with its accent on surface manifestations of rules. Their continual struggles against apartheid, colonialism and neo-colonialism in all its forms, evidence their acceptance of human rights as a higher law imbued with the binding legal force upon all states. This is supportable, as indicated earlier in this study, by the Law

of Treaties, Natural Law, Customary International Law and General Principles of Law.

Not to be overlooked also is the "indivisibility" of human rights --in the sense that one cannot pick and choose only those rights considered to be advantageous to it and reject the others. By subscribing to the binding legal force of human rights in the areas of self-determination and equality, one is bound to observe the other human rights as well--social, economic, cultural, health, etc.⁸⁸ Herein lies the opportunity for a new human rights-oriented World Order which looks to the well-being of the individual as well as the society as the ultimate test of legality.

That the exercise of sovereign rights should be subject to the overriding concern for human rights has indeed been accepted by all states. Thus, a resolution adopted by the World Population Conference in Bucharest states explicitly that while "it is the right of each nation to determine its own population policy in the unrestricted exercise of its sovereignty,"⁸⁹ such policy must accord "absolute respect" for human rights.⁹⁰

The World Plan of Action adopted by the World Conference of the International Women's Year in Mexico City in 1975 also subordinates national legislation to human rights principles. Paragraph 38 provides:

Governments should revise their legislation affecting the status of women in the light of human rights principles and internationally accepted standards. Wherever necessary, legislation should be enacted or updated to bring national laws into conformity with the relevant international instruments...

As Judge Jessup warned:

Unlimited sovereignty is no longer automatically accepted as the most prized possession or even as a desirable attribute. 91

For it is often his own "state against which the human rights of the individual are in need of protection."⁹² The elevation of human rights over conflicting national laws is thus based not only on solid jurisprudential grounds, but also on the protection and promotion of individual wellbeing--toward which goal law ultimately aims.

FOOTNOTES

¹ New York Times, 21 January 1977, p. B1.

² The Czechoslovak dissidents were among 300 signers of "Charter 77," appealing to the authorities to respect human and civil rights. Andrei D. Sakharov, a Soviet Nobel Laureate, was publicly warned by Soviet officials about his vocal opposition to the Government. See id., 28 January 1977, p. A1, col. 3; 29 January 1977, p. 2, col. 3.

The arrest in Moscow of Yuri Orlov, a prominent human-rights activist, prompted a twin move by the Department of State: the American delegate to the UN Human Rights Commission, Allard K. Lowenstein, was instructed to propose an investigation by the Commission in the arrest and to state the American concern; and the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C. was informed that the Carter administration viewed the arrest with the same concern it felt about the arrest of Aleksandr I. Ginzburg, another human-rights activist, a week earlier. Id. 12 February 1977, p. 6, col. 4.

³ Id., 2 February 1977, p. 4, col. 4.

⁴ Id., 9 February 1977, p. 38, col. 6.

4a Consistent with this position, President Carter wrote a letter to Mr. Sakharov assuring him of the Administration's commitment to human rights. The pertinent passages read:

Human Rights is a central concern of my Administration. In my inaugural address I stated: 'Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere.'

You may rest assured that the American people and our government will continue our firm commitment to promote respect for human rights not only in our own country but also abroad.

We shall use our good offices to seek the release of prisoners of conscience, and we will continue our efforts to shape a world responsive to human aspirations in which nations of differing cultures and histories can live side by side in peace and justice....

Id., 18 February 1977, p. A3, col. 1.

The U.S. Government has held fast to its position notwithstanding the Soviet rejection of its "attempts to interfere, under a thought-up pretext of defending human rights, in its internal affairs." *Id.*, 19 February 1977, p. 1, col. 6. At the same time, President Carter ordered a review of American laws, including immigration laws, which may violate the Helsinki Agreement.

Id., 20 February 1977, Section 4, p. 1, col. 6.

4b Emphasis supplied. See the transcript of the President's news conference in *id.*, 24 February 1977, p. 22, col. 3. At this conference, Mr. Carter also cited violations of human rights in Uganda, South Korea, Cuba, several South American countries and the United States itself.

5 The Final Act, for example, contains the following paragraph:

The Government of the Republic of Finland is requested to transmit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the text of this Final Act, which is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations....

(Article 102 of the Charter provides: "Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations...shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.")

5 (cont'd.)

As a double safeguard, a letter was drafted for the Government of Finland to use in forwarding the Final Act to the Secretary-General of the United Nations which contains the following paragraph:

I have also been asked...to draw your attention to the fact that this Final Act is not eligible, in whole or in part, for registration with the Secretariat under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, as would be the case were it a matter of a treaty or international agreement, under the aforesaid Article. (73 Dept. of State Bulletin 349 (1975).

For the complete text of the Final Act of The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki, see 73 Dept. of State Bulletin 323 (1975).

A detailed analysis of the legal status of the Final Act appears in Harold S. Russell, "The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?", 70 Am. J. Int'l L. 242, 246 (1976).

6

E. g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and peoples (1960); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (1963); Declaration on the Promotion Among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding Between Peoples (1965); Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1967); Declaration on Social Progress and Development (1969).

For texts of declarations, proclamations and conventions, see United Nations. Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments of the United Nations (1973); UNFPA, The United Nations and Population: Major Resolutions and Instruments (English ed., 1974; French and Spanish eds., 1976); see also

6 (cont'd.)

Brownlie, Basic Documents on Human Rights (1971). For a report on the status of multilateral agreements in human rights concluded under U.N. auspices, see U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/907/Rev. 7.

7
E.g., Teheran Proclamation on Human Rights (1968).

8
E.g., until 1976: Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).

9
See e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G. A. Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14 at 47, U.N. Doc. A.6181 (1965); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 174 (1948); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 7 Sept. 1956, 266 U.N. Treaty Series 3 (1957); Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, G. A. Res. 317, U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 33 (1949); and the two international covenants of 1966 cited in note 8 supra.

10
H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law 144, 145 (1952); H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights 397-417 (1950); Schwelb, "The Influence of Universal Declaration of Human Rights on International and National Law," Proceedings of American Society of International Law 217 (1959); P. Drost, Human Rights as Legal Rights 32 (1951).

11
Oppenheim, International Law, I, 268-88 (Lauterpacht, 8th ed., New York: David McKay Co., 1955); Hyde, International Law Chiefly Interpreted and Applied by the United States 209 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 2nd revised edition, 1945); Kunz, "Present-Day Efforts at International Protection.

11 (cont'd.)

of Human Rights: A General Analytical and Critical Introduction," Proceedings of American Society of International Law, 1951, p. 117. See also Korowicz, "Protection and Implementation of Human Rights within the Soviet Legal System," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1959, p. 248.

12

Lauterpacht, An International Bill of the Rights of Man (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), p. 5.

13

Ibid.

14.

Waldock, "Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Significance of the European Convention," 11 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 3 (Supp. 1965) (the paper was delivered at the European Convention on Human Rights).

15

Wright, "The Strengthening of International Law," in Recueil des cours, 1959 - III, 7, 141, at 143.

16

I.C.J. Reports 197, p. 57.

17

See, for example, Nelsen, Principles of International Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 144, 145; Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (London: Stevens & Sons, 1949), pp. 397-417; Schwebel, "The Influence of Universal Declaration of Human Rights on International and National Law," Proceedings of American Society of International Law, 1959, pp. 217, 218; Drost, Human Rights as Legal Rights (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1965), p. 32.

18

U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 23 May 1969, Art. 11.

19

The votes were 48 for, none against, with 8 abstentions. Although the Soviet bloc abstained from voting, they subsequently affirmed it when they voted for the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People of 1960, paragraph 7 of which reads: "All states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration...." For re-citation of the Declaration, see text accompanying note 38 below.

20

See 6 Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights 2 (New York, 1968; reprinted in 9 Journal of the International Commission of Jurists, No. 1, p. 94, at 95 (June 1968); see also Sohn and Buergenthal, International Protection of Human Rights (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1973), p. 519.

21

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 32; Supplementary means of interpretation.

22

U.N., Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-1949 (New York, 1949), p. 524.

23

U.N., Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945 (New York), Vol. 6, p. 456.

24

Address given at the final plenary session on 26 June 1945, id., vol. 1, p. 683.

25

Charter of the United Nations, Art. 62.

26

Resolution of the Economic and Social Council of 16 February 1946 (document E/20 of 15 February 1946), Section A-2-(a). Text reproduced in UNFPA, The United Nations and Population: Major Resolutions and Instruments (New York, 1974), pp. 137-38.

27

Proclaimed by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948 in resolution 217 (III).

28

Although the legal status of the draft Declaration was viewed differently by

a General Assembly declaration the division of opinion reflected more the uncertainty as to whether the Declaration constituted an instrument standing on its own feet or one integrally linked to the Charter than a disagreement over the principle that, if integrally linked to the Charter, the Declaration would have the same legal force as the Charter. The representative of Lebanon, for example, stated categorically that no state could violate the principles of the Declaration without also violating the terms of the Charter. He considered that, in actual fact, the resolution for the adoption of the Declaration was more than a recommendation because there already existed a place in the Charter for a declaration of human rights. The French representative stated that the Declaration had no less legal value than a convention, for it was a development of the Charter which had brought human rights within the scope of positive international law. These views were supported to varying degrees by the representatives of Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia and China. (See U.N., Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-48, pp. 527-31.)

Others, including the representatives of the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United States, held that the Declaration imposed only moral, but not legal, obligations since it was not a treaty or international agreement.

(Ibid.)

It is significant to note, however, that none disputed the principle that if the Declaration should indeed be integrally linked to the Charter, it would have the same binding legal force as the Charter. In light of the re-examination of the legal status of the Declaration from the viewpoints of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the conclusion is inescapable that both the Charter and the Declaration share the same binding legal force.

28 (cont'd.)

The relationship among the Charter, the Declaration and the two Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights forms a separate subject for study. Among the questions to be dealt with are the legal obligations of the great majority of states which have signed the Declaration but have not ratified the Covenants, and the legal status of rights which are included in the Declaration (property (Art. 17), asylum (Art. 14), but not in the Covenants, and vice versa (e.g., self-determination (Art. 1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)). See Egon Schwelb, "Human Rights and the Teaching of International Law," 64 American Journal of International Law 355, 359 (1970); idem, "Entry into Force of the International Covenants on Human Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," 70 id. 511 (1976).

29

Adopted at the International Conference on Human Rights, held at Teheran, 13 May 1968.

30

Proclaimed by the General Conference of UNESCO at its fourteenth session, on 4 November 1966.

31

But see the critical observation of Louis Henkin: "There is no consensus on human rights and none is in prospect." "The United States and the Crisis in Human Rights," 14 Virginia Journal of International Law 655 (1974).

32

Lauterpacht, supra note 12, pp.26, 31, 35; Gross, "Family Planning as a Human Right: Some Jurisprudential Reflections on Natural Rights and Positive Law," Human Rights and Population: From the Perspectives of Law, Policy and Organization (Medford, Mass.: Law and Population Programme, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Law and Population Book Series No.5, 1973), p. 25.

- 33 I.C.J. Reports 1965, p. 297.
- 34 Id. at p. 22.
- 35 Lauterpacht, supra note 12, p. 4.
- 36 Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832)
- 37 Arts. 12, 13 and 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
- 38 Bleicher, "The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of General Assembly Resolutions," 63 American Journal of International Law, 444, 455-56 (1969).
- 39 U.N. General Assembly, First Session, Official Records, Plenary Meetings First Plenary Meeting, 10 January 1946, p. e1.
- 40 Stammer, Wirtschaft und Recht (Leipzig: Veit & Co., 1896), p. 170.
- Gross, supra note 32, p. 28.
- 41 Wright, supra note 15, p. 142.
- 42 Gross, supra note 32, p. 28.
- 43 Gross, supra note 32, p. 29.
- 44 See text accompanying note 32, supra.
- 45 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381, U.S. 479 (1965).
- 46 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
- 47 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
- 48 Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth and Danforth v. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri, 44 U.S.I.W. 5197.

- 49 Decision No. 49, Year 1971.
- 50 U.N. Treaty Series 1, No. 747, vol. 49 (1950), p. 3.
- 51 Corte d'Appello di Milano, decision of 8 September 1964.
- 52 Emphasis supplied. It may be noted that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960, para. 7, calls on all states to "observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration..." Similar language is found in the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1963, Art. 11.
- 53 Security Council Official Records: Nineteenth Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1964, p. 13.
- 54 United Nations Charter, Art. 2 (7).
- 55 Security Council Official Records, Nineteenth Year, 1128th meeting, 9 June 1964, pp. 7-11.
- 56 Lee, "International Law Commission Re-examined," 59 American Journal of International Law 545-46 (1965).
- 57 The codification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into the 1966 International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights, and the codification of the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination into the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, are examples of this practice.

58

International Court of Justice Statute, Art. 38, para. 1.

58a

Thus, Tunkin refers to the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as declaratory of customary international law. Operative paragraph 7 of the Declaration provides that "all States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration ...". See G.I. Tunkin, Drôit International Public: Problemes Theoriques (1965), p. 100 ff.

59

For a review of United Nations activity in the field of human rights, see Carey, U.N. Protection of Civil and Political Rights (1970).

60

The Southwest Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, (1966) International Court of Justice Reports 17, 291-293 (Judge Tanaka's dissenting opinion.). In this case, Ethiopia and Liberia sought to establish nondiscrimination as internationally binding on grounds of repeated resolutions and declarations of the General Assembly and other international organs. Without going into the merits of the issue, however, the Court dismissed the case on precedural grounds in that the applicant stated failed to establish a "legal right or interest" in the subject-matter. Judge Tanaka dissented from the Court's holding on "legal right or interest" and proceeded to consider the question of whether "resolutions and declarations of international organs can be recognized as a factor in the custom-generating process."

61

Fitzmaurice, "The Older Generation of International Lawyer, and the Question of Human Rights," Essays in International Law in Honour of D. Antonio de Luna (C.S.I.D. Instituto Francesco de Vitoria, Madrid, 1968), p. 321.

62 Higgins, "The Development of International Law by the Political Organs of the United Nations," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1965; p. 117.

63 Cheng, "United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: Instant International Customary Law?" 5 Indian Journal of International Law 23, 36 (1965).

64 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd ed., 1973), p. 6. He thus disagrees with Manley O. Hudson's view that customary international law requires "continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of time." (Working Paper on Art. 24 of the Statute of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN,r/16 (3 March 1950), p. 5.) See also Lauterpacht, "Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 17 British Year Book of International Law 376,393 (1950) in which he stated:

The length of time within which the customary rule of international law comes to fruition is irrelevant. For customary international law is not yet another expression for prescription. A "consistent and uniform usage practiced by the States in question"---to use the language of the international Court of Justice in the Asylum Case---can be packed within a short space of years. The "evidence of a general practice as law"--in the words of Article 38 of the Statute--need not be spread over decades.

65 Fitzmaurice, supra note 61, p. 321n.

66 Partan, Population in the United Nations System: Developing the Legal Capacity and Program of U.N. Agencies (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, and Durham, H.G.: Rule of Law Press; Law and Population Book Series No. 3, 1973), p. 34

67

Stavropoulos, The United Nations and the Development of International Law 1945-1970, reprinted in U.N. Doc. OPI/411 (1970). See also the following statement of Dr. Edvard Hambro, President of the 25th Session of the U.N. General Assembly and a distinguished jurist in his own right: "The fact is that the wide and pervasive international acceptance of the Declaration allows us to state that it has become, or at least is becoming, international law." Address before the United Nations Association of the United States in New York, Nov. 10, 1970. See also Hambro, "Human Rights and States' Rights," 56 American Bar Association Journal, 360, 361 (1970); Sohn, "The Universal Declaration on Human Rights," Journal of International Commission of Jurists 17, 26 (1967); Schwellb, Human Rights and the International Community (Chicago, 1964).

68

For English Translation of the decision, see Japanese Annual of International Law for 1964, pp. 212-252; digested in 58 American Journal of International Law 1016 (1964). For an excellent analysis of the case, see Falk, "The Case: A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki," 59 id. 759 (1965).

69

On the analogy between atomic bombs and the asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, see Lee, "The Legality of Nuclear Tests and Weapons," 18 Osterr. Zeitschrift fur offentliches Recht 307 (1968).

70

Friedmann, "The Uses of 'General Principles' in the Development of International Law," 57 American Journal of International Law 279, 287 (1963)

71

Lauterpacht, supra note 12, p. 24.

72

1 International Law 29 (8th ed., 1967).

73

Brownlie, supra note 64, p. , See also Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1927).

- 74 See *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479, 14. L. Ed. 1d 510, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
- 75 For a summary of the Irish Supreme Court's ruling (the McGee Case) that part of Section 17 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1935 banning the importation of contraceptives was unconstitutional for invasion of the right of privacy, see The Times (London), December 29, 1973, p. 4, col. 1. For a background of the case, see The Irish Times, June 9, 1972, p. 7. col. 1.
- 76 See *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); *Doe v. Bolton*, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). For a new Tunisian law authorizing the artificial interruption of pregnancy "when performed during the first three months in a hospital, a health center, or an authorized clinic by a duly authorized practitioner," though without specifying the right of privacy as the basis thereof, see Decret-loi No. 73-2 du 26 septembre 1973, portant modification de l'article 214 du Code Penal. An increasing number of countries have since adopted similar abortion laws, including Denmark in 1973, Austria and Sweden in 1974 and France in 1975.
- 77 U.N. Fund for Population Activities, Law and World Population (U.N. Doc. E/CONF.60BP/6, 27 March 1974; background paper for World Population Conference, Bucharest, 19-30 August 1974), p. 14.
- 78 Lauterpacht, supra note 64, p. 204-205.
- 79 McNair, "The Legality of the Occupation of the Ruhr," in 5 British Year Book of International Law 35 (1924).
- 80 Commentary of Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission on the Law of Treaties, on para. 2 of Draft Art. 11 of his Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63, 24 March 1953, p. 166.

81

I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23.

82

Schwarzenberger, International Law, Vol. 1: International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (London: Stevens & Sons, 1957, 3rd ed.), pp. 51-52.

83

Humphrey, "Human Rights and World Law" (Work Paper presented at the Abidjan World Conference on World Peace Through Law," 26-31 August 1973).

The "Ihlen Declaration" in Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark v. Norway) P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 53 (1933), 3 Hudson, World Court Reports 148 (1938), is instructive. An oral declaration by M. Ihlen, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in regard to Eastern Greenland having been relied upon by the Danish Government, was held by the Permanent Court of International Justice to be binding upon Norway. The Court concluded:

The court considers it beyond all dispute that a reply of this nature given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of his Government in response to a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign power, in regard to a question falling within his province, is binding upon the country to which the Minister belongs...

Might not the same reasoning apply to recorded votes at the U.N. General Assembly or specially convened diplomatic conferences by duly accredited representatives of Governments?

84

MacGibbons, "Estoppel in International Law," 7 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 468, 476n (1958).

85

Bleicher, supra note 38, p. 447n.

86

Supra note 60, p, 298.

87

Moskowitz, The Politics and Dynamics of Human Rights (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc. 1968), p. 74.

88

Thus, in his letter of support for the establishment of a Law and Population Project in the Philippines, addressed to Dean Irene R. Cortes of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines, dated 16 March 1972, Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos stated:

Having been endowed with the character of a "human right," family planning therefore imposes not merely a moral but also a legal responsibility upon the state. Our own government has a legal duty to see to it that laws and policies contradictory to this right should be amended or abolished, and new ones adopted in conformity with and in promotion of this right. To bring our present laws in consonance with official recognition of family planning as a right, it is necessary to institute systematic legal reforms, and thereafter to coordinate them into the legal mainstream.

In this regard, I would like to encourage the Law Center to take two courses of action: firstly, to compile existing Philippine statutes, regulations, decrees, customary laws, etc. with a bearing on population and family planning; and secondly, to formulate a model code or proposed revisions geared towards the synthesis of "human rights" ideals and existing laws (including the political, social, economic, religious, and cultural factors giving rise to these laws). The law compilation could include the following areas: laws specifically concerned with family planning; criminal code; family and personal status law; social welfare; education; public health and medical; commercial codes and customs; tax; and land tenure.

I need not stress how beneficent this project would be, nor how urgent in nature it is. The Department of Justice, for one, would be very interested in perusing the materials that you would produce.

- 89 Resolution XVI: Population Policies, paragraph 3 of the Preamble.
- 90 Id., recommendations (a) and (c).
- 91 Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1968), p. 1.
- 92 Schweib, Human Rights and the International Community (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 11.

WORLD POPULATION PLAN OF ACTION³

The World Population Conference, having due regard to the human aspirations for better quality of life and rapid socio-economic development, taking into consideration the interrelationship of population situations and socio-economic development, decides on the following World Population Plan of Action as a policy instrument within the broader context of the internationally adopted strategies for national and international progress.

³ Approved by the conference on Aug. 30 without a vote (text from U.N. doc. E/CONF. 60/WG/L.55/Add. 3, draft report of the Working Group on the World Population Plan of Action, with subsequent corrections).

1. The promotion of development and the quality of life require co-ordination of action in all major socio-economic fields, including population which is the inexhaustible source of creativity and a determining factor of progress. At the international level, a number of strategies and programmes whose explicit aim is to affect variables in fields other than population have already been formulated. These include the FAO's [Food and Agriculture Organization] Provisional Indicative World Plan for Agricultural Development, the United Nations/FAO World Food Programme, the ILO's [International Labor Organization] World Employment Programme, the Action Plan for the Human Environment, the United Nations World Plan of Action for the Application of Science and Technology to Development, the Programme of Concerted Action for the Advancement of Women, and, more comprehensively, the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade. The declaration on the establishment of a new international economic order, and the Programme of Action to achieve it, adopted by the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly provide the most recent overall framework for international co-operation. The explicit aim of the World Population Plan of Action is to help co-ordinate population trends and the trends of economic and social development. The basis for an effective solution of population problems is, above all, socio-economic transformation. A population policy may have a certain success if it constitutes an integral part of socio-economic development; its contribution to the solution of world development problems is hence only partial, as is the case with the other sectoral strategies. Consequently, the Plan of Action must be considered as an important component of the system of international strategies and as an instrument of the international community for the promotion of economic development, quality of life, human rights and fundamental freedom.

2. The formulation of international strategies is a response to universal recognition of the existence of important problems in the world and the need for concerted national and international action to achieve their solution. Where trends of population growth, distribution and structure are out of balance with social, economic and environmental factors, they can at certain stages of development create additional difficulties for the achievement of sustained development. Policies whose aim is to affect population trends must not be considered substitutes for socio-economic development policies but integrated with

those policies to facilitate the solution of certain problems facing developing and developed countries and promote a more balanced and rational development.

3. Throughout history the rate of growth of world population averaged only slightly above replacement levels. The recent increase in the growth rate began mainly as a result of the decline in mortality during the last few centuries, a decline that has accelerated significantly during recent decades. The inertia of social structures and the insufficiency of economic progress, especially when these do not involve profound socio-cultural changes, partly explains why in the majority of developing countries the decline in mortality has not been accompanied by a parallel decline in fertility. Since about 1950, the world population growth rate has risen to 2 per cent a year. If sustained, this will result in a doubling of the world's population every 35 years. However, national rates of natural growth range widely, from a negative rate to well over 3 per cent a year.

4. However, the consideration of population problems cannot be reduced to the analysis of population trends only. It must also be borne in mind that the present situation of the developing countries originates in the unequal processes of socio-economic development which have divided peoples since the beginning of the modern era. This inequity still exists and is intensified by the lack of equity in international economic relations with the consequent disparity in levels of living.

5. Although acceleration in the rate of growth of the world's population is mainly the result of very large declines in the mortality of less developed countries, these declines have been unevenly distributed. Thus, at present, average expectation of life at birth is 63 years in Latin America, 57 years in Asia and only a little over 46 years in Africa, compared with more than 71 years in the more developed regions. Furthermore, although, on average, less than one in 40 children dies before reaching the age of one year in the more developed countries, one in 15 dies before reaching that age in Latin America, one in 10 in Asia and one in 7 in Africa. In fact, in some less developed countries, particularly African countries, average expectation of life at birth is estimated to be less than 40 years and one in four children dies before the age of one year. Consequently, many less developed countries consider reduction of mortality, and particularly reduction of infant mortality, to be one of the most important and urgent goals.

6. While the right of couples to have the number of children they desire is accepted in a number of international instruments, many couples in the world are unable to exercise this right effectively. In many parts of the world, poor economic conditions, social norms, either inadequate knowledge of effective methods of family regulation or the unavailability of contraceptive services results in a situation in which couples have more children than they desire or feel

they can properly care for. In certain countries and regions, on the other hand, because of economic or biological factors, problems of involuntary sterility and of subfertility exist, with the result that many couples have fewer children than they desire. Of course, the degree of urgency attached to dealing with each of these two situations depends upon the prevailing conditions within the country in question.

7. Individual reproductive behaviour and the needs and aspirations of society should be reconciled. In many less developed countries, and particularly in the large countries of Asia, the desire of couples to achieve large families is believed to result in excessive national population growth rates and Governments are explicitly attempting to reduce these rates by implementing specific policy measures. On the other hand, some countries are attempting to increase desired family size, if only slightly.

8. Throughout the world, urban populations are growing in size at a considerably faster rate than rural populations. As a result, the majority of the world's population, for the first time in history, will be living in urban areas by the end of this century. Urbanization is generally an element of the process of modernization. Moreover, in certain countries this process is efficiently managed and maximum use is made there of the advantages accruing therefrom; in others urbanization takes place in an uncontrolled fashion and is accompanied by overcrowding in certain districts, urban unemployment, an increase in slums, deterioration of the environment, and many other social and economic problems.

9. In most of the developing countries, the high rate of urban population growth is generally accompanied by a lesser, but still significant, rate of rural population growth. The rural population of less developed countries is growing at a rate of 1.7 per cent a year and in some instances at a faster rate than that of the urban population in more developed countries. Furthermore, many rural areas of heavy emigration, in both more developed and less developed countries, are being depleted of their younger populations and are being left with populations whose age distribution is unfavourable to economic development. Thus, in many countries, the revitalization of the countryside is a priority goal.

10. For some countries the external migration may, in certain circumstances, be an instrument of population policy. At least two types of international migration are of considerable concern to many countries in the world: the movement of migrant workers with limited skills, and the movement of skilled workers and professionals. Movements of the former often involve large numbers and raise questions of fair and proper treatment in countries of immigration, the breaking up of families and other social and economic questions in countries both of emigration and immigration. The migration of skilled workers and professionals results in a "brain drain", often from less developed to more developed countries, which is at present of considerable concern to

many countries and to the international community as a whole. The number of instruments on these subjects and the increased involvement of international organizations reflects international awareness of these problems.

11. A population's age structure is greatly affected by its birth-rates. For example, declining fertility is the main factor underlying the declining proportion of children in a population. Thus, according to the medium projections of the United Nations, the average population of less than 15 years of age in the less developed countries is expected to decline from more than 41 per cent of total population in 1970 to about 35 per cent in 2000. However, such a decline in the proportion of children will be accompanied by an increase in their numbers at an average of 1.7 per cent a year. The demand for educational services is expected to increase considerably, particularly in view of the existing backlog and the continuously increasing population of children which ought to enter and remain in schools, and therefore the supply of educational services must be increased. On the other hand, with regard to the young population 15 to 29 years of age, an increase in both their proportion and number is expected in the less developed countries. Therefore, unless very high rates of economic development are attained, in many of these countries, particularly where levels of unemployment and under-employment are already high, the additional difficulties will not be overcome, at least until the end of this century. Furthermore, in both more developed and less developed countries, the greatly changing social and economic conditions faced by youth underline the need for a better understanding of the problems involved and for the formulation and implementation of policies to resolve them.

12. Declining birth-rates also result in a gradual ageing of the population. Because birth-rates have already declined in more developed countries, the average proportion aged 65 years and over in these countries makes up 10 per cent of the total population whereas it constitutes only 3 per cent in less developed countries. However, the ageing of the population in less developed countries has recently begun and is expected to accelerate. Thus, although the total population of these countries is projected to increase by an average of 2.3 per cent a year between 1970 and 2000, the population 65 years and over is expected to increase by 3.5 per cent a year. Not only are the numbers and proportions of the aged increasing rapidly, but the social and economic conditions which face them are also rapidly changing. There is an urgent need—in those countries where such programmes are lacking—for the development of social-security and health programmes for the elderly.

13. Because of the relatively high proportions of children and youth in the populations of less developed countries, declines in fertility levels in these countries will not be fully reflected in declines in population growth rates until some decades later. To illustrate this demographic inertia, it may be noted

that, for less developed countries, even if replacement levels of fertility—approximately two children per completed family—had been achieved in 1970 and maintained thereafter, their total population would still grow from a 1970 total of 2.5 billion to about 4.4 billion before it would stabilize during the second half of the twenty-first century. In these circumstances, the population of the world as a whole would grow from 3.6 billion to 5.8 billion. This example of demographic inertia, which will lead to a growing population for many decades to come, demonstrates that whatever population policies may be formulated, socio-economic development must accelerate in order to provide for a significant increase in levels of living. Efforts made by developing countries to speed up economic growth must be viewed by the entire international community as a global endeavour to improve the quality of life for all people of the world, supported by a just utilization of the world's wealth, resources and technology in the spirit of the new international economic order. It also demonstrates that countries wishing to affect their population growth must anticipate future demographic trends and take appropriate decisions and actions in their plans for economic and social development well in advance.

CHAPTER II. PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PLAN

14. This Plan of Action is based on a number of principles which underly its objectives and are observed in its formulation. The formulation and implementation of population policies is the sovereign right of each nation. It is to be exercised in accordance with national objectives and needs and without external interference, taking into account universal solidarity in order to improve the quality of life of the peoples of the world. National authorities have the main responsibility for national population policies and programmes. Nevertheless, international co-operation should play an important role in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The principles on which the Plan of Action is based are the following:

(a) The principal aim of social, economic and cultural development of which population goals and policies are integral parts is to improve levels of living and the quality of life of the people. Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Man's knowledge and ability to master himself and his environment will continue to grow. Mankind's future can be made infinitely bright;

(b) True development cannot take place in the absence of national independence and liberation. Alien and colonial domination, foreign occupation, wars of aggression, racial discrimination, apartheid, neo-colonialism in all its forms, continue to be among the greatest obstacles to the full emancipation and progress of the developing countries and all the people involved. Co-operation among nations on the

basis of national sovereignty is essential for development. Development also requires recognition of the dignity of the individual, appreciation for the human person and self-determination as well as the elimination of the consequences of natural disasters and the elimination of discrimination in all its forms;

(c) Population and development are interrelated: population variables influence development variables and are also influenced by them; the formulation of a World Population Plan of Action reflects the international community's awareness of the importance of population trends for socio-economic development, and the socio-economic nature of the recommendations contained in this Plan of Action reflects its awareness of the crucial role that development plays in affecting population trends;

(d) Population policies are constituent elements of socio-economic development policies, never substitutes for them: while serving socio-economic objectives, they should be consistent with internationally and nationally recognized human rights of individual freedom, justice and the survival of national, regional and minority groups;

(e) Independently of the realization of economic and social objectives, respect for human life is basic to all human societies;

(f) All couples and individuals have the basic human right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so; the responsibility of couples and individuals in the exercise of this right takes into account the needs of their living and future children, and their responsibilities towards the community;

(g) The family is the basic unit of society and should be protected by appropriate legislation and policy;

(h) Women have the right to complete integration in the development process particularly by means of an equal participation in educational, social, economic, cultural and political life. In addition the necessary measures should be taken to facilitate this integration with family responsibilities which should be fully shared by both partners;

(i) Recommendations in this Plan of Action regarding policies to deal with population problems must recognize the diversity of conditions within and among different countries;

(j) In the democratic formulation of national population goals and policies, consideration must be given, together with other economic and social factors, to the supplies and characteristics of natural resources and to the quality of the environment and particularly to all aspects of food supply including productivity of rural areas; the demand for vital resources increases with growing population and with growing *per capita* consumption; attention must be directed to the just distribution of resources and to the minimization of wasteful aspects of their use throughout the world;

(k) The growing interdependence among countries makes international action increasingly important to the solution of development and population problems. International strategies will achieve their objective only if they ensure that the underprivileged of the world achieve, through structural, social and economic reforms, a significant improvement in their living conditions;

(l) This Plan of Action must be sufficiently flexible in order to take into account the consequences of rapid demographic changes, of societal changes and changes in human behaviour, attitudes and values;

(m) The objectives of this Plan of Action should be consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the objectives of the Second United Nations Development Decade; however, changes in demographic variables during the Decade are largely the result of past demographic events and changes in demographic trends sought during the Decade have social and economic repercussions up to and beyond the end of this century.

15. Guided by these principles, the primary aim of this Plan of Action is to expand and deepen the capacities of countries to deal effectively with their national and subnational population problems and to promote an appropriate international response to their needs by increasing international activity in research, the exchange of information, and the provision of assistance on request. In pursuit of this primary aim, the following general objectives are set for this Plan of Action:

(a) To advance understanding of population at national, subnational, regional and global levels, recognizing the diversity of the problems involved;

(b) To advance national and international understanding of the interrelatedness of demographic and socio-economic factors in development; of the nature and scope of the contribution of demographic factors to the attainment of goals of advancing human welfare, on the one hand, and the impact of broader social, economic and cultural factors on demographic behaviour, on the other;

(c) To promote socio-economic measures and programmes whose aim is to affect, *inter alia*, population growth, morbidity and mortality, reproduction and family formation, population distribution and internal migration, international migration, and consequently demographic structures;

(d) To advance national and international understanding of the complex relations among the problems of population, resources, environment and development, and to promote a unified analytical approach to the study of this interrelationship and to relevant policies;

(e) To promote the status of women and expansion of their roles, the full participation of women in the formulation and implementation of socio-economic policy including population policies, and

the creation of awareness among all women of their current and potential roles in national life;

(f) To recommend guidelines for population policies consistent with national values and goals and with internationally recognized principles;

(g) To promote the development and implementation of population policies where necessary, including improvement in the communication of the purposes and goals of these policies to the public and the promotion of popular participation in their formulation and implementation;

(h) To encourage the development and good management of appropriate education, training, research, information and family health services, as well as statistics in support of the above principles and objectives.

CHAPTER III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

A. Population goals and policies

1. Population growth

16. According to the United Nations medium population projections, little change is expected to occur in average rates of population growth either in the more developed or in the less developed regions by 1985. According to the United Nations low variant projections, it is estimated that as a result of social and economic development and population policies as reported by countries in the Second United Nations Inquiry on Population and Development, population growth rates in the developing countries as a whole may decline from the present level of 2.4 per cent per annum to about 2 per cent by 1985; and below 0.7 per cent per annum in the developed countries. In this case the worldwide rate of population growth would decline from 2 per cent to about 1.7 per cent.

17. Countries which consider that their present or expected rates of population growth hamper their goals of promoting human welfare are invited, if they have not yet done so, to consider adopting population policies, within the framework of socio-economic development, which are consistent with basic human rights and national goals and values.

18. Countries which aim at achieving moderate or low population growth should try to achieve it through a low level of birth and death rates. Countries wishing to increase their rate of population growth should, when mortality is high, concentrate efforts on the reduction of mortality, and where appropriate, encourage an increase in fertility and encourage immigration.

19. Recognizing that *per capita* use of world resources is much higher in the more developed than in the developing countries, the developed countries are urged to adopt appropriate policies in population, consumption and investment, bearing in mind the need for fundamental improvement in international equity.

2. Morbidity and mortality

20. The reduction of morbidity and mortality to the maximum feasible extent is a major goal of every human society and should be achieved in conjunction with massive social and economic development. Where death and morbidity rates are very high, concentrated national and international efforts should be applied to reduce them as a matter of highest priority in the context of societal change.

21. The short-term effect of mortality reduction on population growth rates is symptomatic of the early development process and must be viewed as beneficial. Sustained reductions in fertility have generally been preceded by reductions in mortality. Although this relationship is complex, mortality reduction may be a prerequisite to a decline in fertility.

22. It is a goal of this Plan of Action to reduce, to the maximum extent possible, the mortality level, particularly among children, as well as maternal mortality, in all regions of the world, and to reduce national and sub-national differentials in mortality levels. The attainment of an average expectation of life of 62 years by 1985 and 74 years by the year 2000 for the world as a whole would require by the end of the century an increase of 11 years for Latin America, 17 years for Asia and 28 years for Africa.

23. Countries with the highest mortality levels should aim by 1985 to have an expectation of life at birth of at least 50 years and an infant mortality rate of less than 120 per thousand live births.

24. It is recommended that national and international efforts to reduce general morbidity and mortality levels be accompanied by particularly vigorous efforts to achieve the following goals:

(a) Reduction of foetal, infant and early childhood mortality and related maternal morbidity and mortality;

(b) Reduction of involuntary sterility, subfecundity, defective births and illegal abortions;

(c) Reduction, or if possible elimination, of differential morbidity and mortality within countries, particularly with regard to differentials between regions, urban and rural areas, social and ethnic groups, and sexes;

(d) Eradication, wherever possible, or control of infectious and parasitic diseases, undernutrition and malnutrition; and the provision of a sufficient supply of potable water and adequate sanitation;

(e) Improvement of poor health and nutritional conditions which adversely affect working age populations and their productivity and thus undermine development efforts;

(f) Adoption of special measures for reducing mortality from social and environmental factors and elimination of aggression as a cause of death and poor health.

25. It is recommended that health and nutrition programmes designed to reduce morbidity and mor-

tality be integrated within a comprehensive development strategy and supplemented by a wide range of mutually supporting social policy measures; special attention should be given to improving the management of existing health, nutritional and related social services and to the formulation of policies to widen their coverage so as to reach, in particular, rural, remote and underprivileged groups.

26. Each country has its own merits and experience in preventing and treating diseases. Promotion of interchange of experience in this regard will help to reduce morbidity and mortality.

3. *Reproduction, family formation and the status of women*

27. This Plan of Action recognizes the variety of national goals with regard to fertility and does not recommend any world family-size norm.

28. This Plan of Action recognizes the necessity of ensuring that all couples are able to achieve their desired number and spacing of children and the necessity of preparing the social and economic conditions to achieve this desire.

29. Consistent with the Proclamation of the International Conference on Human Rights, the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, the relevant targets of the Second United Nations Development Decade and the other international instruments on the subject, it is recommended that all countries:

(a) Respect and ensure, regardless of their overall demographic goals, the right of persons to determine, in a free, informed and responsible manner, the number and spacing of their children;

(b) Encourage appropriate education concerning responsible parenthood and make available to persons who so desire advice and means of achieving it;

(c) Ensure that family planning, medical and related social services aim not only at the prevention of unwanted pregnancies but also at elimination of involuntary sterility and sub-fecundity in order that all couples may be permitted to achieve their desired number of children; and adoption should be facilitated;

(d) Seek to ensure the continued possibility of variations in family size when a low fertility level has been established or is a policy objective;

(e) Make use, wherever needed and appropriate, of adequately trained professional and auxiliary health personnel, rural extension, home economics and social workers, and non-government channels, to help provide family planning services and to advise users of contraceptives;

(f) Increase their health manpower and health facilities to the level of effectiveness, redistribute functions among the different level of professionals and auxiliaries in order to overcome the shortage of qualified personnel and establish an effective system of supervision in their health and family planning services;

(g) Ensure that information about, and education in, family planning and other matters which affect fertility, are based on valid and proven scientific knowledge, and include a full account of any risk that may be involved in the use or non-use of contraceptives.

30. Governments which have family planning programmes are invited to consider integrating and co-ordinating these services with health and other services designed to raise the quality of family life, including family allowances and maternity benefits, and to consider including family planning services in their official health and social insurance systems. As concerns couples themselves, family planning policy should also be directed towards promotion of the psycho-social harmony and mental and physical well-being of couples.

31. It is recommended that countries wishing to affect fertility levels give priority to implementing development programmes and educational and health strategies which, while contributing to economic growth and higher standards of living, have a decisive impact upon demographic trends, including fertility. International co-operation is called for to give priority to assisting such national efforts in order that these programmes and strategies be carried into effect.

32. While recognizing the diversity of social, cultural, political and economic conditions among countries and regions, it is nevertheless agreed that the following development goals generally have an effect on the socio-economic content of reproductive decisions that tends to moderate fertility levels:

(a) The reduction of infant and child mortality, particularly by means of improved nutrition, sanitation, maternal and child health care, and maternal education;

(b) The full integration of women into the development process, particularly by means of their greater participation in educational, social, economic and political opportunities, and especially by means of the removal of obstacles to their employment in the non-agricultural sector wherever possible. In this context, national laws and policies, as well as relevant international recommendations, should be reviewed in order to eliminate discrimination in, and remove obstacles to, the education, training, employment and career advancement opportunities for women;

(c) The promotion of social justice, social mobility, and social development particularly by means of a wide participation of the population in development and a more equitable distribution of income, land, social services and amenities;

(d) The promotion of wide educational opportunities for the young of both sexes, and the extension of public forms of pre-school education for the rising generation;

(e) The elimination of child labour and child

abuse and the establishment of social security and old age benefits;

(f) The establishment of an appropriate lower limit for age at marriage.

33. It is recommended that governments consider making provision, in both their formal and non-formal educational programmes for informing their people of the consequences of existing or alternative fertility behaviour for the well-being of the family, the educational and psychological development of children and the general welfare of society, so that an informed and responsible attitude to marriage and reproduction will be promoted.

34. Family size may also be affected by incentive and disincentive schemes. However, if such schemes are adopted or modified they should not violate human rights.

35. Some social welfare programmes, such as family allowances and maternity benefits, may have a positive effect on fertility and may hence be strengthened when such an effect is desired. However, such programmes should not, in principle, be curtailed if the opposite effect on fertility is desired.

36. The projections in paragraph 16 of future declines in rates of population growth, and those in paragraph 22 concerning increased expectation of life, are consistent with declines in the birth rate of the developing countries as a whole from the present level of 38 per thousand to 30 per thousand by 1985; in these projections, birth rates in the developed countries remain in the region of 15 per thousand. To achieve by 1985 these levels of fertility would require substantial national efforts, by those countries concerned, in the field of socio-economic development and population policies, supported, upon request, by adequate international assistance. Such efforts would also be required to achieve the increase in expectation of life.

37. In the light of the principles of this Plan of Action, countries which consider their birth rates detrimental to their national purposes are invited to consider setting quantitative goals and implementing policies that may lead to the attainment of such goals by 1985. Nothing herein should interfere with the sovereignty of any government to adopt or not to adopt such quantitative goals.

38. Countries which desire to reduce their birth-rates are invited to give particular consideration to the reduction of fertility at the extremes of female reproductive ages because of the salutary effects this may have on infant and maternal welfare.

39. The family is recognized as the basic unit of society. Governments should assist families as far as possible to enable them to fulfil their role in society. It is therefore recommended that:

(a) The family be protected by appropriate legislation and policy without discrimination as to other members of society;

(b) Family ties be strengthened by giving recog-

nition to the importance of love and mutual respect within the family unit;

(c) National legislation having direct bearing on the welfare of the family and its members, including laws concerning age at marriage, inheritance, property rights, divorce, education, employment and the rights of the child, be periodically reviewed, as feasible, and adapted to the changing social and economic conditions and with regard to the cultural setting;

(d) Marriages be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses;

(e) Measures be taken to protect the social and legal rights of spouses and children in the case of dissolution or termination of marriage by death or other reason.

40. (a) Governments should equalize the legal and social status of children born in and out of wedlock as well as children adopted;

(b) The legal responsibilities of each parent toward the care and support of all their children should be established.

41. Governments should ensure full participation of women in the educational, social, economic, and political life of their countries on an equal basis with men. It is recommended that:

(a) Education for girls as well as boys should be extended and diversified to enable them to contribute more effectively in rural and urban sectors, as well as in the management of food and other household functions;

(b) Women should be actively involved both as individuals and through political and non-governmental organizations, at every stage and every level in the planning and implementation of development programmes, including population policies;

(c) The economic contribution of women in households and farming should be recognized in national economies;

(d) Governments should make a sustained effort to ensure that legislation regarding the status of women complies with the principles spelled out in the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and other United Nations Declarations, Conventions, and international instruments to reduce the gap between law and practice through effective implementation, and to inform women at all socio-economic levels of their legal rights and responsibilities.

42. Equal status of men and women in the family and in society improves the over-all quality of life. This principle of equality should be fully realized in family planning where both spouses should consider the welfare of other members of the family.

43. Improvement of the status of women in the family and in society can contribute, where desired, to smaller family size, and the opportunity for women to plan births also improves their individual status.

4. Population distribution and internal migration

44. Urbanization in most countries is characterized by a number of adverse factors—drain from rural areas through migration of individuals who cannot be absorbed by productive employment in urban areas, serious disequilibrium in the growth of urban centres, contamination of the environment, inadequate services and housing and social and psychological stress. In many developing countries, adverse consequences are due in large part to the economic structures resulting from the dependent situation of these countries in the international economic system and the correction of these shortcomings requires as a matter of priority the establishment of equitable economic relations among peoples.

45. Policies aimed at influencing population flows into urban areas should be co-ordinated with policies relating to the absorptive capacity of urban centres, as well as policies aimed at eliminating the undesirable consequences of excessive migration. In so far as possible, these policies should be integrated in plans and programmes dealing with over-all social and economic development.

46. In formulating and implementing internal migration policies, governments are urged to consider the following guidelines, without prejudice to their own socio-economic policies:

(a) Measures which infringe the right of freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State that is enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments should be avoided;

(b) A major approach to a more rational distribution of the population is in planned and more equitable regional development, particularly in the advancement of regions which are less favoured or developed by comparison with the rest of the country;

(c) In planning development, and particularly in planning the location of industry and business and the distribution of social services and amenities, governments should take into account not only short-term economic returns of alternative patterns, but also the social and environmental costs and benefits involved as well as equity and social justice in the distribution of the benefits of development among all groups and regions;

(d) Population distribution patterns should not be restricted to a choice between metropolitan and rural life; efforts should be made to establish and strengthen networks of small and medium-size cities to relieve the pressure on the large towns, while still offering an alternative to rural living;

(e) Intensive programmes of economic and social improvement should be carried out in the rural areas through balanced agricultural development which will provide increased income to the agricultural population, permit an effective expansion of social services and include measures to protect the en-

vironment and conserve and increase agricultural resources;

(f) Programmes should be promoted to make accessible to scattered populations the basic social services and the support necessary for increased productivity, e.g. by consolidating them in rural centres.

47. Internal migration policies should include the provision of information to the rural population of the economic and social conditions in the urban areas, including information on availability of employment opportunities.

48. In rural areas and areas accessible to rural populations, new employment opportunities including industries and public works programmes should be created, systems of land tenure should be improved and social services and amenities provided. It is not sufficient to consider how to bring the people to existing economic and social activities; it is also important to bring those activities to the people.

49. Considerable experience is now being gained by some countries which have implemented programmes aimed at relieving urban pressure, revitalizing the countryside, inhabiting sparsely populated areas or settling newly reclaimed agricultural land. Countries having such experience are invited to share it with other countries. It is recommended that international organizations make available upon request co-ordinated technical and financial assistance to facilitate the settlement of people.

50. The problems of urban environment are a consequence not only of the concentration of inhabitants, but also of their way of life which can produce harmful effects, such as wasteful and excessive consumption and activities which produce pollution. In order to avoid such effects in those countries experiencing this problem a development pattern favouring balanced and rational consumption is recommended.

5. International migration

51. It is recommended that governments and international organizations generally facilitate voluntary international movement. However, such movements should not be based on racial considerations which are to the detriment of indigenous populations. The significance of international migration varies widely among countries, depending upon their area, population size and growth rate, social and economic structure and environmental conditions.

52. Governments which consider international migration as important to their countries, either in the short or the long run, are urged to conduct, when appropriate, bilateral or multilateral consultations, taking into account the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments, with a view to harmonizing their policies which affect these movements. It is recom-

mended that international organizations make available upon request co-ordinated technical and financial assistance to facilitate the settlement of people in countries of immigration.

53. Problems of refugees and displaced persons arising from forced migration, including their right of return to homes and properties, should also be settled in accordance with the relevant Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments.

54. Countries that are concerned with the outflow of migrant workers and wish to encourage and assist their remaining or returning should make particular efforts to create favourable employment opportunities at the national level. More developed countries should co-operate, bilaterally or through regional organizations and the international community, with less developed countries, to achieve these goals through the increased availability of capital, technical assistance, export markets and more favourable terms of trade and choice of production technology.

55. Countries receiving migrant workers should provide proper treatment and adequate social welfare services for them and their families, and should ensure their physical safety and security, in conformity with the provisions of relevant ILO conventions and recommendations and other international instruments.

56. Specifically, in the treatment of migrant workers Governments should work to prevent discrimination in the labour market and in society through lower salaries or other unequal conditions, to preserve their human rights, to combat prejudice against them and to eliminate obstacles to the reunion of their families. Governments should enable permanent immigrants to preserve their cultural heritage *inter alia* through the use of their mother tongue. Laws to limit illegal immigration should not only relate to the illegal migrants themselves but also to those inducing or facilitating their illegal action and should be promulgated in conformity with international law and basic human rights. Governments should bear in mind humanitarian considerations in the treatment of aliens who remain in a country illegally.

57. Since the outflow of qualified personnel from developing to developed countries seriously hampers the development of the former, there is an urgent need to formulate national and international policies to avoid the "brain drain" and obviate its adverse effects, including the possibility of devising programmes for large-scale communication of appropriate technological knowledge mainly from developed countries to the extent it can be properly adjusted and appropriately absorbed.

58. Developing countries suffering from heavy emigration of skilled workers and professionals should undertake extensive educational, manpower planning, investment in scientific and technical programmes, and other programmes and measures, to

better match skills with employment opportunities, to increase the motivation of such personnel to contribute to the progress of their own country, and also undertake measures to encourage the return of their scientists and skilled personnel to specific job situations where needed.

59. Foreign investors should employ and train local personnel and use local research facilities to the greatest possible extent in conformity with the policies of the host country. Subject to their consent, the location of research facilities in host countries may aid them to a certain extent in retaining the services of highly skilled and professional research workers. Such investment should, of course, in no circumstances inhibit national economic development. International co-operation is needed to improve programmes to induce skilled personnel to return to, or remain in, their own countries.

60. Where immigration has proved to be of a long-term nature, countries are invited to explore the possibilities of extending national civil rights to immigrants.

61. The flow of skilled workers, technicians and professionals from more developed to less developed countries may be considered a form of international co-operation. Countries in a position to do so should continue and increase this flow with full respect for the sovereignty and equality of recipient countries.

62. Countries affected by significant numbers of migrant workers are urged, if they have not yet done so, to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements which would regulate migration, protect and assist migrant workers, and protect the interests of the countries concerned. The International Labour Organisation should promote concerted action in the field of protection of migrant workers, and the United Nations Human Rights Commission should help, as appropriate, to ensure that the fundamental rights of migrants are safeguarded.

6. Population structure

63. All governments are urged, when formulating their development policies and programmes, to take fully into account the implications of changing numbers and proportions of youth, working age groups and the aged, particularly where such changes are rapid. Countries should study their population structure to determine their most desirable balance between age groups.

64. Specifically, developing countries are urged to consider the implications which the combination of their characteristically young age structure and moderate to high fertility have on their development. The fact of increasingly young population structures in many developing countries require appropriate development strategies, priorities being required for their subsistence, health, education, training and incorporation in the labour force through full employment as well as their active participation in political, cultural, social and economic life.

65. Developing countries are invited to consider

the possible economic, social and demographic effects of population shifts from agriculture to non-agricultural industries. In addition to fuller utilization of labour and improvements in productivity and the levels of living, promotion of non-agricultural employment should aim at such change in the socio-economic structure of manpower and population that would effect demographically relevant behaviour of individuals. All countries are invited to fully consider the appropriate support and assistance to the World Employment Programme and related national employment promotion schemes.

66. Similarly, the other countries are urged to consider the contrary implications of the combination of their aging structure with moderate to low or very low fertility. All countries should carry out as part of their development programmes, comprehensive, humanitarian and just programmes of social security for the elderly.

67. In undertaking settlement and resettlement schemes and urban planning, governments are urged to give adequate attention to questions of age and sex balances and, particularly, to the welfare of the family.

B. Socio-economic policies

68. This Plan of Action recognizes that economic and social development is a central factor in the solution of population problems. National efforts of developing countries to accelerate economic growth should be assisted by the entire international community. The implementation of the International Development Strategy of the Second United Nations Development Decade, the Declaration and the Programme of Action on the new international economic order as adopted at the sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly should lead to a reduction in the widening gap in levels of living between developed and developing countries and would be conducive to a reduction in population growth rates particularly in countries where such rates are high.

69. In planning measures to harmonize population trends and socio-economic change, human beings must be regarded not only as consumers but also as producers. The investment by nations in the health and education of their citizens contributes substantially to productivity. Consequently, plans for economic and social development and for international assistance for this purpose should emphasize the health and education sectors. Likewise, patterns of production and technology should be adapted to each country's endowment in human resources. Decisions on the introduction of technologies affording significant savings in employment of manpower should take into account the relative abundance of human resources. To this end it is recommended that efforts should be intensified to determine for each country the technologies and production methods best suited to its working population situation and to study the relationship between population factors and employment.

70. It is imperative that all countries, and within them all social sectors, should adapt themselves to more rational utilization of natural resources, without excess, so that some are not deprived of what others waste. In order to increase the production and distribution of food for the growing world population it is recommended that governments give high priority to improving methods of food production, the investigation and development of new sources of food and more effective utilization of existing sources. International co-operation is recommended with the aim of ensuring the provision of fertilizers and energy and a timely supply of foodstuffs to all countries.

C. Promotion of knowledge and policies

71. In order to achieve the population objectives of this Plan of Action and to put its policy recommendations adequately into effect, measures need to be undertaken to promote knowledge of the relationships and problems involved, to assist in the development of population policies and to elicit the co-operation and participation of all concerned in the formulation and implementation of these policies.

1. Data collection and analysis

72. Statistical data on the population collected by means of censuses, surveys or vital statistics registers, are essential for the planning of investigations and to provide a basis for the formulation, evaluation and application of population and development policies. Countries that have not yet done so are urged to tabulate and analyse their census and other data in order to fulfil these objectives.

73. It is up to each country to take a population census in accordance with its own needs and capabilities. However, it is recommended that a population census be taken by each country between 1975 and 1985. It is also recommended that these censuses give particular attention to data relevant to development planning and the formulation of population policies; in order to be of greatest value, it is recommended that these data be tabulated and made available as quickly as possible, with an evaluation both of the quality of information as well as the degree of coverage of the census.

74. All countries that have not yet done so should be encouraged to establish a continuing capability for taking multi-subject household sample surveys and a long-term plan for securing statistics on various demographic and interrelated socio-economic variables on a regular basis. This is recommended particularly with regard to topics relating to the improvement of levels of living and the well-being and level of education of individuals, in view of the close relationship between these variables and the problems affecting population. All countries are invited to co-operate with the World Fertility Survey.

75. In line with the objectives of the World Programme for the Improvement of Vital Statistics, countries are encouraged to establish and improve

their vital registration system, as a long-term objective, and to enact laws relevant to the improvement of vital registration. Until this improvement is completed, the use of alternative methods is recommended, such as sample surveys, which provide up-to-date information on vital events.

76. Less developed countries should be provided with technical co-operation, equipment and financial support to develop or improve the population and related statistical programmes mentioned above. Provision for data gathering assistance should cover fully the need for evaluating, analysing and presenting the data in a form most appropriate to the needs of users.

77. Governments that have not yet done so are urged to establish appropriate services for the collection, analysis and dissemination of demographic and related statistical information.

2. Research

78. This Plan of Action gives high priority to research activities in population problems (including unemployment, starvation and poverty) and to related fields, particularly to research activities that are important for the formulation, evaluation and implementation of the population policies consistent with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedom as recognized in international instruments of the United Nations. Although research for filling gaps in knowledge is very urgent and important, high priority should be given to research oriented to the specific problems of countries and regions, including methodological studies. Such research is best carried out in the countries and regions themselves and by competent persons especially acquainted with national and regional conditions. The following research areas are considered to be of particular importance for filling existing gaps in knowledge:

(a) The social, cultural and economic determinants of population variables in different developmental and political situations, particularly at the family and micro levels;

(b) The demographic and social processes occurring within the family cycle through time and, particularly, through alternative modes of development;

(c) The development of effective means for the improvement of health, and especially for the reduction of maternal, foetal, infant and early childhood mortality;

(d) The study of experiences of countries which have major programmes of internal migration with a view to developing guidelines that are helpful to policy-makers of these countries and of countries that are interested in undertaking similar programmes;

(e) Projections of demographic and related variables including the development of empirical and hypothetical models for monitoring the future;

(f) The formulation, implementation and evaluation of population policies, including methods for

integrating population inputs and goals in development plans and programmes; the means for understanding and improving the motivations of people to participate in the formulation and implementation of population programmes; the study of education and communication aspects of population policy; the analysis of population policies in their relationship with other socio-economic development policies, laws and institutions, including the possible influences of the economic system on the social, cultural and economic aspects of population policies; the translation into action programmes of policies dealing with the socio-economic determinants of fertility, mortality, internal migration and distribution, and international migration;

(g) The collection, analysis and dissemination of information concerning human rights in relation to population matters and the preparation of studies aimed at the clarification, systematization and more effective implementation of these human rights;

(h) The review and analysis of national and international laws which bear directly or indirectly on population factors;

(i) Basic biological and applied research on the assessment and improvement of existing and new methods of fertility regulation; the evaluation of the impact of different methods of fertility regulation on ethical and cultural values and on mental and physical health, both in short-term and long-term effects; and the assessment and study of policies for creating social and economic conditions so that couples can freely decide on the size of their families;

(j) The evaluation of the impact of different methods of family planning on the health conditions of women and members of their families;

(k) The interrelationships among patterns of family formation, nutrition and health, reproductive biology, and the incidence, causes and treatment of sterility;

(l) Methods for improving the management, delivery and utilization of all social services associated with population, including family welfare and, when appropriate, family planning;

(m) Methods for the development of systems of social, demographic and related economic statistics in which various sets of data are interlinked, with a view to improving insight into the interrelationships of variables in these fields;

(n) The interrelations of population trends and conditions and other social and economic variables, in particular the availability of human resources, food and natural resources, the quality of the environment, the need for health, education, employment, welfare, housing and other social services and amenities, promotion of human rights, the enhancement of the status of women, the need for social security, political stability, discrimination, and political freedom;

(o) The impact of a shift from one family size

pattern to another on biological and demographic characteristics of the population;

(p) Research should be undertaken on the changing structure, functions, and dynamics of the family as an institution, including the changing roles of men and women, attitudes toward and opportunities for women's education and employment; the implications of current and future population trends for the status of women; biomedical research on male and female fertility, and the economic, social and demographic benefits to be derived from the integration of women in the development process;

(q) Research dealing with social indicators, to reflect the quality of life as well as the interrelations between socio-economic and demographic phenomena, should be encouraged. Emphasis should also be given to the development of socio-economic and demographic models.

79. Their national research requirements and needs must be determined by governments and national institutions. However, high priority should be given, wherever possible, to research that has wide relevance and international applicability.

80. National and regional research institutions dealing with population and related questions should be assisted and expanded as appropriate. Special efforts should be made to co-ordinate the research of these institutions by facilitating the exchange of their research findings and the exchange of information on their planned and ongoing research projects.

3. *Management, training, education and information*

81. There is a need for the development of management in all fields related to population, with national and international attention and appropriate support given to programmes dealing with its promotion.

82. A dual approach to training is recommended: an international programme for training in population matters concomitant with national and regional training programmes adapted and made particularly relevant to conditions in the countries and regions of the trainees. While recognizing the complementarity of these two approaches, national and regional training should be given the higher priority.

83. Training in population dynamics and policies, whether national, regional or international, should, in so far as possible, be interdisciplinary in nature. The training of population specialists should always be accompanied by relevant career development for the trainees in their fields of specialization.

84. Training in the various aspects of population activities, including the management of population programmes, should not be restricted to the higher levels of specialization but should also be extended to personnel at other levels, and, where needed, to medical, paramedical, traditional health personnel, and population programme administrators.

85. Training in population matters should be extended to labour, community and other social leaders,

to senior government officials, with a view to enabling them better to identify the population problems of their countries and communities and to help in the formulation of policies relating to them. Such training should impart an adequate knowledge of human rights in accordance with international standards and awareness of the human rights aspect of population problems.

86. Owing to the role of education in individuals' and society's progress and its impact on demographic behaviour all countries are urged to further develop their formal and informal educational programmes; efforts should be made to eradicate illiteracy, to promote education among the youth and abolish factors discriminating against women.

87. Educational institutions in all countries should be encouraged to expand their curricula to include a study of population dynamics and policies, including, where appropriate, family life, responsible parenthood and the relation of population dynamics to socio-economic development and to international relations. Governments are urged to co-operate in developing a world-wide system of international, regional and national institutions to meet the need for trained manpower. Assistance to the less developed countries should include, as appropriate, the improvement of the educational infrastructure such as library facilities and computer services.

88. Governments are invited to use all available means for disseminating population information.

89. Governments are invited to consider the distribution of population information to enlighten both rural and urban populations, through the assistance of governmental agencies.

90. Voluntary organizations should be encouraged, within the framework of national laws, policies and regulations, to play an important role in disseminating population information and ensuring wider participation in population programmes, and to share experiences regarding the implementation of population measures and programmes.

91. International organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, should strengthen their efforts to distribute information on population and related matters, particularly through periodic publications on the world population situation, prospects and policies, the utilization of audio-visual and other aids to communication, the publication of non-technical digests and reports, and the production and wide distribution of newsletters on population activities. Consideration should also be given to strengthening the publication of international professional journals and reviews in the field of population.

92. In order to achieve the widest possible dissemination of research results, translation activities should be encouraged at both the national and international levels. In this respect, the revision of the United Nations Multilingual Demographic Dictionary and its publication in additional languages is strongly recommended.

93. The information and experience resulting from the World Population Conference and the World Population Year relating to the scientific study of population and the elaboration of population policies should be synthesized and disseminated by the United Nations.

4. Development and evaluation of population policies

94. Where population policies or programmes have been adopted, systematic and periodic evaluations of their effectiveness should be made with a view to their improvement.

95. Population measures and programmes should be integrated into comprehensive social and economic plans and programmes and this integration should be reflected in the goals, instrumentalities and organizations for planning within the countries. In general, it is suggested that a unit dealing with population aspects be created and placed at a high level of the national administrative structure and that such a unit be staffed with qualified persons from the relevant disciplines.

CHAPTER IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

A. Role of national Governments

96. The success of this Plan of Action will largely depend on the actions undertaken by national Governments and Governments are urged to utilize fully the support of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.

97. This Plan of Action recognizes the responsibility of each Government to decide on its own policies and devise its own programmes of action dealing with the problems of population and economic and social progress. The recommendations made in this Plan of Action, in so far as they relate to national Governments, are made with due regard to the need for variety and flexibility in the hope that they may be responsive to major needs in the population field as perceived and interpreted by national Governments. However, it is strongly recommended that national policies be formulated and implemented without violating, and with due promotion of, universally accepted standards of human rights.

98. An important role of Governments with regard to this Plan of Action is to determine and assess the population problems and needs of their countries in the light of their political, social, cultural, religious and economic conditions; such an undertaking should be carried out systematically and periodically so as to promote informed, rational and dynamic decision-making in matters of population and development.

99. The effect of national action or inaction in the fields of population may, in certain circumstances, extend beyond national boundaries; such international implications are particularly evident with regard to aspects of morbidity, population

concentration and international migration, but may also apply to other aspects of population concern.

B. Role of international co-operation

100. International co-operation, based on the peaceful co-existence of States having different social systems, should play a supportive role in achieving the goals of the Plan of Action. This supportive role could take the form of direct assistance, technical or financial, in response to national and regional requests and be additional to economic development assistance, or the form of other activities, such as monitoring progress, undertaking comparative research in the area of population, resources and consumption, and furthering the exchange among countries of information and policy experiences in the field of population and consumption. Assistance should be provided, as far as possible, with the assurance of support consistent with the national plans of recipient countries. Assistance should be provided on the basis of respect for sovereignty of the recipient country and its national policy.

101. The General Assembly of the United Nations, the Economic and Social Council, the Governing Council of UNDP/UNFPA [U.N. Development Program/U.N. Fund for Population Activities] and other competent legislative and policy-making bodies of the specialized agencies and the various intergovernmental organizations are urged to give careful consideration to this Plan of Action and to ensure an appropriate response to it.

102. Countries sharing similar population conditions and problems are invited to consider jointly this Plan of Action, exchange experience in relevant fields and elaborate those aspects of the Plan that are of particular relevance to them. The United Nations regional economic commissions and other regional bodies of the United Nations system should play an important role toward this end.

103. There is a special need for training in the field of population. The United Nations system, governments and, as appropriate, non-governmental organizations are urged to give recognition to this need and priority to the measures necessary to meet it, including information, education and services for family planning.

104. More developed countries, and other countries able to assist, are urged to increase their assistance to less developed countries in accordance with the goals of the Second United Nations Development Decade and, together with international organizations, to make this assistance available in accordance with the national priorities of receiving countries. In this respect, it is recognized, in view of the magnitude of the problems and the consequent national requirements for funds, that considerable expansion of international assistance in the population field is required for the proper implementation of this Plan of Action.

105. It is suggested that the expanding, but still insufficient, international assistance in population

and development matters requires increased co-operation; UNFPA is urged, in co-operation with all organizations responsible for international population assistance, to produce a guide for international assistance in population matters which would be made available to recipient countries and institutions and be revised periodically.

106. International non-governmental organizations are urged to respond to the goals and policies of this Plan of Action by co-ordinating their activities with those of other non-governmental organizations, and with those of relevant bilateral and multilateral organizations, by expanding their support for national institutions and organizations dealing with population questions, and by co-operating in the promotion of widespread knowledge of the goals and policies of the Plan of Action, and, when requested, by supporting national and private institutions and organizations dealing with population questions.

C. Monitoring, review and appraisal

107. It is recommended that monitoring of population trends and policies discussed in this Plan of Action should be undertaken continuously as a specialized activity of the United Nations and reviewed biennially by the appropriate bodies of the United Nations system, beginning in 1977. Because of the shortness of the intervals, such monitoring would necessarily have to be selective with regard to its informational content and should focus mainly on new and emerging population trends and policies.

108. A comprehensive and thorough review and appraisal of progress made towards achieving the goals and recommendations of this Plan of Action should be undertaken every five years by the United Nations system. For this purpose the Secretary-General is invited to make appropriate arrangements taking account of the existing structure and resources of the United Nations system, and in co-operation with Governments. It is suggested that the first such review be made in 1979 and be repeated each five years thereafter. The findings of such systematic evaluations should be considered by the Economic and Social Council with the object of making, whenever necessary, appropriate modifications of the goals and recommendations of this Plan.

109. It is urged that both the monitoring and the review and appraisal activities of this Plan of Action be closely co-ordinated with those of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade and any new international development strategy that might be formulated.

APPENDIX B

A selection of international instruments on human rights* and population

BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND POPULATION

- The United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945.
- American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Resolution XXX of the ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, 2 May 1948).
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948 (UNGA Resolution 217A (III)).
- Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950 (European Convention on Human Rights).
- European Social Charter, 18 October 1961 (United Nations Treaty Series (Vol. 529)).
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966 (UN Doc. A/Conf. 32/4).
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966 (UN Doc. A/CONF. 32/4).
- Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, 22 April-13 May 1968 (UN Doc. A/CONF.32/41).
- American Convention on Human Rights, San José, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969 (HRJ (Vol. III-1)). Not in force.
- Declaration on Social Progress and Development, 11 December 1969 (UNGA Resolution 2542 (XXIV)).
- Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 1 May 1974 (UNGA Resolution 3201 (5-VI)).

* Reproduced from UNESCO, Human Rights Aspects of Population Programmes (Paris, 1977), pp. 151-54.

- Programmes of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 1 May 1974 (UNGA Resolution 3202 (5-VI)).
- World Population Plan of Action, 30 August 1974, adopted by United Nation World Population Conference (E/CONF. 60/19).
- Development and International Economic Co-operation, 16 September 1975 (UNGA Resolution 3362 (5-VII)).

BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION

- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948 (UNGA Resolution 260A (III)). Entered into force 12 January 1951.
- United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 20 December 1965 (UNGA Resolution 1904 (XVIII)).
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965 (UNGA Resolution 2106A (XX)). Entered into force 4 January 1969.
- International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 6 December 1973 (UNGA Resolution 3068 (XXVIII)).

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN

- OAS Convention on the Nationality of Women, 26 December 1933 (International Conferences of American States, 1st Supplement, 1933-40). Entered into force 29 August 1934.
- Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women, 2 May 1948 (International Conferences of American States, 2nd Supplement, 1942-54).
- Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Civil Rights to Women, 2 May 1948 (International Conferences of American States, 2nd Supplement, 1942-54).
- Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 31 March 1953 (UNGA Resolution 640 (VII)). Entered into force 7 July 1954.

- Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 29 January 1957 (UNGA Resolution 1040 (XI)). Entered into force 11 August 1958.
- Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1959 (UNGA Resolution 1386 (XIV)).
- Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, 7 November 1962 (UNGA Resolution 1763A (XVII)). Entered into force 9 December 1964.
- Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, 1 November 1965 (UNGA Resolution 2018 (XX)).
- Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 7 November 1967 (UNGA Resolution 2263 (XXII)).
- Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and their Contribution to Development and Peace, 1975, World Plan of Action and Regional Plans of Action for the Implementation of the Objectives of the International Women's Year (E/CONF.66/34).

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO EDUCATION

- Unesco Convention Against Discrimination in Education, 14 December 1960 (United Nations Treaty Series (Vol. 429)). Entered into force 22 May 1962.

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT

- Convention Concerning Forced Labour, 1930, ILO Convention No. 29 (ILO Conventions and Recommendations, 1919-66). Entered into force 1 May 1932.
- Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, 29 June 1951, ILO Convention No. 100 (United Nations Treaty Series (Vol. 165)). Entered into force 23 May 1953.
- Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, 25 June 1957, ILO Convention No. 105 (United Nations Treaty Series (Vol. 320)). Entered into force 17 January 1959.

- Convention on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation, 25 June 1958, ILO Convention No. 111. Entered into force 15 June 1960.
- Convention Concerning Employment Policy, 9 July 1964, ILO Convention No. 122 (UN Doc. A/CONF.32/4). Entered into force 15 July 1966.

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO MOVEMENT OF PERSONS

- Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 21 March 1950 (United Nations, Treaty Series (Vol. 96)). Entered into force 25 July 1951.
- Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951 (United Nations Treaty Series (Vol. 189)). Entered into force 22 April 1954.
- OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, 28 March 1954 (International Conferences of American States, 2nd supplement, 1942-54). Entered into force 29 December 1954.
- OAS Convention on Territorial Asylum, 28 March 1954 (International Conferences of American States, 2nd supplement, 1942-54). Entered into force 29 December 1954.
- Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 28 September 1954. See Ecosoc Resolution 526A (XVII) of 26 April 1954. Entered into force 6 June 1960.
- Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30 August 1961 (UN Doc. A/CONF.32/4). Not in force.
- General Programme for the Removal of Restrictions on the Free Supply of Services, Council of the EEC, 1962 (Council Regulation Nos. 15/61 and 36/64 on the Freedom of Movement for Workers within the Community).
- Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967 (UN Doc. A/CONF. 32/4). Entered into force 4 October 1967.
- Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 14 December 1967 (UNGA Resolution 2312 (XXII)).
- OUA Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 10 September 1969 (HRJ (Vol. III-1)). Not in force.

Law, Human Rights and Population: A Strategy for Action

by Luke T. Lee

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- 18/ *Population and the Role of Law in the Americas*, Proceedings of a Seminar of the Human Rights Committee at the 18th Conference of the Inter-American Bar Association (1974).

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Law, Human Rights and Population: A Strategy for Action*

LUKE T. LEE**

It is entirely possible that the most urgent conflict confronting the world today is not that between nations or ideologies, but rather between the pace of growth of the human race and the disproportionate increase in the production of resources necessary to support mankind in peace, prosperity and dignity. Oddly, it has been only within the past decade that the problems associated with population growth have seemed to be a proper subject for legal concern. Similarly, the conscious relating of basic human rights to the subject of world population in general and family planning specifically is of comparatively recent origin.¹ That any attempt to control population growth touches on certain aspects of human rights is obvious. Yet the subject matter is relatively unexplored.² Even in its unexplored state the potential for contributing to an increased understanding of not only the population problem but of the issue of human rights as well is significantly high to merit the shift in attention. Because research in this area is of so recent an origin, this article is designedly exploratory in nature. It seeks simultaneously to stimulate and provoke further research, thought, and discussion on the subject. To this end it is divided into

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1. See generally *THE WORLD POPULATION CRISIS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND THE ROLE OF LAW* (Proceedings, Regional Meeting of American Society of International Law at the University of Virginia, Mar. 12, 13, 1971, published by the John Bassett Moore Society of International Law, University of Virginia School of Law).

2. Thus, the U.N. Committee for Program and Coordination in 1968 cited the human rights aspects of family planning as an area not yet adequately explored. 45 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. G, U.N. Doc. E/4493 (1968). For a hint of the relatively meager literature in this field see Lee, *Law and Family Planning*, 6 *STUDIES IN FAMILY PLANNING* (Apr. 1971) (originally a background paper commissioned by the World Health Organization's Expert Committee on Family Planning in Health Services for its meeting November 24-30, 1970); Lee, *Population Laws and Human Rights*, AFRICAN POPULATION CONFERENCE, Doc. Pop. Conf. 2/5 (Dec. 9-18, 1971); Partan, *The Legal Capacity of the United Nations System in the Field of Population* (Law and Population Book Series No. 3, 1972).

three parts: first, a review of the status and relevance of the concept of human rights; second, a discussion of the link between human rights and population control; and third, a proposal for a research strategy of action.

I. STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The status of human rights has traditionally been linked to the types of instruments into which they are incorporated. Thus, the answer to the question whether human rights are legally or only morally binding upon states usually hinges upon the fulfillment or nonfulfillment of the various requirements under the law of treaties. As is often the case, where human rights are dealt with in such instruments as declarations,³ proclamations,⁴ or unratified covenants,⁵ they are considered morally, but not legally, binding. Only duly ratified conventions⁶ are given legally binding effect, and then only on

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3. Documents A/CONF. 32/6, at 114 (1967) and Add. 1, at 5 (1968) list the following "declarations" on human rights adopted by the General Assembly through 1967:

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (1963); Declaration on the Promotion Among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding Between Peoples (1965); Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1967).

A "declaration" may be codified into a convention which enters into force upon receiving a requisite number of ratifications, as in the case of the Declaration Against Racial Discrimination (1963), which was codified in 1965 and entered into force in 1969, G.A. Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6181 (1965), or it may be codified but lacks the requisite number of ratifications to enter into force, as in the case of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), which was codified into two international covenants in 1966, see note 5 *infra*, but has not yet entered into force. A declaration may also, of course, stand alone unaccompanied by codification, as in the case of the great majority of declarations cited above.

For the complete language of declarations, proclamations and conventions adopted prior to 1967, see UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1967); see also BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1971). Moreover, for a report on the status of multilateral agreements in human rights concluded under U.N. auspices, see U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/907/Rev. 5 (1969); see also A/CONF. 37/7/Add. 1 (1968) for a report of agreements concluded under the auspices of specialized U.N. agencies.

4. See *e.g.*, Teheran Proclamation on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 (1968).
5. See *e.g.*, Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
6. See *e.g.*, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6181 (1965); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 174 (1948); Supple-

the countries which have ratified them. This treaty-oriented approach to human rights has been subscribed to by many jurists.⁷

It is submitted by this author that human rights, to the extent that they have met the conditions prescribed below, are *ipso facto* legally binding upon states, regardless of the existence of a duly ratified treaty, for human rights, by definition, are "rights which attach to all human beings equally, whatever their nationality."⁸ As such, the legal validity of their application cannot be rooted solely in a mere piece of paper signed and ratified by states.

By emphasizing the formal or procedural aspects of human rights treaties, the traditional approach seems to confuse the *instruments* stipulating human rights with the substantive *human rights* themselves. Rather, the analysis of the binding force of human rights must be approached also from their non-treaty sources: natural law, customary international law and general principles of law as recognized by civilized nations. Each of these sources has contributed to the development of human rights. These sources of human rights will be briefly discussed in the ensuing space, with special emphasis on the formation of customary international law in the light of developments in the twentieth century.

A. Natural Law

Whether in their manifestation as "inherent rights," "fundamental freedoms," or "natural justice," human rights are synonymous with the law of nature. Except for those extreme positivists who would deny *in toto* the existence of natural law,⁹ the latter is deemed to underlie both domestic legislation and international agreements, finding expression in such basic instruments as the U.N. Charter¹⁰ and

mentary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 7 Sept. 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3 (1957); Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, G.A. Res. 317, U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 33 (1949).

7. H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 144, 145 (1952); H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 397-417 (1950); Schwelb, *The Influence of Universal Declaration of Human Rights on International and National Law*, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 217 (1959); P. DROST, HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS 32 (1951).
8. Waldock, *Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Significance of the European Convention*, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 3 (Supp. 1965) (the paper was delivered at The European Convention on Human Rights).
9. See, e.g., Kelsen, *The Pure Theory of Law*, 51 L.Q.REV. 517 (1935); Kelsen, *The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence*, 55 HARV.L.REV. 44 (1941); H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (A. Wedberg transl. 1949); H. LAUTERPACHT, MODERN THEORIES OF LAW 105-38 (1938); W. EBENSTEIN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (1945).
10. Thus, the U.N. Charter makes seven references to human rights in addition to using such terms as "fundamental freedoms" and "inherent rights." An example of the latter provides that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the *inherent right* of individual or collective self-defense." U.N.

national constitutions.¹¹ Yet even for these positivists, to the extent that human right-natural law has already been incorporated into these basic laws, it is already binding upon states regardless, or even in spite, of a treaty.

B. Customary International Law

The recent trend of codifying customary rules of international law into conventional international law¹² is reflected in recent attempts at codifying human rights into treaty form.¹³ It should be noted, however, that in the absence of a binding treaty, the validity of international custom as the second source of international law in the criteria of the International Court of Justice¹⁴ remains undiminished. Thus, those human rights based on international custom continue to be binding upon states, notwithstanding the latter's failure to ratify or adhere to such treaties.

The importance of custom-based human rights assumes growing proportions in light of the increasingly active involvement of the United Nations in the field of human rights.¹⁵ That the United Nations has clear authority to discuss and make recommendations on human rights matters is specifically provided for in Articles 10, 13, 55 and 62 of the Charter. While it is not contended that individual General Assembly resolutions have a legally binding effect upon members of the United Nations, repeated and near-unanimous resolutions or declarations may achieve such an effect through accelerating the custom-generating process. Judge Tanaka describes well the working of such process:

According to traditional international law, a general practice is the result of the repetition of individual acts of States

CHARTER art. 51. (emphasis supplied). The basic nature of the Charter is evidenced in Article 103, under which obligations under the Charter shall prevail over those demanded by any other international agreement, past or future.

11. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I-X, especially the Due Process clauses. See also the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, which contains the reknowned passage:

[W]e hold these truths to be self-evident—That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain *inalienable rights*; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

(emphasis supplied).

12. Lee, *International Law Commission Re-examined*, 59 AM.J.INT'L L. 545-46 (1965).
13. The codification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into the 1966 International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights and the codification of the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination into the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination are examples of this practice.
14. I.C.J.STAT. art. 38, para. 1.
15. For an excellent review of United Nations activity in the field of human rights see J. CAREY, *UN PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS* (1970).

constituting consensus in regard to a certain content of a rule of law. Such repetition of acts is an historical process extending over a long period of time . . . The appearance of organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, with their agencies and affiliated institutions, replacing an important part of the traditional individualistic method of international negotiation by the method of "parliamentary diplomacy" . . . is bound to influence the mode of generation of customary international law. A State, instead of pronouncing its view to a few States directly concerned, has the opportunity, through the medium of an organization, to declare its position to all members of the organization and to know immediately their reaction on the same matter. In former days, practice, repetition and *opinio juris sive necessitatis*, which are the ingredients of customary law might be combined together in a very long and slow process extending over centuries. In the contemporary age of highly developed techniques of communication and information, the formation of a custom through the medium of international organization is greatly facilitated and accelerated; the establishment of such a custom would require no more than one generation or even far less than that. This is one of the examples of the transformation of law inevitably produced by change in the social substratum.¹⁶

The question of when the recommendatory power of a General Assembly resolution is transformed into a legally binding nature would hinge upon the intent of the resolution, the extent of the consensus supporting it, and the repeated endorsements it receives both in and out of the United Nations. Once completed, the metamorphosis would endow the General Assembly resolution with customary law obligations for member states which would be as binding as if incorporated in a ratified treaty.¹⁷ Mr. Constantin A. Stavropoulos, the U.N. Legal Counsel, aptly stated:

The effect of a resolution may vary from case to case and even from State to State, but it seems undue conservatism

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16. *Southwest Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa)*, Second Phase, [1966] I.C.J. 17, 291-92 (Judge Tanaka's dissenting opinion). In this case, Ethiopia and Liberia sought to establish nondiscrimination as internationally binding on grounds of repeated resolutions and declarations of the General Assembly and other international organs. Without going into the merits of the issue, however, the Court dismissed the case on procedural grounds in that the applicant states failed to establish a "legal right or interest" in the subject-matter. Judge Tanaka dissented from the Court's holding on "legal right or interest" and proceeded to consider the question of whether "resolutions and declarations of international organs can be recognized as a factor in the custom-generating process."
17. Partan, *The Legal Capacity of the United Nations System in the Field of Population* 28 (Law and Population Book Series No. 3, 1972).

to suggest that Assembly resolutions have not, in fact, become one of the principal means whereby international law is now moulded, especially in those instances . . . [as with] the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, where the resolution has enjoyed the support of virtually all States Members, both at the time of its adoption and subsequently.¹⁸

The comparative effectiveness of General Assembly resolutions or declarations over that of treaties as vehicles for realizing family planning as a human right is well summarized as follows:

As to governments that are willing to accept the family planning right as stating a binding obligation, the definition of the scope of that obligation can come into being equally as effectively through customary law generated through careful development of an Assembly declaration as through . . . careful development of a draft treaty. The UN process and Assembly declaration would lack the immediacy of formal effect achieved through the ratification of a treaty, but considering that the treaty is not likely to be accorded self-executing status in municipal law, the implementation of the right in the municipal law of the parties would depend upon affirmative action by the government regardless of whether the right is framed in a treaty or in an Assembly declaration.

As to governments that appear unwilling to acknowledge an international law obligation to respect the family planning right, the UN process leading to an Assembly declaration holds promise of having a greater impact in shaping the views of the government than the treaty process. For example, where a government is divided on a human rights issue, a draft treaty might be dismissed as formulating new obligations that may be accepted or ignored, whereas an Assembly declaration is likely to be cast as the recognition of existing customary law obligations and may strengthen the hand of the proponents of human rights within the government. The force of the declaration would of course be limited by the care and attention given to it in the United Nations and the degree to which governments are in fact willing to accept the declaration as framing human rights

18. Stavropoulos, *The United Nations and the Development of International Law 1945-1970*, reprinted in U.N. Doc. OPI/411 (1970). See also the following statement of Dr. Edvard Hambro, President of the 25th Session of the U.N. General Assembly and a distinguished jurist in his own right:

The fact is that the wide and pervasive international acceptance of the Declaration allows us to state that it has become, or at least is becoming, international law.

Address before the United Nations Association of the United States in New York, Nov. 10, 1970.

that they consider themselves under an obligation to respect.

Finally, UN experience in the human rights area shows that governments have been unwilling to accept international implementation procedures. If governments remain unwilling to submit any aspects of their observance of human rights obligations to international adjudication, there seems little purpose in casting those obligations in solemn treaty form. The effective "realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all" might more readily be advanced through the UN process of review, study and debate, leading to periodic reiteration of particular human rights as obligations of governments.¹⁹

C. General Principles of Law

Certain additional rights may be implied in express rights by reasoning or application of the general principles of law—the third source of international law in the World Court's criteria.²⁰ Such inferred rights may in time ripen into express rights through the U.N. custom-generating process. Thus, although the right to family planning was not explicitly included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the two 1966 International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights, such a right may be inferred from the rights to equality of the sexes, privacy, conscience, work, adequate standard of living, health and well-being (physical, mental, and environmental), education (including that for the full development of the human personality), and freedom from hunger.²¹ The right to family planning was subsequently incorporated in the Teheran Proclamation on Human Rights²² and the U.N. Declaration on Social Progress and Development.²³ Likewise, although the right to freedom from hunger was not specifically included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it was later stipulated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.²⁴

Summarizing from the foregoing discussion, this author considers the traditional treaty approach to human rights as too restrictive as well as jurisprudentially unsound. Once a right has met any of the above conditions, it is automatically a *legal* right and carries with it all the implications of that status.

19. Partan, *supra* note 17, at 31-2.

20. See note 14 *supra*.

21. Lee, The Unique Role of UNESCO in Promoting the Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of International Law (background paper prepared for the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Doc. SEM/LAW (67)6, at 15).

22. See note 4 *supra*, para. 16 and Resolution XVIII of that Conference, titled Human Rights Aspects of Family Planning.

23. G.A. Res. 2436, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 45, U.N. Doc. A/7388 (1961).

24. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).

II. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS IN POPULATION

Family planning was formally accepted as a basic human right in the Declaration on Population by World Leaders, signed by twelve Heads of State on Human Rights Day, December 10, 1966:

We believe that the majority of parents desire to have the knowledge and the means to plan their families; that the opportunity to decide the number and spacing of children is a basic human right.²⁵

In the following year, eighteen more Heads of State joined the list.²⁶ Summarizing the rationale for linking human rights to family planning, Secretary General U Thant wrote:

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes the family as the natural and fundamental unit of society. It follows that any choice and decision with regard to the size of the family must irrevocably rest with the family itself, and cannot be made by anyone else. But this right of parents to free choice will remain illusory unless they are aware of the alternatives open to them. Hence, the right of every family to information and to the availability of services in this field is increasingly considered as a basic human right and as an indispensable ingredient of human dignity.²⁷

Official U.N. recognition of the principle that family planning constitutes a basic human right did not come until May 1968, when the U.N. Conference on Human Rights in Teheran proclaimed that "parents have a basic human right to determine freely and responsibly the number and the spacing of their children."²⁸ A unanimously adopted resolution added the language "a right to adequate education and information in this respect" for all "couples."²⁹

An examination of the conference proceedings reveals that the term "couples," instead of "parents" or "families," was used in the resolution in order to insure that couples may "decide to have no children at all."³⁰ While the Yugoslav delegation stressed "the fundamental right of women to conscious motherhood,"³¹ the Belgian and French delegations assumed that the "right to adequate education

25. U.N. Population Newsletter, Apr. 1968, at 44 (published by the Population Division of the United Nations).

26. The thirty states were: Australia, Barbados, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Finland, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia.

27. U.N. Population Newsletter, *supra* note 25, at 43.

28. Teheran Proclamation on Human Rights para. 16.

29. The additional language is found in Resolution XVIII: Human Rights Aspects of Family Planning.

30. 2nd Comm., 23 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/C.2/SR.5, at 57 (1968).

31. 2nd Comm., 23 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/C.2/SR.12, at 143 (1968).

and information" included the right to "available services"³² or "the means for birth control"³³—an assumption not generally supported by other delegations.

The 1969 U.N. Declaration on Social Progress and Development is significant because it is the first U.N. resolution to require governments to provide families with not only the "knowledge," but also the "means necessary to enable them to exercise their right to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children."³⁴

The question may be raised as to whether the language of the Teheran Proclamation would allow couples to have as many children as they want (or do not want). The Proclamation specifically provides that family planning must be made not only "freely," but also "responsibly." Involved in a responsible parenthood is the balancing of the "individual" with the "collective" right—i.e., from the right of children to that of the society at large. Just as the "individual" right to freedom of speech must take into account the "collective" right whether in time of peace (e.g., libel, defamation, nuisance, obscenity) or during war or emergency (e.g., treason, sedition, censorship), so must the "individual" right of family planning be harmonized with the "collective" right, particularly in certain circumstances where the resources, both actual and potential, of a country dictate the limitation of the size of its population in the interest of all. The question of when exactly does the "individual" right give way to the "collective" is always difficult to answer—even in the case of freedom of speech notwithstanding its century-old development and refinement.³⁵ However, it is equally clear that inability to define with exactitude the relationship between the two rights does not negate their existence.

and an in-depth, world-wide study and reform of laws which inhibit family planning.

A. Charter on Human Rights and Population

It may be seen that the Teheran Proclamation and the Declaration on Social Progress and Development have laid down certain minimum conditions for the exercise of the family planning right. Still other conditions may be implied as being necessary to enable couples to determine "freely and responsibly" the number and spacing of children. The following is a composite list of fourteen such conditions, without which the family planning right would prove illusory:

1. The right to education, including information on family planning.³⁶
2. The right to include access to the means of practicing family planning.³⁷
3. The right to the equality of men and women.³⁸
4. The right of children, whether born in or out of wedlock, to equal status under the law and to adequate support from natural parents.³⁹
5. The right to work.⁴⁰
6. The right to an adequate social security system, including health and old-age insurance.⁴¹
7. The right to freedom from hunger.⁴²
8. The right to an adequate standard of living.⁴³
9. The right to freedom from environmental pollution.⁴⁴
10. The right to liberty of movement.⁴⁵
11. The right to privacy.⁴⁶
12. The right of conscience.⁴⁷
13. The right to separation of Church from State, law from dogma.⁴⁸

36. Teheran Proclamation on Human Rights resolution XVIII (1968).

37. U.N. Declaration on Social Progress and Development art. 22(b).

38. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 3; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 3; and Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women arts. 1, 4, 6, 9 and 10.

39. Declaration of the Rights of the Child principles 1, 4, 6, 9 and 10.

40. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 6.

41. *Id.* art. 9.

42. *Id.* art. 11(2).

43. *Id.* art. 11(1).

44. *Id.* art. 12(2)(b).

45. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12.

46. *Id.* art. 17.

47. *Id.* art. 18(1).

48. *Id.* arts. 18 and 26.

International Advisory Committee on Population and Law

The Programme is under the general supervision of an International Advisory Committee on Population and Law, which is on the roster of non-governmental organizations accredited to the U.N. Economic and Social Council. The Committee meets annually in different regions of the world. Its members are:

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 Professor Richard Baxter (*Harvard University*)
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON POPULATION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

April 20, 1978

Testimony by: Phyllis T. Piotrow, Ph.D.
Executive Director
Population Crisis Committee

I serve as Executive Director of the Population Crisis Committee and also on a volunteer basis as a member of the Board of Directors of New Directions, the Center for Population Activities, and on the Coalition for Women in Development of the League of Women Voters. I am the author of World Population Crisis: The United States Response, a study of the development of U.S. support for international assistance programs. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Select Committee on Population and to discuss the role and importance of family planning programs as part of a "basic needs" approach to development assistance and the relative importance of family planning programs and other forms of development assistance that are presumed to have an impact of fertility trends.

I would like to focus my remarks, not on the events of the past decade in policy, programs, and demography, but rather on the needs and challenges which we will face in the next decades if the world is to achieve a reasonable population balance.

The first need is an obvious one and, as a woman, I can only ponder why it remains still such a difficult and sometimes controversial need to meet. That is the basic human need or right spelled out in the World Population Plan of Action and approved by 136 governments, including our own, as stated in paragraph 14(f):

- (f) All couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to

have the information, education and means to do so; the responsibility of couples and individuals in the exercise of this right takes into account the needs of their living and future children, and their responsibilities towards the community;

Although this language was supported and approved by the United States government at the Bucharest World Population Conference and should be the basic foundation of any U.S. population or family planning policy, domestic or foreign, it is still nowhere to be found in U.S. legislation. Although this language is rooted in the principles of voluntarism and informed individual choice that are the very bedrock of our whole system of government, this language is not in the proposed new foreign aid legislation, which speaks instead from a very collectivist viewpoint of the right of countries to establish their own policies and warns of religious and political sensitivities. There is more stressing on motivating people than on helping them. Despite the stress of Congress on basic human rights, including rights to food, education, health, jobs, and many more, there is no mention of the right of families to know how to and be able to control their fertility. Surely any U.S. population planning programs should be justified first and foremost on this basis, or we will be encouraging a reaction against these very efforts.

The language in the World Population Plan of Action plus additional language citing individual and national benefits from reduced population growth and pointing out the two-way relationships between fertility and socio-economic development was combined, reviewed, and approved by a number of organizations, including the Population Section of the American Public Health Association, the Alan Guttmacher Institute, Planned Parenthood, and representatives of the Population Crisis Committee, the Population Institute, the World Population Society, the Population Resource Center, and Worldwatch Institute. Unfortunately, the year's legislative timetable made it impossible to secure appropriate subcommittee consideration of the language before the

legislation came before the full House International Relations Committee last week.

You have asked for specific recommendations, and the first I would offer is that this language be incorporated in U.S. legislation at the first opportunity. As an international commitment undertaken by the U.S. government, it deserves a place in U.S. statutes.

The real issue, however, is not words but action. It is more important to make a genuine effort to meet the human need to control fertility than it is to talk about it. Many men and especially women in the developing countries do recognize the high costs that high fertility exacts -- on health, family welfare, economic well-being and opportunities for individual advancement. Data from seven countries where the World Fertility Survey is now complete show that a substantial number of fecund married women want no more children.

Percentage of Currently Married Fecund Women
Age 15-49 Wanting No More Children

	<u>All Women</u>	<u>Women with 3 Children</u>
Dominican Republic	45	54
Fiji: Fiji	40	39
Indian	57	56
Korea	72	86
Malaysia	43	31
Nepal	30	40
Pakistan	49	48
Thailand	57	64

Source: World Fertility Surveys

Certainly a major objective of U.S. policy should be to help all governments in the developing world provide services to the women -- or families -- who want no more children. This requires a broad range of services with special emphasis on voluntary sterilization, the method of choice for older couples throughout the world. Sterilization is today the major preventive family planning method which requires backup medical facilities,

equipment, and skills. Like abortion and IUD insertion, sterilization cannot be performed as readily or safely on a household or village basis. I have met and talked with women waiting at hospitals for sterilization. I can testify to the depth of their motivation, their own perceived need for this help in controlling their fertility. They come and they bring their sisters, cousins, and friends. They are overjoyed to know that this basic need can be met so safely and easily.

My second recommendation, therefore, would be that henceforth any new hospital or extensive health facility constructed should be required to provide voluntary surgical contraceptive services. Generally, I am opposed to construction of buildings since this virtually insures that the health personnel will remain in the buildings rather than among the people, seeking out those who need services. But where buildings are essential space should be provided for performance of voluntary sterilization, including an overnight stay if necessary.

It is also true, of course, that over the long run socioeconomic improvement helps to reduce fertility -- just as it helps to raise educational standards, improve agricultural and industrial productivity, and encourage better program administration. All of these programs appear to have a reinforcing effect upon one another in the long run. However, we should keep in mind our own experience in the United States in programs like education. Over the last decade, those schools that have concentrated on basic education -- reading, writing, and arithmetic -- have a better record than those which have sought to improve education by introducing a wide variety of supposedly relevant but much less rigorous and focused programs. Likewise, the preponderance of evidence still suggests that the best way to achieve good family planning and rapid fertility declines is through good family planning programs, with strong national leadership to insure that realistic programs are in fact implemented and do not remain merely elaborate paper plans.

To expect socioeconomic development in general to reduce fertility is like expecting industrial development and expanded infrastructure in general to improve the conditions of life for the poor. It is a "trickle down" approach to the population problem, which assumes that indirect measures to reach those in need will be more effective than direct measures. While it seems likely that, under certain circumstances, some "trickle-down" benefits do reach and help the poor and do indirectly encourage lower fertility, the direct approach of providing adequate, convenient, safe, and above all sympathetic services to control fertility would, in my judgment, be more cost-effective in reducing fertility.

My third recommendation, therefore, would be to give highest priority, overseas as in the United States, to meeting the needs of those who desire to limit fertility and providing adequate family planning services for them. If we wait until full-fledged health and education infrastructures exist to improve family planning services, decades will be lost. In any case, why should women who want no more children now have to wait for overall economic development before they have access to simple modern methods of family planning?

Some evidence suggests that the most effective socioeconomic pathway to lower fertility would be improving the status of women, providing alternative opportunities so that women voluntarily engage in activities other than child-bearing. I would strongly endorse such programs -- not primarily as a means to lower fertility but rather as an end in itself to enable women to make a greater contribution to the social and economic development of their countries.

My fourth recommendation therefore would be to urge strong Committee support for the provision adopted by the House International Relations Committee allocating up to \$10 million of US economic assistance funds to help women in income-generating activities with training, credit, technical assistance, and resources. Again I would stress that the direct approach, of help to women, who are beyond question the poorest of the poor, will be more effective in raising the status and sights of women than more diffuse development efforts which, all too often, have left women out altogether.

With respect to socioeconomic development and population programs, I would also note that at present only about 5 percent of U.S. economic development funds are allocated for population programs. The other 95 percent are for agriculture, health, nutrition and a variety of other programs that do in fact constitute socioeconomic development. Because of the pervasive importance of population issues, I believe the population figure should be increased to 10 percent of the total, with additional funds utilized for linkages between population and other direct relevant programs. Five percent, or \$200 million is little enough to help reach 400 million couples simply with minimal services. A figure closer to \$400 million would make it easier to link population planning with all the other elements of development without cutting into the help that is needed directly for the extension of family planning services.

My fifth recommendation would be that the Committee urge the administration to move gradually from an allocation of about 5 percent of economic development funds to 10 percent for population programs.

Finally, looking toward the future, the overwhelming demographic fact of the next two decades will be the presence in the developing countries of a new generation of young, active, fertile men and women, a generation larger in numbers than the world has ever seen. Today 40% of the population of the developing countries is under the age of 15; that means over one billion children, more than the whole population of China. These children will soon be young adults in their peak period of fertility.

This is now the fastest growing age group in the population and basically it is the group of young parents whose fertility decisions will determine whether the world will have 5 billion people in the year 2000 or 7 billion.

What does this mean for the design and implementation of population and family planning programs over the next decade, and for the type and form of U.S. assistance to such programs?

First it means even as efforts continue to try to meet the needs of older couples through traditional, health-oriented programs, programs must also begin to seek a younger population, a population not yet hard-pressed by too many children but a population very hard-pressed indeed by too little land, education, employment, and other opportunities to improve themselves.

To reach these young people in the developing world, just as to reach our own teenagers, traditional health-oriented programs run by doctors in clinics may not be the best answer because basically these young people are not sick. Under these circumstances, the maternal and child health based approach, which was the old-fashioned way to provide family planning for older married women, can no longer monopolize the field. These programs will have to learn to coexist with new efforts to reach the young people wherever the young people are and through whatever media, peer groups, and communities these young people pay attention to.

To reach the younger men--who after all represent half of this population-- commercial distribution programs and employment based programs have so far been the most successful. Subsidized social marketing of condoms has been more effective than anyone ever expected under very different circumstances in India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Employment-based programs cover a great variety of efforts all the way from clinics in factories to tea-estate incentive programs, to agricultural extension education, rural community incentive programs, and government-as-employer penalties for too large families. Most men have some employer and many employers can also benefit if their employees are not overly burdened with too many children. Both commercial distribution and employment based programs have the advantages of being far easier to implement than nationwide health programs, of not overtaxing limited governmental administrative capabilities, of not incurring the liabilities of political unpopularity upon governments, and of reinforcing the long-term economic motivation for smaller families in an acceptable way. As any wife knows, what her husband's boss and paymaster say will have a greater impact than anything she can say. Programs of this nature are not expensive; they rely on the capabilities of the private business sector and often of private voluntary agencies to initiate but they do require encouragement and moral support from governments, especially at the village and local level. To reach the younger men, more attention should now begin to be devoted to these non-health oriented efforts and distribution networks.

To reach the younger women, door-to-door household distribution of services and information is proving more and more effective and acceptable. Women's groups, formal and informal, commercial networks (in countries where women do the marketing), employers of women, door-to-door visitors and social welfare centers may attract more younger women than clinics do. Basically, the women of the developing world are in a situation not dissimilar to U.S. teenagers -- economically dependent and socially insecure. To reach and per-

suade them information and services must come through trusted peer and community groups in a sympathetic and congenial way. The women's programs and special funding allocations mentioned above are especially relevant for these younger women.

My Sixth recommendation would be to encourage AID to explore the political, legal, administrative, institutional, and programatic constraints that can be expected to impede any such new directions in population/family planning policy in the future. AID could provide the Select Committee with a forward-looking report on AID's plans to reach this new younger generation. In fact, if AID developed a Five Year Plan, comparable to the plan required of HEW for domestic programs, this would help focus attention on the special challenges of the next decade.

The kind of programs that will be required -- innovative, small-scale, independent, based in local work or village communities -- are rarely initiated by national governments. Programs such as these are almost always started and often continue to be implemented by private organizations, national and international. At one time it was thought that governments alone could do the massive job of fertility reduction. Today, it is increasingly clear that governments very much need the support, prodding, and constant impetus of dedicated private agencies.

The United States, more than any other government, has recognized the importance of private agencies and made financial support available for experimental programs. But it is all too often the case that U.S. assistance includes so many strings and administrative requirements that it becomes almost counterproductive. Indigenous or international groups, even those receiving less than half their funds from the U.S., are supposed to buy U.S. goods, fly on U.S. airlines, or go through endless red tape to buy cheaper locally available goods. The prohibition on use of U.S. funds for abortion-related activities also is used as a rationale for auditing all the books of agencies that receive

only a portion of their funding from AID and spend very little of their other funds on abortion. Thus, political constraints in the U.S. are used to restrict indigenous projects overseas and to emphasize U.S. government involvement in the very programs which most need to grow strong local roots and support.

My final recommendations to the Committee would be to urge strong support for the work of private agencies in the population field. They have borne a heavy part of the burden and will continue to do so. Their work, and their non-official, non-U.S. character should be carefully preserved. They should not be smothered in regulations and paper work that often take more money to administer than they could ever hope to save.

Basically, the world has seen unbelievable progress in this field in the last 15 years -- in policy changes, in program implementation, and in fertility declines -- unprecedented in history. But a new far larger generation is growing up. To serve its needs will call for wider services, new channels for service delivery, and ever improved services and methods. Individuals, not bureaucracies, will do the best job in solving these problems. It is therefore, critically important to retain flexibility, imagination, and innovation in meeting this challenge.

In conclusion, family planning is a basic need for all families today. First recognized as a health measure for older multiparous women, family planning and reduced fertility are increasingly also economic and social needs for men and women of the burgeoning younger generation. To meet these needs -- directly with services and indirectly with a variety of reinforcing social and economic programs -- will require more than the five percent of U.S. assistance funds now allocated for this purpose. This Committee can perform a major service by

highlighting the encouraging results of many programs to date, the massive task that still lies ahead and the need for a higher priority for these programs which not only contribute substantially to the effectiveness of other forms of economic and social development but also themselves fill a very real need for men and women throughout the developing world.

Population Section in Foreign Aid Bill -

The present language in the Foreign Aid bill on both population and health represents an awkward mixture that does not convey the real intent or extent of either program. After reviewing both the population and health sections extensively, the American Public Health Association and a number of other organizations recommend the following simple, non-controversial language which reflects the World Population Plan of Action, adopted in Bucharest in 1974 by 136 nations:

(1) In the preamble of the present legislation the following paragraph should be added, as proposed by Philander P. Claxton, Jr., who served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Affairs from 1966 to 1975.

Amend HR 11080 by adding on page 4, the following new paragraph:

(c) Assistance under this chapter shall be administered so as to give particular attention to the inter-relationship between (a) population growth, and (b) development and overall improvement in living standards in developing countries and to the impact of all programs, projects, and activities on population growth. In activities proposed for financing under this chapter, priority shall be given to those which, while contributing to economic growth and higher standards of living, may have the greatest effect on creating motivation for and practice of family planning for smaller families. As appropriate under different social, cultural and economic conditions, particular consideration should be given to education in and out of school for both sexes, reduction of infant and child mortality through nutrition, sanitation and maternal and child health services, improvements in the status and employment of women, rural development and land reform for ownership by the farmer, more equitable distribution of income, and establishment of social security and means of support in old age.

(2) Section 105. POPULATION -- (a) While every country has the right to determine its own policies with respect to population growth, it is the sense of Congress that, as stated in the World Population Plan of Action, all couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education, and means to do so. Within the family, responsible parenthood and spacing of children contributes to improve maternal and child health, better nutrition, and a higher family standard of living. For the nation and the community, reducing rapid rates of population growth can facilitate other development programs and improve the availability of food, housing, education, employment, health care, and other social and economic services for all persons. At the same time, social and economic modernization can strengthen motivation for smaller families and improve administration of health, education, and family planning services.

(b) (1) In order to increase the opportunities and motivation for family planning and to slow population growth by reducing fertility, the Administrator is authorized to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for population planning.

(b) (2) These are authorized to be appropriated to the Administrator for the purposes of this section, in addition to funds otherwise available for such purposes, \$ for the fiscal year 1979.

(b) (3) These programs may include but are not limited to family planning services and supplies; demographic research and census-taking; biomedical, social science and policy research (including research on the economic and social determinants of fertility); information, education and communications activities; and training and institutional development. Programs shall be designed to meet the basic human needs of poor men and women in rural and urban areas, including younger couples and potential parents, and shall seek to involve them as active participants with national and local government and private sector leaders in the planning and implementing of programs.

(b) (4) Population planning programs shall be coordinated whenever feasible with related development activities, including especially low-cost intergrated health and nutrition delivery systems, and formal and out of school education. Indigenous male and female paramedical personnel, commercial retail sales, employment-based programs and other innovative modes of community-based participation shall be encouraged and evaluated for acceptability and cost effectiveness.

EFFECTS OF INFLATION ON AID BILATERAL PROGRAMS IN TERMS OF 1972
CONSTANT DOLLARS

MAJOR FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNTS*	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
<u>FOOD AND NUTRITION -</u>								
In actual dollars			284	300	427	505	549	673
In 1972 dollars			258	243	312	333	340	<u>350</u>
<u>POPULATION</u>								
In actual dollars	121	122	100	100	103	143	160	205
In 1972 dollars	121	118	91	81	76	96	99	107
<u>HEALTH</u>								
In actual dollars	-	-	24	15	43	74	126	149
In 1972 dollars			<u>22</u>	12	31	49	78	<u>77</u>
<u>ALL OTHER FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNTS **</u>								
In actual dollars	-	-	166	144	118	137	258	327
In 1972 dollars			151	121	86	90	160	<u>170</u>

*Excluding operating expenses except when these were combined with program funds.

**Including Sahel for 1978 and 1979.

Karen H. Smith
Testimony before Select Committee on Population
April 20, 1978

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

I want to thank you for this opportunity to appear before you. I am here not as a scholar, nor as an anthropologist, an AID administrator or institutional lobbyist. I am here as a rather ordinary American who, over a period of six years (1971-1976) had the extraordinary and enriching experience of working closely with women in several countries in Asia. A majority of that time was spent in Indonesia. It gives me great pleasure to share with you some of what I learned about that country and from the Indonesian women with whom I worked.

As I was leaving the country several women moaned, "Oh, we spent six years teaching you about our country and our point of view and now you are going away. Please go tell other people." When I return to Indonesia next month for a visit the ladies will be happy to hear that I followed their instructions all the way to the U.S. Congress.

My work in Indonesia

Let me tell you briefly how I came to be in Indonesia and about my work there. I was sent to Indonesia by the Overseas Education Fund of the League of Women Voters. Lest you be confused about what the League of Women Voters of the USA is doing overseas I hasten to explain that the OEF and the League are, in fact, separate organizations. The OEF (originally called the Carrie Chapman Catt Memorial Fund) is an autonomous, non-profit organization which was set up by the League in 1947 in response to requests from groups in Europe that wanted technical assistance in organizational and community techniques (volunteer recruitment, leadership styles, planning, budgeting, community survey methods, human relations and communication, etc.)

Since its founding, the OEF has sent a number of field representatives overseas (I was the field representative in Asia) to supply such cooperation as requested by local groups. Through the 50's and 60's the OEF worked almost exclusively on projects in or related to Latin America. During those years Asians occasionally visited the OEF office in Washington and expressed interest in the possibility of OEF cooperation. However, it was not clear from those isolated conversations what, in fact, the level of interest might really be. I was hired to explore this question particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia.

In Indonesia three things became clear on my first trip: (1) that although predominantly Muslim in religion (85%), Indonesia did not exhibit some of the social patterns and attitudes presented as "typically Muslim" in descriptions of countries such as Pakistan or Bangladesh. In contrast to those countries, the women of Indonesia move freely in society, relations between men and women are easy and seen as mutually supportive and, since the early 70's, family planning has been widely and energetically promoted and well received (2) that the women's organizations of Indonesia were an active, respected and positive force in society carrying out programs in a wide range of important fields (health, education, social welfare, home industry, etc.). I heard for the first time a saying which I have often since then: "If you want something planned in Indonesia, ask the men. If you want something done, ask the women." This is perhaps an overstatement with an unnecessary put-down for the men, but it does reflect something of the position and image of women in Indonesia. (3) that some of the women's groups would be interested in technical assistance from the OEF.

For the next six years (1971 until the end of December 1976 when I left Indonesia and the Overseas Education Fund) I spent six to eight months each year in Indonesia working mostly with the women's organizations. During that time I always worked under the direction of the various Indonesian groups seeking our technical assistance. About half my time was spent helping to design and

personally lead workshops on organizational techniques. The other half was spent working directly with board members of organizations in their efforts to improve the effectiveness of their organizations and community projects with more careful planning, realistic budgeting, etc.

It was my good fortune, during those years, to spend nearly as much time with groups in the provinces of Indonesia as at national headquarters of the organizations with which I worked. By the time I left I had worked on one or more projects in 17 of the 26 provinces then making up the country. I almost never went anywhere except at the invitation of local people who wanted me to work with them on some project of theirs. In many cases, I was given home hospitality because there was no hotel in town and in training programs we usually stayed together in dormitory facilities.

The testimony I give here today is based on this experience of working and living with many different kinds of Indonesian women under a variety of circumstances in many parts of the country. The conclusions and suggestions which follow also grow out of that same experience and reflection upon it.

Women and women's groups in rural development and family planning

Women in Indonesia share with their men most aspects of a hard working life. This is especially true in rural areas. In agriculture, women are involved in all phases of planting, harvesting and processing of many crops. In some areas animal husbandry is largely in the hands of women and children. In the home, women are generally responsible for planning and preparing food and they are often the water carriers. Small industry varies from one area to another: some places women do weaving of fibres for baskets and mats which are used as curtains, beds, rugs, etc.; in other places women manufacture quantities of prepared food and traditional medicines which are sold door-to-door or in

street stalls. In commerce, women in many rural areas play a key role, making up as much as 85-90% of the market sellers. In the traditional textile industry, women have dominated almost all phases from the beginning (weaving, embroidering or decorating with the traditional batik dying process) to selling in the market.

As the modern economy spreads and modern equipment and skills are needed in order to survive economically, the position of women is strengthened or eroded depending upon whether or not they have equal access with men to appropriate training and/or credit to acquire the new equipment. Sometimes, the women lose out. For example, in the textile industry it is said that men have had better access to the money needed to convert the traditional retail business into modern (and highly profitable) wholesale business. To the extent that is true, women have lost both the increased profits and some employment as the wholesalers put some of the small retailers out of business.

Women have been centrally involved in the family planning movement in three conspicuous ways:

- (1) The first national family planning organization (the non-governmental Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association) was founded in 1957 by a small group of women who were active leaders in national women's organizations. They felt, in spite of an official atmosphere which was hostile to family planning at the time, that a program must be started for the benefit of the women and the nation in general. Since that time, women have continued

to play important roles -- both staff and management -- in that organization.

(2) Since the early 1970's most of the major women's organizations have included in their programs a wide range of activities related to family planning, for example:

- training organization leaders in family planning information and motivation work;
- organizing workshops for members and/or the community introducing family planning concepts and relating them to overall progress in meeting national aspirations to improve the quality of family life;
- adding family planning counseling and services to rudimentary maternity clinics (BKIA) run by some of the women's organizations throughout Indonesia;
- organizing population education workshops for teachers and principals in schools run by the women's organizations; and
- integrating family planning training into the curricula of their own midwifery professional schools.

(3) Finally, of course, every one of the women who decides to practice family planning shares in achieving national family planning goals. Beyond that, she gives encouragement to others who are undecided and gives local credibility (an extremely important thing in regionally-proud Indonesia) to the much publicized national program.

As time has passed, government programs in family planning have increased, and some family planning activities have become institutionalized (in

school systems, at health clinics, in all medical training) the women's organizations have tended to move from narrowly focused family planning activities toward new concerns. At the time I left Indonesia 15 months ago, nutrition, income generation and integrated family life education (including family planning) seemed to be the three areas of most common concern.

Although you have asked me to address specifically the problems of rural development and family planning, before closing this section I would like to share with you one observation about the urban situation. While statistics argue for special concern being given to rural development, we must not lose sight of the fact that the burden and disorientation of modernization fall particularly hard on the urban poor. According to statistics, they usually appear to have more income than their rural relatives, but these statistics generally do not reflect either the relative importance of money to survival or the distribution of money within the urban areas.

In rural areas of Indonesia money is used for some things, but I suspect it is not the only, nor even the main means of survival. Life is based more on a network of family relationships, on reciprocal community obligations and on free exchange of goods and services than on the use of money to facilitate life.

Many of the women's organizations have small, effective urban projects: small-business training; vocational training of under-educated, unemployed youth; integrated family life education (including family planning, etc.). If our concern is truly improvement of the quality of life, these projects also deserve a sympathetic hearing even though they appear on the surface to deal with fewer, or statistically "richer", people.

A look to the future and some suggestions

The potential of Indonesian women's organizations to facilitate rural development in the future seems to me to depend on two separate but related matters:

- (1) What will happen to the general role of women in the community as modernization and development proceed, and
- (2) Will conditions be conducive to useful action by existing organizations and/or new rural self-help groups.

Let me deal briefly with the first issue. Development does not necessarily bring "all good to all people". It touches people unevenly and sometimes in negative ways. One example: 50 years ago, when villagers chose a village head, what they looked for was an articulate person who could promote and maintain harmonious work and social relations among the people in the village. That might be a man or woman and in some areas of Indonesia there were women village heads elected. To be an effective village head today, one must be able to read and write in order to understand government regu-

lations, make reports and apply for assistance. The intelligence level of village women is no lower than it used to be, but the absence of formal education (fairly widespread among adult village women) expressly removes many of them from the possibility of occupying that conspicuous and influential leadership position. There are still some women village heads, but the number of women who would qualify is smaller than it used to be.

This is just one example but it demonstrates a problem. Both the direct and side effects of "successful" development often change relationships in society radically and there is no guarantee that the changes will all be for the good. Clearly, if the general situation of women in society is weakened, the impact of their organizations in overall rural development is likely also to be weakened.

The answer to the second question -- will conditions be conducive to useful action -- depends, it seems to me, on four things:

- (1) Local permission and encouragement to be active. This is a domestic issue and as foreigners we can only be aware of and respect local decisions. In a country as large and diverse as Indonesia (fifth largest country in the world by population and wider from east to west than the U.S.) the levels and forms of encouragement or discouragement for women's activities will vary considerably from place to place.
- (2) How much "participation" is stimulated and what form does it take? "Participation in development" which takes the form of citizens being asked to carry out government plans usually meets with limited success around

the world...including Indonesia. If, on the other hand, local groups (including women's groups) can be involved in identifying concerns and planning how to deal with them, there is an almost built-in guarantee that they will work with dedication and care on implementation. This issue can be summarized as a question of initiative. Does the initiative for a project come from the people who will carry it out and live with the results, or elsewhere?

(3) Will resources be made EASILY available by domestic and/or international sources?

To carry out new projects, outside resources are often needed. In the course of my work with Indonesian women's organizations I saw more than one project go down the drain because the necessary resources were too impossibly complicated to get (too many forms, too many bureaucratic steps, too many impossible justifications asked for and too long a waiting time). If we are truly committed to more grass roots participation as a key to equitable development and improvements in the quality of ordinary lives, we must invent new, easier, more responsive ways to make resources (money and others) available to ordinary people.

First of all, procedures to apply and qualify for assistance must be simplified. If the procedure to get assistance is more complicated than the project itself, probably nothing will happen.

Next, we must invest more time visiting with people and learning first-hand about the problems and project ideas from them rather than simply processing

application papers. Every development planner, foreign consultant or AID administrator must remember that in more traditional, rural societies while there are always some people who can write, writing is not a much exercised form of communication and there is likely to be a certain measure of discomfort and confusion to filling in application forms. On the other hand, in many such communities, there are people who are articulate speakers. In a half-day visit an observant person can often know, beyond a shadow of a doubt, from whom initiative came for a project, the likelihood of its being successfully completed and can have a real feel for probable impact.

Next, we must assist local groups to understand what is needed, why it is needed and how information can be obtained to justify a grant request. The administrative convenience of the donor should not become an obstacle to assistance.

Finally, we must find ways to speed up the process of small-grant review and decision-making. Projects frequently wither on the vine for want of timely assistance.

All these steps will help make necessary resources available more easily -- a condition likely to stimulate more activity.

(4) Will resources be provided on an appropriate scale?

Small organizations usually need (and can handle best) modest resources, and insistence that a project be expanded in scope, regardless of whether

or not such insistence is well meant, can have disastrous results. We have all heard of American or foreign organizations that sank into oblivion because of a sudden infusion of more money than they could handle. The organization which carries out three successful programs for 25 people each time and lives to plan more in the future obviously can make more contribution to rural development than a group that does one larger fiasco and loses heart to try again.

There is another issue worth mentioning about the scale of assistance: if outside assistance becomes too conspicuous, either because of size or form, it can strip a project of its local flavor and consequently local acceptability. When I was first in Indonesia, such vast quantities of money were flowing in to support a wide range of family planning activities (both domestic and international) that it quickly became known as the "luxury development field". This attracted some people for the wrong reasons -- they liked international conferences.

In other cases, training and orientation programs were so sumptuously carried out that participants had great difficulty later on trying to apply what they had learned to the real Indonesian world where it was needed. I was once told by a village family planning worker that the lavish family planning expenditures which they had heard about had convinced many people in her that family planning was an idea being pushed only by foreigners and should, therefore, be resisted. Said the village people, "We Indonesians just

wouldn't do it that way." Since that time I am happy to say that the Indonesian national family planning program has completely and successfully established its own identity and this issue is seldom a problem.

A word about American assistance before closing. I am sorry to say that in the course of my time in Indonesia, I was not aware of any direct assistance from the U.S. government to any Indonesian women's organizations. Women were, undoubtedly, included in some training programs, etc., but I believe there was little assistance made available to local women's organizations for their own projects.

I have no doubt that there would be some complications in offering such assistance, but I urge that earnest consideration be given to the problem both in terms of reviewing our own patterns of assistance and Indonesian policy on such matters. No outsider and no outside assistance alone can "make development happen", but they can be extremely useful in speeding up the process. If assistance is granted, the chances of it being beneficial would be immeasurably increased if accompanied by:

- serious efforts to make the availability of assistance known to a wide range of potential recipients, particularly the women's organizations;
- visits to possible project sites and sensitivity to the initiative behind project proposals (a foreign consultant? a local organization? a Jakarta-based official?);
- establishment of relatively easy and speedy procedures to apply and qualify for assistance; and

-- development of the flexibility (intellectual and statutory)
to think, act and respond in small ways as well as big ones.

In conclusion, I would repeat that the women and women's organizations of Indonesia are and will surely continue to be active "partners in development" both as initiators and beneficiaries. They know what community problems are, they understand popular aspirations, they have a considerable measure of respect in the community. They generally are, and will continue to be, a force for progress in the community.

Again, I thank you for this opportunity to give testimony here today and I look forward to your questions.



